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1
A Process-Oriented Model
of Metacognition: Links
Between Motivation and
Executive Functioning
John G. Borkowski
University of Notre Dame

Lorna K. S. Chan
The Hong Kong Institute of Education

Nithi Muthukrishna
University of Natal, South Africa

The measurement of metacognition has gone through four overlapping phases: The first phase began with the insightful and stimulating paper of Kreutzer, Leonard, and Flavell (1975) on introspective
reports about memory states and processes, followed by an important theoretical chapter on the nature of metamemory (Flavell &
Wellman,1977). These early contributions documented, and theoretically clarified, the fact that children could accurately report their
knowledge about memory events as they related to a variety of tasks,
circumstances, and strategies; furthermore, memory knowledge was
shown to be age-related. A second phase quickly followed: The
intention here was to show interconnections between memory knowl-
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edge and memory performance. Although hindsight now reveals that
a modest relationship (r = .42) links metamemory and memory across
a wide range of learning contexts (Schneider & Bjorkland in press), an
uncomfortable feeling about the "fuzziness" of the concept prevailed
during this second stage of research (Wellman, 1983). From our
vantage point, three interrelated conceptual and methodological problems surfaced that hindered the search for reliable and valid measures
of metacognition-problems that continue to influence contemporary
research and theory development:
1. Lack of dear definitions for each metacognitive construct
(especially about when, where, and to whom a construct
applies).
2. Lack of an array of well-analyzed tasks that permit the
separation of process and performance measurements.
3. Lack of a variety of measures that converge on a given
construct from multiple diredions.
The third and fourth waves of research-which dominate the
majority of present day studies on metacognition-focus on the issues
of monitoring and control (which we refer to as executive fundioning) and their associations with a variety of motivation variables. This
research has been inspired, in large part, by the enthusiasm for
metacognition theory, and its instructional implications for the educational reform movement. It is not surprising that current research on
metacognition is more commonly found in educational psychology
than in developmental psychology.
METACOG NITION AND GOOD INFORMATION PROCESS ING

The fundion of metacognitive theory is to help explain successes
and failures in strategy generalization. It is a theory confined principally to complex and/or novel tasks because strategies assist learners
in carrying out essential cognitive operations that produce efficient,
insightful learning. Strategies are at the heart of most important
challenging academic activities, such as reading a difficult text passage or preparing for an examination. It is important to note that
strategies are not necessarily conscious, only "potentially conscious."
Pressley, Forrest-Pressley, Elliot-Faust, and Miller (1985) have provided us with a useful definition of astrategy:
[stra tegiesl .. .are composed of cognitive operations over and above
the processes that are a natural consequence of carrying out [al task,
ranging from one such operation to a sequence of interdependent
operations. Strategies achieve cognitive purposes (e.g., memorizing)
and are potentially conscious and controllable activities. (p . 4)
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Over the last few years, the goals and prerequisites for effective
strategy-based learning and instruction have been darified by an
exposition of the states and processes that comprise metacognition
(Borkowski & Muthukrishna, 1992; Pressley, Borkowski, & Schneider,
1990). These goals indude a dear focus on the teaching and learning
of a wide variety of strategies, the higher-Ievel processes necessary for
their implementation, and the self-system (and motivational beliefs)
that are their consequences as weIl as their sources of actualization
(Borkowski, Carr, Rellinger, & Pressley, 1990). This chapter presents
a process-oriented model of metacognition that is useful in understanding the ways in which strategies develop and the reasons for
their generalized use over time and settings. The focus is on executive
functioning and attributional beliefs, how they are conceptualized
and measured, and their developmental origins.
Components of the Metacognitive System

Strategy-based learning is deliberate and effortful, at least with
novice Iearners. It usually pro duces a higher level of performance
than nonstrategic learning. This kind of learning is an integral aspect
of what we have called Good Information Processing (Pressley et al.,
1990). Although somewhere a teacher may discover a child who
actually mirrors our conceptualization of the Good Information Processor, it is a rarity. Although aspects of the theory we espouse can
be observed in reality, the entire model serves more as a long range
goal for faeilitating children's learning through the full development
of metacognitive skills than as an accurate depiction of "normal"
development. Other chapters in this volume (espeeially those of
Pintrich and Pressley) also suggest that dedarative memory knowledge, memory monitoring, and cognitive self-regulation are at the
heart of metacognitive theory. It is the development and integration
of knowledge with higher-order skills and beliefs that are the foei of
this chapter.
The unique aspect of the Good Information Processing model lies
in the successful integration of the main components of the metacognitive
system-induding cognitive, motivational, personal, and situational
characteristics. As Borkowski and Muthukrishna (1992) have argued,
most of the major components of metacognition are, or can be,
developed and reshaped by carefully planned dassroom and homebased learning experiences-€xperiences that begin early and continue throughout the life-span. We have outlined 10 major
characteristics that define a child who is a "Good Information Processor" (Borkowski & Muthukrishna, 1992).
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1. Knows a large number of useful learning strategies.
2. Understands when, where and why these strategies are
important.
3. Selects and monitors strategies wisely, and is extremely
reflective and planful.
4. Adheres to an incremental view regarding the growth
of mind.
5. Believes in carefully deployed effort.
6. 1s intrinsically motivated, task-oriented, and has mastery goals.
7. Doesn't fear failure-in fact, realizes that failure is
essential for success-hence, is not anxious about testsrather sees them as learning opportunities.
8. Has concrete, multiple images of "possible-selves,"
both hoped-for and feared selves in the ne ar and distant future.
9. Knows a great deal about many topics and has rapid
access to that knowledge.
10. Has a his tory of being supported in all of the above by
parents, schools, and society at large.
The relevant background literature and different rationales for
these characteristics can be found in Ames and Archer (1987);
Borkowski et al. (1990); Pressley et al. (1990); Deci and Ryan (1985);
Markus and Nurius (1986); Nicholls (1984; 1989); and Pressley, Gaskins
et al. (1991). Several characteristics, however, are essential aspects of
our view of metacognition and deserve highlighting: (a) Strategies
learned out of context, or in the rote fashion, will usually prove
transient. Thus, Characteristic 2 implies that developing an in-depth
awareness of how each strategy works is critical for generalized
strategy usage. (b) Executive functioning is the most important
process in the entire metacognitive system. Hence, Characteristic 3
emphasizes the essential role of task analysis, planfulness, and
reflectivity in strategy selection as a student confronts a problem or
task; the need to monitor its ongoing effectiveness; and, perhaps, to
replace it with a more viable strategy. (c) Beliefs about hard work in
analyzing tasks and selecting strategies as well as an orientation
toward solving the task-at-hand rather than pleasing others are important motivational processes that energize seH-regulatory processes.
In this sense Characteristics 5 and 6 (which are motivational in nature)
are related to Characteristic 3 (executive functioning or seH-regulation). (d) Students need to visualize themselves in near and far timeframes in order to develop meaningful goals that will actualize the
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metacognitive system at critical moments of difficulty and frustration
in the course of learning and problem solving. Thus, the concept of
possible selves (Characteristic 8), though understudied and not weH
understood, may eventuaHy be useful in understanding why strategies are abandoned in adolescence or adulthood, in both the school
and workplace. (e) Consistency in strategy instructions-across time
and settings (Characteristic 10)-seems essential for lifelong stra tegy
use to occur, for the continued development of the metacognitive
system, and for the reliable and valid measurement of the components of metacognition. Some of the measurement problems encountered in this field may be due as much to inconsistencies in instruction
as to the fickleness of cognitive development (cf. Siegier, 1995).
The Development of Metacognitive Theory

After outlining the major characteristics of Good Information
Processing, it is useful to illustrate how these characteristics become
interrelated by suggesting how the essential components of
metacognition might plausibly develop. Borkowski emd Muthukrishna
(1992) have traced metacognitive development in terms of what
happens to a child who receives high quality, interactive strategy
instruction in both the horne and school:
l. The child is initiaHy taught to use a learning strategy and,
with repetition, comes to learn about the attributes of that
strategy (this is called specific strategy knowledge). These
attributes include the effectiveness of the strategy, the
range of its appropriate applications, and how to use it
with a variety of tasks. Figure 1 shows how a simple
strategy (such as summarization), in isolation from the rest
of the system, can be expected to produce an improvement
in performance.
2. Next, the child learns other strategies and repeats them in
multiple contexts. In this way, specific strategy knowledge is
enlarged and enriched. Figure 2 presents a schematic
diagram showing the emergence of a number of specific
strategies. The child comes to understand when, where,
and how to deploy each strategy.
3. The child gradually develops the capacity to select strategies appropriate for some tasks (but not others), and to fill
in knowledge gaps by monitoring performance, especially
when essential strategy components have not been adequately taught. At this stage, higher-order executive pro-
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Figure 1. A primitive view of the strategy use-performance relationship.
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Figure 2. Multiple strategies and performance.
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cesses emerge. This is the beginning of self-regulation, the
basis for adaptive, planfullearning and thinking. Figure
3 shows the relationship of executive processes to specific
strategies. Initially, the function of the executive is to
analyze the task at hand and to select an appropriate
strategy; during the course of learning, its role shifts to
strategy monitoring and revision.
Figure 3. Executive functioning and strategy use.

r-

Executive
Processes

~

Specific Strategy Knowledge
1. Repetition
2. Organization
3. Verbal Elaboration
4. Summarization
5. Etc.

l
Task

Strategy Use

t
Performance

4. As strategic and executive processes become refined, the
child comes to recognize the utility and importance of
being strategic (general strategy knowledge accumulates), and
beliefs about self-efficacy develop. In addition, as the child
acquires domain-specific knowledge and skills, beliefs
about efficacy become differentiated across domains. More
specifically, children learn to attribute successful (and unsuccessful) learning outcomes to effort expended in strategy
deployment rather than to luck or to task difficulty encountered in specific domains of study. Furthermore, some
children come to understand that through self-directed
actions mental competencies can be enhanced.
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In these ways, the metacognitive model integrates cognitive acts (in the form of strategy use) with their motivational
causes and consequences. Figure 4 suggests that following
most cognitive acts, the child is often provided with, or
infers, feedback about the correctness of performance and its
specific cause(s). This feedback is essential for shaping
personal-motivational states (e.g., attributional beliefs, which
in turn can energize the executive processes necessary for
strategy selection and deployment in future situations.
5. A sense of self-efficacy and an enjoyment of learning flow
from individual strategic events and eventually return to
energize strategy selection and monitoring decisions (i.e.,
executive processes) . It is this latter connection-the association between the learner's reasons for learning and the deployment of self-regulation - that has been absent from most
instructional programs. This theme is at the heart of our
most recent extensions of metacognitive theory (Borkowski
et al., 1990; Borkowski & Muthukrishna, 1992).

Figure 4. Motivational correlates and causes of strategy use.
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6. General knowledge about the world as weH as domain-specific
knowledge (e.g., math) accumulate. Such knowledge is
often sufficient to solve problems, even without the aid of
strategies. In these situations, metacognitive processes,
such as strategy selection are unnecessary, although some
motivational components may remain functional and important (see Figure 5).
7. CrystaHized visions into the future help the child form a
number of "hoped-for and "feared" possible-selves (Markus
& Nurius, 1986) providing the impetus for achieving important short-term as weH as long-term goals, such as
becoming a "competent student" in order to eventuaHy
become a "successful lawyer" (cf. Day, Borkowski,
Dietmayer, Howsepian, & Saenz, 1992). In this way the
seH-system takes on a futuristic perspective, providing
goals and incentives that stimulate the operation of the
entire metacognitive system. The complete metacognitive
model, including the seH-system and the domain-specific
knowledge "bypass," is presented in Figure 5.
In summary, the centerpiece of metacognitive theory is strategy
selection and use. Not only are specific strategies essential for
effective learning and problem solving, they also provide the context
for training higher-Ievel planning and executive skills explicitly as
weH as represent the basis for restructuring attributional beliefs and
enhancing seH-efficacy. As such connections are formed and ingrained, instructional emphasis can shift to their interface with domain-specific knowledge and the explicit incorporation of
possible-selves training into individualized curricula. It is hoped that
the net result of integrating and instructing these central and peripheral components of metacognition will be the production of more
dfective and efficient students, who share many of the characteristics
of the "Good Information Processor" (Pressley et al., 1990)
A Test of the Model

Measurement approaches. There are three general approaches that
have been used to manipulate and/or measure components in the
metacognitive model during the first two decades of research on this
topic:
1. Set up conditions in which no other processes appear as
reasonable, alternative theoretical explanations.
2. Instruct processes directly (and hope that "nothing else"
has been trained).
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Figure 5. Cognitive, motivational, and self-system components of
meta cognition: The complete model.
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3. Develop a broad-based (or domain-specific) questionnaire
that reflects students' use of (or beliefs about) the attributes of a meta cognitive state or process and relate
individual differences to performance.
Several points of clarification about these measurement approaches
are in order. First, they need not be mutually exclusive; for instance,
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it is possible (and desirable) to train and assess processes and beliefs
within the same study (i.e., Parts 2 and 3 combined). Second, the first
two approaches demand a theoretical respect for a dear distinction
between process and performance as they relate to metacognitive
measurement. In a seminal paper, Belmont and Butterfieid (1977)
argued that by measuring performance, separate from the processes
from which it presumably flows, research on cognitive development
stands on firmer theoretical ground, especially when inferring the
former from the latter. Third, although we have listed only three
historically rooted research approaches to measurement, the new
technique advocated by Pressley (this volume)-think aloud, protocol
analysis-represents a powerful context in which to observe and
measure metacognitive activity as it is occurring.
At times, metacognitive research has utilized all three measurement approaches. From our vantage point, this style of research is a
particularly powerful way to validate metacognitive models, especially if the combination of approaches results in interna I replication.
In our own research program, a study by Reid and Borkowski (1987)
contains aspects of all three methodologies, especially the latter two
(process manipulations and questionnaires designed to assess changes
in performance, strategy use, attributional beliefs, and cognitive styles
following a multi-faceted strategy-based intervention).
Before describing the Reid and Borkowski (1987) study in detail,
it should be noted that there are relatively few studies where the
researchers have tried to assess how the major components of
metacognition interrelate. The reason is that it is difficult to manipulate, 01' observe, metacognitive components in isolation from one
another. This is an important point for measurement in this area. It
is also the case that theoretically distinct components may not be
entirely separate from one another as they operate in the real world:
It is often easier to develop theories with boundaries and boxes than
to locate, isolate, and measure these same processes in laboratory or
observational settings. In order to be assessed reliably, components
of metacognition may need to be measured in the midst of their
complex interactions, rather than in isolation.
An integrated approach. In an early study of interrelationships
among the components of metacognition, Reid and Borkowski (1987)
attempted to establish the plausibility of the metacognitive model
with children who were learning disabled. The unique and combined
effects of training specific strategy knowledge, teaching self-control
skills, and reshaping attributional beliefs about the importance of
effort were studied. More specifically, three treatment groups were
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compared: a self-control condition, a self-control plus attributions
condition, and a control condition. In the self-control condition, the
teacher modeled self-verbalization procedures for the child (e.g.,
"look to see how the problem might be solved; stop and think before
responding"). These self-control procedures were taught in the
context of specific strategy training, which focused on the use of
interrogative-associative media tors appropriate for a paired associate
task and a clustering-rehearsal strategy for use on a sort-recall readiness task.
In the self-control plus attributions condition, children received
strategy and self-control instruction as weIl as attributional training
designed to enhance both antecedent and pro gram-genera ted selfattributions. Antecedent attribution training took the form of a
discussion focusing on general, pervasive beliefs about the causes of
success and failure; children were also given opportunities to perform
previously failed items in the self-control package. Program-generated attributions consisted of feedback about the relationship between
strategic behavior (or its absence) and performance during pairedassociate learning. Individual items were shown to be correct 01'
incorrect depending upon whether effort was put forth in deploying
the appropriate strategy. The control group received the same amount
of strategy training as the experimental groups but did not receive
self-controlor attributional training.
Widespread strategy generalization occurred on a 3-week posttest
in the self-control plus attributions condition. More importantly, the
persistent use of strategies was maintained at a 10-month follow-up.
In addition, attributional beliefs and meta memory were permanently
altered in this condition. These results seem surprising in light of the
longstanding diffieulties in obtaining strategy generalization. For
example, Gelzheiser (1984) was unable to obtain extensive generalization in learning-disabled children following prolonged training;
attributional re training, however, was not a component in her instructional package. We believe that the emphasis on strategy-based effort
set in motion a bidirectional chain of events between strategie acts and
the growth of positive beliefs about the importance of effort in
deploying strategies. The net result was that children who, for the
most part, were not spontaneous strategy users at the study's outset,
deployed strategies with greater flexibility and persistence up to 10
months following the end of training.
The intervention program in the Reid and Borkowski (1987) study
contained three key components: detailed information ab out two
specifie strategies, self-control procedures useful in implementing
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these strategies, and an explicit recognition of the role of effort and
personal causality in producing successful performance. The interaction of these metacognitive components seemed to play an essential
role in the generalization of strategic behaviors. These results, together with those of Borkowski, Weyhing, and Carr (1988) and Carr
and Borkowski (1989) on the explicit training of attributional beliefs in
the context of reading comprehension instructions, lead us to believe
that long-term changes in strategie behaviors are probably dependent
on the development of complex relationships among components in
specific strategy knowledge, seH-regulation, and motivational beliefs.
In asense, this set of studies has expanded the boundaries of cognitively
based interventions by focusing on how seH-regulation, the heart of
metacognition, depends on children's rationales and attitudes about
the learning process per se and how they conjointly contribute to
academie achievement.
In subsequent sections, we trace more re cent advances in the
theory and measurement of executive functions and attributional
beliefs. Finally, we suggest specific contexts that influence the integrated development of metacognition with a view toward understanding more about situational factors related to when and where
metacognitive measures should best be gathered.
THEORIES OF EXECUTIVE FUNCTION

Although the major components of executive functioning are by
no means agreed upon, most researchers would concur that the three
components represented in Figure 6 are essential. The first, and
perhaps most essential, component, is task analysis. Despite its centrality in defining executive processing, it is the most poorly understood, and least often measured process in the system. The importance
of task analysis lies in its potential for explaining generality across
settings and domains. This aspect of the executive is critical because
its proper execution is essential for the occurrence of the second
activity-strategy selections. A related component-strategy revision is closely linked to strategy selection and is observed on tasks that
allow for the measurement of continuous changes in the pro ces ses
that determine successful performance in the face of changing task
demands. It is probably methodologieally easier-and perhaps theoretically wiser-to measure strategy revisions than initial strategies
selection in that "moments" of strategy change are likely to be more
reliably assessed than strategy initiation (Siegler, 1995). The most
widely studied attribute of executive processing is strategy monitoring,
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which has a long and substantial history in developmental, educational, and cognitive psychology (Borkowski, Milstead, & Hale, 1988;
Schneider & Pressley, 1997). Pintrich (this volume) does an excellent
job of classifying the types of monitoring tasks that have been used in
metacognitive research, and Schraw, Dunkle, Bendixen, and Roedel
(1995) have recently suggested that monitoring skills are often domain general. We turn now to a review of several theoretical positions that describe the interrelationships among, and the functioning
of, the major components of executive functioning as well as their
connections with other aspects of cognitive systems.
Figure 6. Major attributes of executive functioning.

Components of Executive Functioning

TASK ANALYSIS

STRATEGY CONTROL
(SELECTION & REVISION)

STRATEGY MONITORING
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Butterfield's Theory of Executive Functioning

Butterfieid, Albertson, and Johnston (1995) have developed a new
theory of cognition in wruch executive functioning plays a critical role.
In their model, cognition, metacognition, and executive functioning are
three major components. The cognitive level consists of all the knowledge and strategies that exist in long-term memory; trus reservoir of
information about the cognitive system is critical for effective problem
solving. The metacognitive level represents awareness of the cognitive level
and contains "models" of the various cognitive processes as weIl as an
understanding ofhow knowledge and strategies interconnect. This level is the
unique aspect of the Butterfieid et al. (1995) theory in that it rests on the
interesting assumption that metacognitive skills are generalizable-but
only if students develop mental models in their cognition system.
Furthermore, the metacognitive level is potentially trainable.
Executive functioning coordinates the two levels-the cognitive
and the metacognitive-by monitoring and controlling the use of the
knowledge and strategies in concordance with the "mental model
building." Thus, in the Butterfieid et al. (1995) theory, in contrast with
the theory of Day, Borkowski et al. (1992) described earlier, the
metacognitive level is distinct from the mechanisms that help to
control and monitor the cognitive level. For Butterfieid these mechanisms seem to represent executive functioning in operation.
The concepts of monitoring and control, wruch are responsible for
the emergence of complete and mature mental models, allow for the
possibility of a more general theory of cognition than has previous
task-specific theories. Butterfieid et al. (1995) believe that individuals
are able to create mental models about their own cognitions based on
their day-to-day problem solving activities. They suggest that these
models are similar to those developed by scientists through prolonged, detailed task analysis. Self-generated models exist in direct
relation to the knowledge and strategies present at the cognitive level.
The development and integration of task-specific models, made possible by executive functioning, eventually lead to a personalized (and
unified) theory of cognition. Individuals who possess such unified
theories, according to Butterfieid and Albertson (1995), should show
more rapid acquisition and more extensive generalization of skills
and strategies across domains.
Bransford's Ideal Problem Solver

Bransford and Stein (1993) have incorporated aspects of executive
functioning into their model of the IDEAL problem-solver. The

16
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acronym, IDEAL, is used to symbolize the skilled components in
problem-solving: (a) Identify an important problem to-be-solved; (b)
Define the subgoals involved in solving the problem; (c) Explore
possible approaches to the problem, that is, select a set of potential
strategies; (d) Anticipate potentialoutcomes before acting on the best
initial approach; and (e) Look back and learn from the entire problemsolving experience. Because these five steps are used flexibly by
expert problem-solvers, they do not always occur in the same fixed
order nor is each step necessary for all problem-solving tasks.
These five steps, proposed by Bransford and his colleagues,
closely resemble the components of executive functioning discussed
earlier. The first steps-problem identification and definition-represent a form of task analysis. The discovery and definition of an
existing problem shape the next steps-exploring approaches and
anticipating outcomes. In these steps, various strategies are considered and the best alternative is chosen. The last step of the IDEAL
problem solving strategy involves looking back and learning from
prior efforts. In the ongoing process of problem solution, this step is
at the heart of what we have called strategy monitoring and revision.
Bransford and his colleagues have incorporated aspects of the
IDEAL problem-solver into their video-based technology research.
The Cognition and Technology Group at Vanderbilt has developed a
technology that anchors and situates instruction in shared environments, thus permitting sustained exploration by students and te achers (Bransford, Sherwood, Hassebring, Kinzer, & Williams, 1990).
Students experience the value of exploring the same setting from
multiple perspectives (e.g., as a scientist, his tori an, and mathematician). As they discover their own issues to explore in these enriched
environments, they communicate their ideas to other students and
develop analytic skills as a result of their problem-solving activities.
Difficult to discern in the research of the Vanderbilt group are the
precise sets of metacognitive skills that emerge as a result of these
shared experiences, and their reliable measurement, as students acquire prolonged experience with video-based instruction. What
specific problem-solving strategies are developed? Are higher-Ievel
planning, task analytic, or monitoring skills (i.e., executive functioning) enhanced? Are specific beliefs about self-efficacy and the personal challenge to develop one's own mind explicitly fostered?
We suspect that a comprehensive, and carefully used, videotechnology approach to instruction influences the emergence of planning and executive skills as well as enhances motivational beliefs
about self-efficacy. More precise assessment of these characteristics
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would help to advance the metacognitive aspects of the theories that
underlie video-technology. It is to the measurement of personal
beliefs, and other motivational states, that we now turn.
ATTRIBUTIONAL BELIEFS AND METACOG NITION

An important component of the personal-motivational states in
the metacognitive model is what students perceive as the causes of
their successes and failures in school. The most common reasons
students give for their successes and failures are ability, effort, their
attitude (such as interest), physical factors (mood, fatigue, etc.), task
difficulty, assistance from others, and luck. Weiner (1983, 1984) has
classified these attributions as either internal or externallocus, constant or variable over time and across different situations, and controllable or uncontrollable by oneself. For example, abilityattributions
have an internal locus, are stable but uncontrollable whereas effort
attributions have an internal locus, are unstable (therefore can be
changed) but are controllable. Each of these dimensions is proposed
to be uniquely associated with particular psychological consequences.
The locus dimension affects self-esteem (e.g., attributing success to
interna1factors increases self-esteem). The stability dimension relates
to changes in expectancy oj success or failure and affective reactions
(e.g., attributing failure to a stable cause such as lack of ability leads
to high expectancy of future failure and hence feelings of hopelessness). The controllability dimension relates to sentiments and evaluations of others (e.g., if a student fails because of a controllable cause,
such as lack of effort, anger is often elicited and the student is
negatively evaluated). Affective reactions and anticipations in conjunction with expectancy of success are assumed to affect a student's
willingness to try, persistence, choice or avoidance of tasks, and,
eventually, task performance.
Research has indicated that students who attribute their successes
and failures in school tasks to internal and controllable sources (e.g.,
one's own effort) are more likely to persist in the face of difficulty
(Nicholls, 1984; Weiner, 1984). If students are convinced that success
or failure depends on effort, they will realize that they can expect
success if they put in the required effort. These students who have
interna 1 perceptions of control have high expectancy of success and
are motivated to work hard because they realize that success or failure
will depend on their own effort. On the other hand, students who
attribute successes and failures to external or uncontrollable sources
(e.g., powerful others, luck, task difficulty, or inherent abilities) are
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more likely to give up when they come across difficulties in their
learning. Students who attribute school success to luck will not be
confident of maintaining that success at all times and will not be
motivated to expend maximum effort to attain prescribed learning
goals. Likewise, students who think that their progress in school
depends entirely on teachers' skills will not be motivated to become
independent in learning. Furthermore, they will not be motivated to
try hard because they do not see that their effort will contribute to
success.
It has been widely accepted that beliefs in personal control over
task outcomes can be promoted by convincing students that school
successes and failures are attributable to effort. Such an approach has
not been entirely successful. Some students, particularly students
with learning difficulties, may find that they keep on failing in spite
of increased effort, particularly if they do not know how to try harder.
Such negative experience would even further reinforce their beliefs in
the lack of ability, and thus increase feelings of helplessness. Probably
a more fruitful direction is to try getting these students to attribute
failures to both insufficient effort and ineffective task analysis
(Borkowski, Weyhing, & Turner, 1986; Clifford, 1986; Licht & Kistner,
1986). There are many advantages of encouraging strategy attributions in students, including the elimination of the guilt associated
with not trying hard or the embarrassment and public shame associated with being stupid. More importantly, strategy attributions allow
failure outcomes to be seen as problem-solving situations in which the
search for a more effective strategy becomes the goal (Clifford, 1986).
Indeed, effort and strategy attributions play a critical role in the
developmental aspects of metacognitive theory.
Role of Attributional Beliefs in Metacognitive Theory

As discussed earlier, the centerpiece of metacognitive theory is
strategy selection and use-that is, the operation of executive function
in the form of self-regulation. It was explained in the previous section
that executive functioning is responsible for the planning, selecting
strategies, monitoring, evaluating, and revising ongoing performance
in learning and problem solving. Such planning, evaluating. and
regulating processes require effort, initiation, and willingness to try,
as weIl as persistence. Furthermore, there needs to be some minimal
expectancy of success before a student is prepared to try, marshaI the
appropriate effort, and persist when encountering difficulties. If there
is little or no expectancy of success, students willlikely expend little
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effort in learning, or they may even actively avoid tasks that they
perceive will eventuate in failure . Hence, the assessment of
attributional states likely represents an essential step in measuring
any aspect of executive functioning.
Before students are prepared to deploy effort in planning, evaluating and regulating strategy use, they must develop and maintain
four beliefs:
1. The value of good performance on the task at hand: That
is, they must want to do well and strive to obtain a good
result;
2. Personal control over task outcomes: That is, they must be
convinced that success or failure on the task depends on
themselves;
3. Usefulness of strategy use: That is, they must have the
knowledge that use of specific strategies will lead to better
performance on the task;
4. Their ability to use strategies effectively and successfully:
That is, they must perceive themselves as capable and
competent.
In other words, students who are committed to do well on a given
task, who have well-developed specific strategy knowledge, and who
believe that their effortful use of strategies will lead to successful task
performance are likely to be active in strategy selection, monitoring,
and regulation. Empirical support for these theoretical propositions
is starting to emerge. For instance, perceptions of personal contral
(effort and strategy attributions) have been shown to relate positively
to knowledge and use of strategies, and to academic performance
(Borkowski, Weyhing, & Carr, 1988; Chan, 1994; Chan, 1996a). Further, the pattern and impact of attributional beliefs appear to change
across the school years (Clayton-Jones et al., 1992).
In the Clayton-Jones et al. study, students from grades 4, 6, 7, 9,
and 11 were administered a general attribution scale incorporating
ability, luck, effort, and strategy attributions for success and failure.
For the primary grade children, effort attribution for success was
positively related to achievement in Math and English (a combined
score) but at grade 9, strategy attribution for success emerged as a
positive predictor of achievement. Abilityattribution for failure,
however, was a pervasive negative influence across all grades.
The positive effects of beliefs in personal control over task outcomes on the use of strategies were also observed in both gifted and
average ability students in grade 7 (Chan, 1996a). Indeed, the relationship between attributional beliefs and use of strategies was fur-
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ther clarified in the Chan (1994) study involving 104 grade 5, 133
grade 7 and 101 grade 9 students. Path analysis results indicated that
students in the higher grades (7 and 9) who believed that they had
personal control over learning outcomes, who were not inclined to
feel helpless in their learning, who had high self-perceptions of
cognitive competence, and who had good knowledge of strategies,
were more likely to use strategies in their learning. For grade 5
students, however, only the perceived competence measure was
found to influence use of strategies. When reading achievement was
included, hierarchical regression analyses revealed that although the
attributional beliefs and perceived competence had a more important
role (relative to strategic learning) in explaining reading achievement
in the younger grades, in grade 9 the role of the strategy knowledge
and usage variables was as important, if not more important, as the
motivation variables. Path analyses results clarified these relationships:
Knowledge and use of strategies were found to mediate between the
effects of ath'ibutional beliefs and perceived competence on reading
achievement for grade 9, but not for the younger grades. Results of the
grade comparisons indicated that strategy attributions were not prominent in students' attributional beliefs before grade 9, This result could
explain the lack of influence of strategy knowledge and usage on
reading achievement in the younger students.
Assessment of Attributional Beliefs

The findings of the research studies described above highlight the
complex relationships between the various components of
metacognition and their developmental differences. It follows that to
advance our knowledge and understanding of the development of
metacognition, the components of metacognition should be studied as
they interact with each other in specific learning contexts and from a
developmental perspective. The study of students' attributional
beliefs and their impact on the executive processes and academic
performance provides a useful example to illustrate this principle.
This entails as a starting point the seal'ch for effective means for
obtaining information on attributional beliefs, This is not an easy
task because students themselves are not fully conscious of the
existence of learned helplessness or control beliefs, or they may
encounter difficulty in reporting their causal attributions. We now
turn to some of the issues in the assessment of attributional beliefs
that need to be addressed.
Assessment method, Earlier research on causal attributions in
schoollearning tended to measure attributional beliefs by requiring
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respondents to choose a single major cause. The resultant attribution
was then classified as internal or external, stable or unstable, controllable or uncontrollable according to Weiner's (1984) classification
scheme; inferences were then drawn as to the likely psychological and
behavioral conseq4ences. However, the unquestioned acceptance of
the categorization often causes confusion as it was often the perceived
stability from the perspective of the respondent, rather than the
stability implied by the objective task characteristics, that was the
determinant of the affective outcomes (Weiner, 1983; 1984). To
measure attributional beliefs, respondents could be asked to rate the
cause in question on the stability or controllability dimensions direct
rather than using an apriori classification of the causes. However, the
differential consequences of the various combinations of locus, stability, and controllability dimensions complicates such an approach.
This is particularly so when the dimension of intentionality is subsequently added (Weiner, 1984).
Elig and Frieze (1979) compared different methods of assessing
causes of success and failure, including open-ended questions (e.g.,
why do you think you succeeded on this task?), independent unipolar
ratings (e.g., rate each given cause on a 5-point scale), ipsative measures such as percentage assessment (e.g., provide a percentage
contribution for each given cause), choice of one cause (select one
from a given set), bipolar ratings (rate each of two causes that are
different on a particular dimension), and paired comparison (from
among several causes). Results indicated that the independent unipolar rating method was the superior technique as it had good face
validity, did not force intercorrelations among attributions, and had
moderately good intermethod correlations with percentage measures.
Strategy use as a distinct attribution. As yet little research has been
done in the development of attributional beliefs with respect to the
use of strategies. Most of the extant work has focused on attributions
to ability versus effort (e.g., Cooley & Ayres, 1988; Kistner, Osborne,
& LeVerrier, 1988; Wigfield, 1988). Given the critical role played by
effort and strategy attributions in energizing the executive processes
in the development of metacognition, we need to extend our current
knowledge on the development of strategy-related attributions.
Research findings have indicated that children's concepts of ability become differentiated with age (Nicholls, 1978; Nicholls & Miller,
1984). From a review of research, Stipek and MacIver (1989) concluded that children in preschool and early elementary school have a
global concept of ability that includes social behavior, work habits,
and conduct, and that they conceptualize ability as an "instrumental-
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incremental" skill that is increased by practice and effort. Over the
primary school years (third to sixth grade), children's definitions of
intellectual ability become narrower and the concept of ability as a
stable trait emerges. However, it is not until early adolescence that
they fully differentiate ability from effort and conceptualize ability as
an "entity" unaffected by effort. Nicholls (1978) suggested that this
mature concept of ability as a stable trait, unaffected by effort, requires an understanding of the reciprocal relationship between effort
and ability-that ability limits the effectiveness of effort and that
effort is more facilitative of performance in high-ability than in lowability individuals. Clearly, some form of formal operational thought
is necessary for this understanding to emerge. Apart from cognitive
development, systematic changes in the activities, organization, evaluation practices, and ability-grouping patterns that children are exposed to in school mayaiso contribute to developmental shifts in
children's ability judgments (Stipek & MacIver, 1989).
Likewise, the differentiation of the concept of strategy use from
effort mayaiso be age-related, particularly because strategy instruction has not been given much emphasis, at least until recently. It is
critical to find out when strategy attributions becomes prominent in
students' motivational orientations. Some evidence is emerging from
the Chan (1994) study described earlier, suggesting that the differentiations between ability, effort, and strategy attributions may not
occur fully until the high school years. Furthermore, data from a
re cent cross-sectional project (Chan & Moore, 1994) gave support to
the distinctiveness of strategy attributions as separate from ability,
effort, and luck attributions.
Subject-specificity. Most of the research on causa I attributions has
been limited to general notions of learning rather than learning in
specific subject domains. Marsh, Cairns, Relich, Barnes, and Debus
(1984), however, maintained that there is good evidence for the
separation of attributions according to academic subject matters, at
least in the case of abilityattributions. The results of their study
suggest that attributional responses students make do not generalize
across academic subject domains and two subject-specific dimensions
(ability in mathematics and reading) can be identified. It was suggested that abilityattributions are specific to academic content, but
effort attributions and external attributions may not be subject-specific. Similarly, strategy attributions mayaiso depend on specific
subject domains. These findings suggest that students held different
attributional beliefs for different school subjects. Such research provides rather compelling evidence for moving to subject-specific as-

1. PROCESS-ORIENTED MODEL OF METACOGNITION

23

sessments as well as global assessments of motivation and strategic
knowledge.
Development of a Causal Attribution Scale

A 10-item rating scale was developed and used in several research projects (e.g., Chan, 1994; Chan, 1996a, 1996b; Clayton-Jones et
al., 1992) to assess students' tendency to attribute their school success
and failure experiences to the four likely reasons of effort, ability,
strategy use, and luck. Five items describe success incidents (such as
doing well on a test), and the other 5 describe failure incidents. For
each item, four different reasons are listed and students are required
to rate each on a 4-point scale to indicate how true they consider that
particular reason to be for them. Two versions were constructed, one
for high school students and one for primary students. The content
in the versions was the same, only the wording was modified to suit
the students' grade level. The following is a sample item from the
high school version:
Rarely
True

Sometimes Often Almost
True
True Always
True

1. When you received a bad school report, it was probably because

a. you aren't very good at schoolwork
b. you didn't try very hard
c. you didn't have any useful
methods for studying
d. you were having a lot of bad luck
at the time

1
1

2
2

3

3

4
4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

Each of the four types of reasons (effort, ability, strategy use, and
luck) is grouped across the five success items and the five failure items,
respectively, thus yielding eight separate subscales. For example, a high
score on the Failure-Ability subscale indicates greater tendency of
attributing school failure experiences to a lack of ability. Based on this
general version, three other scales were subsequently developed, one for
English/Reading, one for Mathematics and one for Social Studies. In the
subject-specific scales, the subject area (e.g., math) was specified or
inserted in place of expressions like "schoolwork." Again, two versions-for primary and high school students- were developed for each
subject area, thus giving a total of eight causal attribution scales.
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As part of a 3-year longitudinal study, Chan and Moore (1994)
administered these scales to 354 students in grade 5, 650 in grade 7,
and 450 in grade 9. The data from the Causal Attribution Scales were
subjected to several Confirmatory Factor analyses using the LISREL
(Joreskog & Sorbom, 1989) to examine the invariance of factor patterns across grades and across subject areas. The use of Confirmatory
Factor Analysis allows the fit of a hypothesized apriori factor pattern,
indicating which items should load onto which factors, to be tested
against the empirical data. The analysis provides goodness of fit
statistics, which indicate how closely a matrix obtained from parameter estimates for the posited model correspond to the input correlation or covariance matrix calculated from the data. Each set of four
subscales (effort, strategy, ability and luck attributions) for success
and failure for the three grade levels, as well as the combined total
group, was analyzed separately. Overall, results confirmed a fourfactor pattern in each case, with the items loading clearly on the
intended factors. At the same time, there was some indication that the
distinctiveness of the strategy attribution from the effort and ability
attributions increases with age. This was seen in the decrease in the
factor correlations and in the cross-loading of the factor score regressions from grade 5 to 9.
A preliminary analysis of data from the general and subjectspecific scales revealed only moderate correlations between the general and the English, Mathematics and Social Studies scales. The
correlations ranged from.55 to .61 for abilityattributions, .56 to .65 for
strategy attributions, .64 to .79 for effort attributions and .60 to .62 for
luck attributions. Furthermore, ANOV A results revealed subjectdomain differences as a function of grade level for ability and effort
attributions, independent domain and grade level differences for
strategy attributions, but no differences for luck attributions (Moore
& Chan, 1995). For example, students were more likely to make
ability attributions for failures in specific subject-domains than in the
global domain, and the younger students were more likely to make
abilityattributions for successes in English/Reading than in the other
domains. Whereas younger students were more likely to make effort
attributions for successes in English/Reading and So ci al Studies than
in Maths and the global domain, the subject-domain differences
observed among the older students were in the reverse direction:
They were more likely to make effort attributions for successes in
Maths and in the global domain than in English and Social Studies.
For strategy attributions, students were more likely to attribute failures in specific subject domains rather than the global domain to their
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lack of effective strategy use, whereas the reverse was observed for
successes. No grade level nor subject-domain differences were observed for luck attributions. These findings once again illustrate the
need to consider contextual and developmental differences in any
study of metacognition and its components.
Pattern of Attributional Beliefs: Adaptive versus Maladaptive

In interpreting the scores from the Causal Attribution Scale, and
to make inferences as to the consequences of particular beliefs, we
need to examine the pattern of a student's tendency to attribute
success or failure to ability, effort, strategy, or luck. The likelihood of
making any one of these attributions by itself is not sufficient to allow
meaningful assessment of the components of metacognition as they
interact. To minimize the number of measures to be included in an
analysis as weH as to facilitate interpretation of the results, the eight
attribution subscale scores can be combined to form two or more
variables (e.g., a "belief in personal control" variable, which can be the
mean of ability, effort, and strategy attributions for success and effort
and strategy attributions for failure; and a "learned helplessness"
variable, which can be the mean of luck attribution for success and
abilityattribution for failure).
In the previously noted Chan (1994) study using students from
grades 5, 7, and 9, significant differences were observed between
students with and without learning difficulties (LD) on such patterns
of adaptive versus maladaptive attributional beliefs. LD students
were more likely than the non-LD group to attribute successes to luck
and failures to lack of ability or bad luck, but less likely to attribute
successes to effort or use of effective strategies. That is to say,
compared to non-LD students, LD students had greater maladaptive
learned helplessness beliefs, but less adaptive control beliefs. When
these adaptive and maladaptive composite scores were used in path
analyses instead of individual subscale/ attribution scores, a consistent trend started to emerge. Maladaptive attributional beliefs tended
to have a direct negative influence on performance/ achievement,
whereas the positive influence of adaptive attributional beliefs on
performance was consistently mediated through knowledge and the
use of strategies. These relationships were observed in school-age
students (Chan, 1994, in press-a; Ee & Chan, 1994; Youlden & Chan,
1994) as weH as in university nursing students (Cholowski & Chan,
1994). It seems likely that although maladaptive attributional beliefs
may have a direct detrimental effect on performance, adaptive
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attributional beliefs are not sufficient to bring about better performance on their own: Each student must also have good knowledge
and effective use of strategies. Adaptive attributional beliefs, or
beliefs in personal control over task outcomes, serve the function of
energizing the executive processes responsible for the regulation of
strategies and, in combination, are likely to lead to better dassroomor laboratory-based performance.
Suggestions About Measuring Metacognitive Components

In the initial wave of research, the components of metacognition
were measured in isolation. For instance, in the Kurtz and Borkowski
(1984) study, knowledge about a set of memory problems reported by
impulsive and reflective children was related to their transfer of
reading strategies 3 years later; no intervening changes in other
aspects of metacognition, such as the development of monitoring or
control skills, that might have been associated with prior metamemorial
knowledge, and perhaps causally related to the development of
reading strategies, were assessed. Trus study illustrates the need to
consider (and perhaps control) multiple aspects of metacognition
when isolating and measuring any single component. We believe that
three points need to be considered with reference to the context (and
background information) necessary for the reliable measurement of
the components of metacognition:
1. It may be impossible-or at least theoretically naive-to
study the components of metacognition in isolation.
2. "Linkage" studies (e.g., relating strategy selection and
attributions) may provide the best framework for theoretical validation as well as for achieving reliable measurements.
3. There is a dear need for research in which metacognitive
constructs are interrelated from a developmental perspective. The relative importance of each component in the
successful integration of the entire metacognition system
probably changes dramatically with age (cf. Borkowski &
Thorpe, 1994).
HOW LEARNING CONTEXTS INFLU ENC E THE DEVELOPMENT
OF METACOGNITION

It is possible to design learning contexts that influence attributional
beliefs, motivational goals, and self-efficacious beliefs as well as the
efficient processing of information, eventually resulting in deep con-
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ceptual understanding. We believe it is essential to consider both
contextual and correlated information related to the emergence of
these skills and beliefs in. order to develop reliable and valid measures
of metacognition.
Parents and teachers-and the learning environments they create-are pivotal to the development of an integrated metacognitive
system. The beliefs that parents and teachers hold about the nature
of knowledge, and about the processes related to knowledge acquisition, play powerful roles in determining the design and outcome of
in.structional arrangements. These experiences also have implications
for both the development and measurement of metacognitive skills
and beliefs.
Teachers' Implicit Theories

Teachers' beliefs and implicit theories about how children learn
can influence their planning of daily activities and, more generally,
their teaching styles. For instance, Palincsar, Stevens, and Gavelek
(1989) fOlmd a complex relationship between teacher beliefs and
practice in the context of teaching reading skills: Teachers who
conceptualized reading as a mastery of a sequence of isolated skills
tended to require children to practice strategies in a routine fashion
and were content-oriented in their conceptions of reading instruction.
On the other hand, teachers who were more student-oriented, devoted more time to the aHective and oral language dimensions of
reading instruction and, important to metacognitve development,
encouraged the flexible use of strategies. The "working model"
presented by Borkowski and Muthukrishna (1992) suggests that teachers entice their students to become active participants in their own
learning. Because the focus of instruction is always on the child's
personally initiated learning process, the instructor needs to become
adept at hypothesizing how the learner is processing information at
any given moment and to adap t instructions appropriately.
In problem-centered learning contexts, as described by
Muthukrishna and Borkowski (1995), Cobb et al. (1991), and Olivier,
Murray, and Human (1992), teacllel'S become committed to the belief
that students need to regard mathematics, in part, as a self-constructed activity. That is, they and their classmates can learn to
discover new ways to solve problems if only they make the effort to
think about the subject matter and work hard in wlderstanding
problem complexity. The teacher must regard himself 01' herself as
the critical mediator in this instructional process, designed to interre-
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late key metacognitive components: skills, knowledge, beliefs, and
executive processes.
The teacher makes possible maximum task involvement by
prompting students to collaborate with one another in order to gain
deep conceptualtmderstanding. Teachers' behaviors include verbalizations such as, "What do you think of what Peter just said?" "Do
you agree/ disagree with what Joanne said" "Has anyone solved the
problem a different way?" These verbalizations require processoriented answers and help students to develop self-regulatory capabilities, such as monitoring, checking, and reflecting. Teachers also
help students feel that they can assume personal responsibility for
their own learning, by prompting them to explain and justify new
solutions, resolve conflicts, and develop productive small-group re lationships.
Motivation and Strategie Proeessing

Many researchers have argued that an understanding of motivation depends on the specification of achievement goals towards which
individuals are oriented (Ames & Archer, 1987; Dweck, 1989; Dweck
& Leggett, 1988; Nicholls, 1984). The achievement goal framework
integrates cognitive and affective components of goal-directed behaviors. An achievement goal defines an integrated pattern of beliefs,
attributions, and affect that tmderlies academic behavior and is represented by different ways of approaching, engaging in, and responding to achievement-related activities (Arnes, 1992).
Nicholls and his colleagues (Nicholls, 1984; Nicholls, Pataschnick,
& Nolen, 1985) have identified three types of motivational orientations towards schoolleaming. Task orientation involves a commitment to learning for its own sake: The goal is to increase understanding,
to accomplish something not previously done, and to improve performance. In other words, a task orientation implies that the process of
learning, including the effort involved, is an end in itself.
Task-oriented individuals strive to leam and understand, and the
more they see that they have mastered a task the more competent they
feel (Nicholls, 1984). With an ego orientation, the aim is to perform
bettel' than others 01' to establish that one's ability is superior to
another's. In this case, learning and understanding are viewed as
means to the end of establishing superiority over others. Evidence
presented by Nicholls (1989) shows that these two dimensions are
uncorrelated, or only slightly associated. The third motivational
orientation, work avoidance, involves adesire to put forth as little
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effort as possible; work avoidance is negatively related to taskorientation.
The dimensions of task orientation and ego orientation relate to
students' beliefs about the causes of academic success. Thus, different
achievement goals should be associated with different attributional
beliefs. Nicholls, Cheung, Lauer, and Pataschnick (1989) have suggested that if students are committed to outperforming their peers,
they tend to believe that superior ability or attempts to do better than
others are the causes of their successes in school. Similarly, the more
task oriented an individual, the more that individual believes that
success in school depends on effort, interest, and attempts to und erstand. Whether students are oriented to one goal or the other has
consequences for whether they develop a sense of efficacy and a
willingness to try hard and to take on challenges, or whether they
select easy tasks and give up in the face of failure. h1 an important
paper, Ames (1992) drew attention to the need to explore how the
structure of learning environments can emphasize different motivational goals and, consequently, influence how students think about
themselves, their ability, their peers, and how they and their peers
approach problem solving tasks.
Muthukrishna and Borkowski (1995) analyzed how a problemcentered learning environment, compatible with socio-constructivist
theory (Cobb et al., 1991), may help alter existing patterns of motivational goals and beliefs as weIl as produce more desirable strategies.
The teacher created a "sense-making atmosphere" in which mathematics was seen as a meaningful activity. The learning context
fostered task orientation and the belief that success depended on
attempts to make sense of the subject matter. Students were made to
see that they themselves could discover ways to solve problems if
only they made the effort to think about them and worked hard to
understand them. Results revealed that students exposed to the
problem-centered contexts rated the task-oriented goal of und erstanding and collaborating more highly than students in a direct
explanation of strategies condition. The belief that success in mathematics derives from attempts to understand and coIlaborate also
distinguished the problem-centered group from the direct-explanation group. Relatedly, students in the problem-centered condition
reported greater use of deep-processing strategies than students in
the direct-explanation group and tended to show greater evidence of
strategy use on a long-term "far transfer" task. One can infer that
students whose primary goal is learning for its own sake will value
and use strategies that require deep processing of information. If

30

BORKOWSKI/CHAN/MUTHUKRISHNA

students are encouraged to explore and trust their intuitions, they will
have a feeling of control and develop an excitement about searching
for meaning and understanding-processes that promote the generalization of skills and strategies across time and settings. After aU, it
was in large part, to solve the problem of skill generalization that
inspired the development of metacognitive theory.
Similarly, Lampert (1988) has described a research and development project in teaching mathematics that demonstrates how it is
possible to foster the simultaneous construction of meaning in mathematics, task-orientation as a form of motivation, and the deep processing of information. Lampert used a lesson to demonstrate how a
teacher might model a new form of sodal interaction that would
encourage arguments among students who were learning to examine
hypotheses about the mathematical structures underlying their solutions to problems. In her lessons, she presented students with
problems, but did not explain how to arrive at the answers. The
questions she expected of her students went beyond simply determining whether they could arrive at a correct solution. Students were
expected to answer questions about the legitimacy of the strategies
they had used in problem solutions. Questions were process-oriented
and required students to explain and defend their strategies. In this
way, Lampert stressed that strategies used for figuring out a problem
were as important as the answers themselves. The role of the teacher
was to engage all students in the dass in forming and testing mathematical hypotheses. Lampert (1988) found that these hypotheses
were embedded in the answers that students gave to a problem, and
that comparing answers actually engaged students in a discussion of
a wide range of hypotheses.
Collaboration in Knowledge Construction

The characteristics of learning tasks and dassroom activities can
have profound influences on strategy-based learning and motivational orientations, such as students' initiation about the requirements
of various problems as weIl as the intensity and persistence with
which they pursue them. Recent instructional innovations emphasize the need for students to be provided opportunities to construct
knowledge and to engage in generative rather than passive learning
(Brown & Campione, 1990; Bransford et al., 1990; Cognition and
Technology Group at Vanderbilt, 1992; Pressley, Harris, & Marks,
1992; Schoenfeld, 1992). Learning as a sodal process and as a
collaborative activity in pursuit of knowledge construction needs to
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be stressed. In this view, children should engage in argumentation
and reflection as they use and refine their existing knowledge in order
to make sense of alternative points of view and to add to their
knowledge base. A critical factor is that a truly collaborative learning
environment demands reflection by the learners. Students are obligated to reflect on the meanings they construct and share in collaborative groups. Reflection induces an on-line awareness of one's
cognitive processes, which prornotes the development of self-regulatory skills. By expressing ideas in public, by defending them in the
face of questions from peers, by questioning others' ideas, students
are forced to elaborate, clarify, and reorganize their own thinking
processes, contributing to the emergence of the kind of advanced
cognition described by Butterfieid et al. (1995).
In the "communities of learners" environment designed by Brown
and Campione (1990), the aim is to produce "intelligent novices." According
to these authors, intelligent novices have "learned how to learn" rather than
just to memorize facts. Intelligent novices, therefore, presumably possess a wide repertoire of strategies for gaining new knowledge. A
community of learners is jointly responsible for creating knowledge as
well as a learning environment that is designed to foster the development of problem solving, critical thinking, and reflective analysis.
From our vantage point, the common thread in the learning
environments of Brown, Bransford, and Schoenfeld and their colleagues is that learning occurs within an active social context that
prornotes the emergence of executive processing skills and positive
beliefs about self-efficacy. Classrooms that emphasize socially based
learning differ from traditional classes in several important ways: (a)
students take on more active roles in monitoring their own progress
as well as that of others; (b) teachers serve as models of active learning
and guide learning rather than adopting a domineering, didactic role;
and (c) the content emphasis is on deep understanding rather than on
acquiring a breadth of facts.
Similarly, Schoenfeld (1992) has argued for a particular agenda in
order to develop classrooms that are "microcosms of mathematical
sense-making" (p. 82). His problem-solving courses at the college level
appear to have as their major focus the development of self-regulation,
especially monitoring and control skills, as weIl as the development of
self-directing motivational beliefs. The approach is to prompt students
to monitor their solutions carefully, pursue interesting leads, and to
abandon those that do not seem to result in success. Students' ability to
monitor and assess their "on-line" progress, and to act in response to
these assessments, are co re components oE self-regulation.
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The instructor's job is to shape and structure dassroom interactions (Schoenfeld, 1992). The shaping process consists of working on
ideas genera ted by students themselves, with the teacher serving as a
moderator for dass discussions. A vast ainount of the time is spent
on collaborative efforts, either in small groups or as a whole dass.
Time is spent in actually doing mathematics. That is, students are
engaged in the discipline, debating, conjecturing, proving, agreeing,
and disagreeing. The focus is on deep levels of understanding and in
enhancing positive attributional beliefs. The teacher serves as an
external monitor during problem solving, encouraging discussion of
behaviors considered important for the internalization of metacognitive
skills, as weIl as a model of good executive behaviors. The hoped-for
result is an increase in planning, monitoring, and active problem
solving among the students.
Selecting Learning Tasks

Learning environments need to be structured so that students
perform tasks that are related to interesting and coherent goals, rather
than for extrinsic reasons. It is difficult to teach students to be
strategic, to plan and to be cognitively alert when they are working on
meaningless activities. In addition, the active use of knowledge is
made dear, rather than obscured, when learning goals are personal
and valuable. Brown, Collins, and Duguid (19B9) have stressed the
importance of "situated learning" in wruch knowledge is learned in
the context of meaningful goals. Decontextualized forms of instrucbon are to be avoided. For instance, in the reading program developed by Palincsar and Brown (1984)-referred to as reciprocal
teaching- comprehension monitoring strategies, such as summarizabon and questianing, are modeled and practiced in a context in which
participants share the goal of gaining meaning from the text. The fact
that students learn to apply comprehension strategies as they are
being acquired is thought to be the key to the program's success.
Situated learning has a great impact on the motivational orientations
students develap. Activities become more meaningful because they
affer personal challenges, provide students with a sense of control
over the task at hand, and create an intrinsic purpose for learning.
Ames (1992) believes that if students perceive meaningful reasons for
engaging in an activity, they are more likely to espouse a taskoriented goal.
Presenting learning tasks as problems to be solved rather than
facts to be learned can encourage richer and more elaborated process-
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ing of information, espedally if this is done collaboratively. In many
classrooms, however, problems are typically of a "closed" nature, and
difficult for collaboration. Problems of an "open" type provide
opportunities for students to share different perspectives, hypotheses,
and solution paths, as well as to engage in critical analyses. Such
activities influence the emergence of executive skills as weH as develop positive motivational goals.
Student Perceptions of Their Learning Environments

Students need to leam that classroom activities typically require
them to work hard to achieve understanding. The classroom environment must be perceived as one in which they are free to explore ideas,
ask questions, and make mistakes. They should leam that it is
possible, even probable, to understand what one is doing and to come
to the realization that it is worthwhile and rewarding. Such an
environment contributes to the emergence of short- and long-term
academic and occupational possible selves (Day et a1., 1992). Ames
and Archer (1988) and Maehr and Midgley (1991) have argued that
such visions and beliefs are likely to develop when students are
involved in choice and decision making, when there are opportunities
for peer interaction and cooperation, and when success is defined as
much by effort and improvement as by "correctness."
Students' perceptions of how their responses are evaluated influence how they approach tasks and result in the development of stable
orientations towards motivational goals. Brophy (1983) characterized
traditional classroom leaming as highly product-oriented. In contrast, there should be an emphasis placed on thinking processes:
Students leam that they have a need or an obligation to process
information at a deep level because they might have to explain and
defend their solutions to themselves and to others.
Students must recognize that their individual ideas become of
greater value when placed in a sodal setting. Each student is not
compared with others but rather is encouraged to jointly construct
meanings and solutions to problems within a sodal context. Peers
should be seen as sources of information, rather than as threats to selfesteern. Sodal comparisons, when they occur, are a critical factor
affecting students' perceptions about themselves, others, and the
tasks per se. Ames (1992) found that students' self-evaluations of
their ability are more negative when classroom structures emphasize
winning, outperforming others, and surpassing normative standards.
Sodal comparisons in a classroom setting can have negative conse-
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quences for student interest (Deci & Ryan, 1985), pursuit of challenging tasks (Elliot & Dweck, 1988), and use of learning strategies (Ames,
1992). Relatedly, Graham and Golan (1991) found that a focus on
sodal comparison standards can interfere with effort-based strategies
that require reflective, deliberate processing. In short, collaborativebased learning seems to enhance the development of the full
metacognitive system.
SUMMING-UP
It is likely that the search for domain-specific or domain-general
laws about metacognition, which up to this point in two decades of
research have favored the former, willlikely continue to be the core
issue in metacognition research emd measurement. However, both
intuitive appeal and scholastic relevance favor the generality side and
will continue to influence the direction and style of research in this
field. We suspect that the data will eventually reveal selective
generality (perhaps in an executive process such as task analysis); an
intricate pattern of developmentally related events necessary for
achieving generality (involving consistency in metacognitively based
instructions in the horne and school over long periods of time); and a
complex blending of specificity emd generality across individuals.
Not all students who have relatively similar environments will show
generality and those who do mayaiso have relative strengths and
weaknesses in one and the same metacognitive component across
domains. For instance, a student may be high in a variety of monitoring skills but superior in monitoring memory accuracy. Given the
early stage of theory development as w ell as the lack of measurement
sophi::;tication that characterizes this field, it is not surprising that the
search for across-tasks and across-domains gen eraliza tion of
metacognitive components has remained an elusive goal. Consistency in horne and school instructional environments appears as the
major prerequisite for developing generalized metacognitive skills
and beliefs. In this sense, our discussion of the nature and quality of
learning environments takes on special significance for achieving
high levels of metacognitive development and stability.
Classroom environments and experiences should show each student that he 01' she can gain control over their own learning outcomes
if they adop t self-regula tory strategies. Teachers must continually
encourage students to evalua te and monitor their problem-solving
ini tia tives. This recommendation is supported by data of Paris and
Winograd (1990) who found that students will apply self-regulatory
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skills if they feel that they are able to manage their own learning.
Perceptions of control affect motivational, regulational, achievement
processes, and outcomes as weIl. Finally, Grolnick and Ryan (1987)
conduded that conceptuallearning appears to be facilitated by contexts that minimize external controls, and at the same time focus
students on the task by encouraging deep processing. Thus, students'
perceptions of activities and tasks not only influence how they approach learning, but also their judgments about their ability, willingness to apply effortful strategies, and feelings of satisfaction-all of
which contribute to skill-based learning.
It is not surprising that challenge, interest, and perceived control
are embedded in the structure and design of problem-centered learning contexts (Muthukrishna & Borkowski, 1995). In such contexts,
activities are structured as problems to be solved by all students,
assisted by ample guidance, facilitation, and modeling from the
teacher. Problem-centered, collaborative environments offer personal
challenges and, over the long run, help students gain a sense of
control, together with the emergence of task- rather than ego-orientations. Most importantly, such environments hold the potential for
creating an intrinsic love of learning, housed within a mature and
stable metacognitive system that yields to reliable assessment and,
more importantly, gives reality to the idealized model of the "Good
Information Processor" (Pressley et al., 1990).
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In this chapter we provide an overview of the conceptual and
methodological issues involved in developing and evaluating measures of metacognition and self-regulated learning. Our goal is to
suggest a general framework for thinking about these assessmentsa framework that will help generate questions and guide future
research and development efforts. Broadly speaking, we see the main
issue in assessing metacognition and self-regulated learning as one of
construct validity. Of critical importance are the conceptual or
theoretical definitions of these constructs and the adequacy of the
empirical evidence offered to justify or support interpretations of test
scores obtained from instruments designed to measure them.
In speaking to this issue of construct validity, we organize our
chapter into four main sections. First, we review the various theoreti-
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cal and conceptual models of metacognition and self-regulated learning and propose three general components of metacognition and selfregulation that will guide our discussion in subsequent sections.
Second, we briefly describe a set of criteria proposed by Messick
(1989) for investigating construct validity and suggest a set of guiding
questions and general issues to consider in evaluating measures of
metacognition and self-regulated learning. Third, we discuss in some
detail several measures for assessing metacognition and self-regulated learning in light of the empirical evidence available to address
issues of the construct validity of these measures. In the fourth and
final section, we draw some conclusions about current measures of
metacognition and self-regulated learning, suggest some directions
for future research, and raise some issues that merit consideration in
the development and evaluation of valid measures of metacognition.
COMPONENTS OF METACOGN ITION AND SELF-REGULATED
LEARN ING

There is general agreement that metacognition can be divided
into two general constructs termed metacognitive knowledge and
metacognitive control and regulation. Some researchers have proposed that the term metacognition be reserved for the construct of
metacognitive knowledge and that the term not include metacognitive
control and regulation activities (Paris & Winograd, 1990). Others
have proposed that monitoring and control are two different aspects
of meta cognition and need to be separated conceptually and functionally from each other and from metacognitive knowledge (Nelson &
Narens, 1990). In this chapter, we recognize the importance of
distinguishing between these different components and organize our
discussion around three general components of metacognition: (a)
metacognitive knowledge, (b) metacognitive judgments and monitoring, and (c) self-regulation and control of cognition. Of course, as in
any model of metacognition and self-regulation, these three general
components are interdependent, but for the purpose of exposition, we
discuss them separately.
It should be noted that there is confusion in the literature regarding the use of the terms meta cognition and self-regulated learning.
Metacognition is the "older" term defined and used in the late 1970s
and into the 1980s by developmental and cognitive psychologists (see
Flavell, 1979). Much of the research on meta cognition during this
time focused on students' metacognitive knowledge about different
types of memory and cognitive strategies and only later were issues
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of control and regulation of cognition included (Brown, Bransford,
Ferrara, & Campione, 1983). Beginning in the mid 1980s and continuing into the 1990s the construct of self-regulated learning was proposed by educational and developmental psychologists to refer to the
various ways individuals monitor, control, and regulate their learning
(see Schunk & Zimmerman, 1994; Zimmerman, 1986; Zimmerman &
Schunk, 1989). In this research, self-regulated learning includes
monitoring, controlling, and regulating cognition and monitoring,
controlling, and regulating other factors that can influence learning
such as motivation, volition, effort, and the self-system. Most of the
models of self-regulated learning assume that the processes of monitoring, controlling, and regulating are related to, if not dependent on,
metacognitive knowledge about the self and cognition (Garcia &
Pintrich, 1994). As such, self-regulated learning is the more global
and inclusive construct and subsumes metacognition and
metacognitive knowledge. Nevertheless, we will refer to certain
aspects of knowledge and monitoring as metacognitive because they
are focused specifically on knowledge and monitoring of cognition.
We now turn to a description of the three general components of
metacognition and self-regulated learning and the various ways they
have been conceptualized in the research (see Table 1).
Metacognitive Knowledge

Metacognitive knowledge includes students' declarative, procedural, and conditional knowledge about cognition, cognitive strategies, and task variables that influence cognition (Alexander, Schallert,
& Hare, 1991; Flavell, 1979). In some models, metacognitive knowledge is labeled as metacognitive awareness, but w e believe that
awareness connotes a more "on-line," "in-the-moment," or conscious
experience and we prefer to consider that an aspect of meta cognitive
judgment and monitoring. We reserve the term metacognitive knowledge for knowledge about cognition and assume it is similar in many
ways to other kinds of knowledge in long-term memory that individuals can have about any topic such as geography, automobiles,
furniture, or mathematics. In this sense, metacognitive knowledge
may be more "static" and statable than monitoring and regulation
(Schraw & Moshman, 1995); that is, individuals can tell you if they
know something or not, such as knowing the state capital of Nebraska
or knowing the definition of words (see Tobias, this volume). In
contrast, a more "on-line" measure of metacognitive monitoring
would involve students' judgments of whether they are comprehend-
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ing the text or learning something about the Great Plains as they read
a geography textbook.
In Flavell's classic (1979) paper on meta cognition he proposed
that metacognitive knowledge included knowledge of the person,
task, and strategy variables or factors that can influence cognition. In
the person category he included beliefs about the self in terms of
intraindividual differences (e.g., knowing that one is better at memory
tasks than problem-solving tasks) as well as interindividual differences (e.g., knowing that one is better at memory tasks than a friend)
and universals of cognition (e.g., knowing that one has to pay close
attention to something in order to learn it). In our conceptualization
of metacognition, we believe that the person variables, except for the
universals of cognition, are better seen as motivational constructs
(Garcia & Pintrich, 1994). They certainly represent knowledge of the
self, and in that sense are metacognitive. However, because they
involve the self, they are "hot" cognitions, not" cold" cognitions about
task and strategy variables, and as such will not be discussed much in
this chapter.
Knowledge about the task and knowledge about the strategy
variables that influence cognition are the more traditional
metacognitive knowledge constructs. Task variables include knowledge about how task variations can influence cognition. For example,
if there is more information provided in a question or a test, then it
will generally be more easily solved than when there is little information provided. Most students corne to understand this general idea
and it becomes part of their metacognitive knowledge about task
features. Other examples include knowing that some tasks, or the
goals for the task, are more or less difficult, like trying to remember
the gist of a story versus remembering the story verbatim (Flavell,
1979).
.
Knowledge of strategy variables includes all the knowledge individuals can acquire about various procedures and strategies for
cognition including memorizing, thinking, reasoning, problem solving, planning, studying, reading, writing, etc. This is the area that has
seen the most research and is probably the most familiar category of
meta cognitive knowledge. Knowing that rehearsal can help in recalling a telephone number, or that organizational and elaboration strategies can help in the memory and comprehension of text information,
are examples of strategy knowledge. In addition, metacognitive
knowledge has been further broken down into declarative, procedural, and conditional metacognitive knowledge (Alexander et al.,
1991; Paris, Lipson, & Wixson, 1983; Schraw & Moshrnan, 1995).
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Table 1. Three General Components of Metacognition and Self-Regulated

Learning
I.

METACOGNITIVE KNOWLEDGE
A.

B.
C.

II.

Knowledge of cognition and cognitive strategies-knowledge
about the universals of cognition
1) Declarative knowledge of what different types of
strategies are available for memory, thinking, problem-solving, etc.
2) Procedural knowledge of how to use and enact different cognitive strategies
3) Conditional knowledge of when and why to use different cognitive strategies
Knowledge of tasks and contexts and how they can influence
cognition
Knowledge of self-comparative knowledge of intraindividual and interindividual strengths and weakness
as a learner or thinker; better seen as motivational not
metacognitive self-knowledge

METACOGNITIVE JUDGMENTS AND MONITORING
A.

B.
C.

D.

Task difficulty or ease of learning judgments (EOL)-making
an assessment of how easy or difficult a learning task will
be to perform
Learning and comprehension monitoring or judgments of learning (JOL) -monitoring comprehension of learning
Feeling of knowing (FOK)-having the experience or "awareness" of knowing something, but being unable to recall it
completely
Confidence judgments-making a judgment of the correctness or appropriateness of the response.

III. SELF-REGULATION AND CONTROL
A.

B.

C.

D.

Planning activities-setting goals for learning, time use,
and performance
Strategy selection and use-making decisions about which
strategies to use for a task, or when to changing strategies
while performing a task
Allocation of resources-control and regulation of time use,
effort, pace of learning and performance
Vo litional control-control and regulation of motivation,
emotion, and environment
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Declarative knowledge of cognition is the knowledge of the what of
cognition and includes knowledge of the different cognitive strategies
such as rehearsal or elaboration that can be used for learning. Procedural knowledge includes knowing how to perform and use the
various cognitive strategies. It may not be enough to know that there
are elaboration strategies like summarizing and paraphrasing, it is
important to know how to use these strategies effectively. Finally,
conditional knowledge includes knowing when and why to use the
various cognitive strategies. For example, elaboration strategies may
be appropriate in some contexts for some types of tasks (learning from
text); other strategies such as rehearsal may be more appropriate for
different tasks or different goals (trying to remember a telephone
number). This type of conditional knowledge is important for the
flexible and adaptive use of various cognitive strategies.
Metacognitive Judgments and Monitoring

Unlike the static nature of metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive
judgments and monitoring are more process-related and reflect
metacognitive awareness and ongoing metacognitive activities individuals may engage in as they perform a task. These activities can
include four general metacognitive processes: (a) task difficulty or
ease of learning judgments (EOL), (b) learning and comprehension
monitoring or judgments of learning (JOL) , (c) feeling of knowing
(FOK), and (d) confidence judgments (see Table 1).
Individuals can make determinations of the difficulty level of the
task such as how hard it will be to remember or learn the material, or
in Nelson and Narens's (1990) framework what they call ease of
learning judgments (EOL). These EOL judgments draw on both
metacognitive knowledge of the task and metacognitive knowledge
of the self in terms of past performance on the task. Further, these
EOL judgments are assumed to occur in the acquisition phase of
learning before the learner begins a task and therefore should be
viewed separately from judgments of learning or readiness for a test
(e.g., Hunter-Blanks, Ghatala, Pressley, & Levin, 1988). In the classroom context, students could make these EOL judgments as the
teacher introduces a lesson or assigns a worksheet, project, or paper.
A second type of metacognitive judgment or monitoring activity
involves judgments of learning and comprehension monitoring. These
judgments may manifest themselves in a number of activities such as
individuals becoming aware that they do not understand something
they just read or heard or becoming aware that they are reading too
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quickly or slowly given the text and their goals. Judgments of
learning also would be made as students actively monitor their
reading comprehension by asking themselves questions. Judgments
of learning also could be made when students try to decide if they are
ready to take a test on the material they have just read and studied.
Pressley and Afflerbach (1995) provide a detailed listing of monitoring activities that individuals can engage in while reading. These
types of monitoring activities are called judgments of learning (JOLs)
in the Nelson and Narens (1990) meta memory framework. JOLs
occur during the acquisition and retention phases in their model of
memory. In each case individuals make predictions about which
items on a memory task they have learned and whether they will be
able to recall them in the future . In a reading comprehension task, this
would involve readers, as they are in the process of reading, making
some assessment of whether they will be able to recall information
from the text at a later point in time (e.g., Pressley, Snyder, Levin,
Murray, & Ghatala, 1987b). In the classroom context, besides reading
comprehension, JOLs could involve a student making a judgment of
her comprehension of a lecture as the instructor is delivering it or
whether she could recall the lecture information for a test at a later
point in time.
A third type of metacognitive awareness process is termed the
feeling-of-knowing or FOK (Nelson & Narens, 1990; Koriat, 1993). A
typical instance of FOK occurs when a person cannot recall something
when called upon to do so, but knows he knows it, or at least has a
strong feeling that he knows it. In colloquial terms, this experience is
often called the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon and occurs as a person
is attempting to recall something. In the Nelson and Narens (1990)
framework, FOKs are made after failure to recall an item and involve
a determination of whether the currently unrecallable item will be
recognized or recalled by the individual at a later point in time. Koriat
(1993) points out that there is evidence that FOK judgments are better
than chance predictors of future recall performance, albeit not a
perfect correlate. In a reading comprehension task, FOKs would
involve the awareness of reading something in the past and having
some understanding of it, but not being able to recall it on demand.
FOKs in the classroom context could involve having some recall of the
teacher lecturing on the material or the class discussing it, but not
being able to recall it on the exam.
A fourth type of metacognitive judgment concerns the confidence
an individual has in their retrieved answer on a memory task, a
reading comprehension task, or even on a classroom exam. This
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confidence judgment is assumed to come after some retrieval of
information and some output response or behavior has been enacted
(Nelson & Narens, 1990). For example, students might be given a text
to read, asked to answer some questions about it, and then asked to
judge the confidence they have in their answers (Pressley, Ghatala,
Woloshyn, & Pirie, 1990). Another type of confidence judgment has
been used in error detection studies. Students are given a text to read
that has errors in it and they are asked to find contradictions or errors
in the text. After they have finished reading the text and reporting on
the errors they found, students are asked to rate their comprehension
of the text and rate their performance in detecting the errors (Baker,
1989b). These judgments of comprehension and error detection
performance are assumed to reflect some metacognitive awareness
about the correctness of performance and the calibration of these
confidence judgments to actual performance is an important aspect of
metacognitive judgment and monitoring.
Self-Regulation and Control

The types of activities that individuals engage in to adapt and
change their cognition or behavior are known collectively as selfregulation and control. In this sense, this component is more of a
process, ongoing activity, like meta.~ognitive judgments and monitoring, than a static entity like metacognitive knowledge. In most
models of metacognition and self-regulated learning, control and
regulation activities are assumed to be dependent on, or at least
strongly related to, metacognitive monitoring activities, although
metacognitive control and monitoring are conceived as separate processes (Nelson & Narens, 1990; Zimmerman, 1989, 1994). In this
chapter we focus on measures of control and regulation of cognition
that could be more narrowly labeled metacognitive control and selfregulation. Other aspects of self-regulated learning including motivation, effort, volition, goals, and the self-system, can be "controlled"
and therefore are included in our framework of self-regulated learning (see Table 1). However, because control and regulation of these
components have not been studied as much as control and regulation
of cognition, they are not discussed in as much detail in the third
section of this chapter on construct validity of the instruments to
measure metacognition and self-regulated learning.
In the Pressley and Afflerbach (1995) model of constructively
responsive reading, monitoring activities include monitoring of comprehension as well as a variety of decisions to change reading strate-
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gies and behavior such as varying the speed of reading, rereading, or
taking notes on reading material. This model is based on data from
in-depth verbal protocol analyses of reading behavior where it is clear
that monitoring and regulating activities often occur at the same time.
Likewise in our self-report data on metacognition and self-regulation,
it has not been possible to separate empirically cognitive monitoring
from control and regulation of cognition (Pintrich & De Groot, 1990;
Pintrich, Smith, Garcia, & McKeachie, 1993). Despite the empirical
difficulties demonstrated by these studies, conceptually it is possible
to distinguish between monitoring activities that involve assessing
comprehension, learning, or performance, and regulating activities
that involve changing cognition or behavior to bring them in line with
personal goals or task demands. Further, there are a number of
different activities that can be considered part of the various control
and regulation processes. We organize our conceptual discussion
around the four general categories of planning, strategy selection and
use, resource allocation, and volitional control (see Table 1).
Planning is an important aspect of regula ting cognition and
behavior and involves the setting of goals that can be used to guide
cognition in general and monitoring in particular (Pressley &
Afflerbach, 1995; Schunk, 1994; Zimmerman, 1989; Zimmerman &
Martinez-Pons, 1986, 1988). The goal acts as a criterion against which
to assess and monitor cognition, just as the temperature setting of a
thermostat guides the operation of the thermostat and heating/
cooling system. For example, if one student has a goal of mastering
the text material as opposed to another student who just wants to
complete the reading assignment, then the first student will monitor
and regulate her reading cognition in a way that can lead to deep
understanding (e.g., use self-questioning or reread parts that are not
understood) . In contrast, the second student may just proceed to read
through the material and, when at the end of the selection, be satisfied
that the goal of completing the reading has been reached. Of course,
planning is most often assumed to occur before starting a task, but
goal-setting can actually occur at any point during performance.
Learners may begin a task by setting specific goals for learning, goals
for time use, and goals for eventual performance, but all of these can
be adjusted and changed at any time during task performance.
One of the central aspects of the control and regulation of cognition is the actual selection and use of various cognitive strategies for
memory, learning, reasoning, problem solving, etc. Numerous studies have shown that the selection of appropriate cognitive strategies
can have a positive influence on learning and performance. These
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cognitive strategies range from the simple memory strategies very
young children through adults use to help them remember (Schneider
& Pressley, 1989) to sophisticated strategies that individuals have for
reading (Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995), mathematics (Schoenfeld, 1992),
writing (Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1987), problem solving, and reasoning (see Baron, 1994; Nisbett, 1993). Although the use of various
strategies is probably deemed more "cognitive" than metacognitive,
the decision to use them is an aspect of meta cognitive control and
regulation as is the decision to stop using them or to switch from one
strategy type to another.
The third aspect of self-regulation and control that we include in
our framework is the allocation of resources such as time, overall
effort, and pace of learning. These resources may not be strictly
cognitive because they do not involve specific cognitive strategies, but
the control and regulation of these resources can be an important
aspect of self-regulated learning (Nelson & Narens, 1990; Pintrich,
Smith et al., 1993; Zimmerman, 1989, 1994). Obviously, a greater
amount of time spent studying a list of words to be memorized or a
set of text materials for an exam should result in improved learning
and performance. Moreover, the amount of overall effort put into a
task can reflect overall time use, the intensity of study including the
use of more appropriate cognitive strategies, or more attention and
concentration on the task without the use of better strategies. Finally,
the pace of learning, how fast individuals perform the various sub tasks
of the overall task, is an important feature that self-regulated learners
can control.
A fourth category of self-regulation and control is what we have
called volitional control. Although some theorists have termed all of
the meta cognitive control and regulation activities as volitional control (d. Como, 1993; Kuhl, 1985, 1992), we reserve this term for the
control of emotion, motivation, and the general environment. As
learners engage in tasks, their cognition, emotions, and motivational
beliefs are activated. Consequently, the learners' ability to control
and regulate their emotions can play an important part in their
learning (Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995). In the same manner, motivational beliefs can have a dramatic influence on cognition, learning,
and performance (Pintrich, Marx, & Boyle, 1993; Pintrich & Schrauben,
1992) and attempts to regulate or control motivation could result in
improved learning. Both Como (1993) and Kuhl (1985; 1992) have
suggested that individuals' ability to control their environment (e.g.,
arrange for quiet space for studying away from distractions) is an
important aspect of self-regulation. Although the control of motiva-

2. ASSESSMENT OF METACOGNITION

53

tion and emotion are important aspects of self-regulated learning, we
do not discuss in much detail the various instruments to assess them
in this chapter because of our focus on the cognitive components of
self-regulated learning, not the motivational components.
Taken together, planning, strategy selection, resource allocation,
and volitional control comprise four important aspects of self-regulation and control. In combination with metacognitive judgments and
monitoring, they make up the "on-line" process-oriented aspects of
metacognition and self-regulated learning. The "static" component of
metacognition, metacognitive knowledge, once activated in a situation, is an important resource that is drawn upon by learners as they
monitor and control their own learning. In proposing this three
component model of metacognitive knowledge, monitoring, and selfregulation and control, and their corresponding subcomponents, we
lay a conceptual framework for examining the empirical evidence for
the construct validity of our measures. We turn now to a discussion
of construct validity.
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING CONSTRUCT VALIDITY AND
RELEVANCE/UTILITY OF A MEASURE

One of the fundamental issues in evaluating assessment instruments purporting to measure metacognition and self-regulated learning is that of construct validity. Historically, construct validity was
conceived as one of three essential aspects of validity termed construct, criterion (predictive and concurrent), and content validity.
Each aspect was defined to some extent with respect to the purpose
of the measure. Content validity was of primary importance for
achievement tests where issues of the overlap between test items and
a subject-matter domain were addressed by professional judgment.
Tests designed to predict future performance (e.g., success in college)
or tests designed to replace an existing measure, relied on criterionrelated validity evidence typically in the form of data from correlations or regressions where the test score (e.g., SAT score) was related
to the" criterion" (e.g., success in college as measured by undergraduate GPA). Construct validity in the form of correlational, experimental, or other forms of data analysis argued for the presence of latent or
unobservable traits such as anxiety or intelligence.
Recent conceptions reject this traditional three-pronged approach
in favor of a "unified" validity theory with construct validity as the
overarching issue and all other "types" of validity subsumed under it
(Cronbach, 1989; Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Messick, 1989; Shepard,
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1993). In his comprehensive treatise of validity, Messick (1989)
restated the centrality of construct validity and drew attention to its
relations to the value and consequences of test interpretation and use.
In an effort to clarify these relations, he proposed a four quadrant
model of validity that crosses the nature of the empirical evidence on
the test and the potential consequences of the test data with how the
test is interpreted and used (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Messick's (1989) Conceptualization of Construct Validity.

Test Interpretation
Evidential Basis

CellI
Construct Validity
1)

2)
3)
4)
5)

Consequential Basis

Content
Substantive
Structural
External
Generality of
Meaning

Test Use
Cell 2
Construct Validity
+

Relevance IU tili ty

Cell 3

Cell 4

Value Implications

Social Implications

In CellI, Messick (1989) considers a number of specific types of
evidence that can be offered to support test score interpretations.
Collectively, he terms these different types of evidence as construct
validity. Essentially, construct validity involves a determination of
how well the instrument produces scores that avoid two basic measurement problems: (a) construct underrepresentation or not measuring all relevant aspects of the construct and (b) construct irrelevant
variance or measuring other constructs, not just the target construct.
Moving across the row, Cell 2 considers evidence required for test
score use and includes not only construct validity but relevance and
utility of the scores as well.
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In the bottom two cells in Table 2, Messick has placed concerns
about the consequences of the uses of test scores. In terms of test score
interpretation, Cell 3, labeled value implications, concerns how the
construct is defined theoretically and conceptually and the ways in
which this theoretical framework reflects underlying societal values
or ideologies. In Cell 4, Messick considers the social benefits and costs
of using the test scores. For example, intelligence tests and achievement tests are often used to classify children for special services or for
selection and placement into different academic tracks and each of
these decisions has a number of social costs associated with it. Given
that most measures of metacognition or self-regulated learning are
not used in this manner, we focus our comments on the first row in
Figure 1 and consider issues of construct validity and relevance/
utility of measures of metacognition and self-regulated learning. In
what follows, we describe each more fully, noting where appropriate
similarities and differences between Messick's formulation and the
writings of others (e.g., Linn, Baker, & Dunbar, 1991; Shepard, 1993).
Messick (1989) proposes five general components of construct
validity that merit consideration under the heading evidential basis
for test score interpretation. These are content, substantive, structural, external, and generality of meaning. These five components are
interdependent and although it is difficult to draw sharp distinctions
or bOlmdaries between them, we discuss them separately.
Content Component. This component is concerned with the relevance and representativeness of the content coverage of the assessment tool in relation to the domain of interest (Messick, 1989). The
basic guiding question is: Are the items on the test representative of
the domain? In achievement testing this concerns how well the
content of the test reflects the content of the domain. Linn et al. (1991)
suggest that there are three important aspects that should be considered in examining content validity: (a) domain specification, (b)
relevance and meaningfulness of the tasks, and (c) representativeness
of the content.
Domain specification concerns assumptions that the test has important content on it. For example, would the content on the test be
considered important by most individuals in the field? Relevance and
meaningfulness of the tasks concerns the assumption that instructional
relevance stems from students being asked to do tasks that are as
meaningful, relevant, and authentic as possible. Although this aspect
may not be crucial for paper-and-pencil tests, this is especially important for performance assessments where students are often asked to
engage in extended tasks or solve complex problems that demand
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sustained thinking and reasoning. Finally, the issue of representativeness of content concerns the comprehensiveness of the content coverage of the test relative to the subject-matter domain. For example, in
constructing a science achievement test, one should consider the degree
of overlap between the content included on the test and the various
domains and important concepts students have learned in science.
In terms of metacognition and self-regulated learning, content
coverage and representativeness are important issues when considering measures of metacognitive knowledge. Metacognitive knowledge can include knowledge of strategies and conditional knowledge
of when and why to use these strategies. Given that there are probably
many different strategies for learning in the domains of literacy, mathematics, science, and social studies, there will be different domains of
metacognitive knowledge. Accordingly, assessments of metacognitive
knowledge must be examined in terms of their content coverage for a
particular domain. The issue of representativeness may not be as
important if only one domain is under consideration (e.g., reading)
unless the measure is assumed to be a general measure of metacognitive
knowledge but only assesses metacognition for reading words.
Metacognitive monitoring and self-regulation and control are usually assumed to be general, content-free processes. Consequently,
issues of content representativeness are of less importance for these
assessments than for measures of metacognitive knowledge.
Substantive Component. Whereas the content component concerns
the relation between the test items and the larger content domain
from which the items are sampled, the substantive component refers
to the internal relations between the data generated from the items
and the construct theory. The basic guiding question is: Are the
response patterns on the test consistent with the theory of the construct? In particular, Messick (1989) notes that items on the test as
well as individuals' responses to these items should exemplify the
construct being measured and not other constructs. Further, items
that ostensibly measure a different construct should not be related to
the test items of the targeted construct. In achievement testing, for
example, the items on a science achievement test should reflect to a
large extent acquired knowledge in science, not general intelligence or
general reading ability. The same logic applies to measures of
metacognition. For example, measures of metacognitive monitoring
and awareness should assess monitoring and not other constructs
such as verbal ability, prior knowledge, or general intelligence (Pressley
& Ghatala, 1990). Accordingly, a measure of metacognitive monitoring that is dependent on the learner's verbal fluency and ability to
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articulate their thinking and awareness may be introducing constructirrelevant variance into the measure.
Structural Component. This component of construct validity concerns the relations between the scoring system used and the theoretical model of the construct. The guiding question is: Do the scores on
the test and the scoring system reflect the complexities of the construct as expressed in the theoretical model? Generally, the relations
between items on a test-how they are scored and then summed,
combined, or kept separate-should reflect the same relations as
those expressed in the theoretical model of the construct. A single
total score from a test implies that the construct is unitary; a number
of different subscales or scores implies a differentiated construct; a
combination of one total score with several subscales implies a hierarchical model of the construct under consideration.
In achievement testing, separate subscores for different aspects of
mathematics such as geometry, algebra, and trigonometry implies
that there are different domains of expertise and separate scores are
necessary to capture this complexity. On the other hand, one total
score assumes that there is an overall general mathematical expertise
construct. Of course, it is possible to have a conceptual model that
underscores the utility of having scores that express domain-specificity as well as general expertise in mathematics. In terms of measures
of self-regulation and control, if a model proposes a general construct
as well as the four subprocesses of planning, strategy selection,
resource allocation, and volitional control, then there may be a rationale for having one general self-regulation score and four subscores
corresponding to the four subprocesses.
Another issue that is subsumed under the dimension of structural
validity concerns the interpretation of scores in terms of normative
versus ipsative models and criterion-referenced versus norm-referenced models (Messick, 1989). The normative-ipsative distinction
represents the measurement version of the nomothetic-idiographic
distinction made in psychology and education. Normative models
are concerned with how individuals differ with respect to some
variable or construct, allowing for comparisons between individuals.
In contrast, ipsative models order scores on some set of attributes or
variables for each individual allowing for intraindividual comparisons of the relative strengths or weaknesses across attributes (Messick,
1989). In a similar fashion, norm-referenced scoring models highlight
the distribution of scores and allow for comparisons between individuals on the construct. For example, intelligence as a theoretical
construct is usually conceptualized in a normative fashion and IQ
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scores are usually scaled to facilitate interpretation of an individual's
score relative to the population distribution of IQ scores. In contrast,
criterion-referenced scoring models allow for the comparison of an
individual's score to some standard and individuals are judged in
relation to that standard, not with respect to how others performed
(e.g., driving test).
In terms of measures of metacognition and self-regulated learning, the Learning and Study Skills Inventory or LASSI (Weinstein,
Schulte, & Palmer, 1987; Weinstein, Zimmerman, & Palmer, 1988)
uses a norm-referenced system so that students' responses can be
compared against a normative sample. In this case, there is an
underlying theoretical assumption that students' scores are somewhat general and stable across situations, allowing for normative
comparisons. Other measures such as the Motivated Strategies for
Learning Questionnaire or MSLQ (Pintrich & De Groot, 1990; Pintrich,
Smith, et al., 1993) or the Self-Regulated Learning Interview Schedule or
SRLIS (Zimmerman & Martinez-Pons, 1986, 1988) do not use norms.
These measures reflect a theoretical assumption that students' responses
may vary as a function of the task, situation, course, or school context,
thereby rendering normative comparison groups less useful.
External Component. This component of construct validity asks
the basic guiding question: "What is the nature of the ·relations
between and among various measures and the construct of interes t?"
Evidence may come from correlational studies of the pattern of
relations among measures that purport to measure similar or different
constructs with similar or different methods (d. Campbell & Fiske,
1959). In addition to these multitrait multimethod studies, evidence
may come from an examination of the actual and theoretically predicted relations between measures of different constructs. Also
known as nomological validity, the issue is one of fit between theory
and observed relations between tests scores and other measures of the
construct.
In achievement testing, this might involve the collection of data to
demonstrate how well the test scores relate to the grades students
receive from teachers or how long they have been in school or how
many courses they have taken in that domain and their performance
in those courses. At the same time, scores on the achievement test
might be compared to other general ability measures (intelligence)
and the data should show modera te positive relations given that
achievement and intelligence are usually conceptualized as separate
constructs, albeit our theories predict they will be positively related.
In terms of metacognition, if meta cognitive monitoring is assumed to
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be an important component of skilled reading, then measures of
metacognitive monitoring should be positively related to other measures of reading performance such as reading achievement test scores,
teachers rating or grades for reading, and measures of reading comprehension.
Generality of Construct Meaning. The guiding question for this
component asks how generalizable the scores are across different
populations (e.g., males and females; different ethnic gro ups), domains (e.g., mathematics and reading), tasks, settings, and time. In
terms of population generalizability, the issue is whether the assessment data from different groups of shldents can be scored and
interpreted in the same way. Differential performance of various
populations of students (differing by gender, ethnicity, etc.) has
always been a concern in achievement te s ting . Recently,
generalizability has been cited as a primary limiting factor in the use
of performance assessments-as a replacement or supplement to 40item multiple-choice tests common in educational measurement (e.g.,
Linn et al., 1991; Shavelson, Baxter, & Gao, 1993). For measures of
metacognition and self-regulated learning there is a grea t deal of
evidence to suggest that metacognition and self-regulated learning
change with age, both in level and quality, and assessment instruments must take this into consideration . Further, consideration must
be given to the consistency of measures across groups varying in
gender, ethnicity / culture, or socioeconomic status (SES).
Also included under this component are issues of how the assessment data generalize across domains and tasks (see Linn et al., 1991).
For example, in terms of domain specificity, does a science performance assessment score for solving a circuits problem generalize to
other aspects of science performance in earth science or biology? In
terms of task specificity, does the score on a paper-and-pencil measure of students' knowledge of circuits correspond to their performance on a hands-on performance assessment on the same content
(Baxter & Shavelson, 1994; Gao, Shavelson, Brennan, & Baxter, 1996).
This issue of domain and task generalizability is one of the major
lmresolved issues in our theories of meta cognition and self-regulated
learning and consequently as well with our assessment procedures.
Empirical studies are mute with respect to the rela tion between a
person's metacognitive monitoring score on a reading comprehension
task and her metacognitive monitoring score on a mathematics problem-solving task. High correlations may support a domain-general
theory whereas low correlations may support a domain-specific interpretation. Further, inconsistent results with different methods of
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assessing metacognition within a domain such as think-alouds, cloze
procedures, or multiple-choice questionnaires may arise from construct
relevant or irrelevant variance. Finally, in terms of temporal
generalizability, for the same tasks in the same domain, there should be
some consistency across time in individuals' performance, at least
within a restricted range of time where development or learning opportunities are minimal (cf. Ruiz-Primo, Baxter, & Shavelson, 1993).
Issues of domain, task, and time generalizability are more or
less important depending on the theoretical stance adopted regarding the situational nature of metacognition and self-regulated
learning. If the conceptual model assumes that all cognition and
behavior are always and mainly situational, then there is no
expectation that there will be much consistency across domains,
tasks, or time. Consequently, variations in scores across these
contexts are viewed positively, or at least as non-problematic. At
the other end of the continuum, if the conceptual model assumes
that metacognition is a stable p ersonal "trait" of the individual,
then there should be a fairly high level of consistency across
contexts and deviations from consistency are viewed as problematic for the theory and the assessment instrument.
Relevance and Utility Concerns in Test Use. Besides the more
technical aspects of construct validity, Messick (1989) suggests that
the meaning, relevance, and utility of a measure must be considered
once the test is prepared for actual use. Linn et al. (1991) suggest that
for performance assessments, utility concerns the purpose of the measure, issues of cost and efficiency, and ease of use. In terms of purpose,
a distinction can be made between measures of metacognition and selfregulated learning designed primarily for research purposes (i.e., to
understand and analyze the various components of metacognition and
self-regulation) and those used to improve practice (i.e., to gauge
general levels of student metacognition and self-regulation in the
classroom or for diagnostic purposes). Some methods, such as thinkaloud protocols, may be more easily used in the laboratory or controlled settings such as one-to-one interviews that take place in
schools, but outside the classroom. Other methods, such as questionnaires or self-reports, can be used in whole group settings such as
classrooms without too much disruption to established routines.
Regardless of the purpose for which the method was designed, each
varies in terms of ease of use and cost. Self-report questionnaires are
relatively easy and inexpensive to administer and score in terms of
labor and time; think-alouds and interviews require extended periods
of time and trained personnel for both administration and scoring.
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CONSTRUCT VALIDITY OF MEAS URES OF METACOGNITION
AND SELF-REGULATED LEARNING

A number of different instruments for assessing students'
metacognition have been developed. In this section we discuss
several of these instruments in light of our conceptual framework for
metacognition and self-regulated learning and Messick's proposed
framework for assessing construct validity. In particular, we focus on
construct validity and issues of relevance and utility described above.
Consistent with the three-component model of meta cognition and
self-regulated learning described in the first section of this chapter, we
consider first measures of metacognitive knowledge, then measures
of metacognitive monitoring, and finally measures of control and selfregulation. For each type of measure, we report relevant empirical
studies that bear on issues of construct validity. Our purpose is to
illustrate the problems and the accomplishments associated with
es tablishing evidence of construct validity for measures of
metacognition and self-regulated learning. In doing so, we set aside
a comprehensive review of all measures and corresponding empirical
work in favor of attention to selected measures that exemplify key
issues in evaluating assessments of metacognition and self-regulated
learning.
Measures of Metacognitive Knowledge

Because the knowledge component of metacognition is much like
other static knowledge stored in long-term memory, measures to
assess it can look quite similar to standard tests of subject-matter
knowledge. For example, the Index of Reading Awareness (IRA),
developed by Paris and his colleagues, is a multiple-choice questionnaire designed to measure metacognitive knowledge in the domain of
reading comprehension (Jacobs & Paris, 1987; Paris & Jacobs, 1984;
Paris & Myers, 1981). The 20-item instrument, designed for use with
elementary school children, consists of 5 items in each of four sections:
(a) self-knowledge and task knowledge about reading (evaluation),
(b) knowledge of planning and skimming (planning), (c) knowledge
about changing and adjusting reading behaviors (regulation), and (d)
knowledge of when one might use different reading strategies (conditional knowledge).
In taking the IRA, students are posed a question and asked to
choose one of the three possible responses. An example of a regulation item is: "What do you do if you come to a word and don't know
what it means?" For all 20 items, each of the three choices are

62

PINTRICHIWOLTERS/BAXTER

assigned scores of 0 for an inappropriate answer, 1 for a partially
appropriate answer, and 2 for the best or most strategic answer
(Jacobs & Paris, 1987). For the question above, the responses were
categorized as: Best response (2 points)-Use the words around it to
figure it out; Partial credit (1 point)-Ask someone else., and No credit
(0 points)-Go on to the next word. Scores for each of the 20 items are
then summed and higher scores are interpreted as reflective of more
metacognitive knowledge.
The Metacognitive Assessment Inventory (MAl), developed by
Schraw and Dennison (1994), attempts to tap into metacognitive
knowledge in a somewhat different manner than the IRA. The MAl
presents college students with 52 different items grouped into two
scales termed general metacognitive knowledge and regulation of
cognition. As an example, one knowledge item on the MAl states, "I
have a specific purpose for each strategy that I use." Students are
asked to indicate how true or false each statement is for them on a 100
mm line where 0 indicates not true at all and 100 mm indicates very true
for me. Scores are computed by averaging the lengths of the line for
items corresponding to each scale.
The IRA is similar to a multiple-choice test, whereas the MAl is
similar to a traditional self-report instrument. Taken together, empirical studies of these two instruments help to illustrate some of the
issues that must be addressed when considering the construct validity
of measures for assessing metacognitive knowledge. In what follows,
we review research studies for each of these instruments using
Messick's framework described in the previous section as an organizational guide.
Content Component. The IRA and the MAl provide a good contrast
between a domain-specific and a more general measure of
metacognition. Establishing evidence for the content validity of these
instruments involves determining how well each covers the intended
domain. The IRA is designed to assess metacognitive knowledge in
the area of reading comprehension. Pressley and Afflerbach (1995)
list over 150 different activities that skilled readers engage in as they
read. In assessing metacognition U1 this context, how large a sample
of items is needed to tap adequately the important components of
these 150 activities? Are 20 items sufficient? Generalizability studies
would provide important ffiformation on the ex tent to which the
items on the test generalize to the larger domain of metacognitive
knowledge (d. Shavelson, Gao, & Baxter, 1995).
In contrast to the IRA, items on the MAl are not tied to any
specific domau1 such as reading, but instead focus on more general
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learning situations and hence more general metacognitive knowledge. The content validity of this instrument depends on how well
general metacognitive knowledge is sampled. The MAl includes 17
items aimed at assessing students' declarative, procedural, and conditional knowledge in addition to other items that measure aspects of
metacognitive monitoring and control. Again, as for the IRA, questions as to the adequacy with which the 17 knowledge items adequately sample the domain of general metacognitive knowledge
have not been answered empirically.
Substantial Component. Substantial validity concerns the match
between the data generated by the items on the test and the construct
theory. In terms of the IRA, the conceptual model predicts four
subcomponents of metacognitive knowledge in reading: evaluation,
planning, regulation, and conditional knowledge. Although Jacobs
and Paris (1987) did not report factor analysis results or alphas for the
four subscales of the IRA, a study by McLain, Gridley, and McIntosh
(1991) of third, fourth, and fifth graders reported extremely low
alphas (between .15 and .32) for the four subscales of the IRA. These
results suggest that the four subscales of the IRA, although theoretically important, lack empirical support as four independent subcomponents.
Schraw and Dennison (1994) found a similar pattern of results
with the MAL Although their conceptual model predicted eight
subcomponents including three subscales for knowledge (declarative,
procedural, and conditional), results of factor analyses in two different studies of college students supported the use of only one knowledge scale and one regulation scale. These two scales had high
internal consistency producing alphas of .88 and .91, for knowledge
and regulation, respectively. This theory-data mismatch is a continuing problem in the field. There seem to be more factors or components predicted by theory than supported by the data generated from
the empirical studies of the insh"uments.
This mismatch between theory and empirical data can be conceived as a problem in "grain size" or resolution power as suggested
by Howard-Rose and Winne (1993). That is, our theoretical models
have proposed relatively fine distinctions, or small grain-size components of metacognition. However, our instruments may not be
powerful or precise enough to bring these smaller grain-size components into resolution. It remains an issue for future research and
development to determine if we need to develop more powerful
"microscopes" to observe these smaller grain-sized units or whether
we need to modify our theoretical models to reflect the functional
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nature of the fairly molar components of metacognition and selfregulated learning that seem to emerge from our data.
Structural Component. An important aspect of structural validity
is the way in which an instrument is scored, and in turn how scores
are combined. For the IRA, students are given 0,1, or 2 points for each
item based on the appropriateness of the response they select from
three possible options. Points are swnmed to create a subscale score
for each of the evaluation, planning, regulation, and conditional
knowledge scales. The combination of these four scales results in a
total score for the entire instrument. At the question level the scoring
system is basically ordinal, the 2-point response is judged to be
superior to the I-point response, which is considered superior to the
a-point response. Nevertheless, the types of analyses carried out
assume an interval scale. In the absence of a good theoretical model
for differentiating the quality and quantity of metacognitive knowledge, it is difficult to defend using interval or ordinal scaling metrics.
Most of our theoretical models simply assume that more metacognitive
knowledge is better, hence, the summative scoring on both the MAl
and IRA. However, it may be more adaptive to have metacognitive
knowledge that is situation- or task-specific, but we have not developed tasks and scoring rubics or metrics that can capture these types
of conditional relations between metacognitive knowledge and different tasks. Needless to say, this is an area that is ripe for further
research and development activity.
External Component. External validity is a reflection of how well
performance on one measure is related to other measures of the same
or different constructs. Paris and Jacobs (1984) and Schraw and
Dennison (1994) attempted to provide some evidence that speaks to
the external validity of their respective instruments by examining the
relation between students' metacognitive knowledge and their standardized achievement test scores. Schraw and Dennison (1994) used
portions of the Nelson-Denny vocabulary and reading comprehension tests with the MAl, whereas Paris and Jacobs (1984) used the GatesMcGinitie test of reading achievement and McLain et al. (1991) used the
Woodcock test of reacting in their stuclies of the IRA. In all cases, the
authors found a positive, but modest relation between theiJ: respective
measure of metacognitive knowledge and students' standardized achievement scores, with correlations ranging from .20 to .35.
Correlations with standardized achievement tests provide some
evidence to support the external validity of these instruments, but
they should not be the sole criterion used in this regard because these
rather global and stable measures may not be sensitive to variations
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in metacognitive knowledge (Jacobs & Paris, 1987). There are other
measures of performance and metacognition that might be expected
to show positive relations. For example, Paris and Jacobs (1984)
examined how students' scores on the IRA were related to their
performance on both cloze and error-detection tasks, tasks that require more explicit metacognitive skills. These analyses showed that
scores on the IRA were positively related to these measures of reading
. comprehension and were of the same magnitude as correlations with
standardized achievement tests.
Another type of evidence that bears on this issue of external
validity is the comparison of pre-existing groups or groups that are
assigned to treatments that are thought to vary on the construct. For
example, Paris and his colleagues fOlmd that the IRA distinguished
between students who were classified as good and poor readers a
priori (e.g., Cross & Paris, 1988; Paris & Jacobs, 1984; Paris & Oka,
1986). Good readers were much more likely to have higher IRA
scores. The IRA also distinguished between those students who
received a specific curriculum designed to increase metacognitive
knowledge and use of cognitive strategies and students who did not
receive this program, with as expected, those in the metacognitive
curriculum having higher IRA scores. As Messick (1989) notes,
experimental studies of different types of students or students in
different educational programs can add greatly to the evidence for the
construct validity of the measure. Experimental studies are not used
as frequently as correlational studies, but given the relative yield,
experimental studies should be used more often in construct validity
research on metacognition and self-regulated learning.
Generality of Construct Meaning. Assessments of metacognitive
knowledge have, for the most part, been designed for u se with a
particular age group within a particular domain. The IRA, for
example, was designed for use with elementary school children who
are beginning to read. Although studies conducted with the IRA have
included large numbers of subjects, the studies have not included
children from different racial! ethnic or ability backgrounds. Examining a more diverse subject population would provide insight into
the generalizability of the construct across different populations of
students. For example, Swanson (1993) examined the metacognitive
knowledge of students classified as learning disabled, normative, or
gifted. Differences in the degree to which metacognitive knowledge
and problem-solving abilities were intercorrelated within these groups
suggest tha t the meaning of the construct, in terms of its relation to
other constructs, varies in different populations of students.
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The MAl also has seen limited use in nontraditional populations,
in part perhaps because the instrument is new. Nevertheless, similar
points about generality of construct meaning can be made. Recall that
the IRA was restricted to early elementary school students. The MAl
has been used primarily at the other end of the educational spech'um,
college students. College students are a select group of late adolescents and generalizations to this age group in the general population
are questionable. The use of undergraduate college students at a
single university demonstrates a recurring generalizability issue in
much psychological research. Examinlll.g metacognitive knowledge
in groups or ages that extend the usual boundaries of samples of
white, middle class students (d. Graham, 1992) will provide evidence
to support the construct generality of the various instruments.
Relevance and Utility Concerns for Test Use. The IRA and the MAl
can be readily used in a classroom or group setting because they are
easy to administer and most students are quite familiar with the
response formats on each of these measures. Relative to other formats
for aSSeSSlll.g meta cognition or self-regulation such as thiJ.l.k-alouds or
interviews (to be discussed below), self-report questionnaires are easy
for teachers and students to use and can provide information about a
large number of students in a practical and efficient manner.
Summary. According to a number of researchers, metacognitive
knowledge is similar to other knowledge in long-term memory and
can be accessed by the individual when properly cued (Alexander et
al., 1991; Flavell, 1979). Thus, self-report instruments such as the IRA
and the MAl seem appropriate for obtainillg this information. The
ease and efficiency with which these measures can be admillistered
and scored facilitate their use lll. educational and research settings. At
the same time, there remain significant questions and concerns about
the construct validity of these measures. First, the content representation of the items on these two instruments may not be adequate
given the rather large domain of metacognitive knowledge they
purport to measure. Second, there is a continuing mismatch between
the theoretical models of metacognitive knowledge that propose
multiple dimensions or subcomponents and the empirical data that
often yields one general factor or scale of metacognitive knowledge.
Third, there is a need for theore tical work on how best to conceptualize a metric for quantifying metacognitive knowledge, followed by
the concomitant psychometric research to validate new scaling procedures. Fourth, although there is more research on the relations with
standardized achievement tests and comparisons of different groups
of students for measures of metacognitive knowledge than other
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components, studies that include other constructs as external criteria
(e.g., intelligence) would be useful. Finally, there is a great need for
studies that examine the generalizability of these measures for groups
of students that differ on age or ethnicity or educational category such
as "at-risk" students.
Measures of Metacognitive Judgments and Monitoring

The awareness or monitoring aspect of metacognition reflects an
"on-line" process that includes students' current thinking, awareness,
consciousness, or monitoring of their cognitive operations just before,
during, or just after completion of a task. There have been a number
of different methods used to assess this aspect of meta cognition
including self-report of monitoring-based judgments (see Baker, 1989b;
Nelson & Narens, 1990; Tobias, this volume; Tobias & Everson, 1995),
error-detection studies, interviews, and think-aloud protocols (Pressley
& Afflerbach, 1995). We first provide general descriptions of these
different measures and then an analysis of the empirical evidence for
construct validity.
Self-report. Nelson, Narens, and their colleagues carried out a
series of studies using self-report judgments to measure student
monitoring (Leonesio & Nelson, 1990; Nelson, 1996; Nelson, Gerler, &
Narens, 1984; Nelson & Narens, 1990). Generally, students are presented with some information to be retrieved later (e.g., a list of
words, a paired associates recall task). Before they actually perform
the memory task they are asked to rank or rate how easy the information will be to learn (an ease-of-Iearning judgment or EOL). Then,
these subjects are given a number of learning/study trials where they
learn the list to criterion. After the learning trials, students are asked
to rank or rate their level of learning, or to make a judgment of their
level of learning (a judgment-of-Iearning or JOL). Students are then
given a retention test and are told which items they did not recall.
After receiving this feedback on their performance, students are asked
to rank or rate which of those unrecalled items they think they may
know. These judgments are called feeling of knowing (FOK) judgments (Leonesio & Nelson, 1990; Nelson et al., 1984; Nelson & Narens,
1990). Students' confidence in their performance is usually assessed
after a performance; students are asked to make some rating or
assessment of how well they did on the task. Taking actual performance as the standard, the accuracy of these judgments is considered
an indicator of students' monitoring ability. Thus, students who felt
they knew something and did, as well as students who felt they did
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not know something and did not, are both considered good monitors
of their performance. The assumption is that the ability to make
accurate judgments of what one knows and what one does not know
is an important aspect of metacognitive monitoring.
Using a similar judgment method with a different set of tasks,
Pressley and his associates asked students how well they performed
just before, during, or just after completing memory or reading tasks
(Hunter-Blanks, et al., 1988; Pressley et al., 1990; Pressley, Levin,
Ghatala, & Ahmad, 1987a; Pressley et al., 1987b). For example,
Pressley et al. (1987b) reported three experiments in which undergraduate students read short passages from an introductory psychology textbook and predicted their level of performance on either
multiple-choice or fill-in-the-blank questions. In line with the constructs from the Nelson and Narens (1990) framework, these types of
studies assess students' judgments of learning (JOL) because they ask
for an assessment of current learning.
In contrast to the JOL measures of current learning, Tobias and his
colleagues asked students to make judgments of prior learning-what
they already know-about word knowledge or mathematics problem
solving (see Tobias, this volume; Tobias & Everson, 1995; Tobias,
Hartman, Everson, & Gourey, 1991). In their studies of word knowledge, students are shown a list of words and then asked to check one
of two boxes indicating whether they know the definition of the
word or they do not know the definition. Similarly for the mathematics problem-solving task, students are shown a set of mathematics problems and asked to check one of two boxes indicating whether
they can solve the problem or they cannot solve the problem. Students are asked to go through these estimates quickly; judging 30
mathematics problems in 6 minutes or about 12 seconds per problem.
Error detection. In work directed by Baker, an error detection
methodology was used to assess metacognitive monitoring (Baker
1979, 1984, 1985, 1989a, 1989b). Typically, in these studies, students
are presented with passages or sentences containing errors, omissions, or inconsistencies within the text, and are asked to identify
aspects of the text that make it difficult to understand. Students who
detected more problems were considered better comprehension monitors than students who detected fewer problems. This method,
although not typical of the kind of texts or reading situations students usually encounter, allows the researcher more direct behavioral evidence of students' monitoring than is provided by self-report
measures.
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Think-Aloud. Researchers have also examined monitoring with
think-aloud or interview methodologies. For example, Pressley and
Afflerbach (1995) summarize the results of a number of studies that
have used think-aloud protocols to examine what students do as they
read various types of texts. Consistently, these studies indicated the
overall importance of monitoring in reading behavior; students who
are better monitors of their reading show higher levels of reading
comprehension and more learning. Further, these studies have identified a number of different aspects of monitoring including monitoring of the text characteristics, monitoring of self-understanding and
problems in comprehension, and monitoring of cognitive processes
used to read and understand text (Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995).
Given these different methods for measuring metacognitive judgments and monitoring, there are a number of issues to consider in
terms of construct validity. We now turn to an analysis of the
construct validity of these different measures of metacognitive judgment and monitoring.
Content Component. In the self-judgment methods of Nelson,
Narens, Tobias, and others, individuals are asked to rate a set of items
and then these same items are used in the performance or criterion
task. In this sense, the internal logic for the study insures a perfect
match, or overlap in terms of content representation, between the
judgment task and the criterion task. On the other hand, the items
used in these judgment tasks sample only a small range of possible
content areas such as word definitions or arithmetic problems, leaving many other content areas not represented. Accordingly, if the
judgment task samples the student's awareness of vocabulary word
definitions (see Tobias, this volume), this measure of monitoring does
not necessarily represent the student's monitoring of their mathematics knowledge.
In terms of meaningfulness, the reading and mathematics tasks
used by researchers like Tobias, Baker, and Pressley are seemingly
more relevant for academic learnmg than the paired-associate memory
tasks used in the work by Nelson and Narens and their colleagues
because of their similarity to classroom tasks. Nevertheless, some of
the tasks used in the studies of reading have used texts with purposely misspelled words, nonsensical sentences, or other types of
errors embedded in the text. Although these kind of tasks may be
motivating and interesting for some students, like doing a puzzle or
game, they are not representative of the usual texts students encounter in the classroom (e.g., textbooks) or outside the classroom (e.g.,
newspapers, magazines) that are designed to be error-free. It remains
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an empirical question whether this difference in meaningfulness
between authentic texts and "error-filled" texts influence students'
monitoring processes.
The research on metacognitive monitoring also illustrates how an
assessment technique might adequately cover a broad spectrum of
content within a particular domain but not across domains. Pressley
and his colleagues, for instance, have examined monitoring while
students read individual words and sentences, extended passages on
the PSAT and SAT, or introductory psychology textbooks (HunterBlanks et al., 1988; Pressley et al., 1987a; Pressley et al., 1987b; Pressley
et al., 1990). In a similar manner, Baker (1979, 1984, 1985, 1989a,
1989b) has examined students' ability to monitor the presence of
many different types of errors within different text formats. Hence,
within a specific domain, such as reading comprehension, these
researchers have used an array of content in their measures of morutoring. Similar results of students' monitoring in other domains (e.g.,
science, social studies, reasoning, problem solving) would add to the
evidence supporting inferences about the construct validity of our
instruments. In addition, students' prediction accuracy or error
detection while completing a science experiment or while listening to
a discussion in social studies would provide further insights into
students' overall monitoring behavior.
Substantive Component. Unlike the measures of meta cognitive
knowledge presented earlier, many of the measures of monitoring
we have discussed in this section have not used items that could be
readily subjected to factor analytic studies as a means of examining
the internal relations among the item responses. However, in the
comprehension monitoring research by Baker and Pressley, there is
some evidence to suggest individual differences in detection of errors/
text problems and monitoring of comprehension. Baker (1985,1989b)
notes that there seem to be at least seven different types of standards that
individuals can use to evaluate text, ranging from a lexical standard
focused on individual word comprehension to more molar standards
involving internal consistency and structural cohesiveness within the
text. Individuals who use different standards will detect different errors
or problems in the text. If the experimenter counts only detection of
word errors, but a subject is using a more molar standard such as
internal consistency or structural cohesiveness and does not detect the
word errors, this subject may be considered a poor monitor, when in
effect she is monitoring the text in a different manner.
As noted above in the metacognitive knowledge section, the issue
of grain size and theoretical divisions of metacognition versus the
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empirical evidence or resolution power of our instruments to adequately measure these divisions is important. On the one hand,
much of the think-aloud literature reported by Pressley and Afflerbach
(1995) suggests that monitoring and regulating processes often occur
together and are difficult to separate empirically. On the other hand,
there are good theoretical reasons for discussing monitoring and
regulating as distinct processes (see Baker, 1989b; Zimmerman, 1989).
This problem has implications for the development of self-report
measures of monitoring. Developers of these types of measures may
have to consciously choose whether to have measures that represent
monitoring and regulation as relatively distinct aspects of
metacognition and self-regulated learning thereby reflecting theory,
or measures that blur the boundaries between these two components,
reflecting much of the empirical evidence.
Structural Component. The relation between test scores and the
construct of interest is of particular concern when considering
metacognitive judgments and monitoring. Measures of EOL, JOL,
and FOK rely on an analysis of the consistency between the subjects'
responses to the judgment task (their perc~ptions) and their actual
performance on the task. In the typical case, the pattern of responses
can be organized in a two-by-two matrix representing the crossing of
the judgments (yes/no about whether subjects know an item or not)
with actual performance (yes/no regarding their recall or correctness
of response). In this simple matrix, scores that are in the two cells of
yes-yes and no-no are often called "hits" and reflect accuracy or
calibration because of the match between judgment and performance.
That is, the subjects judge they know it and they do (the yes-yes cell)
or they judge they do not know it and they do not (the no-no cell).
Subjects who have more scores in these two cells than the two offdiagonal cells (often called "misses" in judgment) are deemed to be
better at monitoring or better calibrated given that there is substantial
agreement between their judgments and actual performance. Subjects whose scores fall primarily in the yes-no cell (say they know it,
but do not know it, an overestimation) or in the no-yes cell (say they
do not know it, but then do recall it or know it, an underestimation)
are assumed to be less effective at monitoring or less calibrated given
the minimal agreement between their judgments and actual performance (d. Tobias, this volume).
Although the methodological issues with this type of scoring
system are complex and beyond the scope of this paper, we briefly
mention one important consideration. Schraw (1995) calls attention to
the distinction between measures of association and measures of
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accuracy in developing scoring systems for analyzing the pattern of
scores in the matrix of hits and misses. In his discussion, he points out
that many studies have used gamma as a measure of association
between judgments and performance scores. However, gamma reflects degree of association and not level of agreement. Using both
mathematical and theoretical arguments, Schraw (1995) also shows
that a simple matching coefficient does not capture all the information
about accuracy either because it does not take into consideration
miscalculations or mismatches (see Tobias, this volume; Tobias &
Everson, 1995). For a measure of accuracy, he suggests the use of the
Hamann coefficient, which includes information from both matches
and mismatches by the student, thereby expanding the range of
information that is used. He concludes that judgment studies should
include measures of association like gamma as well as measures of
accuracy such as the Hamann coefficient. Using an array of these
types of measures of both association and accuracy will provide
interval scales for data analysis and also will avoid the problem of
using two simple measures of hits (or matches) and misses (or
nonmatches) that are not independent from one another (i.e., if one
has a high "hit" rate, then one's "miss" rate will be lower).
Another issue regarding the scoring of data from the matrix of
hits and misses concerns the categorization of individuals into different groups, reflecting a more idiographic analysis. For example,
scores from the judgment-performance relational data can be used to
classify subjects into those who are calibrated (high agreement between judgments and performance), those who are overestimators
(relatively high level of confidence in judgments and low level of
performance), or those who are underestimators (low level of confidence in judgments and high level of performance). This type of
scoring classifies individuals into three general groups in terms of
their overall level of calibration. In the same way, Baker (1989b)
suggests that there may be stable individual differences in reading
comprehension monitoring resulting in two basic groups of skilled
and unskilled readers. Again, this would reflect a more personcentered analysis focused on classifying students into two general
groups of skilled and unskilled readers, or at least skilled and unskilled monitors of reading. Pressley and Afflerbach (1995) also
suggest that some type of categorical system th at distinguishes between good and poor readers may capture much of the important
variance. This type of categorical analysis conceptualizes metacognitive
monitoring in terms of different "types" of people who are either
good or poor monitors, rather than the idea that individuals can and
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do vary along a continuum in terms of their monitoring ability.
Accordingly, a model that proposes that the construct of monitoring
should be represented along a continuum should generate and use
the various continuous measures of monitoring discussed above. In
contrast, a more person-centered model of monitoring that stresses a
disjunction between good and poor monitors should generate and
utilize dichotomous scoring methods.
External Component. Questions of how the various measures of
metacognitive judgment and monitoring are related to: (a) each other,
(b) measures of metacognitive knowledge and regulation, and (c)
other constructs such as prior knowledge and general intelligence are
addressed under the external component of construct validity. In the
metamemory research on EOL, JOL, and FOK measures, Leonesio
and Nelson (1990) have shown that these three types of judgment
measures are only weakly related to one another. Correlations
ranging from .12 to .17 among the three measures suggests that EOL,
JOL, and FOK judgments are tapping different aspects of monitoring.
Pressley and his colleagues (e.g., Hunter-Blanks, Ghatala, Pressley, &
Levin, 1988; Pressley, Snyder, Levin, Murray, & Ghatala, 1987b)
examined the relations among various measures of monitoring by
using judgments of learning at different times during the readingtesting process, reflecting EOL, JOL, FOK, and confidence measures
of monitoring. Results indicated that JOLs and confidence ratings
were more closely tied to performance in comparisons to EOLs or
FOKs. In most of the studies by Pressley and his colleagues, students
were assigned to one of three conditions defined by when they were
asked to make their judgments (before reading, after reading, or after
testing). This type of between-subject design does not allow for
comparisons within individuals across measures as in the Leonesio
and Nelson (1990) study. Accordingly, although there is experimental evidence that different types of judgments (i.e., EOLs, JOLs, and
FOKs) can have different relations to performance, thereby suggesting different functions for these components (Nelson, 1996), there is
still a need for within-subject designs that allow for intra individual
comparisons of the relations among EOLs, JOLs, and FOKs.
In terms of how monitoring is related to metacognitive knowledge and control or regulation, the findings are mixed. Pressley and
Afflerbach (1995) have shown that monitoring and regulating are
often reported together in think-aloud protocols. Paris and Oka
(1986) have shown that metacognitive knowledge is weakly related to
performance on error detection tasks with correlations ranging from
.15 to .30. Baker (1989b) notes that predictions of learning (EOLs),
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judgments of comprehension or learning (JOLs), and confidence in
learning (postdictions of learning) are often not clearly related to
performance. This type of mixed evidence signals the need for
research to clarify the conceptual relations among the three general
components of meta cognitive knowledge, monitoring, and control
and regulation as well as their relations with actual performance.
Finally, measures of monitoring should assess monitoring and
not other constructs such as verbal ability, prior knowledge, or
general intelligence (Pressley & Ghatala, 1990). In the error-detection
method described above, students are told to look for errors. This
may invoke a level of monitoring in which the students do not
typically engage when reading. Accordingly, performance on the
error detection task may not represent spontaneous monitoring, the
actual construct of interest. Moreover, students' monitoring per se is
not measured, rather monitoring is operationalized as the reporting of
problems in the text. In addition, students may notice but hesitate to
report problems with the text because they fear being wrong or
because of epistemic beliefs about text that constrain their reporting of
errors. For example, as Baker (1989b) has pointed out, if students
endorse the cooperative text principle of Grice, they generally believe
that texts are correct and should be error-free. When operating with
this belief, students will be unlikely to report all errors in the text. To
the extent that factors other than metacognitive monitoring influence
students' reporting of problems in the text, results of error-detection
studies may be challenged in terms of the evidence they provide of
construct validity.
In the think-aloud studies, spontaneous monitoring is evoked and
can be assessed quantitatively and qualitatively (Pressley & Afflerbach,
1995). However, think-aloud protocols require students to perform
the actual task and simultaneously verbalize their thoughts. The
cognitive demands of this dual task may vary with the expertise or
knowledge of the student, the extent to which students have automatized some of the cognitive activities, the age of the student, and/ or
their verbal ability. Consequently, verbal reports of monitoring may
be confounded with these other constructs and may not provide the
best evidence for construct validity.
Unlike the work on metacognitive knowledge, there is not as
much validity research on how students' monitoring is related to
performance on standardized achievement tests. Given that monitoring is an ongoing process for a specific text or task, the relation to
standardized general achievement tests may be variable. For example, Pressley et al. (1990) found that actual comprehension perfor-
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mance was moderately correlated with scores on a subset of SAT
verbal items (rs ranged from .42 to .59), but that these same scores
were not significantly related to monitoring of comprehension as
measmed by prediction scores (rs ranged from -.24 to .39, but were
not significant due to power of test, small sample sizes). Pressleyet
a1. (1987b) also reported no significant relation between students'
general abilities (as measured with SAT and GRE items) and their
monitoring as measured by estimates of test readiness (a JOL judgment). Paris and Oka (1986), however, did report that measures of
error detection were positively related to performance on a standardized reading test, even after general intelligence was partialled out,
although the magnitude of the relation was small (rs ranged from .09
to .23). Tobias and Everson (1995) reported that their measures of
metacognitive judgments of mathematics knowledge were highly
correlated with scores on the mathematics section of the Metropolitan
Achievement Test (r = .76 for correct estimate scores, and r = -.72 for
incorrect estimates scores). Despite these encomaging results, more
research on how various measmes of monitoring are related to standardized measmes of achievement and ability will improve our understanding of the relations among the different aspects of monitoring and
other constructs such as general ability, achievement, and leaTning.
Generality of Construct Meaning. Research on measures of monitoring have been carried out with groups of students varying in age
and gender but not varying in ethnic/racial/cultural background.
For example, Pressley et a1. (1987a) included students from the first
and fifth grade, Pressley and Ghatala (1989) included first, second,
fomth, fifth, seventh and eighth graders, whereas Pressley et a1. (1987b)
and Hunter-Blanks et a1. (1988) used lmdergraduate students. Baker has
focused on adults and much of the metamemory research of Nelson and
Narens and their colleagues has been carried out with college students.
Although studies by Baker (see summary in Baker, 1989b) have
tended to rely on the adult reader, students of different developmental levels have also been included. In addition, Baker has examined
how error detection might differ among good and poor readers. In
some of these studies gender differences were explored and found
(e.g., Pressley et a1., 1987a; Pressley & Ghatala, 1989). Hence, results
from this work extend over a broad age range and across gender,
suggesting the generalizability of the measures across diverse populations. Nevertheless, like much of the research in psychology and
education (see Betancourt & Lopez, 1993; Graham, 1992), there is a
large void in terms of our understanding of these constructs and
measures in diverse cultural, racial, and ethnic populations.
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Besides this issue of sample generality, there remains the perpetual and crucial issue of domain generality. Does a general monitoring skill exist or is monitoring dependent on domain expertise or
other personal and contextual factors (Schraw, Dunkle, Bendixen, &
Roedel,1995)7 Schraw et al. (1995) have shown that there are domaingeneral and domain-specific aspects of metacognitive monitoring.
They found that confidence judgments were correlated across different domains of knowledge and a factor analysis of several different
measures of monitoring (confidence, discrimination, bias) did generate one general monitoring factor. However, they also found that a
measure of monitoring accuracy (the discrimination score, which
takes into account correct and incorrect predictions) showed a domain-specific pattern of results. They suggest that there may be a
developmental progression from a domain-specific expertise to a
general monitoring skill. Accordingly, measures of monitoring have
to be sensitive to developmental and domain-specific factors that
might bear on the construct validity of domain-general measures of
monitoring.
Relevance and Utility Concerns for Test Use. As noted above in the
metacognitive knowledge section, measures vary in their relevance
and utility for researchers versus practitioners. Think-aloud protocols offer a window into the kinds of monitoring processes that
individuals use as they perform cognitive tasks and are therefore
probably best suited for researchers who are attempting to provide a
detailed description of the various monitoring processes (Pressley &
Afflerbach, 1995). However, protocol analysis is time and laborintensive, requires specific training, and cannot be used easily or
efficiently with large groups of students thereby limiting its use in
classroom settings. In contrast, methods like the error-detection tasks
can be used by both researchers and teachers. These tasks do not rely
on verbal reports and can be tied closely to the types of classroom
tasks in which many students engage on a regular basis such as
reading different texts. As such, they provide opportunities for
teachers to examine monitoring in their students quickly and to guide
lessons on reading comprehension skills.
Formal measures of EOL, JOL, FOK, and confidence are probably
best suited for use by researchers. It seems unlikely that teachers
would have students go through and rate all the items on a test or
questions on a worksheet in terms of their difficulty before, during,
and/ or after performing the task. However, teachers can use informal methods of assessment by asking students to think about their
prior knowledge before reading a text, or self-question themselves
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about their understanding (a good strategy for monitoring) during
reading, or self-test themselves after reading a text. These informal
assessment procedures may be useful to teachers, at a very global
level, to determine students' ability to monitor their comprehension.
Summary. There are a number of instruments that can be used to
assess metacognitive judgment and monitoring skills. Although each
of the measures discussed in this section is backed by considerable
empirical data, there remain a number of unresolved issues. First, at
a conceptual level, researchers need to be careful in terms of their
labels for different aspects of metacognitive judgments in terms of
EOLs, JOLs, FOKs, and confidence ratings. The proliferation of
different labels for the same basic constructs makes it difficult to
summarize and compare results from different studies. If any science
is to make significant advances, there is a need for clearly defined and
agreed-upon labels for the constructs under study. The area of
metacognitive monitoring has generated a large number of different
terms that do not help facilitate communication. We propose that the
framework of EOLs, JOLs, FOKs, and confidence judgments is a
reasonable start in the direction of fostering clarity and consensus.
Second, because current measures are primarily restricted to reading
and mathematics, questions regarding the operation of monitoring in
other domains remain unanswered. Third, there remains an issue
about the conceptual and empirical separation of monitoring from
regulating. As we saw in the previous section on metacognitive
knowledge, our theoretical models of metacognitive monitoring propose more distinctions and subcomponents than what is often found
in our empirical data. In particular, most models propose a separation of monitoring and regulation, but these two components are
often fused in learning. It may be difficult to develop assessment
instruments that can reliably and validly tease these subcomponents
apart, so our conceptual models may have to be adjusted unless we
can develop instruments with higher resolution power. Fourth, in
terms of scoring measures of metacognitive judgments (structural
component), more careful measures of both association and accuracy
need to be used as Schraw (1995) has proposed. Fifth, although the
evidence for the external component of construct validity is fairly
good, there is still a need for more research with diverse samples to
improve the generality of construct meaning. Finally, efforts are
needed to bridge the gap between experimental methods of assessing
meta cognitive monitoring (e.g., EOLs, JOLs, etc. from metamemory
paradigm; Nelson & Narens, 1990) as well as the error detection tasks
and think-aloud protocols and those (e.g., ratings of knowledge; see
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Tobias, this volume) that can be more easily used in classrooms by
researchers and teachers.
Measures of Self-Regulation and Control of Cognition

Although there are data suggesting that monitoring and regulation are often fused in actual performance (Pressley & Afflerbach,
1995), measures have been developed that focus more on regulation
and control of cognition than on monitoring. Three general methods
have been used to assess regulation: think-aloud protocols, self-report
questionnaires, and interviews. We have already described thinkaloud protocols in the previous section. Here we concentrate on selfreport questionnaires and interviews. A number of different
questionnaires have been used to assess various aspects of regulation
including the Learning and Study Strategies Inventory or LASSI
(Weinstein et al., 1987; Weinstein et al., 1988), the Motivated Strategies
for Learning Questionnaire or MSLQ (Pintrich & De Groot, 1990; Pintrich,
Smith et al., 1993) and other more focused instruments such as Kuhl's
action-control scale (Kuhl, 1985) and other study skills instruments such
as Brown and Holtzman's (1967) Survey of Study Habits and Attitudes.
Given our research with the MSLQ, we concentrate on that instrument
as representative of a questionnaire to measure self-regulated learning.
For comparative purposes, we consider some aspects of the LASS!.
Self-regulated learning has also been measured in various interview studies, but the Self-Regulated Learning Interview Schedule
(SRLIS) developed by Zimmerman and Martinez-Pons (1986, 1988) is
the most formalized interview measure available, so we concentrate
on this exemplar in this section. Together, these three instrumentsthe MSLQ, the LASSI, and the SRLIS-can be used to illustrate some
of the important construct validity issues concerning assessments of
students' regulation of their cognition.
The MSLQ and LASSI are self-report instruments that ask students to respond to Likert-type items concerning their level of cognitive strategy use and their regulation of cognition. The key difference
between the two instruments is the theoretical assumption about the
nature of self-regulation underlying their development. The LASSI
was developed from a domain-general perspective. Students are
asked about what they do in general in terms of their learning. The
MSLQ reflects a more domain-specific view, at least in terms of
domain specificity being operationalized at the course level. Students
are asked to respond to the items in terms of what they do in a specific
course or class. The MSLQ is not task specific (e.g., exam, reading
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textbook, writing a paper) or knowledge-base specific (biology, mathematics, history, etc.), which might be important from some perspectives (see Schraw et al., 1995).
In terms of cognitive strategy use, individual scales on the MSLQ
are designed to assess rehearsal, elaboration, organization, and critical thinking, whereas metacognitive monitoring and self-regulation
are assessed using one 12-item scale (Pintrich, Smith et al., 1993). In
addition, resource management strategies are assessed in four different scales, including time and study management, effort regulation,
peer learning, and help seeking (Pintrich, Smith et al., 1993). A typical
question from the regulation scale of the MSLQ states, "When I become
confused about something I'm reading for this class, I go back and try
to figure it out."
The SRLIS, using an individual-interview format, asks respondents about specific tasks with follow-up probes questioning how
they would behave in six different academic contexts (Zimmerman &
Martinez-Pons, 1986). These contexts are a classroom discussion,
short writing assignment, mathematics assignment, end-of-term test,
homework assignment, and studying at home. Students are presented with a one- or two-sentence description of the context and then
asked about their methods for managing the situation (Zimmerman &
Martinez-Pons, 1986). For example, for the test-taking context students are told, "Most teachers give a test at the end of the marking
period, and these tests greatly determine the final grade." Then, they
are asked "Do you have a particular method for preparing for a test
in classes like English or history?" Whereas ratings of the items on the
MSLQ are averaged into scales, SRLIS responses are categorized into
1 of 14 different categories representing knowledge (e.g., organizing),
monitoring behavior (e.g., keeping records, self-evaluation), strategy
use (e.g., rehearsing and memorizing), and regulation (e.g., goal
setting and planning).
Content Component. As reflected in the many scales of the MSLQ
and the 14 different categories of strategies from the SRLIS, items on
these measures attempt to cover important content in self-regulation
and control of cognition. There is also evidence that these two
measures strive to represent content from the diverse domain of
regulation strategies by sampling strategies related to many different
academic activities. The MSLQ queries students about one particular
class and focuses on reading and study activities, although a few
items refer to other academic situations (e.g., note taking, listening to
lectures). In other research, however, items on the MSLQ have been
modified to cover specifically a broader range of academic contexts
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by preceding items with cues to different situations such as "When I
study for a test ...," "When I do homework .. .," or "When the teacher
is talking ... " (Pintrich & De Groot, 1990). More recently, items from
this instrument have been used specifically to assess regulation within
different subject areas in order to evaluate between-domain differences (Wolters & Pintrich, 1998).
The SRLIS also asks students to report their strategy use across a
variety of academic tasks (e.g., classroom discussion, test taking, and
homework) and different academic subject areas (e.g., history, mathematics). Further, this open-ended interview allows students freedom to respond with the particular strategies they use in these
different contexts. Overall, both of these measures provide a breadth
of coverage in terms of strategies for different tasks and subject areas
as well as the type of strategies assessed. This coverage seems to
provide reasonable content representativeness of the many different
control and regulation strategies available relative to other assessments that focus on one type of task, one academic domain, or a small
number of strategies.
Substantive Component. The MSLQ provides a reasonable match
between the theoretical model and the empirical results of confirmatory factor analyses with data from college students (see Pintrich,
Smith et al., 1993). For example, in our structural equation models we
have a chi square/ratio of 2.26 (values under 5.00 are considered
optimal), a GFI of .78 (GFls of .90 or above are considered optimal),
and a CN of 180 (CNs of 200 and above are considered optimal).
Although some of the fit statistics for our structural equation models
could be improved by having a less theoretically based factor structure, we have opted to maintain the theoretical structure as long as
the data provide a reasonable fit to the model. Of course, this problem
of lack of a stronger fit between the theoretical model and the actual
empirical data parallels the problems mentioned previously in our
discussion of both metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive monitoring. In general, the problem remains that our conceptual models
propose more components and complexity than are supported by the
empirical data.
Using data from younger students, such as junior high school
students, we have not been able to reproduce as detailed a factor
structure as in the college data (Pintrich & De Groot, 1990). For
example, rather than three scales that reflect different types of cognitive strategy use, the junior high data only formed one scale reflecting
students' combined use of rehearsal, elaboration, and organizational
strategies. In the same fashion, the two scales of metacognitive and
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effort management, distinct in the college student data, combined into
one scale with the junior high students. These results could reflect the
general developmental orthogenetic principle of Werner (1948), which
suggests that, with development, systems change from being relatively undifferentiated to having very differentiated components organized into a hierarchy. On the other hand, the results could just
reflect a problem in generality of construct meaning with younger
students or a problem with construct irrelevant variance arising from
the use of self-reports with young students.
In both the college and junior high data, there was no support for
separate metacognitive scales of planning, monitoring, and regulating. Hence, although the lmderlying theory suggests that these
aspects of metacognition and self-regulation should be distinguishable, the data do not support this assumption. Results such as these
challenge the substantial component of construct validity and highlight the grain size and instrument resolution problem mentioned
previously.
The SRLIS produces interview data coded according to 14 different categories of strategies that are based upon a specific theory of
self-regulation (see Zimmerman, 1989, 1994). On one hand, given that
these categories determine the type of information extracted from
students' interviews, this instrument may have a higher degree of
substantive validity than interviews that code responses using post
hoc categories. On the other hand, Zimmerman and Martinez-Pons
(1988) have shown that a principal component analysis groups 12 out
of 14 categories into one large factor that they call Student SelfRegulated Learning. Again, paralleling the data from the IRA and
MAlon metacognitive knowledge, the think-aloud protocol data
from Pressley and Afflerbach (1995) on metacognitive monitoring,
and the MSLQ data on regulation, these findings from the SRLIS
suggest that students who engage in one component of self-regulated
learning also engage in other components. Accordingly, efforts to
separate the different components into theoretically smaller subcomponents may not be justified by the empirical data.
Taken together, the data from the MSLQ and SRLIS, as well as the
monitoring data from the think-aloud protocols, suggest that although we can distinguish monitoring and regulation theoretically,
the empirical data are more ambiguous. It appears that some students
tend to engage in a variety of these strategies and other students are
less likely to report using them. There is clearly a need for more
specification of the theoretical model or nomological network of
constructs that involve both monitoring and regulation, followed by

82

PINTRICHIWOLTERS/BAXTER

careful research on how these improved models can help us develop
substantively valid and high resolution measures.
Structural Component. One difficulty with data from the SRLIS is
that it is not easy to quantify the scores in a manner that will yield
interval data. Zimmerman and Martinez-Pons (1986), for example,
proposed and tested three different methods for scoring results from
the SRLIS. Based on its ability to distinguish between students of
different achievement groups (using the Metropolitan Achievement
Tests), Zimmerman and Martinez-Pons (1986) chose a scoring method
dependent on students' mention of a particular strategy and their
report of how often they used that strategy. This overall measure
seemed to provide a better index than did counts of strategy use or
strategy frequency, although these other two measures also discriminated between the two achievement groups.
The MSLQ is scored by taking the mean of the students' ratings
for the items that comprise a scale. However, it should be noted that
the MSLQ does not provide any normative data for comparison as
does the LASS!. Users of the LASSI have available the norms for a
large sample of students and comparisons can be made between an
individual's score on a scale and the scale score based on the normative
sample. In contrast, the MSLQ is based on the assumption that students'
use of strategies and self-regulation may vary by type of course and
specific classes and so norms are not provided. Although this may be
more in line with current views of self-regulated learning, lack of
normative data restricts some of the practical uses of the MSLQ.
Given the differences in scoring and conceptual models, there
may be some evidence to support the use of more idiographic or
person-centered categorical systems of scoring that simply classify
students into good or poor self-regulators or sh'ategy users (see
Pressley, Harris, & Marks, 1992). The use of norms, as in the LASSI,
suggests that students can be compared and then classified into
different categories of more or less self-regulating learners. The
interview data from the SRLIS could also be used in such a manner.
As was discussed in the section on monitoring, this distinction between continuous versus categorical scoring systems is an important
one for future research to address.
External Component. One issue with the MSLQ and the SRLIS is
that, like the assessments of monitoring, it is not clear if the measures
primarily assess the construct of interest Both of these instruments
ask students to report, retrospectively, how they behave in general
types of situations. These measures do not question students about a
previously completed specific task. Because of this format, students
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are more apt to access long-term memory and make generalizations
about what they believe they do in a particular situation. Consequently, self-reports have been criticized for their potential to be
biased or inaccurate (Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Garner, 1988; Pressley
& Afflerbach, 1995). For instance, on the MSLQ students may endorse
the statement "I try to change the way I study in order to fit the course
requirements and instructor's teaching style," not because they really
change their study behavior, but because they know that this would
be a good strategy. In this case, student responses may tap into
metacognitive knowledge as well as regulation of cognition. One way
to remedy this problem is to adapt items so that students are referring
to specific recent incidents or recently completed tasks when they
respond. Nevertheless, these self-report measures are still subject to
problems of students having conscious access to their strategy use,
being able to verbalize their stra tegy use, as well as being unbiased
and accurate in their reporting (i.e., reporting more strategy use than
actually engaged in for social desirability reasons).
Another way to address this problem would be to assess control
and regulation using a more "on-line" methodology such as stimulated
recall or think-aloud. Howard-Rose and Wume (1993), for example,
devised a task in which students reported what they were thinking and
doing while they were still in the process of reading a passage, perhaps
giving a more direct measure of regulation and monitorulg. The
considerable time and effort involved Ul instructiI1.g students in how to
perform this task combined with the actual administration time,
reduce the utility of this method. Furthermore, the ability to generalize this task to other tasks and other populations may be limited to older
students who are able to manage the cognitive load produced by
simultaneous task completion and the thulk-aloud task.
Although these problems of consh·uct validity are always present
with self-report instruments, there is evidence bearing on the external
component of construct validity that supports the use of self-report
instruments. Students' scores on the regulation portions of the MSLQ
and the SRLIS have been linked in predictable ways to a nwnber of other
indicators of learning, performance, and motivation. Strategy use and
regulation, as measured by the MSLQ, were related to seventh-grade
students' fu·st and second semester grades and theu· achievement on
different types of classroom tasks where regulation may influence
performance (Pultrich & Garcia, 1991; Pinh·ich & De Groot, 1990). For
example, PUltricll and De Groot (1990) fOlmd that the MSLQ regulation
scale was related to students' performance durUlg seatwork, on tests or
quizzes, and on report writing. Although correlations were not high (I'S
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range from .20 to .32), they do indicate some relation between academic performance and the regulation scales on the MSLQ. Scores on
the strategy use and regulation scales of the MSLQ have been related,
in theoretically predictable ways, to components of students' motivation including self-efficacy, task value, intrinsic motivation and testanxiety (Pintrich, 1989; Pintrich & De Groot, 1990; Pintrich & Garcia,
1991; Pintrich, Roeser, & De Groot, 1994; Pintrich, Smith et al., 1993).
Whereas the SRLIS has not been linked to performance on specific
classroom tasks like the MSLQ, Zimmerman and Martinez-Pons (1986,
1988) did find that students' responses to the SRLIS were related to
teachers' ratings of students' efforts at regulation and to achievement
on the Metropolitan Achievement Test. In short, positive efforts have
been made to examine the expected relations between strategy use
and regulation as measured by the MSLQ and the SRLIS and other
constructs such as achievement, teachers' grades and ratings, and
motivational constructs. Although the magnihlde of the relations is
modest, the evidence indicates that scores on these instruments, at a
minimum, can distinguish between high and low achievers in classroom settings as predicted by our conceptual and theoretical models
of self-regulated learning.
Generality of Construct Meaning. The generalizability of an assessment across different domains is an important aspect of construct
validity. The MSLQ and the SRLIS have items that refer to distinct
academic tasks and subject areas. Hence, results about students'
ability to regulate their cognition may not be limited to a single
domain as the case may be with instruments that reference only one
domain (i.e., reading comprehension).
As we have noted, the diversity and size of the samples used in
the studies of these measures are important to consider when assessing generality of construct meaning. Data for the MSLQ were initially
collected with a fairly large number of college students (different
samples of 326, 687, 758 and 380, for a total of over 2,000) from
different types of institutions (research universities, comprehensive
universities, small liberal arts colleges, and community colleges)
spanning many different subject areas (see Pintrich, Smith et al., 1993).
It has also been used extensively with middle school students (Pintrich
& De Groot, 1990; Pintrich et al., 1994), but has not, to our knowledge,
been used specifically to examine students below the seventh grade or
special populations such as students with learning disabilities or
gifted students. Self-report questionnaires may be difficult for younger
children or those of lower achievement levels who may not be able to
read the items on the questionnaire. Interviews or reading the
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questionnaire items to students can help in this regard, but interviews
may still be better with younger children. In terms of sampling issues,
Zimmerman and Martinez-Pons (1988) used the SRLIS to examine
metacognition and self-regulation in a relatively small sample (N = 80)
of high and low track high school students. Clearly, as we have already
noted for the measures of both metacognitive knowledge and monitoring, there is a need for research on these control and regulation instruments with more ethnically and racially diverse populations as well as
students across a range of grade (age) and achievement levels.
Relevance and Utility Concerns of Test Use. One reason for the
difference in the samples sizes of studies using the MSLQ and those
using the SRLIS is likely the relative ease of administration of the
MSLQ. Self-report measures, as exemplified by the MSLQ, can have
relatively high degrees of utility value for research studies or more
practical uses because they can be completed quickly and easily by
large numbers of students. In addition, they can be used by teachers
or researchers in classroom settings without much disruption of
routines. One or two individuals can administer the questionnaire to
large numbers of students over a relatively short time frame and the
data collected are fairly easily transferred to analyzable form.
In comparison, even short interviews such as the SRLIS must be
individually administered and therefore take substantially longer to
complete. Further, the resulting data require a labor intensive effort
to change into a usable format. Thus, one advantage to questionnaires
such as the MSLQ or LASSI is that the researcher is able to collect a
great deal of information quickly and easily. At the same time, openended interviews like the SRLIS have an advantage in that they allow
students more freedom to respond because they do not limit responses to particular strategies. This aspect of these interviews may
increase the relevance that scores have for more diagnostic purposes.
The interview data can provide a good window into the students'
general schema for learning, a more "Gestalt" like view of their approach to learning and self-regulation that can get lost in the division of
self-regulated learning into the multiple scales of the MSLQ.
Summary. Both self-report questionnaires and interview methods
can provide reasonable measures of control of learning and selfregulated learning. First, these measures seem to provide good
content representativeness of a number of different types of general
strategies for control and regulation of learning, although they do not
include domain-specific control and regulation strategies (e.g., a control strategy for math problem solving; a control strategy for writing
an essay). Second, as noted in our discussion of measures of
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metacognitive knowledge and monitoring, there are still major questions about the fit between the complex theoretical models (in terms
of number of subcomponents) and the somewhat simple models
supported by the empirical data. Third, the scoring systems are
reasonable and easy to use, although there still remain questions
concerning the use. of continuous measures of self-regulation versus
categorical scoring systems based on a simple dichotomy of good and
poor self-regulators or strategy users (see Pressley, Harris, & Marks,
1992). Fourth, the major issue in terms of construct validity of selfreport questionnaires or interviews concerns their susceptibility to
problems of construct-irrelevant variance stemming from differences
in individuals' ability to consciously access their strategy use and
control efforts, verbalize their strategy use, read the questionnaire
items, or their susceptibility to social desirability or other forms of
bias. Much work needs to be done to resolve these problems with
self-report questionnaires and interviews. Fifth, as with all the
measures there is a great need for the use of more diverse samples.
Finally, questionnaires can be used easily and quickly with large
groups of students in classroom situations and can be a very practical
alternative to more experimental methods. Interviews can avoid
some of the problems of questionnaires in terms of construct irrelevant variance by the judicious use of probes and focusing the student
on specific tasks, but they are more time-consuming and costly to use.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Given our discussion of various measures of metacognition and
self-regulated learning, there are a number of conclusions that can be
drawn from our review of the evidence for the construct validity of
these measures. These conclusions suggest several fruitful directions
for research and development activities.
1. There is no one "perfect" measure of metacognition.
As we have seen throughout this chapter, there are a number of
different measures and methods that have been used. Oftentimes the
strength of one method is the weakness of another. Certain methods,
such as think-aloud protocols, although potentially supplying "realtime" measures of metacognition and self-regulated learning in given
contexts are difficult to use on a large-scale basis. In contrast, self-report
questiom1aires are high in applied utility, but are open to criticism
regarding the potential for consh'uct-irrelevant variance to be generated
by the self-reports. Individual researchers and practitioners must deter-
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mine what their purposes and needs are and then make informed
choices about what measures to use given their own goals and the
context in which they are workin,g.

2. Different instruments measure different components of metacognition.
Measures of metacognitive knowledge do not necessarily tap
into aspects of monitoring or regulation. In fact, different measures
of metacognitive judgment or monitoring do not even assess the
same components of metacognitive monitoring and judgment. Consequently individuals must be clear on which aspect they are interested in and choose instruments that match their interest because the
measures cannot be used interchangeably. To facilitate this type of
informed decision making, researchers and instrument developers
need to be clear about which component of metacognition their
instrument assesses and label their instrument accordingly. We have
proposed a general three-component model of metacognition and
self-regulated learning that includes a number of important subcomponents. We think this model is grounded in current theory and
research and should be helpful in clarifying which components of
metacognition the various instruments are tapping. Instrument
developers who use this three-component model of meta cognition
and self-regulated learning and label their instruments in line with it
will ensure some consistency in assessment use and facilitate crossstudy comparisons of empirical findings.

3. Further specification of the theoretical relations among the different
components of metacognition and self-regulated learning would be helpful
for instrument development.
As has been noted throughout this chapter, there is a disjunction
between our theoretical models and the empirical data, particularly
with respect to monitoring and regulation. Most models separate
these two components and the separation makes sense intuitively
and conceptually, but the empirical data argue against a separation.
This is the problem of "grain size" and instrument resolution (see
Howard-Rose & Winne, 1993). For some purposes, a general distinction between high and low lev~ls of self-regulation (Zimmerman &
Martinez-Pons, 1986, 1988), or good and poor strategy users (Pressley
et aI, 1992), or more or less cognitive engagement (Pintrich &
Schrauben, 1992) can be fruitful. In other contexts and given other
research goals, there is a need for more fine-grained analysis of the
component and subcomponent processes. Theoretical and empirical
work on these issues will clarify our models and help us develop
more conceptually sound and useful instruments.
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4. Construct validity studies are needed to test our theoretical models
and the validity of our assessment instruments.
Given that metacognition and self-regulated learning include a
number of different components and that there are a number of
different methods that can be used to assess these components, there
is a need for careful and well-designed construct validity studies. For
example, multi trait, multimethod (MTMM) studies can be used to
clarify our theoretical models as well as provide us with useful
information about our instruments. The recent MTMM study by
Howard-Rose and Winne (1993) on self-regulated learning demonstrates how a MTMM study can help to clarify our conceptual models
as well as suggest how best to measure different components of
metacognition and self-regulated learning. There have been very few
carefully done studies like this in the area of metacognitton and selfregulation and more MTMM studies would certainly benefit the field.
At the same time, we can go beyond the correlational analyses of
MTMM studies and examine the different factors that contribute to
the variance of our measurement instruments through the use of
generalizability studies. For example, generalizability studies (see
Baxter & Shavelson, 1994; Gao et al., 1996) can provide data on the
comparability of different tasks and methods for assessing the different components of metacognition and self-regulation.
5. One of the most problematic issues from both theoretical and
measurement perspectives is the domain specificity vs. generality issue.
Metacognition and self-regulated learning are generally measured with respect to one domain such as reading comprehension,
but they are often considered domain-general construc ts that transfer
or generalize across domains. For example, it is often assumed that
students who are high in meta cognitive monitoring or general selfregulation for one task will also be able to transfer these skills to
another task or domain. In terms of content representativeness,
many of our measures have focused on the content areas of memory
or reading comprehension. There is a need for more research and
development in other academic areas such as mathematics, science,
and social studies. In addition, in our measures of metacognition and
self-regulated learning, we need to address how individual scores on
our instrument generalize or transfer across domains (see Schraw et
al., 1995). Our theoretical models have not always been clear concerning how transfer is assumed to occur across situations, tasks, or
domains, so it is not surprising that our measurement efforts have
been less than successful in coping with this issue. The issue of
domain specificity and transfer may be the largest and most intractable problem confronting our theoretical and assessment efforts.
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6. The use of performance assessments may help us measure both
knowledge and metacognition within and across domains.
Recent developments in the use of performance assessments may
help us resolve the tension between knowledge-based or domainspecific models of learning and cognition that focus on students' prior
knowledge and more domain-general models that stress the role of
metacognition and self-regulated learning. For example, Baxter,
Elder, and Glaser (1994, 1996), have examined performance assessments designed to provide measures of students' knowledge in
science domains (life science, physical science). These performance
assessments use tasks that are meaningful and relevant to students and
are typically used in classroom settings to monitor instruction. Interviews of students while carrying out the assessment provided evidence
of general monitoring and regulation strategies. Moreover, students
who performed well on the science assessment displayed more frequent
and flexible monitoring strategies than did students who performed less
well. Research that attempts to examine the use of metacognitive
strategies in everyday classroom contexts and how these strategies
relate to performance within and across tasks sheds important light on
our lmderstanding of metacognition and suggests how insh·uctional
changes might be implemented to enhance learning in the classroom.
7. There is a need for longitudinal research across ages.
Cross-sectional studies of different aged students show that
metacognition develops with age and experience, but we have relatively few studies that show metacognitive development within individuals. We need studies to test the theory that children first develop
domain-specific metacognitive knowledge or strategies, followed by
a more generalized transfer of these strategies to a number of domains
(see Schraw et al., 1995). Moreover, these kinds of studies can guide
instrument development and perhaps lead to different types of measures being used at different ages.
8. There is a need for research with diverse populations.
Obviously, as we have pointed out throughout this chapter, there is
a need for more research and test development activities that include
diverse ethnic and racial groups. Although most models of metacognition
should be applicable to all groups of individuals, there is some evidence
that different groups of students may make judgments about themselves in somewhat different ways. Graham (1994) points out that many
African-American students' perceptions of their learning and confidelKe in their ability are not highly correlated with their actual achievement scores or performance. As we have discussed in this paper, this is
a problem in the calibration of monitoring judgments and actual perfor-
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mance. Graham (1994) notes U1at it is not clear theoretically why fuis
may be the case, but there have been suggestions that fuis is an adaptive
coping strategy given U1at many of these students have generally low
academic performance. If this explanation is correct, U1en it suggests
that for these students, they may be making poor judgments of their
learning and understanding in order to maintain their motivation and
self-beliefs. However, fuis poor calibration can have detrimental effects
on the use of regulating strategies. If the students believe that U1ey are
learning, when they are not, then they will be unlikely to change or
effectively regulate their cognition and learning.
This type of dynamic is not addressed in most of the research on
metacognitive monitoring and self-regulated learning and we need
to test our models with diverse groups of students to determine if
there are different processes involved for some of these groups. To
the extent that there are different processes for these groups, and our
normative models of metacognition and self-regulated learning do
not include these processes, then this can result in instruments that
suffer from construct underrepresentation of these different processes for diverse groups. Alternatively, our current models and
instruments may suffer from problems of construct-irrelevant variance if these different groups respond to our instruments in a
different manner than what is predicted by our normative models.
In summary, our models and instruments are developed to the
point that they are useful for field work and the improvement of
practic~ . At the same time, there is much theoretical and empirical
work to be done in the area of metacognition and self-regulation to
clarify our models and substantiate the "adequacy and appropriateness of inferences and actions based on test scores" (Messick, 1989, p.
13). We hope that the discussion in this chapter will stimulate
researchers in the field to continue to question their instruments in an
effort to improve our assessment methods and build our understanding of the nature of metacognition and self-regulation.
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It has been about 25 years now since researchers first became
interested in the study of metacognition, with the onset of interest
marked by the publication of the 1975 metamemory interview study
of Kreutzer, Leonard, and Flavell and the seminal theoretical work of
John Flavell (1976) and Ann Brown (1978). The early work by
developmental psychologists on age-related differences in children's
metacognition captured the attention of researchers concerned with
individual differences in academic achievement in children as well as
adults. Within academic domains, most of the research has been
focused on reading and studying (Baker & Brown, 1984; ForrestPressley & Waller, 1984; Garner, 1987; Paris, Wasik, & Turner, 1991),
but mathematics (Van Haneghan & Baker, 1989), writing (Scardamalia
& Bereiter, 1985), and science (Baker, 1991) have also received attention. The consistent finding has been that students who are more
successful in a domain exhibit higher levels of meta cognitive knowledge about the domain and are more skilled at regulating their
cognitive processes.
Clearly, the construct of metacognition has had wide appeal and
wide applicability, stimulating a great deal of research across a broad
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spectrum of psychological problems and issues, as well as a growing
amount of intervention work in classrooms. In a 1994 review paper on
social influences on metacognitive development, Baker wrote, "The
popular appeal of metacognition has led to the widespread adoption
and somewhat uncritical acceptance of the construct among educators. This situation is obviously problematic from a scientific standpoint and makes clear the need for further basic research on how
metacognition develops, the role of metacognition in cognitive development, and how metacognition may best be fostered" (pp. 202-203) .
The concern about uncritical acceptance is no less apt with regard to
measurement; let us therefore amend the final sentence to end with
and measured.
In this chapter, we address the issue of metacognitive assessment
first by examining methods of measuring metacognition used in
empirical research, including questionnaires, interviews, think-aloud
procedures, error-detection procedures, and various on-line measures. We then examine some of the instruments that have been
subjected to tests of reliability and validity by independent investigators; their numbers are few. Next we consider recommendations for
assessing metacognition that are published in books and journals for
teachers and school psychologists; their numbers are many. Throughout, primary emphasis is on metacognition as it relates to reading and
studying, but some reference is made to assessment of meta cognition
in other domains as well (e.g., metamemory, problem solving).
The literature focusing specifically on metacognitive assessment is
sparse, but many researchers have discussed issues related to assessment in their own empirical investigations as they seek to justifiy the
measures they have chosen. In addition, much relevant writing appears
in papers on the assessment of reading or academic achievement in
general rather than the assessment of metacogniti~n per se. We will
consider the place of metacognition in the altemative assessments
currently being promoted in the educational community. We conclude
the chapter with discussion of general issues pertaining to the assessment of metacognition and recommendations for future directions.
DEFINITIONAL ISSUES

How meta cognition is defined of course has important implications for how it is measured. The term initially was used by Flavell
(1976) and by Brown (1978) in their early work in the 1970s to refer
to knowledge about cognition and regulation of cognition. This twocomponent concep tualization of metacognition has been widely used
in the literature since that time. However, Brown (1987) came to
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believe that using the term to refer to two distinct areas of research
creates confusion, clouding interpretation of research findings. In
fact, White (1988) identified four possible facets to metacognition: (a)
propositional knowledge about metacognition, (b) awareness of personal thinking, (c) ability to regulate thinking, and (d) readiness to
apply that ability, and he wrote: ''It is essential to know which of
these are meant when an author refers to metacognition in order for
communication to be clear" (p. 71). Some researchers have called for
restricting its definition to knowledge about cognition (e.g.,
Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982), excluding the regulatory processes.
For example, Paris and his colleagues define the term as knowledge
about cognitive states and abilities that can be shared (e.g., Paris,
Jacobs, & Cross, 1987; Paris & Winograd, 1990). On the other hand,
Sternberg (1991) believes that research on metacognition got off to a
false start with its emphasis on what we know about our own
thinking rather than on how we control our thinking.
Even today, there is still no consensus as to how metacognition
should be defined. However, our own definition of metacognition
includes both knowledge and control components (e.g., Baker, 1985b,
1994,1996), and so we will be addressing measurement issues related
to both. Those readers who prefer the more restrictive usage perhaps
can be satisfied by thinking "cognitive monitoring" when we refer to
metacognitive regulation or control.
Another definitional disagreement that has important implications
with respect to measurement is whether metacognition is necessarily
conscious. Some researchers have suggested that meta cognition can be
unconscious, tacit, and inaccessible (Pressley, Borkowski, & Schneider,
1987). However, the difficulty of measuring something that is unconscious and inaccessible is of course insurmountable, and therefore the
position we have adopted is that metacognition refers to knowledge and
control of cognition that is conscious or accessible to consciousness.
Two recent trends have expanded the scope of inquiry in
metacognition, trends that other authors in this book have had a
leading role in establishing. The first is the interest in "self-regulated
learning," which refers to learning that is self-directed, intrinsically
motivated, and under the deliberate, strategic control of the learner
(Pintrich & DeGroot, 1990; Schunk, 1989). The term self-regulation is
sometimes used in the literature to refer to the use of skills included
within the regulatory component of metacognition, such as planning,
monitoring, and evaluating. For example, Borkowski, Day, Saenz,
Dietmeyer, Estrada, and Groteluschen (1992) wrote that self-regulation is the "heart" of metacognition.
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The second trend is the recognition that one cannot understand
how and why people perform as they do on cognitive tasks without
an examination of motivational and affective as well as metacognitive
factors (Paris & Winograd, 1990; Pintrich & DeGroot, 1990; Pressley
et al., 1987). Indeed, Borkowski, Pressley, and their colleagues (e.g.,
Borkowski, Carr, Rellinger, & Pressley, 1990; Borkowski et al., 1992)
have argued that the "self-system" underlies the development of a
metacognitive system. And Paris and Winograd suggested expanding the scope of metacognition to include affective and motivational
aspects of thinking. In response to these new conceptualizations,
measures of metacognition are often paired in research now with
those that tap self-regulated learning as well as self-system factors
such as attributional beliefs about the causes of success and failure
and concepts of self as a learner.
METHODS FOR ASSESS ING METACOGNITION USED IN BASIC
RESEARCH

When one of us (LB) first set out in 1979 to synthesize the
literature on metacognitive skills and reading for the Baker and
Brown (1984) Handbook of Reading Research chapter, the term
metacognition was seldom used. However, it was possible to identify
a variety of methods that provided information about what we had
defined as metacognition, even though it may not have been called
this by the researchers who devised the measures. These methods are
still widely used both in reading research and in other domains as
well. To measure metacognitive knowledge about reading, researchers have relied on interviews and questionnaires. To measure
metacognitive control in reading, or comprehension monitoring,
researchers have used a variety of measures: detection of errors in
passages; ratings of felt w1derstanding; self-corrections during oral
reading; completion of cloze tasks; on-line measures of processing
during reading (e.g., eye movements and reading times); and retrospective or concurrent verbal reports (e.g., thinking aloud). In the
chapter, we discussed the limitations of the various measures, and
many publications since that time have also done so (Afflerbach &
Johnston, 1984; Baker, 1985b, 1989; Garner, 1987; 1988; Pressley &
Afflerbach, 1995; Winograd & Johnston, 1982). Because extensive
discussions are available elsewhere, we will not devote much attention to these issues. However, because many of these measures are
still in use in research and they are recommended for use by teachers
and practitioners as well, it is important to summarize the relevant
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issues here. We focus here on two approaches that are widely used but
also widely criticized: verbal reports and the error detection paradigm.
Verbal Reports

One of the most frequently used approaches for assessing both
metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive control is to ask students directly about what they know or what they do. Such selfreports have been collected in a variety of ways. For assessing
metacognitive control, participants may be asked to think aloud about
what they were doing and thinking as they solved a problem or read
a text or to provide written comments periodically throughout the
session (e.g., Bereiter & Bird, 1985; Cerro & Baker, 1993; Garner &
Alexander, 1982). Or they may be asked to complete checklists of
strategies they use (e.g., Phifer & Glover, 1982) or they may complete
questiOlmaires or Shldy strategy inventories (Cerro, 1995; Pintrich &
DeGroot, 1990; Schraw & Dennison, 1994; Weinstein, Zimmerman, &
Palmer, 1988). Students may be asked to report their strategies retrospectively or introspectively (e.g., Fischer & Mandl, 1984; Garner,
1982; Lundeberg, 1987; Winser, 1988).
Whereas verbal reports are but one way for assessing metacognitive
control, they are the primary basis for collecting information about
metacognitive knowledge, either through interviews or questionnaires (e.g., Belmont & Borkowski, 1988; Jacobs & Paris, 1987). In fact,
many of the studies that assess metacognitive knowledge within a
particular domain use questions that can be traced back to a few key
studies. For example, most assessments of metamemory use at least
some of the items used in the seminal study of Kreutzer, Leonard, and
Flavell (1975). And many interview studies of children's metacognitive
knowledge about reading use questions from Myers and Paris (1978),
which in turn were based on Kreutzer et al.
Research has convincingly shown that verbal reports of all types
are subject to many constraints and limitations (Afflerbach & Johnston,
1984; Baker & Brown, 1984; Ericsson & Simon, 1984/93; Garner, 1988;
Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995; Ward & Traweek, 1993). Briefly, problems with interviews include the following:
1. Participants may not be able or willing to express their
thoughts and experiences.
2. Questions may not be understood by all participants.
3. Questions may induce responses based on social desirability.
4. Open-ended responses are often difficult to score.
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Concurrent verbal reports (think-alouds) are also subject to many
limitations, including the following:
1. Think-aloud procedures may disrupt processing of the
task.
2. Cognitive processes may not be accessible to consciousness for report.
3. Personal characteristics such as age, motivation, anxiety,
verbal ability, and willingness to reveal oneself may influence responding.
4. The instructions, types of questions, and probes that are
used can cue participants to give particular kinds of responses.
5. The task needs to be difficult, complex, and novel enough
to require metacognitive skills to perform.
6. Think-aloud protocols are difficult to score. (The coding
scheme summarized in Pressley's chapter [this volume]
and described in detail in Pressley and Afflerbach [1995] is
a welcome addition).
Despite their limitations, there is a general consensus that verbal
reports can be valid and reliable sources of information about cognitive processes when elicited and interpreted according to guidelines
recommended by such authors as Ericsson & Simon (1984/93). Advocates of this approach are sometimes impassioned in its defense. For
example, Winser (1988) argued that self-reports are valid evidence of
students' processing, "in sharp contrast to the so-called objective and
valid evidence from outmoded psychometric tests" (p. 260).
Error-Detection Approaches

The error detection paradigm is the most commonly used approach to assess metacognitive control in reading, that is, comprehension monitoring. It has also been used in listening situations (Baker,
1984; Flavell, Speer, Green, & August, 1981) and in research on
mathematical problem solving (Van Haneghan & Baker, 1989). As
used in reading, the reader is presented with texts that contain
embedded problems or errors and is asked to identify them. The
assumption underlying this paradigm is that these problems disrupt
comprehension, and so the reader who is checking his or her ongoing
comprehension should notice them. Much of the research in this area
has shown that neither children nor adults are very successful at
identifying the embedded problems (see Baker, 1985b, 1989; Baker &
Brown, 1984, for reviews). Various measures have been used to
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determine if readers are capable of detecting the errors: performance
measures, such as underlining errors when they are encountered;
verbal reports collected during or after reading; and on-line measures
such as patterns of eye movements, reading times, and look backs
(Baker & Anderson, 1982; Grabe, Antes, Thorson, & Hahn, 1987;
Zabrucky & Ratner, 1992). However, caution is necessary in interpreting results of studies using this paradigm, as first discovered by Baker
(1979) in her inaugural investigation of comprehension monitoring in
adult readers.
In that study, students were instructed to read carefully six
expository passages containing different types of embedded problems (internal inconsistencies, inappropriate logical connectives, and
ambiguous referents) in preparation for answering subsequent discussion questions. After reading and answering questions calling for
recall of the problematic sections of text, students were informed that
the passages contained problems and were asked to report them,
rereading as necessary. The students were also questioned as to
whether or not they noticed the problems during reading, how they
had interpreted them, and how they affected their overall understanding. Most surprising was that only 38% of the problems were
detected, and fewer than 25% of these were reported to have been
noticed during reading. Nevertheless, the recall protocols and retrospective reports made it clear that many failures to report problems
were not due to failures to evaluate comprehension, but rather to the
use of fix-up strategies for resolving comprehension difficulties. In
other words, participants attempted to evaluate and regulate their
comprehension, using strategies such as backtracking and seeking
clarification in subsequent text. Thus, the study revealed the great
lengths to which skilled readers go to make sense of text, especially if
they have no reason to suspect that the texts were altered to be
difficult to tmderstand. Many studies conducted since that time have
documented similar behaviors among elementary school children
(e.g., Baker, 1984). There are clear differences in apparent comprehension monitoring effectiveness depending on whether readers are
informed or uninformed about the presence of problems (e.g., Baker,
1984, 1985a; Baker & Anderson, 1982).
The 1979 study also revealed that adult readers use a variety of
different criteria for evaluating their understanding; in fact, the participants frequently reported problems other than those intended to
be conveyed. This led to the conclusion that failure to notice a
particular type of problem embedded in a text does not necessarily
imply poor comprehension monitoring (Baker, 1984, 1985a). For ex-
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ample, the reader who fails to notice a contradiction within a passage
presumably was not evaluating his or her understanding with respect
to an internal consistency standard; however, he or she may have
been using alternative criteria for evaluating comprehension. In much
of Baker's own research on comprehension monitoring, she has focused on the kinds of standards readers use to evaluate their understanding (Baker, 1985b), and has found that some standards are more
likely to be applied than others, both by children and adults. What
this means from the standpoint of measurement using the error
detection paradigm is that care must be taken to specify exactly what
aspects of comprehension monitoring one is interested in assessing
and select embedded errors accordingly. Moreover, the information
provided to participants is also critical; readers are more likely to
identify problems when they know exactly what kind of problems to
expect (Baker, 1985a; Baker & Zimlin, 1989).
Given the limitations of verbal reports noted earlier, exclusive
reliance on post-reading verbal reports as a measure of error detection
is unwise. Having participants underline problematic segments of
text as they encounter them provides some evidence of on-line comprehension monitoring, but this performance measurement can only
be used when readers are informed in advance of the existence of
problems. With the increasing availability of affordable computers
and appropriate software (Nason & Zabrucky, 1988), collecting process measures of comprehension monitoring while reading is becoming easier and more common. These measures include reading times
and patterns of movement through the text (e.g., looking back, jumping ahead), measured either with eye movements or keystrokes.
Assessment of comprehension monitoring with the error detection paradigm is further complicated by demand characteristics of the
task. Performance measures and verbal reports often give less indication of problem awareness than the on-line measures; the same reader
who slows down when encountering inconsistent information may
not report having noticed anything wrong (e.g., Harris, Kruithof,
Terwogt, & Visser, 1981; Zabrucky & Ratner, 1992). Whether or not
a problem will actually be reported depends on several factors: the
participants' goals for reading, the criteria they adopt for evaluating
their understanding, and their threshold for deciding when a problem
is serious enough to report. Moreover, personal characteristics playa
role, such as whether an individual tends to be reflective or impulsive
(Erickson, Stahl, & Rinehart, 1985); these findings lend weight to the
importance of assessing the self-system concurrently with
metacognition (Borkowski et al., 1992).
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The error detection approach is often criticized for its lack of
ecological validity on the grounds that typical texts do not contain
embedded problems, but in fact this is not altogether true. We have
been able to find "errors" corresponding to each of seven different
standards of evaluation (Baker, 1985b) in naturally occurring prose. In
other words, texts are often "inconsiderate," and copy editors do not
always do their jobs as well as they should. Zabrucky (1990) similarly
argued that the paradigm is relevant outside the laboratory because
of the prevalence of coherence problems in text. Nevertheless, such
problems are not so prevalent that we can easily find suitable natural
texts for our research. The reason researchers went to contrived texts
in the first place is because skilled readers process text quickly and
effortlessly when comprehension is proceeding well; it is only when
obstacles arise that the process becomes slower and more deliberate.
To increase the likelihood that obstacles would arise, embedded
problems were deliberately introduced .
Despite the limitations of the error detection paradigm established through the research in the 1980s, a large number of studies
continue to be conducted and published using the method. Unfortunately, many of them do not even take into accotmt the cautions
raised above. We feel it is time that we move beyond this approach in
basic research on comprehension monitoring. It was a useful paradigm for providing insights into comprehension monitoring when
research in that domain was in its infancy, and we have learned what
we need to know from it.
Concerns Expressed about the Measurement of Metacogn ition

Virtually every empirical or theoretical article about metacognition
includes at least an acknowledgement of the problems of measurement. In many cases, this acknowledgement is tied in with definitional issues: "The construct of metacognition and its measurement
have remained somewhat elusive" (McLain, Gridley, & McIntosh,
1991; p . 84). Theory and research are impeded by difficulties that have
been encountered in defining and measuring metacognition. In part,
the problem has arisen because of the diversity of forms of investigation; there are few parallel studies or replications by independent
researchers. Indeed, there are almost as many approaches to measuring metacognition as there are empirical research studies. This lack of
consistency has occurred, in part, because the term metacognition has
been used in many ways to refer to a wide variety of behaviors (Jacobs
& Paris, 1987). Though such diversity is good in the early stages of
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research on a topic, White (1988) noted, "eventually some sorting out
is necessary" (p. 70) and we may now be at that point. Jacobs and
Paris (1987) expressed a similar sentiment: "Now that the first glow of
metacognition as a 'new approach' to reading has faded, the challenge
is to continue to tackle the tough issues of defining, measuring, and
fostering students' metacognitive approaches to reading" (p. 275).
Other recent calls for more research on the measurement of
meta cognition have been made by Duffy et al. (1987), Wittrock (1991),
Weinstein and Meyer (1991), Torgesen (1994), and Meltzer (1994).
As discussed earlier, many researchers, including ourselves, define metacognition as entailing both knowledge and control of cognition. Others, such as Paris and his colleagues, believe only the
knowledge component should be subsumed under the label, thereby
permitting direct measurement of metacognitions (Paris, Jacobs, &
Cross, 1987). A major reason for their insistence on restricting the
definition is that measurement of metacognitive control depends on
inferences, saying: "Although these inferences may be warranted on
occasion, they run the risk of assuming that children understand more
than they actually do about the variables that influence thinking."
(Jacobs & Paris, 1987, p. 264). However, there are many other researchers who would say that process measures are more valuable
than verbal reports, the common means by which knowledge is
assessed, because of inherent limitations in such measures (e.g.,
Clements & Nastasi, 1987).
Despite the importance attributed to metacognition, and the
acknowledgement of measurement problems, little research has been
conducted to test the adequacy of the measurement procedures, a
concern expressed by many (e.g., Geary, Klosterman, & Adrales, 1990;
Hertzog, Hultsch, & Dixon, 1989; Jacobs & Paris, 1987; Kirby & Moore,
1987; Meichenbaum, Burland, Gruson, & Cameron, 1985; Torgesen,
1994; Ward & Traweek, 1993). Torgesen observed, quite accurately,
that research on metacognition has focused more on intervention than
assessment, with the result that not much has been done to develop
standardized assessment procedures that can be used as part of a
diagnostic battery in applied settings. Others have argued that more
work is needed to establish the construct validity of metacognition
(Geary et al., Hertzog et al., Torgesen). Few standardized measures
exist and many of those that do are not theoretically motivated
(Meichenbaum et al.).
Many studies of metacognition and its relation to cognition, in
both basic and applied settings, have yielded inconsistent results
(Baker, 1994). Jacobs and Paris (1987) suggested that inconsistent
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intervention outcomes may be due to metacognition being measured
in different ways in different studies. And Schneider, Korkel, and
Weinert (1987) suggested that failures to find strong correlations
between memory behavior and metamemory may be due to the use
of unreliable metamemory assessments. Rushton, Brainerd, and
Pressley (1983) suggested that these weak relations may also have
been due to the use of but a few items to measure metamemory, with
resulting low reliability.
In response to criticisms such as these, some researchers have
sought to develop standardized instruments that are theoretically
motivated and that meet psychometric criteria of reliability and
validity. h1 the next section, we consider some of these instruments,
giving particular attention to those that have been subjected to independent testing by other researchers. We selectively discuss instruments in the following areas: metamemory assessment, metacognitive
knowledge about reading, learning and study strategies (self-regulated learning), and problem solving.
DEVELOPMENT OF METACOGNITIVE ASSESSMENT TOOLS
Instruments for Assessing Metamemory

Research in metamemory has the longest history of any of the
domains of metacognition, and some of the most stringent psychometric testing of instruments for assessing aspects of metacognition
has been done in this area. We focus here on work done to develop
and validate an instrument for assessing children's metamemory,
undertaken by one of the other presenters at the symposium, John
Borkowski. The instrument he developed along with several of his
students and colleagues evolved from the classic meta memory interview of Kreutzer, Leonard, and Flavell (1975). It consists of five
subtests, three of which involve verbal reports alone and two of which
involve metamemorial processing. The instrument initially was used
with second graders as an individually administered test by Kurtz,
Reid, Borkowski, and Cavanaugh (1982). Reliability and validity
were considered adequate; test-retest correlations for subtests ranged
from .29 to .49, though the composite was considerably higher, .67.
The metamemory battery was later adapted for group administration
by Belmont and Borkowski (1988) and was tested with third and fifth
graders. Age-related differences were found on each of the five subtests,
consistent with theoretical predictions. Correlations among the sub tests
were near 0, suggesting metamemory is task- or domain-specific rather
than general. The overall test-retest reliability of the Metamemory
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Assessment Battery was very similar to that of the individually administered instrument, .66. The group-administered battery was independently tested for validity by Geary, Klosterman, and Adrales (1990).
Geary et al. looked for age-related changes among second and fourth
graders as one way of establishing validity; they found age-related
differences on all but one subtest and evidence that the test might be too
difficult in general for second graders. Geary et al. also found correlations near 0 among the subtests. There were some significant correlations with achievement test performance, providing some evidence of
convergent validity. The authors concluded that their study provided
some converging evidence for the validity and utility of the battery,
but that more information was needed as to appropriate age ranges.
Instruments Designed to Assess Metacognitive Knowledge in
Reading

As noted earlier, there have been numerous studies of
metacognitive knowledge about reading involving both children and
adults. Most of these studies have used structured interviews with
open-ended questions. Few efforts have been made to develop interview instruments intended for use beyond the research setting of the
study, with perhaps the only exception the work of Kirby and Moore
(1987). Nevertheless, as we will see in a subsequent section, interviews are widely recommended for use in classrooms and clinics.
We focus here on a multiple-choice questionnaire, the Index of
Reading Awareness (IRA), developed originally as a research tool and
recommended for use to classroom teachers as an informal assessment
instrument Gacobs & Paris, 1987; Paris, 1991). The goal was to design a
measure that would be sensitive to individual and age-related differences in awareness about reading and to changes in awareness occurring during a school year and/ or in response to instruction. According
to Jacobs and Paris, the IRA assessed "children's knowledge about
reading and their abilities to evaluate tasks, goals, and personal skills; to
plan ahead for specific purposes, to monitor progress while reading, and
to recruit fix-up strategies as needed" (p. 268). The IRA assessed
planning, evaluation, and regulation, using 15 items from the Paris and
Jacobs (1984) interview, with three response options based on children's
actual answers given to the interview items. Another five questions
assessed knowledge about strategy utility, the understanding of when
and why particular strategies should be used. Choices are awarded 0, I,
or 2 points, corresponding to inappropriate, partially adequate, or
strategic responses. The IRA was designed for third to fifth graders, with
grade equivalent reading abilities in second through seventh grade. Its
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use in a study evaluating the effects of an intervention that incorporated
metacognitive instruction showed the instrument was sensitive to changes
in awareness due to individual dilierences in age, sex, and reading ability.
The IRA was subjected to an independent test of reliability and
validity by McLain, Gridley, and McIntosh (1991), who felt that the
psychometric properties of the instrument had not been adequately
tested by Jacobs and Paris (1987). McLain et al. administered the IRA
to 145 children in grades 3, 4, and 5. Tests of reliability revealed that
the Cronbach's alphas for the four subscales were low (.15-.32), and
the total reliability for the items was .61 and for the subscales .56. A
preliminary factor analysis did not yield interpretable factors. McLain
et al. also tested validity by determining whether the instrument
yielded the theoretically predicted age-related increases in awareness. They did find such differences between third and fifth graders,
as did Jacobs and Paris, but fourth graders were comparable to fifth
graders in the McLain et al. study, leading the authors to conclude
that" conceptualizing metacognitive awareness as increasing steadily
with age may be erroneous" (p. 86). Tests for criterion-related
validity revealed that although the IRA was moderately correlated
with standardized reading comprehension scores, once basic reading
skills were controlled for statistically, the IRA added little or no
information to the prediction of comprehension.
McLain et al. (1991) concluded that the IRA "should be used
cautiously as a measure of metacognition in reading for both research and classroom use" (p. 86). Their analyses questioned both the
internal and criterion-related validity of the scale. They considered the
scale to be acceptable "if used as a total score and only as one measure
of the reading process in a portfolio assessment" (p. 86). Moreover, the
subscale scores should not be used separately because internal consistency reliability was too low. Paris (1991) himself wrote that separate
scores should not be reported because the four constructs tapped by the
scale axe not independent.
In their description of the development of the IRA, Jacobs and
Paris (1987) argued that the multiple-choice format avoids some of the
pitfalls of verbal reports. Specifically, it is more objective than interviews that may involve interpretations of open-ended responses,
experimenter bias, or fabricated responses; it does not put shy or
inarticulate children at a disadvantage; the measure is based on
empirical research of childJ.'en's responses to metacognitive questions;
it accurately reflects children's knowledge about reading sh'ategies
rather than researchers' beliefs about what children know; and it is
easier to administer, in that it can be given to groups rather than
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individuals, it can be completed in a short time, and it is easy to score.
However, there are dangers associated with such a format. Duffy et al.
(1987) evaluated their own efforts to develop a multiple-choice instrument to assess students' awareness of strategy use in reading and
identified problems that are relevant to all attempts to develop multiplechoice assessments of meta cognition. One is that the multiple-choice
format suggests there is a single right way to think about using a
particular strategy, a criticism also made by Rhodes and Shanklin
(1993) in a critique of metacognitive instruments advanced for use in
the classroom, such as that of Schmitt (1990). Another concern is that it
is difficult to write dis tractors that are plausible. Those used in the Duffy
et al. study were, however, considerably less plausible than those used
in the IRA, which avoided this problem by using only options provided by children during earlier interviews. Another problem with
multiple-choice assessments such as the IRA is that they they "could
easily be corrupted by teaching children to mimic stock answers to
the questions" (Paris, 1991, p. 38). For this reason, Paris argued, the
IRA was not intended to be a formal assessment of metacognition,
but rather, should be used only informally.
Instruments for Assessing Metacognitive Strategy Use in Learn ing
and Studying

Instruments that include assessments of metacognitive functioning in learning and study situations had their origins in early inventories of "study skills" that tended to focus on overt behaviors such as
underlining and note-taking. Many instruments designed for this
purpose have been developed in recent years, most of which are
intended for use by adolescents and adults (college students). We will
briefly note a few relevant instruments.
The instrument developed by Pintrich and his colleagues, the
Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire (MSLQ), is a selfreport measure of adolescents' and college students' motivational
orientations and use of various learning strategies (Pintrich & DeGroot,
1990; Pintrich, Smith, Garcia, & McKeachie, 1993). Thirty-one of the
items are motivational and 50 are learning strategies. Of these 50, 12
items are concerned with metacognitive self-regulation; specifically
tapping the processes of planning, monitoring, and regulating. The
instrument has been subjected to extensive checking of reliability and
validity. The metacognitive self-regulation scale has an adequate level
of internal consistency (.79), and an overall correlation of .30 with final
course grade.
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Perhaps the most widely used instrument is the Learning and
Study Strategies Inventory (LASSI, Weinstein, 1987), available as a
paper-and-pencil test and in a computerized version. The LASSI
consists of 77 items rated using a 5-point Likert-type scale that ranges
from not at all typical of me (1) to very much typical of me (5). It yields
10 subscale scores: attitude, motivation, time management, anxiety,
concentration, information processing, selecting main ideas, study
aids, self-testing, and test strategies. The assignment of items to these
subscales was based on the intuitive judgment of several experts
(Weinstein, Zimmerman, & Palmer, 1988). The LASSI has been subjected to extensive validation efforts, including those by independent
researchers (e.g., Olejnik & Nist, 1989), and it is considered to have
good psychometric properties.
A promising new instrument focusing more exclusively on
metacognitive awareness was developed by Sdu'aw and Dennison
(1994). The inventory consists of 52 items in which the respondent
indicates how true the statement is of him or her on a 100 mm. scale.
Some of the items tap an individual's knowledge about cognition
(declarative, procedural, and conditional knowledge) and some tap
regulation of cognition (planning, information management sh'ategies, monitoring, debugging strategies, and evaluation of learning).
Factor analyses revealed these two factors had good internal consistency (.90) and were intercorrelated (.54). The authors interpret their
results as providing support for the two-component conceptualization
of metacognition; however, their focus really is on two types of
knowledge, rather than knowledge and regulation per se.
Instruments for Assessing Metacognition in Problem Solving

All of the other instruments discussed thus far, with the excep tion
of portions of the metamemory assessments, rely on self-reports of
metacognitive knowledge or control. Within the domain of problem
solving, there are self-report instruments as well as process measures
that provide on-line evidence of metacognitive control.
Several assessment approaches, both process-oriented and selfreport, have been based on Sternberg's (1986) meta componential
theory. In Sternberg's theory, meta components are the metacognitive
or executive processes used in planning and evaluating cognitive
activities. Sternberg has developed paper and pencil measures for
research purposes, where the use of metacomponents is inferred on
the basis of response time and accuracy, but he does not yet have an
instrument he recommends for formal assessment (Sternberg, 1991).
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Clements and Nastasi (1987) developed a naturalistic approach to
measuring metacomponential processing, arguing that a naturalistic
setting was needed to increase ecological validity. In the study reported for instrument development and validation, children worked
together in pairs to solve various kinds of problems, and all verbalizations were coded as to the types of metacomponential processing
involved. The authors concluded that both reliability and construct
validity of the observational instrument were acceptable; interrater
agreement of the classification of meta componential processes was 87%,
and there were significant correlations between the observational task
and paper-and-pencil tasks. Clements and Nastasi discussed their approach as an instrument with practical utility (the article was published
in Psychology in the Schools), but it cannot really be picked up easily and
used in educational settings because it requires careful analysis of verbal
protocols. Moreover, it is difficult to disentangle the relative contributions of the two children who are observed. The approach warrants
further reseru:ch and refinement before it should be recommended for
use by educators. Swanson (1990) also assessed component processes of
problem solving (using his own system based on analysis of think-aloud
protocols), and he found that these process measures were related to
verbal reports on a metacognitive interview (modeled on Kreutzer et
al.,1975) focused on problem solving.
Instruments designed as self-report measures of metacomponential
processing have been developed by Armour-Thomas and her colleagues. The Student Thinking About Problem Solving Scale (STAPPS)
consists of 37 items and has been subjected to two separate factor
analyses, which yielded markedly different results, even though the
populations were similar. Armour-Thomas and Haynes (1988) administered the STAPPS to high school students (predominantly African American and Hispanic) and obtained a six-factor solution
accounting for 73% of the variance. In contrast, Armour-Thomas,
Bruno, and Allen's (1992) factor analysis yielded three different factors which accounted for 29% of the variance. The inconsistencies in
the results of the factor analyses are of course problematic and reveal
that this instrument is not ready for general use. Perhaps in recognition of this problem, Allen and Armour-Thomas (1993) developed
another self-report instrument of metacomponential processing, with
items tapping use of each of Sternberg'S eight metacomponents in
four different domains, both academic and nonacademic. The theoretical underpinnings of the instrument are solid, but once again the
validation efforts were less than satisfactory, with factor analysis
yielding what to us appear to be uninterpretable results. This may
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well be due to problems with the items themselves, responses to
which are likely influenced by social desirability factors.
Meltzer (1991, 1994) has developed an instrument intended to be
multidimensional, tapping metacognitive and strategic processing in
several different domains. We include it in this section because of its
emphasis on problem solving. The Surveys of Problem Solving and
Educational Skills (SPES) "represents one of the first pilot attempts to
systematize some of the informal approaches used currently in clinical asessment for the evaluation of students' meta cognitive awareness
and reliance on strategic learning" (Meltzer, 1994, p. 598). Unlike most
of the other instruments discussed, which had their origins in basic
research on an aspect of metacognition, the SPES was specifically
designed for diagnostic use in clinical and school settings with children aged 9 to 15 with learning difficulties. Meltzer argued that there
is a need for procedures that evaluate metcognitive strategies as they
interact with cognitive processes such as problem solving, language,
memory, and attention. The SPES actually consists of two separate
parts: The Survey of Educational Skills measures strategic performance in the academic areas of reading, spelling, written language,
and mathematics. The Survey of Problem Solving measures strategic
problem solving on six different tasks, three nonlinguistic and three
linguistic/verbal. The SPES is based on a model that focuses on major
features of strategy selection that are essential for learning: efficiency,
flexibility, methods, styles (self-monitoring, systematic and planful,
reflective), and the ability to justify the solutions provided. It emphasizes the importance of systematic observations of the learning strategies and processes used by students in different situations. Response
demands include think-alouds, retrospective reports, and introspection on strategies used. Systematic observations of how the student
approaches the tasks and analyses of error patterns are also important
features of the assessment.
The SPES holds great promise as a process-oriented assessment
tapping important aspects of metacognitive control. However,
Torgesen (1994) expressed concern that if the SPES came to be used
widely in diagnostic work, "it might create the impression that
metacognitive processes can be usefully measured and perhaps
remediated, as a set of domain-general skills" (p. 156). His concern
stems from doubts about the domain generality of metacognition (this
issue is discussed in more detail subsequently). Nevertheless, Meltzer
(1994) herself did stress that the SPES should not be used as a method
for analyzing and then training domain-general problem-solving
processes.

116

BAKER/CERRO

PUBLISHED RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TEACHERS AND
PRACTITIONERS ON ASSESSING METACOGN ITION

Very early on in the history of metacognitive research, recommendations began to appear in the literature for teachers, summarizing the
research findings, emphasizing their educational significance, and
suggesting ways for teachers to promote metacognition in the classroom
and to assess it informally in their students. During our literature search
for preparation of this chapter, we found that many of the articles that
addressed metacognitive assessment appeared in journals for teachers
and practitioners such as school psychologists. This is consistent with
the finding by Paris, Wasik, and Van del' Westhuizen (1988) in their
literature search covering the years 1981-1987. Of the 124 journal articles
they found, only 40 were empirical; the rest "extoll(ed) the virtues of
metacognition for understanding reading" (p. 163). They argued, as
have we in similar terms (Baker, 1994), that there is a "dangerous
imbalance in which the enthusiasm and prescriptions far outstrip the
empirical data base" (p. 163). Many of the recommendations we found
appear to be based on limited empirical evidence. Several articles and
books include actual instruments that teachers can use, but most of these
instruments have little or no validation. In this section we consider the
prescriptive advice given to teachers and school psychologists for how
they might assess metacognition using interviews, think-alouds, error
detection, and process measures.
Recommendations for Using Interviews

Almost every article written for teachers or practitioners about
metacognition includes recommendations to interview students about
their metacognitive knowledge and strategy use. However, a lack of
explicit information as to how to use the interview information, and
a lack of a caution on the limitations of verbal reports, is typical of a
number of these articles. For example, Ellis (1989) included sample
questions for teachers to use in a metacognitive interview, but he did
not provide any guidance as to how teachers should use the information or interpret the students' responses. He simply wrote that the
interview's purpose is to find out what students know about their
own thinking, their perceptions of their own thought processes and
cognitive strategies, and their perceptions of strategies they were
asked to use. Garner (1992) suggested teachers can interview readers
to get a sense of their views of the reading process and their knowledge of reading and study strategies using questions originally designed for research purposes. However, she was careful to caution
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teachers of the need to be aware of the limitations of ve,r bal reports if
they interview their students, explaining problems of accessibility,
memory failure, inadvertent cuing, and verbal facility.
Several different authors have recommended the use of either the
interview questions originally used by Paris and his colleagues (e.g.,
Myers & Paris, 1978; Paris & Jacobs, 1984), their multiple-choice Index
of Reading Awareness (Jacobs & Paris, 1987), or both. These include
Paris (1991), Zabrucky and Ratner (1990), and Lloyd and Loper
(1986). Lloyd and Loper recommended for their school psychologist
audience that they begin by determining if students can respond to
the IRA questions open-endedly; if not, then the multiple-choice
options should be provided.
Many of the recommended interviews include items that focus on
students' views of themselves as readers (e.g., What do you do best
when you read?), consistent with the recent focus on self-system factors.
For example, Yochum and Miller (1990) stressed the importance of
considering both metacognition and attributions and achievement motivation. Others who have recommended interviews include Gray (1987),
Weinstein and MacDonald (1986), and Paratore and Indrisano (1987).
A number of published interview instruments that h ave been
recommended for teachers are now being publish ed i!l secondary
sources, thus giving them what might appear to be even greater
legitimacy. For example, Rhodes (1993) publish ed a handbook of
informal instruments for assessing literacy that included several
metacognitive interviews drawn from other sources. One of the
instruments was the la-question Reading Interview: A reader's view
of the reading process (Goodman, Watson, & Burke, 1987). Directions
for administering the interview provided by Goodman et al. include
coding directions, with categories of responses students might provide. This level of detail seems appropria te and helpful for teachers.
Another interview Rhodes included in her collection was a content
reading interview based on Wixson, Bosky, Yochum, and Alvermann
(1984). The questions are similar to those used in other interviews, but
are tied specifically to a particular con tent area selected by the
interviewer. This instrument has been criticized on the grounds that
no reliability data or validity data were provided, but the lack of such
data is a common weakness of most of these interview instruments.
Recommendations for using think-aloud measures

The growing popularity of think-aloud procedures in research on
cognitive processing and meta cognition has led, not surprisingly, to
recommendations for its use as a diagnos tic tool. As with the inter-

118

BAKER/C ERRO

views, there is often a lack of explicit attention to the problems
inherent in collecting think-aloud protocols and the ways that the
data should be interpreted. Most of the recommendations have been
addressed to those who work with college students as opposed to
younger children, perhaps because there is still uncertainty as to how
effectively children can engage in productive think-alouds. For example, Randall, Fairbanks, and Kennedy (1986), Nist and Kirby
(1986), and Steinberg, Bohning, and Chowning (1991) advpcated
using think-aloud procedures with college students experiencing
reading difficulties. Steinberg et al. explicitly acknowledged that the
complex coding systems used in research analyses of think-aloud
protocols would not be appropriate for teachers to use but they did
not offer simpler alternatives. Winser (1988) recommended using
think-alouds with students of all ages and abilities, including children
as young as second grade. Yochum and Miller (1990) also recommended collection of think-alouds with elementary-aged children.
Winser reported working with several teachers who confirmed that
the think-aloud approach could be used for evaluation.
Think-aloud approaches have also been recommended as informal assessments in math as well as in reading. For example, Lawson
and Rice (1987), in an article written for school psychologists, discussed the value of having students think aloud as they solve math
problems. This would help the teacher diagnose difficulties the student has with respect to problem solving and allow for analysis of
error patterns. The authors included a simple-to-use "coding schedule" that includes items such as metacognitive knowledge that is
made explicit, checking, planning, and strategy use.
Recommendations for Using Error Detection Procedures

Several investigators who have conducted research using the
error detection paradigm and have identified problems with it in
their empirical reports have gone on to write articles for teachers
recommending its use in assessment. Although some caveats are
included, they do not seem strong enough to us. For example, Garner
(1992), Zabrucky and Ratner (1990) and Paris (1991) have all recommended this approach for assessing comprehension monitoring.
Zabrucky and Ratner (1990) wrote that the ability to evaluate comprehension "is assessed by introducing errors into passages," implying that this is the only way possible. They recommended adapting
grade-appropriate texts, introducing different kinds of problems to
find out what standards children can use and what standards they
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need help using. The authors cautioned about reliance on verbal
reports of error detection, and asserted that underlining is a better
indicator of what children can do than are answers to questions.
However, to our knowledge, this assertion is not supported by
empirical evidence. To assess the ability to evaluate, Zabrucky and
Ratner advised, give children specific information about the nature
of the problems and examples; to assess spontaneous evaluation,
they continued, do not forewarn children that passages have problems. This latter recommendation seems problematic to us because
children may well be spontaneously evaluating using criteria other
than those represented by the embedded problems.
Garner (1992) identified some of the difficulties researchers have
had in disentangling explanations for poor detection performance,
but encouraged teachers "to experiment with error-detection exercises in the classroom" (p. 244). She suggested teachers could assess
children's use of different standards of evaluation through the process of embedding errors in short expository passages, asking children to underline anything troublesome, and having them explain
the nature of the problem. Garner reported that teachers she has
worked with found this procedure useful in revealing whether there
was reliance on one particular type of standard. Garner offered the
good advice that work with contrived texts should be phased out to
work with uncontrived texts.
Paris (1991) also recommended the error detection approach, saying
that it can be adapted easily for diagnostic and remedial purposes. He
described various kinds of errors that can be introduced. He listed the
following advantages of the approach: It can be used with regular
curriculum materials and may be particularly useful in content area
reading; it can be used with individuals, small groups, or large classes;
and it can be used as a paper-and-pencil silent reading task or it can be
given orally. "Besides the flexibility, quick administration, adaptability
to the reading level of each student, and the savings in time and money
with a locally designed task, error detection tasks promote a thoughtful,
inquisitive interaction while reading, so that the goals of instruction and
assessment are congruent" (p. 39).
Others who have recommended error detection procedures include
Gray (1987), who did explain for teachers why failures to notice errors
may not signal poor comprehension monitoring, and Weinsten and
MacDonald (1986), writing for school psychologists without critical
commentary on the approach.
We have been rather critical of these recommendations for using
the error detection paradigm to assess children's ability to monitor
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their comprehension. However, we too, have written about using
error detection methods in the classroom (Baker, 1991), and we have
incorporated the method in a metacognitively oriented curriculum
for customer service workers as part of a workplace literacy program
(Baker et al., 1994). We think it is a useful instructional tool for
helping readers to see the variety of ways that comprehension can
fail and the variety of things that can make text difficult to understand. But we do not believe it should be used for formal assessment
purposes. Use for informal assessment is perhaps acceptable if the
tester is well aware of its limitations and it is used in conjunction with
other assessment approaches. But it should not be used in groupadministered paper-and-pencil assessments because the risks of misinterpreting failures to d etect problems are too great. In group
administration, students are typically presented with passages containing problems and asked either to underline problems, to write
down what if anything did not make sense, or to rate how well they
understood the passage. Without the opportunity for an individual
interview, we cannot be sure why a reader may not have identifed
the intended problems.
Recommendations for Assessing Metacognitive Processing in
Authentic Tasks

The simplest recommended process assessment is to observe
students while they are engaged in authentic tasks such as reading,
writing, or mathematical problem solving. Zabrucky and Ratner
(1990) advised that given the problems with verbal reports, teachers
may need other approaches to assess what children do instead of
what they say they do. They suggested that observing children while
they read may provide the best assessment of regulation of comprehension, but they did not give specific guidance as to how to do this.
Others who recommended naturalistic observations include Yochum
and Miller (1990) and Lloyd and Loper (1986). Several books have
been published that include observational checklists for use by teachers interested in assessing literacy, including Burke (1993); Kemp
(1990, cited in Paris, 1991); Rhodes (1993); and Rhodes and Shanklin
(1993). For example, Kemp included observational records that can
provide information about strategies, metacognition, and motivation
in authentic tasks.
One recommended approach that has a number of advantages is
to collect "running records" to evalua te children's oral reading strategies (Paris, 1991; Rhodes & Shanklin, 1993). As the child reads aloud,
the teacher records oral reading miscues, including substitutions,
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rereadings, omissions, and self-corrections. Winser (1988) recommended an interesting variation of this procedure involving stimulated recall: Children read a passage orally; the session is videotaped
and the children are asked to talk about their self-corrections (e.g.,
"What did you do when you fixed that part up?"). The value of this
sort of data, Winser asserted, is that it "provides teachers with some
clues to the way their students are actually functioning, so that they
have an insight into their learning styles that is not available from
traditional tests" (p. 264). Retrospective analyses of running records
have an advantage over traditional verbal reports based on hypothetical or "typical" behaviors in that they focus the individual's
attention on a particular task context. However, the time-intensive
nature of this procedure may make it more suitable for research
purposes than for practical assessments. Another advantage of
approaches involving running records, which also applies to thinkaloud procedures, is that they can be used with naturally occurring
materials and so have greater ecological validity than error detection
procedures.
Another authentic approach was developed by Paris (1991) for
assessing children's reading comprehension as well as their strategies,
motivation, and metacognition. The "think-along" approach, recommended to teachers and clinicians, simulates a real classroom experience where the student reads aloud and the teacher asks interspersed
questions. The questions not only assess understanding, but also
how students know they know the answers, or if they do not know,
how they can find out. The teachers probe students' thinking with
questions about their strategies and also observe spontaneous strategy use. The approach is available commercially as the Heath Reading Strategies Assessment (1991), but Paris stressed that any passage
can be used as a think-along passage. He included in his article
generic questions that can be used to assess both comprehension and
metacognition. The students' responses are evaluated with respect to
strategy effectiveness, but the burden of judgment is on the examiner
or teacher, as it is in most of the recommended approaches. An
answer sheet has spaces for checking off the strategies used for
identifying the topic, predicting, monitoring meaning, making inferences, and summarizing. For example, the teacher might question the
child about an unfamiliar word: "What do you think 'trat' means in
the sentence you just read? How could you tell? If you don't know,
how could you find out?" The checklist of strategies includes: uses
context cues, substitution looks or sounds similar, mentions others as
resources, and mentions dictionary as resource.
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Garner (1992) suggested still another approach in which
metacognitive knowledge could be revealed in an authentic setting:
observation of peer tutoring. One child serves as tutor for another; the
tutor is the focus of particular interest in this assessment. Listening to
how the tutor describes strategies to a child who is not using them
spontaneously provides insight into the tutor's own metacognitive
knowledge. Does the tutor show awareness, for example, of how to
use reinspection to locate information in a text that the tutee could not
remember?
Comments on the Recommendations for Metacognitive
Assessments in Classroom and Clinic

As the preceding review should make clear, there have been
many recommendations for teachers and school psychologists to
assess metacognition, dating back at least as far as the mid 1980s (e.g.,
Bondy, 1984; Weinstein & MacDonald, 1986). The literature for practitioners extends to school counselors as well; Mills and Brunner
(1988) wrote about the need for school counselors to be aware of
metacognition and of ways to assess it in their clients (students). As
should also be clear, we have serious reservations about the way
many of these recommendations are framed. Those made to school
psychologists are perhaps less problematic than those made to teachers. School psychologists have advanced degrees that involve training
in assessment techniques, and they should also be better prepared to
be critical consumers of the literahu'e. Classroom teachers, on U1e other
hand, frequently have little formal training in either research methods or
assessment, and so they are more likely to take the recommendations at
face value. Researchers who write for teachers, who attempt to h'anslate
research into practice, have an ethical obligation to frame their recommendations responsibly, providing concrete advice on how to interpret the data that may be collected through interviews, think-alouds,
and error detection tasks. The same is true to some extent for researchers writing for school psychologists, who may not have the time to
familiarize themselves with the primary sources on which the recommendations are based. It is important that teachers not be left with the
false impression that they can easily acquire useful or meaningful
information by administering these measures.
Many of the materials written for teachers overgeneralize the
construct or metacognition to refer to the use of any kind of strategy
during cognitive activity, a practice that has led to some confusion in
the literature and fueled recommendations to restrict the term to
knowledge about cognition (e.g., Brown, 1987). For example, in a
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book that consists of a collection of assessment instruments, Burke
(1993) included a listing of the following "metacognitive" abilities to
look for: "ability to solve problems and to make decisions; ability to
brainstorm or generate ideas." Further overgeneralization occurred
in her recommendation for teachers to use journals as "metacognitive
strategies" by assessing the reflectiveness of the student's response.
Despite the plethora of recommendations, it is not clear how
widely they have been adopted. Garner (1992) wrote about teacher
assessment of metacognition as though it were commonplace: "Many
teachers assess what their students know (and don't know) about the
reading process in general and about important reading and study
strategies in particular" (p. 242). But is it? No data addressing this
question are available to our knowledge, although it does appear that
the emphasis on the importance of metacognition has reached the
classroom teacher. Commeyras, Osborn, and Bruce (1993) studied
teachers' reactions to items on the 1992 National Assessment of
Educational Progress (NAEP), which included a special study of
fourth grade students designed to examine their awareness of their
own comprehension. Their use of effective reading strategies was
assessed, analyzed, and reported as descriptive data. Teachers were
asked the extent to which they believed the study was needed.
Responses were obtained from 312 teachers, 80% of them at the
elementary level. Forty two percent gave the highest rating of 5 (to a
very great extent); 36% the next highest rating of 4; 14% gave a rating
of 3; 4% gave a rating of 2; and only 3% gave the lowest rating of 1
(not at all). Thus, the majority of teachers who responded to the
survey appeared to believe this type of metacognitive assessment
was important.
To what extent are metacognitive assessments used in diagnostic
settings? Again, little information is available, but some relevant
data were collected in England. Farrell, Dunning, and Foley (1989)
conducted interviews in England with 100 school psychologists in
1981 and 1986 to determine the types of instruments used to assess
children with learning difficulties. Their conclusion was that psychologists have hardly begun to assess children's metacognitive
strategies and that practice has only partially kept up to date with
developments reported in the litera ture.
The Place of Metacognition in General Assessments of Educational
and Intellectual Functioning

Traditional approaches to intellectual and educationa l assessment do not reflect meta cognitive skills, and there is a growllLg
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demand for change in this direction. With respect to intellectual
assessment, Carr and Borkowski (1987) wrote, "The inclusion of
process-oriented measures (e.g., meta memory and components of
metacognition) in the assessment of intelligence may minimize the
need for product-oriented measures which often fail to provide
educationally valuable information about learning skills and deficiencies" (p. 43). Sternberg (1991) also believes that intelligence tests
should put greater emphasis on metacognition, and the test he is
developing based on his componential processing theory includes
assessments of metacomponential processing (i.e., metacognition).
With respect to educational assessment, Benton and Kiewra (1987)
discussed the need for metacognitive assessment in the academic
domains of reading, writing, and mathematics. And Glaser, Lesgold,
and Lajoie (1987) identified metacognitive skills for learning as a
dimension that should be assessed in the measurement of achievement. Many of the recommendations have as a premise the need to
make assessment practices more in line with current views of learning and instruction. For example, the prevalent view of reading as a
strategic activity has led to calls for reading assessment to incorporate metacognitive assessment (Duffy et al., 1987; Valencia & Pearson,
1986).
Critics of traditional tests argue that intelligence tests are insensitive to student's metacognitive and attributional perceptions of the
task, strategies, and personal abilities, and therefore these psychometric evaluations are not very relevant to educational intervention
(Paris, Jacobs, & Cross, 1987). The focus on static levels of performance rather than on emerging cognitive processes provides little
direction for intervention. Current educational achievement tests
also are not very successful at diagnostic testing because they do not
reveal the processes by which a response to a problem or question is
constructed and so do not reveal the types of misunderstandings that
individual students have (Linn, 1991). Accordingly, there are many
calls for new modes of assessment that focus on the processes of
cognitive activity rather than the products (e.g., Carr & Borkowski,
1987; Clements & Nastasi, 1987; Ellis, 1989; Linn, 1991; Paris et al.,
1987; Mills & Brunner, 1988; Meltzer, 1994; Taylor, 1987; Ward &
Traweek, 1993), and also for more "authentic" forms of assessment
that capture what students do in more ecologically valid contexts.
We now consider briefly the place of metacognition in some of these
alternative assessments, including dynamic assessments, portfolio
assessments, and performance assessments, both commercially available instruments and statewide performance assessment programs.
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Dynamic Assessment
Dynamic assessment approaches are becoming increasingly popular as a way of assessing the processes of learning, inclucting metacognitive
control, rather than the products of learning that are assessed in traditional static measures (Ellis, 1989; Kaniel & Reichenberg, 1990; Lidz,
1991; Linn, 1991; Meltzer, 1994; Paris et al., 1987; Ward & Traweek, 1993;
Taylor, 1987). These approaches, also known as mediated assessment,
assisted learning, and learning potential assessment, view instruction
and assessment as closely intertwined. The distinctive feature of dynamic assessment is that it includes a teaching phase. The students'
independent performance is first assessed, followed by instruction and
subsequent retesting. This test-teach-retest method allows the students'
responses to intervention to be examined, revealing cognitive and
metacognitive processes that are available but not necessarily used. The
teaching phase can include instruction in both cognitive and
metacognitive aspects of the task.
Recommendations for dynamic assessment as an alternative to
traditional psychometric tests are appearing in the literature for teachers
and practitioners. Ward and Traweek (1993) provided an illustration of
how think-alouds could be used by school psychologists in dynamic
assessment, addressing the question of whether students needed only a
simple prompt to activate metacognitive awareness and strategic processing. Weinstein and MacDonald (1986) also recommended that school
psychologists use a process approach to determine if students have
learning problems because of cognitive monitoring deficits: Form hypotheses about the source of the problem, teach specific strategies, and
assess whether the strategy has helped the child's performance.
Within the specific area of reading, there have also been similar
recommendations. Ellis (1989) described a model for assessing students' use of reading strategies and their metcognitive knowledge
about reading that included obtaining process measures of stra tegic
functioning via mediated cues to use various cognitive strategies while
reading. Paratore and Indrisano (1987) also proposed a mediated assessment of reacting comprehension: First give comprehension tasks traditionally; if there are difficulties, initiate intervention with the instructor
teaching the student a strategy and modeling its use; then administer a
new passage and observe the student's use of the sh·ategy.
Portfolio Assessments
Many educators have advocated the use of portfolios to capture real
uses of literacy, math, or science. Just as artists create portfolio collec-
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tions to display their best work, so too, it is argued, should students.
Much has been written about portfolios in authentic assessments of
literacy in particular (Valencia, Hiebert, & Afflerbach, 1994). Portfolio assessments involve metacognition because students' written
reflections about themselves as learners and about their learning
typically are critical components (Hansen, 1994; Snider, Lima, &
DeVito, 1994; Valencia & Place, 1994). Having students keep daily
"learning logs" (e.g., Bondy, 1984) also provides a means by which
teachers can assess students' awareness of their own cognitive processes. However, Valencia and Place (1994) suggested that teachers
should first provide modeling and guided practice in metacognitive
reflection because this is not something many students do spontaneously.
Commercial Performance Assessments

Given the limited number of assessment instruments that have
been documented as reliable and valid, it is not surprising that there
are very few commercial instruments available. As Lloyd and Loper
(1986) noted, because there are no norm-referenced commercial
instruments for the asessment of metacognition, school psychologists
must develop their own assessment procedures. There is apparent
demand, however, for we are beginning to see some attention to
metacognition among commercial test publishers (Linn, 1991; Paris,
1991; Powell, 1989). Paris (1991) discussed some of the instruments
available in reading that include metacognitve assessments, such as:
the Qualitative Reading Inventory (Leslie & Caldwell, 1990) and the
Heath Reading Strategies Assessment (1991) that in.corporates the
"think-along" approach developed by Paris himself to assess comprehension and metacognition simultaneously.
Statewide Performance Assessments

The new statewide performance assessments that are being used
in such states as Michigan, Illinois, and Maryland include measures
of metacognition, in response to the growing awareness that assessments should include evaluation of thillking skills, strategy use, and
metacognition. These assessments are designed for group assessment only, however; individual scores are not reported because not
all students receive the same tasks and generalizability cannot be
assured. The Michigan items measure children's knowledge about
reading (e.g., the strategies that are appropriate for different purposes). The Illinois test poses scenarios to students and asks them to
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judge whether particular strategies would be helpful or not in those
circumstances. For example, students might be given a scenario in
which they are asked to retell a selection they just read to different
audiences: a peer, a younger child, and a teacher. Then they rate the
helpfulness of several different responses for each audience (Valencia
& Pearson, 1986). The Maryland State Performance Assessment Program (MSP AP) also examines metacognition; one of its outcomes is
demonstrating awareness of strategic behaviors and knowledge about
reading. This information is gathered through questions such as the
following used in pilot work (Kapinus, Collier, & Kruglanski, 1994,
p . 265):
When you read a story such as the Great Kapok tree, you may come
to a part that you don't lmderstand. Put a check mark in front of each
thing below that tells what you might do. You may choose as many
as you want. If you do something that is not listed, write it on the line
next to the word "other."
Sometimes I
_
_
_
_
_
_

keep reading and then come back to that part
skip over the part that is confUSing
ask someone about the part that is confUSing
try to sound out new words
use a dictionary
other: _ _ _ __ _

There is a danger with test items such as this that students may
respond correctly about the strategies they would use because they
have been coached, but the knowledge would not transfer to authentic situations (Wixson, 1994). Recall Paris' (1991) caution that the
Index of Reading Awareness, which includes similar kinds of questions, should not be used as a formal assessment because of the
danger of mimicking stock answers.
The Arizona Student Assessment Program (ASAP), as described
by Garcia and Verville (1994), does not have metacognitive assessment as an explicit goal, unlike the other three state programs.
However, it includes what we have called metacognitive control
strategies in its comprehension outcomes: "uses strategies to selfcorrect when necessary," with the associated competency indicators:
checks understanding against predictions, oral rereads, uses context,
"holds" to read further, and asks for help.
In a discussion of the Michigan and Illinois assessments, Linn
(1991) concluded that the metacognitive sections "break new ground"
but cautioned, "Until a good deal more research has been completed
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that leads to a better understanding of the properties of these measures and their construct validity, however, they are best viewed as
promising experimental approaches" (p. 193). State education officials would do well to heed his advice.
Additional Recommendations for New Educational Assessments

As already emphasized, the emerging consensus is that new
educational assessments should capture the cognitive and
metacognitive processes involved in academic activities such as
reading, writing, and problem solving. Weinstein and Meyer (1991)
emphasized the importance of focusing on metacognitive processes,
but asserted that there is a measurement problem because process is
not usually available to direct measurement. Her own instrument, the
LASSI, is an indirect form of assessment in that it relies on selfreports, as do most of the psychometrically validated tools. We would
disagree with Weinstein's pessimism on the feasibility of measuring
process directly, however, as would many others. For example, Taylor (1987), Linn (1991), and Nason and Zabrucky (1988) advocated the
use of the computer for assessing cognitive and metacognitive processes. The computer can continuously monitor and record all responses, adapt to the student's responses, and make accurate time
measurements. In addition, as Taylor noted, tasks can be designed
that require the student to externalize processing steps. For example,
a list of strategies could be displayed on a main menu; the student
selects one and the computer records which was selected and when.
It also appears that the approach Meltzer (1994) is taking to
develop process measurements is a good step in the right direction
(but see criticisms by Torgesen, 1994). She seeks to "assess the
students' metacognitive strategies and ability to coordinate the multiple subskills and strategies necessary for effective learning" (p.
594). Her recommendation is to use tasks that assess the ability to
access, use, and monitor strategies in multiple domains, academic
and nonacademic.
Consensus is also emerging for assessments to provide opportunities for reflection on cognitive processing (Valencia et al., 1994).
Consider the endorsement of this view that appeared in the report of
The Presidential Task Force-Learner Centered Psychological Principles: Guidelines for School Redesign and Reform (1993); effective
assessment should promote "students' self-reflection on their growth
by providing opportunities for self-assessment and thoughtful feedback on learning progress" (p. 13).
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
OF METACOGN ITIVE ASSESSMENT

Where do we now stand with respect to the measurement of
meta cognition? What are our future prospects? In 1991 Paris wrote
that during the past 10 years "there have been great strides made" in
the assessment of meta cognition in the domain of reading (p. 45).
Although we are perhaps not as sanguine as he is, we agree that
progress has been made. This is not so much progress in developing
instruments that have been validated psychometrically, but rather in
the emerging consensus that process measures rather than product
measures are needed in educational assessment in general and that
metacognitive assessments have their place in this new wave of
testing. Throughout this chapter, we have included quotations from
leading scholars in psychology and education that reflect these
views. In this section we make some closing observations and recommendations regarding metacognitive assessment, addressing such
issues as the value of converging evidence, domain specificity,
evaluation criteria, and uses to which metacognitive assessments are
put.
On the Value of Converging Evidence

That we are still far from having adequate tools for measuring
metacognition is clear. One solution to the problem of measurement
is to use as many methods as possible with each student. This
recommendation for converging evidence is not new, having b een
made by Baker and Brown (1 984); Garner (1988); Rushton et al.
(1983); White (1988); and Weinstein and Meyer (1991), among
others. However, it is sufficiently important to bear reiterating.
Many investigators today do in fact use a combination of measures
to obtain converging evidence. As White wrote, "Though each method
is weak, the constellation of evidence from them will be more reliable
and valid than each alone" (p. 74). If different measures are used that
do not share the same sources of error, and the same conclusions are
. reached, we can be more confident that we have measured what we
set out to measure. The need for obtaining converging evidence is
perhaps even greater in applied settings, where the stakes to the
student are higher, than it is in basic research. Recommendations to
collect multiple measures occasionally appear in the literature for
teachers and practitioners (e.g., Yochum & Miller, 1990), but not as
often as they should.
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On the Issue of Domain Specificity in Metacognitive Assessment

It is generally agreed that metacognitive knowledge and control
do not occur uniformly across tasks or settings, and that the likelihood of transfer from one setting to another is quite low (Baker,
1994). Studies that have included assessments of different domains of
meta cognition have found low correlations among domains such as
metamemory, metacommunication, metareading, and social cognition (e.g., Byrd & Gholson, 1985; Kurdek & Burt, 1981). Even within
a particular metacognitive domain, there are multiple independent
dimensions to the construct, as has been demonstrated in metamemory
research (Belmont & Borkowski, 1988; Hertzog, Hultsch, & Dixon, 1989).
Given the lack of evidence of a general metacognitive ability, it is clear
that assessment instruments must be tailored to the domain or domains
of interest, whether for use in research or practice.
It has been observed that metacognition is often equated with
higher level thinking in the educational literature (Linn, 1991; Paris,
1991), with the unfortunate consequence that metacognition might be
regarded as domain general. Thus, teachers might develop curriculum units focusing on metacognition as a decontextualized skill (and
indeed we have seen such a unit in a local gifted and talented sixth
grade classroom) and seek assessments that are "pure" measures of
metacognition. However, the consensus among researchers is that
metacognitive skills should be taught in context, not as separate
aspects of the curriculum. This concern has been articulated persuasively by Paris, Jacobs, and Cross (1987):
It appears that the enthusiasm surrounding metacognilion has
established the construct as a pinnacle of information processing. It
is the most prized, most regulative, top-of-the-hierarchy component in several theories and instructional packages. This appears to
us to be an erroneou s aggrandizement of decontextualized knowledge. The goal of development and education is not to produce
people who reflect, orchesh'a te, plan, revise, and evaluate their
every action. (p. 238)

Metacognition is important, but it should not serve as an instructional
goal in itself but rather as a means to an end (Baker, 1994; Garner,
1987; Symons, Snyder, Cariglia-Bull, & Pressley, 1989). It follows that
the assessment of me tacognition should also be done in context, with
measures developed in conjw1ction with instructional programs (Jacobs
& Paris,1987).
Measurement of metacognition is made more difficult by many
of the same individual difference variables that confound measure-
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ment of intelligence. Torgesen (1994) has identified four: differences
in information-processing capacity and basic processing efficiency;
domain-s pecific knowledge and experience; environmental
oportunities to learn appropriate executive routines, including interactions with parents and teachers; and motivational/ attitudinal variables. Content-free measures of metacognition would have the
potential to reduce the influence of these confounding variables. But
"because executive functioning in the real world is so interdependent
with knowledge structures and basic processing efficiency, one wonders if such 'decontextualized' measures of executive processes will
have much value in explaining everyday performance problems or
providing proper guidance for remedial efforts" (Torgesen, p. 154).
The best intervention programs are those that work within a specific
context, and so, as noted above, the focus should be on the development of methods for assessing individual differences in meta cognition
within specific academic domains (Torgesen, 1994).
On the Criteria for Evaluating Metacognitive Assessments

In our earlier discussions of assessment instruments, we included
information about validation efforts when it was available. In many
cases, it has been difficult to develop instruments that met traditional
criteria of reliability and validity. Linn (1991) raised the important
question of whether efforts to develop psychometrically sound assessments of metacognition are in fact misguided. As he wrote,
"Constructing valid assessment procedures to tap thinking processes
and metacognition is certainly not an easy task, but the difficulty of
the task is not the major barrier. Practical concerns about cost and
efficiency, the seemingly insatiable demand to boil everything down
to a single number, and the over-reliance on standard psychometric
criteria to judge test reliability and validity present m~ch more
formidable barriers" (p. 204). Perhaps we should be considering other
criteria in evaluating meta cognitive assessment procedures, those
recommended by Linn for evaluating performance assessments, such
as fairness and generalizability.
Certainly there is a need for greater ecological validity in the
assessment of metacognition. Paris (1991) advocated the use of authentic text and provision of full information to students about the
nature and purpose of the task. Valencia and Pearson (1986) similarly
suggested that meta cognition might best be assessed by observing
and interacting with students while they are actually engaged in
"real" reading situations, pointing out limitations of group tests:
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We can and should measure these skills in formats amenable to
large-scale assessment. But there will always be some limitations to
data gathered from group tests of metacognitive activities: (1) what
students say may differ from what they do, (2) strategic readers may
be too flexible and adaptive to allow us to capture their skill in a
small sample of situations and options, and (3) for many readers,
these strategies operate at an unconscious, automatic level inaccessible to verbalization or even reflection. In short, here is a case in
which large-scale assessment may prove moderately useful for some
very limited purposes and decisions; however, the assessment strategies that really count are likely to occur at the classroom or
individual level. (p. 6)

On the Uses to Which Tests of Metacognition are Put
It is important to keep in mind the various purposes for tests in the
assessment of metacognition as well as in other domains. Instruments
that are used in basic research are designed to answer particular
questions and usually have standardized procedures. They may not be
practically useful, but they may lead to the development of instruments
useful in practice. In contrast, tests that are designed for diagnostic
purposes need to give information that can be easily translated into
educational terms (Taylor, 1987). The distinction made by Meltzer (1994)
between measurement and assessment is relevant: Assessment is a
broader and more inclusive term in that it entails goals and objectives,
including identification of the what, how, and why of learning, and
prescription, including directions for intervention and instruction. We
have been using the terms interchangeably in this paper, but in reality,
much of the basic research on metacognition is concerned with
measurement, whereas in school settings assessment is primary.
There are variations across domains in the uses to which
metacognitive tests are put. For example, as we have seen, assessments of metacognition in reading have been widely used in educational settings as well as research settings. Numerous articles for
teachers and for school psychologists have offered recommendations
as to how and why metacognitive aspects of reading should be
assessed. In contrast, assessments of metamemory are almost exclusively the province of the research community. It is rare to see articles
for practitioners calling for tests of metamemory in school settings. Is
this perhaps because there is less perceived need for metamemory
assessments in school? Or is it that basic researchers are refraining
from putting research instruments into schools until the construct of
metamemory and its measurement are more fully validated?
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Another relevant issue concerns whether metacognitive assessments in applied settings should be used for diagnostic, summative,
or comparative purposes. Paris (1991) cautioned teachers, "Because the
goal of increasing children's metacognition about reading is only an
intermediate step in the development of literacy, measures of
metacognition should be diagnostic rather than summative" (p. 38).
And Wittrock (199].) argued that the assessments should be for diagnostic rather than comparative purposes. He called for a new type of test
that would provide diagnostic information about a student's preconceptions, learning strategies, metacognition, and affective thought processes. It would not be used to provide comparative information but
rather would help provide information relevant to the diagnosis of
student learning and to the design and improvement of classroom
teaching by increasing teachers' understanding of these processes.
Is it time for measures of metacognition to assume a place in formal
diagnostic assessment batteries? Torgesen (1994) thinks not. In fact, he
offered a provocative suggestion on "how to prevent the assimilation of
these measures into assessment practices for children with learning
disabilities: avoid providing good norms for the measures so that they
remain within a research experimental context" (p. 157). He argued that
the first priority is to examine the construct validity of the measures. As
we have seen, however, the assimilation may already be beginning, as
witnessed by the many articles written for school psychologists on
metacognitive assessment. Perhaps the findings of Farrell et al. (1989)
that school psychologists are not typically assessing metacognition, at
least not in England, should be seen in a positive light.
Is it time for measures of metacognition to assume a place in
assessment of educational progress? As Linn (1991) argued, tests
signal what is important to teachers, parents, students, and
policymakers, and if these constituencies are to see that teaching
metacognitive skills is important, then metacognition needs to have
its place in tests. Tests, like it or not, drive instruction. Usually
educators decry the practice of teaching to the test; this is of course
a problem if there are specific facts that the student is to master that
are assessed in standardized multiple-choice formats. This is no less
true if it is ·a question about the strategies readers should use when
they are having difficulty understanding than if it is a question about
the date a historical event took place. As Kirby and Moore (1987)
argued, "Instruction in metacognitive awareness, without any practical skill or strategy development, would be unlikely to improve
[reading] skills or to serve any other useful function" (p. 135). A
student can just as easily memorize metacognitive "facts" as his tori-
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cal facts. But teaching to the test is much less of a problem if the
processes of thinking, reasoning, and problem solving, and the
metacognitive strategies that facilitate those processes, are the focus of
insh'uction and assessment.
Summary

Many researchers have been concerned about the uncritical acceptance of the construct of metacognition and the approaches that
have been used to measure it. In this chapter, we examined measurement issues from a variety of different perspectives, beginning with a
consideration of definition. Some of the difficulty in developing solid
measures of metacognition stems from the differences in the way
metacognition has been defined by those who study it. We define
metacognition as knowledge and control of cognition, and so we
discuss issues relevant to assessment of both knowledge and control.
Measures discussed in detail were verbal reports (interviews, questionnaires, and think-alouds) and error detection (used most frequently in studies of comprehension monitoring). Despite their
limitations, verbal reports are valuable sources of information and
continue to have an important place in the assessment of metacognition.
The limitations of error detection approaches have been well documented; although this paradigm has been informative, we believe it is
time to focus on more ecologically valid indices.
Some researchers have sought to develop standardized instruments for assessing metacognition that are theoretically motivated
and that meet psychometric criteria of reliability and validity. We
selectively discussed instruments assessing metamemory assessment,
metacognitive knowledge about reading, learning and study strategies, and problem solving. Although we now have a handful of
instruments with reliability that is adequate for research purposes,
none are sufficiently solid that they should be used for formal assessment in school or clinical settings.
Many articles have been written for teachers and school psychologists suggesting ways for them to assess metacognition in their students.
We discussed the prescriptive advice given to practitioners for how they
might assess metacognition using interviews, think-alouds, error detection, and process measures, and we expressed our reservations about
the tillcritical presentation of measures with questionable reliability and
validity. Researchers who attempt to translate research into practice
have an ethical obligation to frame their recommendations responsibly,
providing concrete information on the limitations of the measures.
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New modes of intellectual and educational assessment are being
developed that focus on the processes of cognitive activity rather than
the products and that measure what students do in more ecologically
valid contexts. There is a growing demand to make assessment
practices more in line with current views of learning and instruction.
We briefly discussed the place of metacognition in some of these
alternative assessments, including dynamic assessments, portfolio
assessments, and performance assessments. Though these approaches
are promising, they are in need of additional validation.
In the final section of the chapter, we stressed the value of
converging evidence in the assessment of metacognition, the evidence
that metacognitive skills should be taught and therefore assessed in
context, as domain-specific rather than domain-general skills, and
raised questions regarding evaluation criteria for metacognitive assessments and the uses to which such assessments are put. We do not
yet have solid answers to these important questions, but we hope that
the issues addressed in this paper, along with the contributions of the
other participants in this timely symposium, will serve to stimulate
further dialogue among researchers, educators, and policymakers
about the future of metacognitive assessment.
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Assessing Metacognitive
Knowledge Monitoring1
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Metacognition has been defined as the ability to monitor, evaluate, and make plans for one's learning (Flavell, 1979; Brown, 1980).
Research has shown that learners with effective metacognitive skills
are more capable of making accurate estimates of what they know and
do not know, of monitoring and evaluating their on-going learning
activities, and of developing plans and selecting strategies for learning new material. A large body of literature, reviewed in the other
chapters of this volume, has reported differences in metacognitive
abilities between learning disabled and regular students, as well as
between generally capable learners and their less able counterparts.
This research clearly indicates that metacognitive abilities are critically important for effective learning.
Metacognitive processes are usually divided (Pintrich, Wolters, &
Baxter, this volume) into three components: knowledge about
metacognition, monitoring of metacognitive processes, and control of
those processes. The research described in this chapter concentrates
'Preparation of this chapter was supported by The College Board, as were Studies
II- VII. Parts of this chapter were prepared while the first author was a Visi ting Facu lty
Fellow at the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center in San Diego, in a
program sponso red by the American Association for Engineering Education and the
U.s. Navy.
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on the monitoring component of metacognition, specifically students'
abilities to monitor their learning by differentiating between the
known and unknown. It is assumed that effective control of learning
cannot occur in the absence of accurate monitoring. If students cannot
distinguish between what they know and do not know, they can
hardly be expected to exercise control over their learning activities, or
to select appropriate strategies to attain their goals.
INTRODUCTION

Our concern with assessing knowledge and/ or ability monitoring
is based on reasoning that it is a crucial component of most learning
and training contexts. In such situations the learner usually has to
master a great deal of new knowledge. Therefore, those who accurately distinguish between what they have already learned and what
is yet to be acquired have an important advantage, because they can
refrain from studying material that has already been mastered, or
merely review it briefly. Such students can then devote most of their
time and energies to new, unfamiliar materials. In contrast, those
with less effective knowledge monitoring processes are likely to
allocate their time and resources less effectively and spend valuable
time studying what is known at the expense of the unfamiliar material
and, consequently, have greater difficulty mastering new subjects.
For these reasons, the program of research described in this chapter
concentrated on the development of a procedure to assess students'
abilities to monitor their knowledge, and differentiate between what
they believe they know and do not know and what they actually
know and do not know.
The purposes of this chapter are to describe the metacognitive
knowledge monitoring assessment (KMA) we have developed, and to
report on a program of research-12 studies in all-that relate scores
on the procedure to reading comprehension, problem solving in
mathematics, and, more generally, to learning in school settings.
Other studies also related scores on the KMA to such variables as
anxiety, interest, and need for feedback, and examined the usefulness
of the procedure in differentiating among learning disabled, attention
deficit hyperactive, and students without special educational needs.
All of the studies reported in this chapter used the KMA, a procedure
that may be administered using paper and pencil or via computer.
The procedure can also be scored objectively and, unlike other assessments of metacognitive processes, it does not rely solely on selfreports of cognitive processing.
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Assessing Metacognition
Despite its importance in meaningful human learning, the assessment of metacognition has proven to be both difficult and timeconsuming (Pintrich et aI., this volume). Metacognition, as a higher
order executive process (Borkowski, this volume; 1995), monitors and
coordinates the cognitive processes employed during learning. As
can be expected, there are considerable difficulties in assessing such
higher level processes. Metacognition is usually assessed in two
principal ways: observations of students' performance or by selfreport inventories. Some problems associated with each of these
forms of assessment are described below.
Observation and Verbal Report
Assessing metacognition by observation and verbal reports usually requires all of the following: (a) that students work on some task
individually; (b) that their performance is carefully observed; and (c)
that their performance is recorded in some way (notes taken by observers or audio/videotapes). Often a number of additional steps are
required before a rating of metacognition can be made, including
detailed interviews of students, the development of "think aloud"
protocols collected as students work on a learning task, and the recording of students' introspective reports. Multiple raters are usually
needed to inspect both the records of the performance and the interviews, or introspection protocols, before a sound rating of meta cognition
can be made (Meichenbaum, Burland, Cruson, & Cameron, 1985).
Referring to this approach, Royer, Cisero, and Carlo (1993) noted that:
"The process of collecting, scoring, and analyzing protocol data is
extremely labor intensive" (p. 203). The resources for such work are
rarely available in most instructional situations or in many universitybased research programs. Pressley's work (this volume; Pressley &
Afflerbach, 1995) provides a good example of the complexities of
conducting protocol analysis, and Baker and Cerro's chapter (this
volume) also discusses some problems with this approach, especially
as it pertains to the use of error detection for assessing metacognition.
Labor intensive practices such as those described above make it
difficult to evaluate metacognition in many instructionally relevant
settings, including secondary and post-secondary schools, as well as
training environments in business-industry, governmental agencies,
or in the military. In view of these difficulties it is not surprising that
most metacognitive research is usually conducted in elementary and
some secondary school settings where the time of those participating
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in the research can easily be diverted for the research effort. Of
course, substantial resources still have to be devoted to enable researchers to collect such metacognitive data.
Self-Report

A number of self-report measures of metacognition (Everson,
Hartman, Tobias, & Gourgey, 1991; Jacobs & Paris, 1987; O'Neil, 1991;
Pintrich, Smith, Garcia, & McKeachie, 1991; Schraw & Dennison, 1994)
have been developed and are widely used. Such questionnaires have
the advantage of being easily administered to groups and may be scored
rapidly and objectively. Self-report scales usually ask respondents to
select from a set of printed choices the cognitive processes and sh·ategies
they use while learning from instruction. Such scales put a premium on
effective reading abilities and, therefore, are not usually suitable for use
with younger or early elementary school children.
Unfortunately, the use of self-report measures in assessing a
complex process such as metacognition raises a variety of questions,
including some of the following: Because metacognition involves the
monitoring, evaluation, and coordination of cognitive processes, are
students aware of the processes used during learning? Further, are
students able to describe and report on metacognitive processes used,
even by merely selecting from available alternatives on a multiplechoice scale? Finally, there is the question of whether students report
honestly on the processes. Although the truthfulness of students'
answers is always an issue with self-reports, it may apply especially to
reports of cognitive processes used during learning because students at
any level are probably reluctant to admit that they may be relatively
casual during their attempts to complete school assignments. Of course,
these concerns are minimized if appraisals of any construct, and evaluations of metacognition in particular, do not rely on self-reports.
Rationale for Assessing Knowledge Monitoring

Each of the studies reported in this chapter employed a technique
for assessing metacognitive monitoring that simultaneously evaluated students' self-reports of their declarative word knowledge, or
their procedural math problem-solving ability, and their demonstrated knowledge or ability. The basic strategy is to assess knowledge monitoring by evaluating the discrepancy between students'
estimates and their actual (determined by performance on a test)
knowledge or ability. On the KMA, students are first asked to
estimate their knowledge or ability to solve mathematical problems.
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The actual knowledge or problem-solving ability is subsequently
assessed by administering an objectively scored test, most frequently
in multiple-choice format. The discrepancies between students' estimates and their actual knowledge are used as an index of the accuracy
of students' metacognitive knowledge monitoring abilities.
The KMA generates four scores that reflect the relationship between students' knowledge estimates and their test performance.
Two scores indicate that students estimated knowing an item, or being
able to solve a problem, (a) and answered the question correctly on a test
(abbreviated as + +), (b) or answered it incorrectly (+ -). Two further
scores are generated indicating that students estimated that they do not
know an item, or are unable to solve a problem, and (c) answer it
correctly (- +), or (d) incorrectly (- -). Of course, the + + and - - scores aTe
assumed to reflect accurate knowledge monitoring judgments, and the
+ - and - + scores reflect inaccurate judgments.
Like other types of meta cognitive measures, KMA estimates also
consist, in part, of self-reports. However, such reports typically are
much more readily available to students than the questions usually
appearing on self-report inventories dealing with their recollections
of the cognitive processes engaged in during learning, and/or how
frequently the processes were used. More important, the KMA also
incorporates students' actual performances on a test. Because estimated and actual performance can both be scored objectively, the
procedure has a clear-cut advantage over asking students to report on
their cognitive processes either in the form of protocols, or by choosing from available alternative on self-report inventories.
School assessments are often used to determine whether students
learned material presented in class. Therefore, it is important to
evaluate students' ability to update their knowledge and make accurate metacognitive estimates of whether the new material was learned,
in addition to assessing their prior learning. Consequently, several of
the studies reported below also examined students' accuracy in monitoring whether they had mastered materials after being given the
opportunity to do so.
The KMA was applied to the domain of students' declarative
word knowledge in 10 of the 12 studies described in this chapter. This
domain was selected because of its relevance to school learning. In
order to demonstrate that the procedure generalizes to other academic domains, two s tudies dealt with students' procedural knowledge in the area of solving mathematical problems, another important
domain in school learning at all levels. Finally, the research described
below also examined the relationship of KMA scores and measures of
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reading comprehension, school learning, anxiety, interest, and need
for feedback, as well as examining whether the KMA differentiated
between regular students and those diagnosed as being either learning disabled or having an attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.
Reports of the studies are organized into different categories according to the variables examined. Because a number of the investigations
dealt with multiple variables, some studies appear under more than one
rubric. In such instances, a detailed report of the study is given when
it is first described, and the reader is directed back to that description in
subsequent, briefer references to that investigation.
KNOWLEDGE MONITORING AND READING COMPREHENSION

There has been a good deal of research demonstrating that word
knowledge or vocabulary is one of the major components of reading
comprehension and learning more generally (Breland, Jones, & Jenkins,
1994; Just & Carpenter, 1987). However, few investigations studied •
whether the accuracy of students' estimates of their word knowledge
was an important predictor of the ability to learn. If students are
unable to differentiate accurately between the words they know and
do not know, they must find it difficult to determine whether to slow
down while reading and try to figure out the meaning of a word from
the context, or go to a dictionary to have it defined, or go on in the
possibly mistaken or uncertain belief that they understand the word's
meaning. Such uncertainty must be reflected in reduced reading
comprehension for students with inaccurate knowledge monitoring.
On the other hand, being able to distinguish accurately between
words students can define correctly and those they cannot should
enhance their reading comprehension and their effectiveness in learning new material. Because a great deal of research on metacognition
has dealt with reading comprehension, the criterion for assessing the
validity of the KMA in the first two studies was to determine its
relationship to measures of reading comprehension.
Study I: Estimates of Word Knowledge and Reading
Comprehension 2

In view of the demonstrated relationships between metacognition
and reading comprehension, it seemed important to evaluate the
accuracy of students' monitoring of their word knowledge ill a
2Study I was presented at the arulual convention of the American Psychological
Association, in San Francisco, Aug ust 1991. That paper was co-a uthored by S. Tobias,
H. Hartman, H. Everson, and A. Gourgey . See references.
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reading context. Such a setting was expected to increase the relevance
of the assessment to school learning. It was also anticipated that the
ability to learn new vocabulary would be an important skill for
reading specifically, and school learning more generally. Furthermore, students' abilities to make accurate metacognitive assessments
of whether they had actually learned the meanings of new words,
given an opportunity to do so, would also seem to be an important
indicator of reading comprehension. Therefore, the ability to update
one's knowledge and to make metacognitive estimates of the updated
knowledge were also assessed in this study.
Participants and Procedures

Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions.
One group was asked to read a 750-word text passage, and then
complete a word list and vocabulary test composed of words that had
been defined explicitly or implicitly in the text. The second group
received the Sentence Verification Test (SVT; Royer, Lynch, Hambleton,
& Bulgarelli, 1984) rather than the text passage as a control. The text
passage described the incidence and prevalence of heart disease, the
risk factors for developing heart ailments, the technical terms for
varying degrees of the illness, the characteristics differentiating the
different degrees, and a number of ways by which the risks of
developing heart disease could be reduced. It was known from prior
research (Tobias, 1989; 1969) that there was a good deal of variability
in participants' prior knowledge of this material.
On the word list, participants were asked to indicate, by checking
off one of two blanks, whether they knew, or did not know each of 33
words. All of the words were defined, either explicitly or implicitly,
in the passage previously administered to the group who read the
heart disease text. When the word list was completed, students
received a four-choice vocabulary test containing all of the 33 items on
the word list with instructions to select the correct synonyms or
definitions of the words. A number of other research instruments
were also administered, as was the Descriptive Test of Language
Skills, Reading, and Comprehension (DTLS; College Board, 1979), a
standardized test of reading comprehension.
The text passage, word list, and vocabulary test were examined
by four raters who judged whether the words were defined implicitly
or explicitly in the text. The passage was revised until consensus was
reached among the judges. Of the 33 words, the ratings indicated that
25 were defined implicitly (e.g., "Epidemiologists who have com-
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pared the prevalence of heart disease in the United States and in other
countries ... ") and eight words were defined explicitly (e.g., "Coronary or heart disease .... ").
A total of 167 freshmen at a large urban wuversity participated in
this Shldy. The students attended a summer session program designed to familiarize them with the university and the skills needed
to succeed in their studies. The group receiving the SVT consisted of
87 students, and 82 subjects read the text passage.
Results and Discussion

The accuracy of students' metacognitive word knowledge judgments was determined by comparing students' estimates of their
knowledge with their performance on the vocabulary test. The four
scores described earlier were generated: Terms checked as being
known on the word list which were scored (a) correct [abbreviated as
+ +], or (b) wrong [shown as + - ] on the vocabulary test. Two further
scores described terms students checked as being unknown on the
word list and answered (c) correctly [abbreviated as - +], or (d)
incorrectly [- -] on the vocabulary test.
The four KMA scores were computed for the total set of words,
and also for those that were defined explicitly or implicitly. The
correlations between these data and the reading comprehension sub test
of the DTLS are shown in Table I, for all subjects combined, as well
as for the group receiving the Sentence Verificati(!m Procedure (SVT)
and those reading the heart disease text.
The correlations in Table 1 indicate that, as expected, accurate
metacognitive judgments about the number of words students thought
they knew and answered correctly on the test (T + +) had a substantial
positive relationslup with reading comprehension. Estimates of the
number of words thought to be unknown and answered incorrectly
(T- -) were negatively related to comprehension. Furthermore, and
also anticipated, accurate estimates of words defined explicitly (E + +
and E - -) and implicitly (I + + and I - -) were also significantly
correlated (see Table 1) with comprehension, whereas the incorrect
judgments (E + -, E - +, I + -, and I - +) were not. The magnitude of
many of the correlation coefficients is especially impressive because
the participants were relatively homogeneous with respect to ability,
because they were considered to be at risk of doing poorly in school
and, therefore, advised to participate in the orientation and prefreshmen skills program they were a ttending.
The relationships between the KMA scores and reading comprehension were dramatically lower for students who did not read the
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Table 1. Zero-Order Correlations for Selected Variables with the DTLS
Reading Comprehension Score.
Entire Sample
T++
T- T-+
T+ E++
1++
E- 1- E- +
1- +
E+ 1+ -

.4655**
-.4330**
-.1803
.0678
.3263**
.4662**
-.3349**
-.4413**
-.1390
-.1626
.1586
.0140

SVT Group
.2913*
-.3721 **
-.0885
.2027
.0808
.3185*
-.2894*
-.3822**
-.1715
-.0523
.3295*
.1095

Heart Disease Group
.6474**
-.5442
-.2600
-.0825
.5221 **
.6302**
-.4196
-.5438**
-.1151
-.2827*
.0389
-. 0877

Legend: T = total score on word list task; E = words defined explicitly; I = words
defined in1plicitly; ++ = words Ss claimed to know and got right on a vocabulary test; - - = words Ss claimed they did not know and got wrong on a
vocabulary test; + - = words Ss claimed to know and got wrong on a vocabulary
test; - + = words Ss claimed they did not know but got right on a vocabulary test.
text passage, and received the SVT, compared to the others. Those
reading the passage had the chance to learn the meanings of previously unknown words, or to update their knowledge of familiar and
partially known words, whereas students who received the SVT did
not have that opportunity. It was expected that students who could
update their knowledge would make more accurate metacognitive
judgments than the others. Operationally then, it was expected that
group membership (i.e., reading the heart disease passage or the SVT)
and accuracy of metacognitive judgments would have an interactive
effect on reading comprehension. This hypothesis was tested by
multiple regression analysis in which a binary vector for group
membership (those reading the heart disease passage or the SVT),
KMA score, and their product (representing the interaction term),
were entered as independent variables and the reading comprehension test score was the dependent variable. The results of that analysis
are shown in Table 2.
As expected, the t test on the beta weights for the interaction term
was significant in five of the six equations shown in Table 2. These
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Table 2. Beta Weights and Associated t Tests for all Effects on all Derived
Scores.
Group
Score
T++
T- E++
E- 1++
1- -

Beta
-.10
.12
-.42
.07
-.59
.10

Score

Beta

Beta
.44
.97
3.00**
.56
3.14**
.84

-.62
.04
-.34
.03
-.07
.00

Group X Score

3.33**
.19
1.22
.14
.29
.02

.88
-.54
.85
-.41
.82
-.50

2.67**
2.32*
2.60*
1.70
2.55*
2.17*

*p<.OS
**p<.Ol
T = Resu lts for total word list.
E = Resu lts for words defined explicitly.
I = Resu lts for words defined implicitly.
++ = Words students claimed to know and got right on vocab ulary test.
+- = Words students claimed to know and got wrong on vocabulary test.
- - = Words students claimed not to know and got wrong on vocabu lary test.
-+ = Words stud ents claimed not to know and got right on vocabulary test.

results indicate that students who could update their word knowledge by reading the passage made significantly more accurate
metacognitive judgments than those who did not have that chance.
This finding is not surprising because the major skill assessed for the
group reading the passage was probably the ability to infer the
meaning of words, surely an important component of reading comprehension. Clearly then, the opportunity to renew word knowledge
and then estimate mastery of the updated knowledge improved the
relationships with reading comprehension.
Estimates and Number Correct. The metacognitive scores described
above were a function of two factors: Knowledge as reflected in the
number of items students answered correctly on the vocabulary test,
and knowledge estimates seen from how accurately students estimated that number. One question that arises is whether students'
knowledge estimates contributed variance above and beyond their
actual knowledge reflected by the total number correct, or raw score.
Of course, a great d eal of research has demonstrated that students'
vocabulary scores are highly related to reading comprehension and
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school learning more generally (Breland, Jones, & Jenkins, 1994; Just
& Carpenter, 1987). In the KMA, the raw score may be obtained by
adding the ++ and -+ scores. For the monitoring procedure to be
usefut it should account for more variance than the number of items
students answered correctly, irrespective of their knowledge estimates. That question is examined below in the first study and for all
of the other investigations described in this chapter.
The correlation between the raw score on the vocabulary test
(total number of words correct) and the DTLS was .45. As Table 1
indicates, the highest relationship among the metacognitive estimates
and reading ability, r = .65, was between the total number of words
estimated to be known and actually known (T ++). The difference in
the magnitude of these correlations indicates that accurate estimates
of students' word knowledge contributed variance above and beyond
the total vocabulary score. When T++ was forced into a regression
equation, the total number of words correct, irrespective of prior
estimates, did not contribute enough independent variance to enter
the equation. That finding confirms the differences between the two
correlation coefficients described above, and indicates that the accuracy of students' estimates of their updated vocabulary knowledge
were more highly related to comprehension than the actual knowledge.
The results of this first study were encouraging with respect to the
construct validity of the KMA. As expected, metacognitive assessments of students' word knowledge were more substantially related
to reading comprehension than the number of correct answers alone.
Study II. Declarative Word KMA and Reading Comprehension 3

The preceding study found strong relationships between
metacognitive monitoring and reading comprehension in general.
The purpose of the second study was to determine the KMA's
relationship both to prior reading ability and some of the components of reading comprehension, such as identifying words in
context, understanding meaning, and unders tanding the writer's
tone and assumptions. The four basic KMA scores appeared to
have some similarity to the phenomena studied in signal detection
theory (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 1991), which
separates phenomena into signal and noise components. Therefore,
a further purpose of this study was to examine whether the signal
JThis study, by Howard Everson, Ivan Smod laka, and SigmLmd Tobias was
published in Stress, Al1xiety, al1d Copil1g, 1994. See References.
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detection paradigm could define more useful scores than the ones
used in Study 1. Finally, relationships between KMA scores and
measures of test anxiety were examined, and are reported later in this
chapter.
Participants and Procedures

The word list and vocabulary test used in the first study were
administered to students, together with the Worry subscale of the Test
Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et al., 1980), and the Descriptive Test
of Language Skills, Reading, and Comprehension (College Board,
1989) that contained three subscales: identifying words in context,
understanding meaning, and understanding the writer's tone and
assumptions. An archival index of reading ability was obtained from
the participants' school records. The participants were 117 undergraduates from a large urban university, 65% were women.
Resu lts and Discussion

Knowledge monitoring ability was assessed by computing "hits"
(i.e., the number of words each participant claimed to know and
subsequently identified correctly on the vocabulary task or conversely said they did not know and failed to identify correctly on the
subsequent vocabulary task), and "false alarms" (i.e., the number of
words each claimed to know but did not correctly identify, and those
claimed to be unknown yet correctly identified). Using signal detection theory, these two indices were transformed into a d' index that
provides an estimate of metacognitive sensitivity and B, an index that
provides an estimate of the participants' response bias. The reliability
estimate (Cronbach, 1951) of these two indices was .78.
In general, the more capable readers demonstrated higher levels
of metacognitive ability. The correlations of knowledge monitoring
ability-as measured by the d' index- with prior reading ability and
the experimental measure of reading comprehension were.35 and
.39, respectively. Moreover, hierarchical multiple regression analyses
permitted us to isolate the effects of metacognitive ability on reading
test performance, once prior reading ability and anxious worry were
controlled statistically. These analyses suggested that metacognitive
ability was positively related to reading test performance (B = .17, t =
-2 .23, P = .03). Similarly, the correlations with the reading test's
subscales measuring vocabulary in context, literal interpretation of
text, and understanding the writers' tone and assumptions were .32,
.43, and .26 respectively.
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Contrasts with Study I

In Study II the text in which all of the vocabulary words were
defined was not administered. The correlation of .35 between the d'
score and reading comprehension was similar to the correlation of .29
(see Table 1) found in the first study between T ++ and reading
comprehension for those students who did not read the text passage.
Of course that relationship is much lower than the correlation of .65
found in Study I between the same variables for students reading the
passage. Clearly then, these two studies suggest that the metacognitive
word knowledge scores derived from the KMA had a strong, consistent relationship with standardized measures of reading comprehension and, further, that the opportunity to renew word knowledge and
re-estimate mastery of the updated knowledge improved the relationships with reading comprehension.
KNOWLEDGE MONITOR ING AND SCHOOL LEARNING

The first two studies were encouraging with respect to the relationship of the declarative word KMA to reading comprehension.
The results of these investigations indicated that meta cognitive estimates were closely related to competence in the domail.1. in which
students' estimates of knowledge were obtained (i.e., reading). One
purpose of the studies described below was to examine whether the
declarative word KMA was related to a more distant domain than the
one in which the assessment occurred, such as learning in school. The
expected relationship with school learning seemed reasonable because accurate estimates of one's knowledge should make it easier to
acquire the large amounts of new information taught in such settings.
Four studies dealing with these questions are described below. Furthermore, because the vocabulary and text passage dealt largely with
familiar issues and had a minimal technical vocabulary, the task of
inferring the meanings of unknown words from the passage, or
estimating one's word knowledge seemed most similar to learning in
courses that rely largely on conventional vocabulary, rather than
introducing a large set of new technical terms. Therefore, it seemed
likely that declarative word KMA scores should be more closely
related to students' learning in English and Humanities courses than
in others.
Another purpose of the succeeding studies was to extend the
research on metacognitive knowledge monitoring to the learning of
students in secondary and post-secondary schools. As mentioned
above, much of the research dealing with metacogl.1ition has been
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conducted in elementary schools, and to a lesser degree in secondary
or post-secondary school settings. Two of the succeeding studies
examined the relationship of the knowledge monitoring procedure to
students' overall achievement in college, and to their learning in
different content domains, and two others used high school students
and those who dropped out of school.
Study II I. Knowledge Monitoring and College Learning4

Students acquire a great deal of new knowledge in secondary and
post-secondary schools. Therefore, their ability to estimate whether
they have mastered either previously learned content or new material
seemed to be an important characteri~tic of effective learners, especially in college. Accurate monitoring of new learning should enable
students with effective knowledge monitoring strategies to concentrate on new materials and skim over familiar content. On the other
hand, students with less effective knowledge monitoring may waste
time practicing or reviewing what they already know, rather than
zeroing in on new material or updating partially learned content.
Therefore, Studies III and IV asked students to estimate their vocabulary knowledge twice: the first time to assess their prior learning, and
the second to determine their ability to update prior learning. It was
assumed that students' accuracy in estimating their word knowledge
after having the chance to update it would be more closely related to
college learning reflected in their grade point average (GPA) than to
estimates of prior learning.
The word list, vocabulary test, and text materials used in the two
studies reported above contained a much larger set of explicitly
defined words compared to those defined implicitly. It was reasoned
that implicit definitions might be especially important for college
learning, where students frequently had to infer the meanings of new
words from context. Therefore, the materials were modified to
increase the number of implicitly defined words.
Participants and Procedures

The word list, vocabulary test, and text passage were revised to
contain an equal number of target words that were defined explicitly
and implicitly in the text passage. The expository text used in one of
the prior studies was revised and a narrative version of the same
passage was developed in order to examine the effect of situational
'A paper based on Studies III and IV was presented at the ann ual meeting of the
American Ed uca tional Research Association, San Francisco, CA, April 1995.
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interest on metacognitive knowledge monitoring (findings dealing
with interest are discussed later in the chapter).
The word list and vocabulary test contained 38 words, half were
explicitly defined and the others received implicit definitions. Types
of definitions were determined by two independent judges who rated
all words. Disagreements were resolved by revising the passage until
agreement was reached. Because these materials are used in six of the
studies described in this chapter, a sample, consisting of the first page
of the materials, is shown in Figures 1-3.
The word list and vocabulary test (alpha reliability = .80) were
administered in a first session. Students were then randomly assigned to one of the two versions of the text in a second session,
followed by a re-administration of the word list and vocabulary test.
The materials were administered during students' classes in the
presence of their instructors.
Figure 1. Word List for Knowledge Monitoring Procedure.

Please indicate whether you know, or do not know each of the words listed
below, by checking the appropriate space.

Abuse
Acute
Ascribed
Attenuate
Attributed
Benign
Cholesterol
Coronary
Deterrent
Diagnosis
Efficacy
Emanating
Entity
Epidemiology
Esoteric
Etiology
Fatalities
Genre
Gravity
Guarded
Implicated

- Know
__Know
- -Know
- -Know
- -Know
- -Know
- -Know
__Know
- -Know
- -Know
- -Know
__Know
- -Know
__Know
- -Know
- -Know
- - Know
- - Know
- -Know
- -Know
- -Know
-

- - Do
- - Do
- -Do
- -Do
- -Do
- -Do
- -Do
- -Do

Do
- -Do
- -Do
- -Do
- -Do
- -Do
- -Do
- -Do
- -Do
- -Do
- - Do
- -Do
- -Do
--

not
not
not
not
not
not
not
not
not
not
not
not
not
not
not
not
not
not
not
not
not

know
know
know
know
know
know
know
know
know
know
know
know
know
know
know
know
know
know
know
know
know
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Figure 2. Example of Vocabulary Items for the Knowledge Monitoring
Procedure
For each word check the space which means most nearly the same thing as the first
word.
1) Prevalent
_ a) stronger
_ b) winning
_ c) frequent
_ d) prior

6) Ascribe
_ a) refer
_ b) written
_ c) question
_ d) bed

11) Infarction
_a) tooth decay
_b) particle
_ c) rule violation
_ d) muscle death

2) Attributed
_ a) caused
_ b) ovation
_ c) stream
_ d) tax

7) Transitory
_ a) move
_ b) temporary
_ c) carry
_ d) train

12) Fatalities
_ a) fatty tissue
_ b) deaths
_ c) fateful
_ d) take in stride

3) Optimal
_ a) best
_ b) opening
_ c) eyeball
_ d) cheerful

8) Median
_ a) stripe
_ b) divider
_ c) middlemost
_ d) negotiate

13) Incidence
_ a) new cases
_ b) an example
_ c) exciting
_ d) event

4) Obesity
_ a) listen
_ b) fat
_ c) apology
_ d) obsolet.e

9) Ingest
_ a) joke
_ b) eat
_ c) enter
_ d) exit

14) Attenuate
_ a) listen
_ b) reduce
_ c) pay attention
_ d) try

5) Acute
_ a) pretty
_ b) serious
_ c) heavy
_ d) often

10)
_ a)
_ b)
_ c)
_ d)

15) Guarded
_ a) uncertain
_ b) optimistic
_ c) degrees
_ d) watchful

Residual
lasting
live
income
clever

Please turn to next page to continue

The sample consisted of 139 students attending a large urban
university, though only 84 subjects completed all the materials during
two sessions. Part of the sample consisted of students entering the
nursing program (N = 47, N = 33 with complete data) who were taking
an orientation course in that department. The rest of the sample
consisted of freshmen (N = 92, N = 51 with complete data) taking a
freshman orientation course.
Results and Discussion

The correlation between total score on both administrations of the
vocabulary test, based on 84 students who completed the test on both
administrations, was .75. This is not a test-retest reliability coefficient
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Figure 3. Text Passage for the Knowledge Monitoring Procedure.

Read this passage carefully:

Coronary or heart disease is a major health problem
among all ethnic, racial and occupational groups in the
United States. In addition to coronary disease, health
workers are worried about many other maladies affecting
Americans, such as cancer, AIDS, and other equally serious
conditions. However, compared to all other serious illnesses, coronary problems cause more than half of the total
number of fatalities or deaths in the United States. To be
exact, 55% ofthe deaths among all groups in this country, or
more fatalities than for all the other illnesses combined, may
be ascribed to coronary disease. Not only is coronary
disease responsible for the greatest number of fatalities in
this country but it is also the most prevalent, or frequent, of
all the serious illnesses. That is, coronary disease is more
prevalent than all the other serious conditions combined.
The incidence, that is the number of new cases, of
coronary disorders is higher among men than among women
for the country as a whole. The incidence of heart disorders
is also higher for cigarette smokers than it is among nonsmokers. A higher incidence of coronary disease among
Americans is also attributed to alcoholism, drug addiction,
and tobacco. The etiology, or causes, of coronary disease
among Americans are not completely clear, but excessive
use, or abuse of alcohol and the other substances mentioned
above is often linked to coronary disease. In addition,
tension, air pollution, weighing too much, and engaging in
too little exercise are also implicated as causes of heart
disease among people living in the United States.
The gravity of heart disease for people in general is a
function of the magnitude of coronary damage. The heart is
basically a muscle similar to all the others in the human body.
The amount of damage to the heart muscle, or myocardium,
determines the seriousness of the illness. The most serious
type of damage, which is called myocardial infarction, occurs
when the heart muscle dies. One major difference between
the myocardium and other muscles in the human body ...
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because students read the text passage, from which the meaning of
the words could be inferred, immediately before the second administration of the vocabulary test.
Students' estimated word knowledge and performance on the
vocabulary test were determined for both administrations. Two
scores were computed for each administration: the total number of
correct [words in the + + and - - categories] and incorrect [+ - and - +
categories] estimates. Preliminary analysis found no differences
between students assigned to the expository or narrative text versions, or between explicitly and implicitly defined words, therefore
the data for both text versions and both types of words were pooled.
The correlations between the correct and incorrect estimates on both
administrations of the words and students' GPA in English, Humanities, Sciences, Social Sciences, and combined GP A were computed and
are shown in Table 3. Because 92 participants were freshmen in their
first term of college the overall GPA for this group was based on an
average of only 12.1 credits (SD = 5.6), whereas the nursing students had
a mean of 56.4 credits (SD = 28.3). Therefore, the correlations are
presented for each group separately, as well as for the total sample.
Table 3 also shows the correlations for metacognitive estimates and raw
score, number correct on the vocabulary, separately. Finally, the different number of cases in the various cells of Table 3 should also be noted.
The correlations shown in Table 3 are generally positive and
frequently significant, even though they ranged from low to moderate
in magnitude. The results support the concurrent validity of the
procedure with respect to its relationship to learning in college. As
expected, correlations between knowledge monitoring scores and
GP A in English were generally highest; presumably accurately estimating word knowledge is more important in English than in other
subjects. Relationships with Humanities courses and with the combined GP A were generally significant and lower than those with
English grades; correlations with social science and science GP As
were generally lower, and usually not significant. The largely nonsignificant relationships with social and behavioral science courses were
surprising because it had been assumed that these courses usually
contained less technical or unfamiliar material and vocabulary than
the sciences. Perhaps grades in these courses, like those in science,
reflected greater domain specific knowledge than found in English
and Humanities classes.
The significance levels of the correlations reported in Table 3
varies widely, probably as a function of at least three factors. First, the
number of cases in each cell differs due to students' absence from
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Table 3. Correlations Between Knowledge Monitoring Procedure Scores,
Raw Scores, and Overall Grade Point Averages in Different Subject Areas.

Variables
Group

Administration 1
Correct
Estimate

n
Total GPA
Total
101
Freshmen
65
Nurses
36
English GPA
72
Total
Freshmen
53
Nurses
19
Humanities
82
Total
Freshmen
52
Nurses
30
Science GPA
Total
65
28
Freshmen
37
Nurses
Social Science GP A
Total
64
Freshmen
26
Nurses
38

Raw
Scr

Administration 2
Correct
Estimate

Raw
Scr

r

r

.20*
.09
.28*

.01
-.25
-.37*

n
94
61
33

r

r

.09
-.10
.19

-.00
-.21
.17

.30**
.31**
.25

.19
.10
.33

63
48
19

.19
.00
.45*

.05
.16
.44*

.26**
.12
.48**

.04
-.21
.40*

74
46
28

.13
-.11
.35*

.00
.22
.24

.18
.11
.26

-.01
-.30
-.42*

63
27
36

.03
-.28
.18

-.07
-.47
.26

.18
.15
.09

.26
.10
-.31

63
29
34

.24'·
.14
.14

.26*
.18
.10

• = P <.05
•• = P <.01

either the first or second administration of the materials. Second, it is
well known that college grades are often unreliable (Werts, Linn, &
Joreskog, 1978; Willingham, Lewis, Morgan, & Ramist, 1990), reducing the magnitude of any correlations with them. Third, students
completed a varying number of courses in each area, thus GP As may
have been based on one or a few courses in some fields, reducing the
stability of the criterion. The reliability of the grades may have been
reduced further by three factors: (a) students took dissimilar courses
in each of the areas shown in Table 3; (b) when similar courses were
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taken they were taught by different instructors; and (c) differences in
students' major fields of study.
As expected, the correlations between knowledge monitoring
scores and grades in English were generally higher, and more frequently significant, than those of any other subject. For the 84
students with complete data for both administrations of the vocabulary test, the mean total score increased from 23.3 (SD = 6.0) for the
first vocabulary test to 26.0 (SD = 6.6) for the second (t(83)= 5.53, P
<.001). Thus students clearly learned the meanings of some of the
words after having the chance to update their word knowledge by
reading the passage. However, in contrast to the results of the first
study, the relationships between the metacognitive scores and grades
shown in Table 3 were generally higher before students read the text
passage than afterwards. The Study I findings of higher relationships
with DTLS scores on the second administration of the procedure may
be attributable to the use of reading comprehension scores rather than
grades as criteria. Apparently, inferring the meaning of words is a
more important component of reading comprehension than of school
learning more generally.
It was assumed in this study that having the chance to update
one's word knowledge before estimating it would be more similar to
students' learning in their classes than merely estimating prior word
knowledge. Therefore, relationships with grades were expected to be
higher for the second administration than the first. The findings did
not support these expectations. Although the increase in vocabulary
score after reading the text was statistically significant, it indicated
that, on average, less than three new words were learned from the
text passage. Perhaps such modest acquisition was dissimilar to the
amount of learning in college courses leading to lower relationships
with metacognitive monitoring scores on the second administration
of the procedure. Similarities between the knowledge monitoring
task and school learning might have increased if students were
instructed to study the passage more intensely, or asked to pay special
attention while reading words they had previously seen on the
vocabulary test. Such instructions may have increased the correlations with GP A for the second administration. It remains for further
research to explore that possibility.
Table 3 also indicated that the correlations with number correct
on the vocabulary test were generally similar to the relationships with
correct knowledge monitoring estimates. Due to the varying Ns in the
different cells, the significance of differences in correlations was
examined with a t test developed by Hotelling (1931). For the
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correlations with GPA based on both administrations, using the total
group, the knowledge monitoring scores were higher seven times
(one difference was significant at p <.05), and the correlations based
on raw scores were higher three times (none significantly so). For
freshmen, the correlations with knowledge monitoring procedure
scores were higher twice, but not significantly so, and correlations
with raw score were higher eight times (two significant at p< .05)
Finally, for nursing students, correlations based on knowledge monitoring scores were higher five times (none significant), and relationships based on raw scores were higher five times (one significant p
<.05). Thus, the knowledge monitoring scores appeared to add little
independent variance to the relationship with grades beyond that
accounted for by the number correct on the vocabulary test.
The findings for this study, in contrast to the findings of the first
two investigations, suggest that the knowledge estimating procedure
seems to account for little independent variance in GPA above that
attributable to number correct on the vocabulary test. Conceivably
the findings of low reliability for college grades (Werts, Linn, &
Joreskog, 1978; Willingham, Lewis, Morgan, & Ramist, 1990), referred
to above, may have contributed to these findings. The criterion in the
first two studies consisted of test scores, which are much more reliable
than grades.
Study IV: Predicting College Learning from KMA Scores

The preceding study dealt with the concurrent validity of the
KMA by examining the correlations of knowledge monitoring procedure scores with students' prior learning in college. The fourth study
investigated the KMA scores' predictive validity by examining whether
metacognitive estimates predicted entering students' performance
during their first year of college.
Participants and Procedures

The materials used were identical to those described in Study III.
They were administered while students attended a prefreshman skills
program prior to beginning their first semester of college. Learning
was determined by obtaining students' GP As at the end of their first
college year in the same areas examined in the prior study: English,
Humanities, Science, and Social and Behavioral Science, as well as the
combined GPA. The sample consisted of 115 students (59 female)
participating in a prefreshman skills program intended for students
considered at risk of doing poorly in their first year of college.
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Results and Discussion

The number of correct metacognitive estimates of students' word
knowledge were determined. As in the prior studies, correct estimates were defined by combining the + + and - - categories. Preliminary analysis again indicated that there were no differences between
the expository and narrative passages, nor between the words defined
explicitly or implicitly. Therefore, these data were pooled for the
succeeding analyses.
Correlation analysis was the optimal data analytic mode in the
preceding study because of the large amount of missing data due to
student's absences, and the varying courses in different areas taken by
the freshmen and prenursing students. However, by examining
whether changes in knowledge monitoring scores were accompanied
by similar changes in GPA correlations were likely to maximize
errors attributable to the low reliability of grades because small
changes that could alter the correlations might be attributable to error.
The participants in Study IV were incoming freshmen who completed
all the materials and took similar types of courses. Therefore, high
and low achievement groups were created by splitting students at the
GP A median in the different academic areas, and on the combined
GP A, and then examining know ledge monitoring differences between the groups. Mixed between and within subjects analyses of
variance were then computed to determine the significance of differences between the first and second administrations, and of differences
in metacognitive estimates between groups above and below the GPA
median.
A search of the college records found that 95 of the 115 students
examined a year earlier had completed some courses at the school.
ANOV A indicated that, as expected, students above the median GPA
(N = 48) made significantly more accurate overall metacognitive
judgments (Mean = 49.2, F (I, 93) = 6.42, P <.05) on both administrations than those below the median (N = 47, Mean = 45.8); the size of
that effect, determined by eta 2 (SPSS, 1993), was .065. Also as
expected, there was a significant difference between the first (Mean =
22.9) and second administration (Mean = 24.5) of the word list and
vocabulary test (F(I ,93) = 14.95, P <.01, eta 2 = .138), though there was
no interaction between these variables. A similar analysis was computed using the number right on both administrations of the vocabulary test as the dependent variable. That analysis indicated that the
differences between the high (Mean = 43.2) and low GP A group
(Mean = 39.3) on the vocabulary test was not significant (F(I, 93) =

4. METACOGN ITIVE KNOWLEDGE MONITORING

169

2.73, eta 2 = .029), and the differences between the first (Mean = 17.7)
and second administrations (Mean = 24.5) were significant (F(l,93) =
198.04, P < .001, eta 2 = .68); again there was no interaction.
High and low groups in English, Humanities, Science, and Social
Science courses were also formed by splitting the students at the GPA
median in each of these content areas and examining the significance of differences on the number of correct meta cognitive estimates. In English, the overall differences in meta cognitive accuracy
between students above (Mean = 48.9) and below the median
(Mean = 45.4) were significant (F(l,82) = 6.18, P <.02, eta 2 = .07), as
were the differences between the first (Mean = 45.6) and second
administrations (Mean = 48.7, F(l,82) = 11.92, p<.Ol; eta 2 = .127).
Furthermore, there was an interaction between groups and administrations (F(l,82) = 4.41, P <.05; eta 2 = .051). The interaction,
shown in Figure 4, suggests that although both groups increased
their accuracy from the first to the second vocabulary test in
estimating which words were known and unknown, higher achieving students had greater gains than the others. A similar analysis was

27
26

.".

.".

1st Administration

25
Knowledge 24
Monitoring
Accuracy Scale
23
22

Low
GPA

High
GPA

Figure 4. Interaction of GP A Groups, Hits, and Administration.
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computed for number correct on both vocabulary test administrations. The finding indicated a slightly smaller difference between the
high (Mean = 42.9) and low GPA group (Mean = 38.9, F (1,82) = 5.43;
eta 2 = .062) than obtained when the metacognitive scores were used,
but a stronger effect for differences between first (Mean = 18.0) and
second administrations (Mean = 23.6, F (1,82) = 169, P < .001; eta 2 =
.673); there was no evidence for interaction in these results.
Similar analyses were computed for students above and below
the median in Humanities courses (Art, History, Music, Philosophy,
World Civilization, World Humanities, and World Arts) . Differences between High (Mean = 49.4) and Low Humanities GPA
groups (Mean=45.3) were also significant (F(I, 81) = 7.96, P < .01;
eta 2 = .089), as were the differences between first (Mean = 23.0)
and second administrations (Mean = 24.5, F(I, 81) = 9.94, P < .001;
eta 2 =.109), there was no interaction. The same type of analysis
was also computed for number correct on the first and second
vocabulary test again revealing somewhat smaller differences
between the high (Mean=43.1) and low groups (Mean = 39.0, F (I,
81) = 4.18, P < .05; eta 2 = .049) and larger differences between the
first (Mean = 17.8) and second administration (Mean = 23.4, F (I,
81) = 179.2, P < .001 ; eta 2 = .689) than the results for knowledge
monitoring scores. There were no significant differences between the
Science or Social and Behavioral Science GP A groups using either the
knowledge monitoring procedure or raw scores.
The relationships between metacognitive scores and GP A a year
later were generally similar to those reported in Study III, supporting
the predictive validity of the KMA scores. Unlike the prior study, in
which both knowledge monitoring and raw scores had fairly similar
patterns of relationships, the metacognitive scores had a significant
effect on overall GP A, whereas the raw scores did not. Furthermore,
the knowledge monitoring scores accounted for more variance than
the number right in two of three other comparisons, supporting the
construct validity of the procedure.
Several factors are likely to have reduced the magnitude of the
effects and the generalizability of the results to other college groups.
As was the case in the first study, the participants in the pre freshmen
program were considered to be at risk for poor performance in
college. This factor may have reduced the range of college achievement for the sample and, therefore, may also have reduced knowledge monitoring differences between the groups. Furthermore, even
though data were not collected in sections of the pre freshmen skills
program devoted exclusively to English as a Second Language (ESL),
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some of the students were signed up for both ESL and other skills
sections, and thus ended up as part of the sample. The presence of
nonnative English speakers could also have reduced the variability
among participants and narrowed group differences in this study.
Further research limited to native English speakers, who are more
heterogeneous in academic skills than the present sample, is
needed to determine whether metacognitive differences between
low and high achieving . students are greater than those reported
here.
In general, KMA scores seemed to differentiate the more capable
students, whose grades were above the median, from those less able
more successfully than did the raw scores, replicating the findings of
Studies I and III. The knowledge monitoring scores accounted for
anywhere from 1% to 4% more variance than similar analyses using
the raw score. It was also interesting to note that the analysis of raw
score differences between the first and second vocabulary test administrations always accounted for substantially more variance than did
a similar analysis based on knowledge monitoring scores. The latter
finding is reasonable and supports the construct validity of the
procedure because most students learned some new words from the
text passage, though their knowledge monitoring was not equally
enhanced. However, it should be noted that the results for English
grades indicated that there were greater increases in knowledge
monitoring accuracy for capable students than for their less able peers
(see Figure 4). These findings suggest that although all students
increased both their knowledge and knowledge monitoring accuracy
from first to second administration, the increases in metacognitive
knowledge monitoring accuracy were greater for more capable students (i.e., those whose English grades were above the median).
Apparently such students' metacognitive skills improved to a greater
degree than those of their less able colleagues.
It should be noted that many of the students in this sample took
less than a full-time schedule of courses. That is likely to have
decreased the reliability of the GP A because it was based on fewer
courses and credits than is usually the case after a year of college.
This factor may also limit the generalizability of the results to
other groups, in addition to reducing the magnitude of the findings by decreasing the potential variability of the GP A. Therefore,
in order to increase both the reliability and variability of the criterion, it would be useful to investigate the predictive validity of the
knowledge monitoring procedure in settings with a greater percentage of full-time students.
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Study V: Knowledge Monitoring and Learning Among Vocational
High School Students5

All of the prior studies used college students as subjects. College
students are probably more academically oriented than those attending vocational high schools, and consequently more likely to be
reflective about their declarative word knowledge and in turn, likely
to make more accurate estimates of what they know and do not know.
Therefore, one purpose of the next study was to examine the relationship of the knowledge monitoring procedure for students attending a
vocational high school. This study also examined the relationship
between metacognitive monitoring scores and students' estimates of
their performance, as well as their test anxiety. The results dealing
with those variables are discussed in later sections of this chapter.
Participants and Procedures

This study employed the word list and vocabulary test described
in the two preceding studies; the text passage was not used. Students
were tested in one of their regular school classes. In addition some
anxiety scales were administered and students were also asked to
estimate their grades on tests given in one of their vocational classes.
Students' overall GPAs were obtained from the school's permanent
records.
All of the participants attended a vocational high school in a large
urban school system. A total of 61 students (59 male) participated in
this study. The students' ages ranged from 16-19.
Results and Discussion

Students were split at the GPA median, and two multivariate
analyses of variance (MANOV A) computed. The first examined
differences between the high and low GPA groups on the accuracy of
students' knowledge estimates (using the + +, + -, - +, and - - scores)
and the second analysis examined group differences in student word
knowledge (the sum of ++ and -+ scores equal the number correct on
the vocabulary test). MANOVA indicated that the overall knowledge
monitoring differences between the high and low GP A groups were
significant (Transformed Wilks lambda F (3,57) = 3.17, P <.05, effect
size = .143). Univariate analyses found that only the difference
between the high (Mean = 17.8) and low (Mean = 14.4) GPA groups
on the + + scores were significant (F(1,59) = 9.35, P <.01).
5The data for this study were collected by Deno Charalambous.
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The MANOVA computed on group differences in the number
correct on the vocabulary also indicated a significant difference between the groups (Transformed Wilks lambda F (2,58) = 5.35, P <.01,
effect size = .156). Univariate analyses found that the differences
in + + scores were the same as in the preceding analysis; however, in
this analysis group differences between the high (Mean = 3.5) and low
(Mean = 5.2) GP A groups on the - + scores were also significant
(F(2,58) = 5.59, P <.05). As expected, the results indicated that the
more capable students estimated and actually knew more words than
those with lower GP As; the latter group estimated not knowing more
words than the students who were above the GP A median.
The significant differences between the two GP A groups replicate
the results of the two prior studies dealing with college GP As and
confirms the relationships between metacognitive knowledge estimates and school learning. The results of the second analysis fail to
support the additional importance of obtaining students' estimates of
their knowledge because the differences between the GPA groups on
their actual vocabulary knowledge were also significant and slightly
greater than the differences in knowledge monitoring. The word list
and vocabulary test were developed for a college population; perhaps
these materials were so unfamiliar to these vocational high school
students that their estimates were based on little more than chance.
Study VI. Knowledge Monitoring Among High School Dropouts6

The high percentage of students who drop out of high school
before graduating is a major problem, especially in times when entry
level employees for most positions in business and industry call for
greater levels of skill than ever before. At a time when the advent of
the information super-highway is beginning to redefine the job functions of lower and mid-level workers in business and industry, it is
vital that students complete a secondary school education in order to
have better chances of finding employment. There is little reason for
optimism in that respect as Mann (1986) reported that "A national
estimate suggests that 25 percent of fifth graders will not make it
through high school graduation" (Mann, p . 309).
There are many reasons for students dropping out of school, but
Tanner (1990) suggests that "School based reasons are the most
important self-reported explanation of dropping-out for all groups of
adolescents" (p. 80). Chief among the school-based reasons is poor
performance in school. When asked why they had dropped out of
6The data for this study were collected by Heather Gerrity.

174

TOBIAS/EVERSON

school, more than one third of the students said "Because I had bad
grades," or "because I did not like school" (Mann, 1986, p. 309).
These findings were substantially similar to those reported by Ekstrom,
Goertz, Pollack, and Rock (1986). Therefore it seemed reasonable to
assume that students who dropped out of high school would have
lower metacognitive knowledge monitoring abilities than regular
students. This expectation was examined in Study VI.
Participants and Procedures

The word list and vocabulary test employed in Studies II-V were
administered, together with some test anxiety scales, described later
in this chapter. The text passage was not used.
A total of 89 subjects participated. The dropout group consisted
of 42 individuals (14 female) who had dropped out of high school and
were attending a General Equivalency Diploma program. The continuing student group consisted of 47 students (16 female) who had a
school GPA of at least B-. None of these students had given any
indication that they were at risk of dropping out of school.
Results and Discussion

Two MANOV As, identical to those of the preceding study, were
computed to determine the significance of differences between the
high school dropouts and continuing students. The first analysis
found significant overall group differences (Transformed Wilks lambda
F (3,79) = 4.08, P > .01, effect size = .134) in knowledge estimates (+ +,
+-, and - - scores). Univariate analyses indicated that the dropout
group (Mean = 12.7) differed from the continuing students (Mean =
16.2) on the + + scores (F(1,81) = 8.83, P <.01) and on the + - scores
(dropout Mean = 10.6, continuing students 8.5; F(1,81 ) = 6.11, P <.02) .
A similar analysis of actual knowledge (+ + and - + scores) also indicated
significant, though somewhat smaller group differences (Transformed
Wilks lambda F (2,80) = 4.61, P < .01, effect size = .103). Univariate
analyses indicated that only the + + score difference was significant.
The results indicate that, as expected, students who dropped out
of high school had less effective knowledge monitoring abilities than
did continuing students. Analysis of raw score differences yielded
similar, though somewhat smaller effects. The results suggest that the
poorer knowledge monitoring abilities of students who dropped out
of school may have made school work more difficult for these students and contributed to poor performance, a picture that is consistent with the descriptions in the literature of school dropouts.
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Summary: Knowledge Monitoring and School Learning

As expected, the four studies found significant relationships
between metacognitive knowledge monitorirlg scores and school
learning. The studies used different types of samples ranging from
regular college students, those about to enter college and enrolled in
a prefreshmen skills program, vocational and regular high school
students, and those who dropped out of school. Because relationships
with knowledge monitoring were in the expected direction for the
different samples it may be inferred that the KMA has some generality across a variety of student groups. In most of the studies, the KMA
scores accounted for more variance than raw vocabulary scores supporting the construct validity of the procedure.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND METACOGNITIVE
KNOWLEDGE MONITORING

The studies reported in the preceding section described the relationships between knowledge monitoring and school learning. The
grades students receive are a function not only of their domain
knowledge, but also of the standards and types of evaluations and
grading procedures used by instructors. These factors potentially add
error to the relationship between knowledge monitoring scores and
GP A. In view of the fact that the KMA assesses students' abilities to
estimate their knowledge, it was reasoned that students who were
capable of accurately estimating their word knowledge on the KMA
should also be more accurate in predicting their performance on
examinations related to their present studies before they take them,
and how well they performed on those examinations after they were
completed. This section describes three studies examining these
questions.
There has been some research on the prediction of performance in courses and on tests, though none of these related the
predictions to metacognition or knowledge monitoring. Keefer
(1971) found that college students who accurately estimated their
performance achieved at a significantly higher level than less
accurate estimators, and had a more positive self-concept than
their low-estimating counterparts. Holen and Newhouse (1976)
found that students' predictions of their grades on a course examination correlated as highly with actual performance as their GPA,
and were significantly more accurate predictors than other variables, such as grades in prerequisite courses or GP A. Furthermore, students' performance predictions contributed significant
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unique variance to predictions of actual final grade, above that
contributed by high school and college GP A, or grades in prerequisite
courses. Harris (1990) found that accurate estimators of test performance in psychology earned a significantly higher final average in
introductory psychology than did low and less accurate estimators.
The research on performance estimation suggests that more capable students make more accurate predictions of their performance
than their less able counterparts. Because the studies described in the
preceding section found that accurate KMA scores were associated
with higher GP A, the findings dealing with performance estimation
support the rationale that students who make accurate metacognitive
assessment of their knowledge should make more accurate predictions of test scores than would less accurate students.
Study VII . Performance Estimation and Predicting Standardized
Test Scores

In some of the previous studies all students responded to the
metacognitive procedure before and after reading the text passage.
The results indicated that metacognitjve estimates before students
read the text passage were somewhat more highly related to their
GP As than those obtained after reading the passage, although the
opposite findings emerged in studies relating knowledge monitoring
to reading comprehension. A further purpose of this study was to
vary the administration of the text passage in order to examine its
contribution to students' estimates of their test performance. Furthermore, it was considered useful to examine performance on a standardized test of known reliability to reduce possible error. Studies I
and II used a standardized measure of reading comprehension as the
criterion, and the results relating test performance to word KMA
seemed more positive than the comparisons with the less reliable
student grades. Therefore, the use of a test that had demonstrated
reliability (.88) in a previous study seemed desirable.
It was expected that General Psychology students who could
accurately monitor their knowledge would also be more accurate in
predicting their actual and estimated scores on the Advanced Placement Test (AP) in Psychology (College Entrance Examination Board,
1988) before and after completing it, and that they would also earn
higher scores on the test than their less accurate peers. Finally, as
suggested by other studies of student's estimation of their performance, it was predicted that they would expect to obtain higher
grades in the course in which they were registered.
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Participants and Procedures

The AP Examination in Psychology (College Entrance Examination Board, 1988) was administered to students enrolled in an introductory psychology class. Students received a description of the
different areas covered by the AP test and were asked to predict how
many of the 100 items they could answer correctly before the test was
taken, and again after it was completed (postdiction). Half the sample
(N ::: 39) was randomly assigned to read the expository version of the
text passage used in the two preceding studies before the word list,
and the other half (N ::: 38) received an unrelated task, the text
selection titled "Teaching the Mentally Retarded" from the Sentence
Verification Technique (Royer, Carlo, Dufresne, & Mestre, 1994), and
then answered the questions on that passage. The same word list and
vocabulary test used in Studies II-VI were then administered to all
participants.
Students were also asked to predict their final grade in the
Introductory Psychology class they were taking. On this campus the
accuracy of their grade predictions could not be determined because
regulations for the protection of students' privacy made it impossible
to obtain information by which they could be identified.
A total of 77 students (41 females) taking the Introductory
Psychology class on one of the campuses of a large urban university
volunteered to participate in the study. Students could choose from
a number of projects to satisfy a requirement for research participation.
Results and Discussion

More accurate meta cognitive scores were expected for the group
responding to the word list and vocabulary test after reading the text
compared to the other group who received the SVT, which was
irrelevant to the task. Surprisingly, MANOVA based on the total
number of accurate estimates [+ + and - -] revealed no significant
differences between the groups (see Figure 5). Examination of the
basic eight scores [ + +, + -, - +, - - for both explicitly and implicitly
defined words] indicated that there appeared to be some group
differences (see Figure 6), but that these canceled each other out when
the data were combined into total number of correct estimates.
When MANOV A was computed on six of the basic scores (the
scores for the + - category for explicitly and implicitly defined words
were eliminated to avoid linear dependencies) the overall differences
between the groups were significant (F(6,70) ::: 3.71, p <.01). Univariate
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Figure 5. Differences Between Text and SVT Groups on Knowledge Monitoring Scores.
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F tests indicated that the students who read the passage made more
accurate metacognitive estimates on explicitly defined words in
the + + category (F(I,75) = 5.97, P <.02), and had fewer explicitly
defined words in the - - category, (F(I,75) = 4.74, P <.05).
Predictions of performance on the AP test were tested by splitting
students at the median on total number of accurate metacognitive
estimates [combining the + + and - -] and computing MANOV A to
examine the significance of the differences on students' pre- and
postdictions of their AP scores, their actual AP score, and their
expected final grade in the psychology class. There were no differences on the AP test data or on the expected final grades between
groups who read either the text passage or the SVT (F(4,69) P < 1).
Differences between high and low metacognitive groups were significant (F(4,69) = 2.83, P <.05; effect size = .141). Univariate tests
indicated that the high knowledge monitoring group obtained higher
AP scores (Mean = 43.6, F (1,72) = 7.81 P <.01) than the low (Mean =
36.6), and that differences in expected final grade in the course just
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Fig ure 6. Differences Between Text and SVT on Explicit and Implicit Words.
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failed of significance (F(l,72) = 3.40, P <.10). There was no interaction
between groups who read either the text or SVT and knowledge
monitoring groups.
The data were also analyzed for the number correct on the
vocabulary test by splitting the groups at the m edian on the number
correct, and computing the significance of differences on the AP and
final grad e data. Those results were similar to the prior analysis u sing
knowledge monitoring scores. That is, there w ere no differences
between the groups who h ad read the text or received the SVT, and
there was a significant difference between groups above and below
the median on prescore (F(4,69) = 6.47, P <.01; effect size = .27).
Univariate analysis again indicated only one significant difference on
actual AP score between groups above (Mean = 45.4) and below
(Mean = 34.2) the median on vocabulary score. Again there was no
interaction among the variables. Unlike the prior studies, where
differences in m eta cognitive estimates were usu ally greater than
those on the vocabulary raw score, the effect size for these data using
the vocabulary tes t results w as larger than for the knowledge monitoring data (.27 compared to .14).
The results indicate that students high on vocabulary score and
on the ability to monitor their word knowledge also obtained higher
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scores on the AP exam and expected illgher final grades in the course
for which they were registered. The absence of group differences on
predicted AP score before taking the test was not surprising because
students were unfamiliar with the test, beyond being informed about
the categories of knowledge covered. They had no information about
the difficulty of the items, the types of preparation expected for the
test, or specifically what they would be questioned on. The absence
of differences on students' postdictions was a little more surprising
because participants now had a much clearer idea about what the test
covered. Perhaps this brief exposure to the test was inadequate to
familiarize them with the domain covered by the AP test.
Study VIII: Knowledge Monitoring and Estimations of Academic
Achievement

Ideally, of course, participants' performance estimates about both
predicted and actual grades should have been studied in courses for
willch they were registered. Unlike the AP test, students should have
enough information to make more reasonable predictions about their
final grades in courses, based on their experience in the class, and
with the subject matter, instructor, and procedures of the course. It
was the purpose of tills study to examine these expectations, ill
addition to attempting to replicate the findings for the AP data.
Participants and Procedures

The procedures were identical to those in the previous study with
two exceptions. First, the predictions students made about their final
grade were compared to the actual final grade obtained in the course.
Second, students took 12 quizzes in this class (the instructor used the
10 highest quiz scores in the determination of the final grade) and the
grades obtained on these quizzes were available as additional dependent variables.
A total of 75 students enrolled in the Introductory Psychology
class participated in tills study. The students received extra credit for
taking part in the research.
Results and Discussion

The first set of analyses were computed to examine the consistency between the findings of tills study and the preceding one. As
in the prior study, a test for significance of differences between the
group who read the text and the SVT on the + +, + -, and - - scores
revealed no differences between the groups. When the component
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scores, based on explicit and implicitly defined words, were examined, overall differences between the groups were significant F (6,68)
= 2.57, P <.05). Univariate analysis indicated that the group reading
the text had fewer - - scores for explicitly defined words (F(l,73) =
7.69, P <.01) and higher scores for the + + explicitly defined words
(F(l,73) = 7.29, P <. 01). These results are consistent with those of the
preceding study and suggest that combining the data may obscure
existing group differences. Both sets of results point to the importance of conducting a study specifically designed to determine which
set of data are the best indicators of the latent knowledge monitoring
variable.
The analysis of differences between high and low knowledge
monitoring groups on predicted, postdicted, and actual AP scores,
and final grades was also similar to that in the preceding study, with
one addition-students' actual final grades in the course were available as an additional dependent variable. Two groups were created
by splitting students at the median on total number of accurate
metacognitive estimates and computing a MANOV A to examine the
significance of differences on the AP and grade data; nine students
were eliminated due to missing information. No differences between
groups who read either the text or the SVT were found (F(S,S8) = 1.37).
Unlike the prior study, the differences between metacognitive groups
only approached significance (Transformed Wilks lambda F(S,S8) =
2.21, P = .066; effect size = .16). Univariate analysis indicated that the
high metacognitive group had significantly higher AP scores (Mean =
45.2) than the low group (Mean = 36.7; F(l,62) = 10.02, P = <.01); there
were no differences on expected score either before or after the AP
exam was taken, or on expected and actual final grades.
The findings that the high and low knowledge monitoring groups
differed only on actual AP test performance, rather than on any of the
estimates, also replicated those of the prior study. The failure to find
differences on final grades may have been a function of the limited
range of the grades; A-D grades (no F grades occurred in this sample)
were converted to their numerical equivalents yielding only four
scores. Furthermore, 76% of the grades were B or high er, further
limiting their variability. The interaction between metacognitive
group and those who read either the text or SVT was of borderline
significance (F(S,S8) = 2.18, P = .07), probably principally attributable
to the fact that the low knowledge monitoring group's estimates of
their AP scores and their final course grades were actually higher than
that of the high monitoring group, although their actual scores and
grades were lower than those of the other students.
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An identical MANOV A was computed with students split at the
median on the vocabulary test as the independent variable. There
were no differences between groups who read either the text or the
SVT. There were significant differences between the groups (Transformed Wilks lambda F (5,58) = 5.70, P <.001; effect size = .33).
Univariate analysis indicated that the high vocabulary group also had
higher AP scores (Mean = 47.0, F (1,62) = 22.89, P <.001) than the low
group (Mean = 35.1). Unlike the analysis based on metacognitive
estimates, the high vocabulary group also received higher final grades
(Mean = 90.4, F (1,62) = 5.24, P <.05) than the low group (Mean = 85).
The interaction between groups who read either the text or SVT and
vocabulary groups were not significant (Transformed Wilks lambda
F (5,58) = 2.12, P = .076) even though the lower vocabulary group
predicted and postdicted higher AP scores and final grades and
actually obtained lower scores on all three.
The second set of analyses examined the relationship between the
knowledge monitoring scores and in-class student performance indices, such as the quizzes administered to students and scores on the
essay and multiple-choice parts of the final examination. Because the
instructor informed students that only the 10 highest scores on the 12
quizzes would count for the final grade, many students missed some
quizzes. Therefore, for students taking at least 10 of the quizzes, the
mean score on all the quizzes taken was used as one of the dependent
variables. Students were split at the median on the correct knowledge
monitoring scores, and MANOV A was computed on the quiz and
final examination data; missing data limited this analysis to 70
students. No significant differences on class performance indices
were obtained between the groups taking the SVT or reading the text
F (4,63) = 1.04). There was an overall significant difference between
the high and low knowledge monitoring groups (Transformed Wilks
lambda F (3,64) = 4.36, P = <. 01, effect size = .17). Univariate analyses
indicated that the high knowledge monitoring group had significantly higher scores on the multiple-choice part of the final examination (Mean = 25.1 ) compared to the low group (Mean = 21.2, F(l,66)
= 12.66, P <.01). Differences between the groups on the mean quiz
score were not significant (F(l,66) = 3.02, P = .09), although the high
knowledge monitoring group received higher scores (Mean = 4.51each quiz had a total of six raw score points) than the low group
(Mean = 4.1). There was no interaction between knowledge monitoring and whether groups read the text or not.
The identical analysis was computed with students split at the
median on the number of words correct on the vocabulary test as the
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independent variable. The high and low vocabulary score groups had
overall differences (Transformed Wilks lambda F (3,64) = 6.44, P <.01,
effect size = .232). The high vocabulary group had significantly
higher scores on both essay (Mean = 17.2, F (1,66) = 7.44, P <.01) and
multiple-choice (Mean = 25.5, F (1,66) = 18.72, P <.0 01) parts of the
final exam, and on the mean of the quizzes (Mean = 4.6, F (1,66) = 7.13,
P = .01) than the lower scoring groups (Means = 14.5, 20.9, and 4.0
respectively). In this study as in the preceding one the differences
between vocabulary score groups were greater than the metacognitive
estimates for differentiating students on the AP and final grade data (.33
effect size vs .. 16) and on the class tests (.23 compared to .17 effect size).
Knowledge Monitoring and Performance Estimation Among
Vocational High School Students
In Study VI, examining relationship between knowledge monitoring and school learning among vocational high school students,
the participants were also asked to predict and postdict their grades
on a course final examination; the actual score on that test was
available as a dependent measure. MANOV As indicated that neither
the meta cognitive knowledge monitoring estimates, nor the raw
scores were significantly related to either of the dependent variables.
The failure to find any differences on actual score is at variance with
the findings of the two preceding studies using college students.
There are a number of differences between the studies using
vocational high school and college students, in addition to the population differences, that may account for the diverse findings. The
vocational high school students were asked to predict performance on
a final exam in the class they were taking, and presumably had a
much better idea of the content of the exam and how to prepare for
it than the college psychology students, who had very little basis for
knowing what to expect on the AP test, and could not prepare for it
at all. Furthermore, because the vocational students had been graded
on other exams in that class, they-unlike the college students-knew
what grade to expect from their prior history in that class. These prior
experiences may have been more important in determining the vocational high school students' estimates than either their knowledge, or
the metacognitive knowledge monitoring abilities.
Summary: Performance Estimation and Knowledge Monitoring

One striking finding of two of the studies using college students
was that the strongest effects were found for students' actual perfor-
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mance, either on tests or in class, rather than for their estimates.
Students' estimated performance on the AP exam, or their predicted
class achievement, were typically not significantly related to KMA
scores. On the other hand, performance on the AP test, or in class final
exams (at least the multiple-choice part of the exam in Study VIII)
were significantly related to knowledge monitoring. These results
may be partially attributable to unrealistic estimates of students in the
lower knowledge monitoring groups that were often higher (though
not significantly so) than those of students in the high knowledge
monitoring group.
There is a large difference between the accuracy of vocational high
school students' test performance estimates and that of college students.
The correlations between predicted and actual scores for the vocational
students were .7l, and .75 (p <.001) for postdiction; comparable results
for college students in Study VII were .13 and .16, both nonsignificant,
and for Study VIII they were -.14 and -.12, also nonsignificant. The
greater accuracy of the vocational students is probably attributable to
their familiarity with the material they were tested on, compared to the
novelty of the AP test for the two college samples. As expected, the
relationships were higher, though not significantly so, for postdiction,
when students knew what was covered on the test, than for predictions
confirming findings by Pressley and Ghatala (1990) who reported that
students were generally more accurate in predicting their recall of text
after completing a test than before taking it.
In both of the studies using college samples, the analysis of school
performance data based on actual knowledge (number correct on the
vocabulary test) accow1ted for more variance than comparable analyses
using knowleclge monitoring scores. It seems possible that students'
achievement in classes is best predicted by actual knowledge, rather
than estimates of it. Furthermore, in view of the nonsignificant relationships for the vocational high school sample between either knowledge
or metacognitive estimates and class final exams, it seems likely that
domain specific knowledge may be most useful for such predictions.
An important question to investigate is whether knowledge estimates in the domain in which school instruction and evaluation are
likely to occur account for more variance than the actual knowledge,
or than either estimates or knowledge of fairly general materials such
as those used in these studies. The prior research assumed that the
word list, vocabulary, and text passage were similar to the kind of
material students would learn in nontechnical areas of school instruction. The studies relating knowledge monitoring to school learning
found KMA relationships with achievement in English and Hu-

4. METACOGNITIVE KNOWLEDGE MONITORING

185

manities courses, but not for Science and Social Science. These results
suggest that general knowledge, or metacognitive estimates of that
knowledge are less useful in more technical areas, which rely on a
domain specific technical vocabulary, than they are in subjects that have
a more widely shared knowledge base and vocabulary.
METACOGNITION AND MATHEMATICS

All of the studies described so far used the KMA in the domain of
declarative word knowledge, and employed similar or identical versions of the materials. A question arises whether the procedure
generalized to domains other than vocabulary, such as mathematics.
Like vocabulary, mathematics is of special mterest because it is also
important in school learning. In addition, however, the computation
and problem solving in mathematics involve more procedural knowledge than does vocabulary learning. Thus, one purpose of the two
studies described below was to examine the applicability of the
knowledge monitoring procedure to the domain of procedural knowledge in mathematics.
The research described above used relatively mature students,
predominantly those attending college; only two investigations used
high school students. A further question examined in the next two
studies was whether the KMA was equally useful with younger,
elementary school students.
Study IX. Monitoring Mathematical Problem Solving Among
Elementary School Students7

Van Haneghan and Baker (1989) reported a number of investigations of the effects of metacognition on the accuracy of problem representation in mathematics. The results indicated that metacognition was
as important for the learning of mathematics as it was for reading. These
findings are supported by the expectations and results of other researchers, such as Campione, Brown, and Connell (1989), Lester, Garofalo,
and Kroll (1989), as well as Schoenfeld (1992). Furthermore, research
(Cardelle-Elawar, 1992; Montague, 1992) has also shown that students' performance in solving mathematical problems was facilitated
when they were instructed with a metacognitive approach. Therefore, it was expected that procedural KMA in mathematics should be
related to general achievement in that subject, and to students' ability
to solve mathematical problems specifically.
'The data for this study were collected by Dhalma Rosado. This investigation was
presented as part of a paper at the annua l convention of the American Educational
Research Association, April 1995, San Francisco, CA.
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Participants and Procedures

A list of 30 mathematical questions was consh'ucted (20 computation, and 10 problem-solving items); the items were selected from the
students' fifth-grade mathematics curriculwn. Students were first asked
to take 6 minutes to determine if "you feel able solve these problems. Do
not solve them now," giving them an average of 12 seconds per
problem. During a later session, the same 30 ques tions were
readministered, and students were given 40 minutes to actually solve
the problems. A nwnber of anxiety scales were also administered.
A total of 51 fifth grade students (31 females) from an urban
public school served as participants in this study. The students w ere
predominantly of Hispanic origin, and their reading and mathematical achievement test scores ranged from average for their grade, to
two years below grade level.
Res ults and Discussion

The scoring for the mathematics materials was similar to the
vocabulary KMA. Four scores, like those used in the prior studies,
were generated: Students felt that they could (a) solve a problem
and did so (+ +); (b) not solve a problem and did not (- -); (c) solve
a problem, but did not (+ -); and (d) not solve a problem, but did
(- +). The results dealing with anxiety will be discussed la ter in
the chapter.
There were no differences attributable to gender on students'
metacognitive estimates, so these data were pooled for further analysis. The knowledge monitoring scores were correlated with the total
math score on the Metropolitan Achievement Tes t (1985) ob tained
from the students' records. The correlations are displayed in Table 4.
The last row in tha t table represents the number correct on the math
test. The + + and - -scores were combined to indicate correct estimates
of students' ability to solve mathematical problems, and the - + and
+ - scores were added to form the incorrect estimates.
Table 4 indicates that three of the four estimates were significantly related to students' mathematics achievement. The correlation
between number correct on the math test and Metropolitan score was
.52. When that relationship is compared to the correlation of .73
between Metropolitan score and + +, or the correlation of .76 between
the Metropolitan score and total number of correct estimates, it is
clear that metacognitive estimates of the ability to answer the questions are more substantially related to mathematical achievement
than the number of problems solved correctly, irrespective of esti-
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Table 4. Correlations Between Different Knowledge Monitoring Scores and

Achievement in Mathematics.

Score

++
+-+
++ & --+& +No. Correct

Correlation
.73***
-.43**
-.65***
-.11
.76***
-.72

.52

mate. That finding was confirmed by regression analysis. When the
number of correct estimates, incorrect estimates, and total number
right were in the model, only the correct estimates contributed significantly to the prediction of Metropolitan score (R2 Change = .08, F
(3,45) = 8.52, P <.01). These results confirm the basic assumption of the
knowledge monitoring procedure that students' metacognitive judgm ents contribute significant independent variance beyond those accounted for by number correct on a test.
The results support predictions regarding the relationships between the procedural KMA in mathematics and achievement in that
domain. As expected, there were substantial correlations between
students' es timates of their ability to solve mathematical problem s
and their achievement in mathematics. Also as expected, inaccurate
assessments were nega tively related to achievement. Although no
causal inferences about mathematical achievement and knowledge
monitoring can be made from these correlational data, the fact that the
variables covary as expec ted supports the generalizability of the
procedure and sugges ts that the technique is u seful for further research in mathematics.
Study X: Relationsh ip of Procedural KMA in Mathematics with Age
and Achievement 8

The prior study provided encouraging evidence of the knowledge
monitoring procedure's applicability to procedural knowledge in
mathematics. Furthermore, the res ults of Study IX also indicated that
8The data for this stud y were collected by Audrey D'Agostino. The stu dy was part
of a paper presented at the alUlual convent ion of the America n Educationa l Research
Association, Apri11994, in New Orlea ns, LA.
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the KMA could be used with elementary school students. Because
metacognition is often viewed as a developed ability and assumed to
increase with age, one purpose of the next study was to investigate
whether procedural knowledge monitoring in mathematics would
also increase with age. The preceding study indicated a high relationship between KMA scores in mathematics and achievement test
scores in that domain. Study X also examined whether knowledge
monitoring scores were related to teachers' judgments of mathematical ability.
Participants and Procedures

Students were presented with 15 mathematical word problems
involving addition and subtraction. The problems were set in the
context of an ice cream store and students received a menu of prices
for different products referred to by the word problems. The materials were prepared in two versions presumed to elicit varying interest
levels among students. The results dealing with interest are discussed
later in the chapter. The materials were administered on two days
during regular class periods. On the first day, students examined the
.85
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Grade 6

Figure 7. Mathematical Knowledge Monitoring Scores by Grade Level.
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problems and estimated whether they could solve them or not; on the
second day the students were asked to solve the problems.
Students (N = 164, 70 female) were selected from the fourth, fifth,
and sixth grades of a school attended largely by children from
minority groups. Mathematical ability was determined by teachers'
judgment; 59 students were classified as being in the low, 67 in the
medium, and 81 in the high ability groups.
Resu lts and Discussion

Students' responses were assigned a score of 1 for correct estimates (combining the + + and - - scores), and 0 for incorrect estimates
(combining the + - and - + scores). Due to a computer malfunction,
the raw data were not available for rescoring to form the same scores
used in the other studies. The data were then submitted to a 3
(grades) x 2 (sex) x 2 (group) x 3 (math ability) analysis of variance. As
indicated above, the results dealing with interest are discussed later.
As expected, a significant increase in knowledge monitoring
scores from grades 4 to 6 was found (F = 34.66, df = 2,144, P <.001, eta 2
= .26; see Figure 7 for plot of the data). Also as expected, the results
indicated that knowledge monitoring scores increased with math.85
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.75
.70
Knowledge
Monitoring .65
Scores

.60
.55
.50

Low

Medium

High

Figure 8. Mathematical Knowledge Monitoring Scores by Math Achievement

Group.
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ematical ability (F = 15.25, df = 2, 144, P < .001, eta 2 = .18; see Figure
8 for plot of the data). These results offer further support for the
construct validity of the knowledge monitoring procedure because
older or more capable students were expected to have better
metacognition than their younger, less capable counterparts. There
were no significant differences attributable to sex.
Summary: Knowledge Mon itoring and Mathematics

The results of the two studies using the procedural KMA in
mathematics were quite positive regarding its applicability to that
domain. The relationship of monitoring scores to achievement in
mathematics in Study X are similar to the correlations with math
achievement test scores reported in Study IX, and both indicate strong
relationships between metacognitive knowledge monitoring and
achievement in mathematics. The increases in metacognitive ability
associated with age reported in Study X also support that relationship. Furthermore, 10 of the studies reviewed in this chapter examined students' estimates of their declarative word knowledge. Because
most of the items in both mathematical studies were composed of
procedural knowledge needed to solve word problems, the results
suggest that the KMA may be applicable to that type of knowledge as
well.
METACOGN ITION AND AFFECT

The paradigm shift to a cognitive orientation in psychology
generated a great deal of research to clarify the cognitive processes
controlling learning from instruction. Although that work has identified many cognitive processes that are important in human learning,
the impact of affective processes on such learning has received considerably less attention (Tobias, 1992, 1994a, b). The aim of the
research discussed :iI, this section is to forge a link between affect and
cognition by examining the mfluence of affective variables such as
anxiety and interest on metacognitive knowledge monitoring.
The Impact of Anxiety on Knowledge Monitoring

One of the affective variables that has been the subject of a great
deal of research, both :iI, educationally relevant situations and in
others, has been anxiety and its impact on learn:iIlg. In general, that
research has suggested a negative relationship between different
forms of anxiety and learning from instruction (Tobias, 1992; Hembree,
1988). It has been suggested (Tobias, 1985, 1992) that interference in
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students' performance as a result of anxiety was attributable to
reduced cognitive capacity available for task solution. It was reasoned that the central representation of anxiety absorbs some proportion of cognitive capacity, leaving a reduced amount available for
allocation to work on tasks. The further absorption of capacity
required by an executive process such as metacognitive knowledge
monitoring was expected to be especially debilitating for highly
anxious students whose cognitive capacity is expected to be reduced
by students' concerns about their test anxiety. Therefore, a negative
relationship between anxiety and knowledge monitoring was anticipated because "highly test anxious students can be expected to have
less adequate metacognitive abilities than those with lower anxiety"
(Tobias, 1992, p. 28).
Knowl edge Monitoring, Read ing Comprehension, and Test Anxiety
It will be recalled that Study II examined the relationship of the
knowledge monitoring procedure to anxiety, in addition to reading
comprehension. The worry subscale of the Test Anxiety Inventory
(Spielberger et al., 1980) was administered to 117 undergraduates
from a large urban university; 65% were women.
As expected, the more highly anxious participants also performed
less well on the KMA. Those lower in anxiety achieved a significantly
higher number of "hits" than those prone to higher levels of anxious
worry (t (115) = 4.92, P <.001), and in general the less anxious had
higher levels of metacognitive word knowledge as measured by d'
(multiple r squared (t (115) = 4.07, P < .001), confirming the expected
negative relationships between knowledge monitoring and test anxiety.

Knowledge Monitoring in Mathematics and Anxiety

Study II found the expected negative relationship between knowledge monitoring procedure scores and anxiety in the vocabulary
domain. Study IX, in addition to investigating the extension of the
knowledge monitoring procedure to mathematics, also studied its
relationship with both test and mathematics anxiety.
As part of Study IX the Fenema-Sherman (1976) scales assessing
math anxiety and attitudes towards mathematics were administered
to the 51 participants (see the earlier description of Study IX) in a first
session. In order to assure that the participating elementary school
students could understand the questions, each item was read aloud as
students read the materials. The Worry-Emotionality scale (Morris,
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Davis, & Hutchings, 1981), a lO-item Likert-type measure of these
components of state test anxiety, was also administered. Students'
mathematical achievement was determined from their scores on the
Metropolitan Achievement Test (1985) obtained from school files.
In Study IX no sex differences in the effects of anxiety were
found, so the data for all students were pooled. The relationships
between knowledge monitoring and mathematics anxiety (scored in
the direction of higher anxiety yielding higher scores) and attitudes
towards mathematics, as well as with worry and emotionality are
shown in Table 5.
Table 5. Correlations Between Knowledge Monitoring Scores and Anxiety in
Mathematics.

Score

Math Anxiety

++
+-+

-.42**
.32*
.38**
.00
-.46**
.46**

++ and - - + and + -

Worry and
Emotionality
-.22
.25
.23
.20
-.15
.33*

* = p<.05
** +=p<.Ol

Table 5 indicates that, as expected, mathematics anxiety was
negatively related to incorrect metacognitive estima.tes and positively
related to correct ones. The correlation between number right and
math anxiety was -.25 and not significant, though the relationships
with metacognitive estimates were negatively and significantly related to test anxiety. The negative relationships between metacognition
and anxiety are generally similar to those found in Study II, confirming expecta tions that anxious students have lower metacognition than
their less anxious colleagues.
Anxiety and Knowledge Monitoring Among High School Dropouts
and Continuing Students

Study VI investigated whether knowledge monitoring differed
between continuing students and high school dropouts. An addi-
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tional purpose of that study was to examine the differences in anxiety
between high school dropouts and continuing students, as well as the
relationship between anxiety and metacognitive knowledge monitoring. In this study the Test Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et al., 1980)
was given to all participants, followed by two administrations of the
Worry-Emotionality Scale (Morris et al., 1981). Initially, participants
completed the Worry-Emotionality scale in terms of the way they felt
while being tested in general; when the scale was re-administered
after the vocabulary test, students were asked to respond the way
they felt while completing the vocabulary test. It will be recalled that
the dropout group consisted of 42 individuals (14 female) who had
dropped out of high school and the 47 (16 female) continuing students
who had a school CPA of at least B-.
Surprisingly, the results of a MANOV A indicated that there were
no anxiety differences between high school dropouts and continuing
students on any of the seven anxiety scores (the three Test Anxiety
Inventory scores: Worry, Emotionality, and Total, in addition to four
Worry and Emotionality scores from each administration of those
scales). That finding is puzzling in view of the reports in the literature
that poor performance in school, and presumably on tests, was a
major reason for students dropping out of high school. One reason
for these findings may rest with the problems to which self-report
measures in general, and self-reports of test anxiety in particular, are
subject. It is easily possible for students to minimize or deny responses indicative of test anxiety on these measures, and to present
themselves as not caring about how well they might function on tests.
The knowledge monitoring procedure, however, made it difficult for
students to present themselves in a more favorable light, and that may
account for the findings of group differences in metacognitive knowledge monitoring and their absence in test anxiety.
Most of the zero order correlations between KMA scores and
anxiety indices were negative, and a fair number were significant.
Multiple linear regression analyses were computed with the KMA
scores as the dependent variable, and the anxiety scores as the
independent variable. Results indicated that the anxiety scales had a
significant impact only on the + + scores, R2 = .25, (F(7,72) = 3.43,
p<.01); significant beta weights were fOlmd for Emotionality, on the
Worry-Emotionality Scale taken after students completed the vocabulary test (t = 2.74). The regression analysis also indicated that none of
the other KMA scores were significantly related to the anxiety scales.
In view of the number of anxiety and knowledge monitoring scores,
the findings of significant relationships for some of them is not
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surpnsmg. In general, however, the results of this study suggested
that there was little association between metacognitive knowledge
monitoring and anxiety.
Anxiety and Knowledge Monitoring Among Vocational High School
Students

A further purpose of Study V, examining metacognition among
Vocational High School students, was to study the relationship between anxiety and metacognitive knowledge monitoring, as well as
between anxiety and achievement. In addition to the rationale relating metacognition to anxiety, it was also expected that students with
lower GP As should have higher anxiety than those who learned more
effectively. These two questions were examined in this study.
Recall that the anxiety scales, and the order in which they were
administered in Study V, were identical to those employed in the
study of high school dropouts (Study VI). The Worry-Emotionality
scale (Morris et al., 1981) was administered first and students were
asked to respond in terms of the way they felt while taking tests in
general. The Test Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et al., 1980) was
then given, followed by a second administration of the Worry-Emotionality scale with instructions for students to respond the way they
felt while taking the vocabulary test. A total of 61 students (59 male)
participated in this study.
The significance of differences in anxiety scores between the
participants in Study V above and below the median GPA in vocational high school was examined by computing a MANOV A. Surprisingly, there were no differences between the GPA groups on any of
the seven anxiety scores. Also, much as in Study VI, most of the zero
order correlations between knowledge monitoring and anxiety were
negative. Multiple linear regression analysis was then computed with
the metacognitive knowledge monitoring scores as the dependent
variable, and the anxiety scores as the dependent variable. None of
the regression equations were significant for this sample.
Summary: Anx iety and Metacognitive Knowledge Mon itoring

The evidence regarding the relationship between anxiety and
metacognitive knowledge monitoring is mixed. Significant negative
relationships were expected and fOlmd in two of the studies, one in
mathematics and the other using vocabulary. On the other hand, two
other studies failed to find any evidence of differences. Study II, in
which significant nega tive relationships with anxie ty using the vo-
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cabulary materials were found, had a much larger sample than the
studies using vocational high school students (see Study V) or
high school dropouts (see Study VI). Because many of the test
anxiety-metacognitive knowledge monitoring relationships in the
two latter studies were, as expected, in the negative direction, and
because some of the regression analyses between these variables
approached significance, further research with larger samples is
clearly needed to clarify the relationship between anxiety and
knowledge monitoring. The results of Study II suggest that
metacognitive word knowledge and test anxiety each contributed
to performance on less challenging reading. On demanding material, however, test anxiety and metacognitive knowledge monitoring ability appear to interact to affect performance. The highly
anxious examinee, regardless of metacognitive ability, performed
less well on the more demanding reading tasks, suggesting that
anxious worrying can interfere with strategic use of metacognitive
skill when the performance tasks are cognitively demanding. That
finding is in accord with the anxiety-cognitive capacity model (Tobias,
1992), because more demanding tasks require greater proportions of
cognitive capacity that may not be available as a result of the resources absorbed by anxiety. Further research is required to pursue
that intriguing finding.
In Studies V and VI, the failure of a number of anxiety indices to
differentiate between either high school dropouts and continuing
students, or between students above and below the median in GP A
was surprising. A meta-analysis of 562 studies dealing with test
anxiety (Hembree, 1988) had indicated that lower achieving students
had higher test anxiety than their more capable counterparts. Although there had been no prior research specifically relating test
anxiety to dropping out of high school, the bulk of this literature has
indicated that the concern of students about their academic achievement was a major factor in dropping out of school, clearly suggesting
that differences in test anxiety could be expected. As mentioned
above, the fact that both the studies dealing with dropouts and
vocational high school students found significant knowledge monitoring differences in the expected direction, and neither found differences on a group of seven test anxiety scales re-emphasizes some of
the problems with self-report measures described at the beginning of
this chapter.
Although the nonsignificant results for anxiety in Studies V and
VI may be attributable to small samples, or to other unknown factors,
it should also be noted that the tendency of participants to present
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themselves in a more positive light may well have contributed to the
nonsignificant findings. One advantage of the KMA is that, because
students do not report on either their feelings or their cognitive
processes, it is difficult for them to present themselves more favorably. Of course, students could easily claim to know more words than
they actually do. However, that claim is immediately checked by the
administration of the vocabulary test making it harder for students to
appear in a more positive light.
Knowledge Monitoring and Interest

There has been a good deal of recent research on the effects of
interest on learning (Renninger, Hidi, & Krapp, 1992). One reason for
that increase is suggested in one definition: "intrinsically motivated
behaviors are those the person undertakes out of interest" (Deci &
Ryan, 1991, p . 241). From that perspective, clarification of the
effects of interest also adds to an understanding of the impact of
intrinsic motivation on learning. Second, interests appear stable
and long lasting among adults (Hidi, 1990; Schiefele, 1991), suggesting that instruction adapted to students' interests may have
positive motivational characteristics for long periods of time.
Third, interests are ubiquitous- everyone is interested in something. Fourth, findings of surprisingly variable and ineffective
cognitive processing of instruction (Paris, 1988; Tobias, 1989)
suggested that these results may be attributable to the possibility
that students' interests or motivation were not engaged by the
materials used in such studies. Finally, research on interest
provides a useful and educationally relevant avenue for study of
the relationship between affect and cognition (Tobias, 1989, 1994a,
b )-a much needed clarification in order to obtain a more complete
picture of people's day to day functioning.
Research has indicated that reading comprehension and recall are
facilitated when students work on material related to their interests
(Renninger et al., 1992). Furthermore, Schiefele (1990, 1991, 1992a, b)
found that comprehension of interesting text was "deeper" (i.e., more
likely to be propositional than verbatim). Little is known, however,
about the cognitive processes that mediate the effect of interest on
comprehension and recall of reading. Therefore, it was recommended
(Renninger et al., 1992; Tobias, 1994a) that research concentrate on the
identification of the processes invoked by interest to facilitate learning. The purposes of the studies reported in this section of the chapter
are to examine whether interest improved students' metacognitive
knowledge monitoring.
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Situational Interest, Topic Interest, and Knowledge Monitoring 9

Two types of interest, situational and topic, have been distinguished (Renninger, Hidi, & Krapp, 1992). Situational interest is
elicited by aspects of a situation, such as its novelty or intensity, and
by the presence of human interest factors contributing to the attractiveness of different types of content. Topic interest refers to peoples'
relatively enduring preferences for different topics, tasks, or contexts
and how they influence learning. The effects of both types of interest
on metacognitive knowledge monitoring were investigated in this
study. It was expected that students with greater topic interest, and
text that elicited situational interest, would lead to more accurate
knowledge monitoring. Furthermore, because interest has been found
to lead to deeper types of text processing (Schiefele, 1990, 1991, 1992a,
b), it was expected that students would make more accurate knowledge monitoring judgments on words requiring intense processing if
the material were interesting rather than neutral. The meanings of
implicitly defined words must be inferred, whereas those defined
explicitly merely require recall of the definitions. Therefore, it was
reasoned that the meanings of implicitly defined words should be
estimated more accurately on interesting content compared to more
neutral content.
Study III Revisited

Recall that two groups of students were used in Study III, nursing
students and college freshmen. Because the passage dealt with heart
disease, it was expected that nursing students would have greater
topic interest in that material than would the freshmen. Situational
interest was varied by converting the expository passage to a narrative format. The narrative passage contained story attributes, such as
character identification and life themes, which according to Hidi and
Anderson (1992), increased the situational interest of passages. A
principal character was introduced in the narrative version, which
then described his efforts to learn more about coronary disease
because his father had developed a mild form of that illness. The
passage indicated that he was trying to help his father prevent the
development of more serious coronary problems. This structure
made it possible to include in the narrative version all the factual
information present in the expository version of the passage. Only 84
9This study conducted by Sigmund Tobias was published in the JOllrnal oj Educational Psychology, 1995. See References.
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of the 139 students completed all the materials during two sessions.
Complete data were available for 33 nursing students and 51 freshmen.
In Study III the correct metacognitive judgments (combining + +
and - - scores) were submitted to analysis of variance, with the correct
estimates on explicitly and implicitly defined words-the dependent
variables-treated as a repeated measure. In view of the importance
of controlling for prior knowledge differences in interest research
(Tobias, 1994a), students' scores on the first administration of the
vocabulary test were used as a covariate because the nursing students
were more familiar with the heart disease material (Prescore Mean =
27.4, SO = 4.0) than were the freshmen (Prescore Mean = 20.1, SO =
5.3). Because there were an w1equal number of females in the groups
(24 of 51 freshmen and 28 of 33 nursing students), gender was added
as a factor in the design. Thus, the ANOV A consisted of a full 2
(freshmen vs. nursing students) x 2 (expository vs. narrative passages) x 2 (gender) factorial design, with prescore as a covariate.
Again, the two-level repeated measure consisted of the number of
correct judgments on explicitly and implicitly defined words after
reading the text. The main effect of the repeated measure was
assessed in the" deviation" manner described by Delaney and Maxwell (1981).
The ANOV A results indicated that there was a significant overall
difference between the freshmen and nurses (F(l,75) = 4.99, P <.05),
favoring nursing students. In addition, the mean number of correct
estimates was higher for explicitly than for implicitly defined words
(F(l,75) = 8.27, P <.01). None of the other main effects or interactions
was significant. The covariate, number correct on the first administration of the vocabulary test, exerted a significant effect on the dependent measures (F(l,75) = 17.01, P <.001). The adjusted means for
freshmen on correct estimates for explicitly and implicitly defined
words were 13.7 and 12.5, respectively, and for nursing students the
corresponding means were 15.0 and 14.1. Ideally, future research
should use participants with similar pres cores who differ in their
interest in such medically relevant materials.
These results support the general hypothesis of enhanced
metacognition for topic interest. As anticipated, nursing students, for
whom the heart disease passage was more interesting than for freshmen, made more accurate metacognitive assessments of their vocabulary knowledge than the freshmen, even when differences in their
prior knowledge of the vocabulary was controlled statistically. The
expected differences attributable to situational interest were not found
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because the narrative and expository passages resulted in similar
KMA scores. Finally, contrary to expectations, explicitly defined
words were judged more accurately than those that were implicitly
defined for both nursing students and freshmen.
The absence of knowledge monitoring differences due to situational interest may be a function of the similarities between the
expository and narrative texts. Even though the passage was altered
to elicit differences in situational interest, ratings of interest on a
Likert-type scale, in the original study and on a follow-up, failed to
find any differences between the passages. Perhaps, greater differences in content are needed to result in situational interest differences
than occurred in Study Ill.
Interest and Knowledge Monitoring in Mathematics Among
Elementary School Students

Study X found that metacogrutive knowledge monitoring ability
in mathematics increased with grade and mathematical ability. A
further purpose of that study was to examine the impact of personalizing instruction on metacognition. Research (Anand & Ross, 1987;
Bracken, 1982; Herndon, 1987; Lopez, 1999, 1990; Ross & Anand, 1987;
Wright & Wright, 1986) has shown that personalizing mathematical
word problems by including materials such as the names of students,
their friends' and teachers' names, or including materials related to
their interests improved performance and attitudes to the materials.
These, and similar, studies suggested that heightened interest was
aroused by personalizing word problems. It was, therefore, hypothesized that the elevated interest should improve students'
metacognitive knowledge monitoring.
Participants in Study X (N = 164, 70 females, and all of whom
were selected from fourth, fifth, and sixth grades of a school attended
largely by children from minority groups) were randomly assigned to
either interesting or control materials. In the interesting condition the
names of classmates and teachers were included in word problems,
whereas the materials used for the control group used standard rather
than familiar names. In each condition, 15 mathematical word problems set in the context of an ice cream store were presented and
students received a menu of prices for different products and were
required to add and subtract menu items. A 12-item Likert-type scale
designed to assess interest in the materials was also administered.
In this study students' responses were assigned a score of 1 for
correct estimates and 0 for incorrect estimates. The data were then
submitted to a 3 (grades) x 2 (sex) x 2 (interest group) x 3 (math ability)
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analysis of variance. The findings dealing with knowledge monitoring and mathematical ability and grade level were reported previously. There were no significant differences attributable to sex or to
interest. However, there was an interaction between math achievement level, as determined by teacher judgment, and interest (F = 6.02,
df = 2, 144, P <.01, eta 2 = .05; see Figure 9 for a plot of the data).
The interaction, unlike the main effect found in the prior interest
study, suggests that the personalization improved the performance of
low ability math students, but had little effect on the other groups. It
seems possible that setting the word problems in the context of an ice
cream store may have raised the interest level of the materials for both
groups, thus leading to the insignificant main effect for interest. In
view of the known difficulties students have with math word problems (NAEP, 1979), it was thought to be important to make the
materials interesting for both groups by situating them in an ice cream
parlor. There is evidence that this setting did arouse the interests of
all students. There were no differences (F < 1.0) between the high and
low interest groups on the 12-item Likert-type scale administered after
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Figure 9. Mathematics Knowledge Monitoring Scores by Interest Group.
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students completed the problem solving. Furthermore, there were also
no differences between the high and low interest groups in the number
of problems solved correctly. These findings indicate that even the low
interest group may have found the materials more attractive than the
math word problems usually received in school, and suggests that an
overall facilitative effect for interest may be found when the materials
elicit greater differences in interest between the groups.
Summary: Affect and Knowledge Monitoring

The findings of the anxiety and interest studies indicate that
anxiety generally seems to have a negative effect on metacognitive
knowledge monitoring, and that working on interesting materials
seems to facilitate it. Further research is needed to answer many
questions before these tentative conclusions can be stated with greater
confidence. It seems, however, that the knowledge monitoring procedure is a useful way for studying the effects of affect on
metacognition, and especially of investigating the effects of interest.
There are a number of persuasive models specifying the cognitive
processes mediating the impact of anxiety on learning (Sarason, 1987;
Eysenck, 1988; Tobias, 1992). However, little is known about the
cognitive processes by which such "positive" affective variables as
interest and motivation facilitate learning. The knowledge monitoring procedure seems useful for further research relating metacognition
to such positive variables as interest or intrinsic motivation.
METACOGNITIVE KNOWLEDGE MONITORING AND OTHER
VARIABLES

Most of the studies reported above related the knowledge monitoring procedure to relatively traditional variables such as achievement in school, estimates of achievement, anxiety, and interest. Two
studies examined the relationship of the knowledge monitoring procedure to other variables such as need for feedback and the procedure's
ability to differentiate between different types of students. These
studies are summarized below.
Study XI. Knowledge Monitoring Procedure and Need for
Feedback 10

Feedback or reinforcement is one of the best known variables in
learning research. Numerous studies have demonstrated that feedback facilitates learning. McKeachie (1974) suggested that the effects
'Il'fhe data for this study were collected by Nadia Seignon.
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of feedback or reinforcement on human learning are not uniform, but
may vary with individuals and situations. Ashford and Cummings
(1983) found that the importance of feedback varied with individuals'
uncertainty and Tuckman and Sexton (1992) found that students in a
no-feedback condition who held high beliefs in their own performance capability outperformed those receiving feedback, whereas the
reverse was true for students of middle and low self-perceived
capability. These results clearly supported the idea that there were
individual differences in the need for feedback.
It was expected that the need for feedback ought to depend on
students' metacognitive capability to monitor their knowledge gathering activities. In an analysis similar to that proposed by Butler and
Winne (1995), it was reasoned that students with accurate knowledge
monitoring abilities probably rely more frequently on their own, or
internal, feedback regarding the accuracy of their reponses than on
their less accurate peers. Such students are likely to have learned
from experience that external feedback often duplicates the information supplied internally, and should require less externally supplied
feedback than colleagues with less accurate knowledge monitoring
abilities. Therefore, when students have a choice of whether they
choose to obtain feedback or not, a negative relationship between
KMA accuracy scores and amount of feedback was expected.
PartiCipants and Procedures

A list of 25 words, appropriate for fifth grade students, and a
vocabulary test based on the same words were developed. Participants were also given a reading test consisting of 11 narrative stories
with an average length of 140 words, or 15 sentences. Each story had
a blank to be filled in, and students were instructed to select a word
from four choices appearing in the right margin for each blank; the
words on the reading test and word list were different. Participants
were told that the correct answer to each question was printed in the
left margin of each page, covered by a tab, and they could look at the
answers whenever they wished simply by lifting the tab. Participants
were tested individually, and the number of times the tabs were lifted
to inspect the correct answer were recorded.
A sample of 59 fifth grade students (35 females) participated in
this study. The school was attended primarily by minority students.
Results and Discussion

Students' need for feedback was operationally defined as the
number of times they lifted the tabs covering the correct answers to
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questions in order to check on the correctness of their response. The
knowledge monitoring procedure was scored to determine students'
accuracy in estimating their word knowledge and the results were
then correlated with amount of feedback sought on the reading test.
The results of that analysis are show in Table 6.
As expected, the results indicated that amount of feedback was
substantially related to the ability to monitor knowledge accurately.
Table 6. Correlations with Amoun t of Feedback.
Score

r

++
+-+

-.50**
.38*
.56**
-.13
-.79
.76
-.19
.84
.71

++ & --+ & + Score (++ & - +)
R
R2

The accuracy of knowledge monitoring was substantially and negatively related to amount of feedback (1' = -.79, P <.001 ), as were the
number of inaccurate estimates (r = .76, P <.001). Equally interesting
was the finding that vocabulary knowledge, determined by the number correct on the vocabulary test, was not related to amow1t of
feedback (r = .-19). The findings suggest that, as expected, need for
feedback was heavily related to the ability to monitor one's knowledge accurately. Furthermore, estimates of students' knowledge were
clearly the major contributor to that relationship, because actual
knowledge was unrelated to amount of feedback.
An equally important aspect of this study and its results was the
fact that a new word list and vocabulary test was developed, different
from the materials used in any of the other studies described in this
chapter. Therefore, the findings also indicated that the knowledge
monitoring procedure has some generality across different types of
vocabulary materials. Furthermore, this was the first study using a
declarative vocabulary KMA with elementary school students, and
the results suggest that the procedure was as applicable to younger
students as were the mathematical materials used in Studies IX and
X.
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Study XII. Knowledge Monitoring Differences Among Learning
Disabled and Hyperactive Students 11
It has been shown (Brown & Campione, 1986; Swanson & Trahan,
1992) that students diagnosed as learning disabled (LD) have lower
metacognition than those who are diagnosed as not being LD. Similarly, students with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorders (ADHD)
have been succinctly described by Douglas, Barr, O'Neil, and Britton
(1986) as having a cognitive deficit featured by an inability to stop,
look, listen, and think. A review of research dealing with ADHD
(Westby & Cutler, 1994) indicates that such students tend to have less
effective complex problem-solving strategies and organizational skills,
that they use less efficient strategies on memory tasks, that they
"demonstrated deficits on all measures of study behavior. They
studied for less time, expended less effort, and used poorer
strategies .... students with ADHD have significant deficits in executive
processes" (Westby & Cutler, 1994, pp. 63-64). These deficits clearly
suggest that ADHD students have less effective metacognition. Therefore, students diagnosed as LD, or ADHD, should have less accurate
knowledge monitoring capabilities than students not affected by
these conditions. It was the purpose of this study to test that
hypothesis.

Participants and Procedures

A list of 35 words, and a vocabulary test based on the same words,
were developed from the high school curriculum. Participants (N =
90) were selected from the ninth (N = 29) and tenth (N=61 ) grades of
a public high school in an urban area; there were 28 females and 62
males. LD and ADHD groups (N = 30 each) were formed by selecting
students diagnosed by a school-based support team consisting of an
educational evaluator, a school psychologist, and a social worker;
scores on the Degrees of Reading Power (Touchstone, 1991) test
placed these groups in the 15th percentile of the population. A
contrasting student group (N = 30) was selected on the basis of having
average reading ability on the DRP and no histories of special educational needs.
Resu lts and Discussion

Three of the KMA scores (+ +, + -, and - -) were analyzed by
MANOVA (the fourth score [- +J could not be entered due to linear
liThe data for this study were collected by Julie Wilson.
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dependencies), with sex and group as the independent variables. A
significant overall difference among the groups was found (Transformed Wilks lambda F(6,164) :=: 5.95, p<.OOl, effect size :=: .179).
Univariate analyses indicated significant differences among the groups
on ++ scores (F(2,84) :=: 16.02, p <.001; Control Group Mean:=: 28.4; LD
Mean :=: 22.2; and ADHD Mean :=: 23.0). Univariate analyses also
indicated another difference on the - - score (F(2,84) :=: 5.32, p< .01;
Control Group Mean:=: 1.5; LD Mean:=: 3.6; and ADHD Mean :=: 4.3);
students in the control group had lower scores because they had
fewer incorrect answers. There were no differences attributable to
sex, and no interaction between sex and group was found.
A similar analysis of the number correct on the vocabulary test
(+ + and - +) also indicated significant group differences (F( 4,166) :=:
7.55, p <.001, effect size :=: .154). Univariate analysis indicated that
only the differences on the + + scores were significant; the group
means are the same as for the preceding analysis. The results confirm
expectations regarding differences between regular, LD, and ADHD
students with respect to their ability to monitor their knowledge and
differentiate between what they know and do not know in this
domain. Although the results were similar when the dependent
variable consisted only of the number correct on the vocabulary, the
effect size on the latter analysis was smaller (.154 compared to .179).
As expected, the control group of students without special needs were
more able to differentiate between the + + and - - words than students
in the other two groups.
There were large differences in reading ability between the groups
which may also have accounted for the group differences, irrespective
of diagnostic category. It is often difficult to separate the effects of
reading ability from research comparing LD, ADHD, and more traditional students because the presence of reading problems is one of the
defining characteristics of the two former groups. Further research
with more similar groups may clarify this problem. In any event,
these results provide additional support for the construct validity of
the metacognitive knowledge monitoring procedure. In view of the
fact that this study, like the prior one, also developed a new list of
words and vocabulary test, the results also support the generality of
the procedure across different types of content.
GENERAL DISCUSSION

The findings of the 12 studies summarized above support the
construct validity of the KMA. Comparable results were found for
samples from student populations such as students in elementary
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school, students attending regular and vocational high schools (including students diagnosed as LD and ADHD), individuals who
dropped out of high school, and students in pre-college-admission
status, and students in their second or higher year in college. Furthermore, substantially similar results were obtained for procedural knowledge in mathematics, in addition to declarative vocabulary knowledge
based on three different vocabulary sets developed to be appropriate
for elementary school through college levels.
The results suggest that the procedure has some generality across
different populations, declarative and procedural knowledge, as well
as different types of vocabulary. In view of the fact that the KMA may
be group administered and/ or given by computer, and is objectively
scored, it seems to be a promising approach for the assessment of the
knowledge monitoring component of metacognition. Furthermore,
Studies V and VI indicated that the KMA made it less likely that
students presented themselves in a more favorable light than selfreport scales of anxiety, one of the problems inherent in self-report
instruments. Although no data comparing the KMA to other
metacognitive scales have so far been collected, we expect that this
measure of knowledge monitoring is likely to be more accurate than
self-report scales because students are less able to present themselves
in socially desirable ways. It remains for further research to investigate this possibility.
The KMA's relationships with external criteria were somewhat
variable. Relationships with standardized achievement tests were
substantial and significant. For example, in Study I correlations with
a reading comprehension test were .67. Similarly, relationships with
achievement in mathematics were also substantial in Study IX (r == .76)
and in Study X, significant effects were found for KMA differences in
students' math achievement (eta 2 == .26) and for higher levels of
mathematical performance across three elementary school grades
(eta2 == .18). Pintrich et al. (this volume) cite some of these findings as
being among the most positive relationships between any metacognitive
measure and external criteria. Relationships with need for feedback in
Study IX were also found to be substantial (r == .62). Significant, though
somewhat more moderate, relationships were found in studies in which
the KMA differentiated between known groups such as regular students and dropouts (Study VI), or among LD, ADHD, and students
without special needs (Study XII). Generally the lowest, though
frequently significant, relationships were found between KMA scores
and college grades. Presumably, as indicated previously, the low
reliability of such grades accounts for the modest associations with

4. METACOGNITIVE KNOWLEDGE MONITORING

207

grades. It should also be noted that differences between the effects of
knowledge estimates and actual knowledge, discussed below, should be
considered in examining the effects.
A number of issues raised by the results require further research.
These include such questions as: Do multiple administrations of the
knowledge monitoring procedure increase its relationship with other
variables? Which of the different scores are optimal indicators of
knowledge monitoring abilities? Do estimates of knowledge account
for more variance than the actual knowledge? These questions are
addressed below.
KMA and Dynamic Assessment

Some of the studies described above administered the text passage to only a part of the sample, others did not use the text passage
at all, and still others gave a word list and vocabulary test before and
after students read a text passage from which the word meanings
could be inferred. A question arises about the value of interspersing
the text passage between administrations of the word list and vocabulary. Giving students a chance to update their knowledge has some
similarities to dynamic assessment approaches (see Carlson & Wiedl,
1992; Guthke, 1992; Lidz, 1992) in which students are given the
opportunity for new learning before being tested. Dynamic assessment procedures usually also include some intervention in students'
attempts to learn, observations of their reaction to the intervention,
and an evaluation of students' responses to the assistance as part of
the assessment. Reviews have suggested (Carlson & Wiedl, 1992) that
students' attempts to verbalize learning difficulties, and receiving elaborated feedback about their efforts, contribute heavily to the value of
dynamic assessment. The KMA differs from dynamic assessment
procedures because it does not include any of these additional attempts
to facilitate learning; students are merely given another opportunity to
learn the words from a text passage without any other assistance.
The results of the present research indicate that the opportunity
to learn the meanings of some words from the text was most important only in the first study relating the knowledge monitoring procedure to reading comprehension, and seemed to have little effect on
studies of college learning or performance estimation. The findings
indicated that, with the possible exception of relationships with
reading comprehension, use of the word list and vocabulary alone
appeal' to be effective in estimating metacognitive knowledge monitoring, whether the text passage is used 01' not.
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The distinction between explicitly and implicitly defined words
was expected to be useful only in those studies in which students read
the text passage. The results of those investigations indicated that
there were few differences between these types of words. Because
neither the use of the text passage nor the distinction between the two
types of words seemed to affect the results, it seems prudent to
abandon that distinction in future research.
Implications for Train ing Research and Instruction

The results indicated that use of the text passage did not add
much variance to the use of the KMA as an appraisal instrument. It
may, nevertheless, be interesting to use the passage in future research
to study the applicability of the KMA for research on the training of
knowledge monitoring. If the word list and vocabulary test are used
as pre-post measures, the text passage could be interspersed to help
students learn the meanings of those words about which they had
made incorrect knowledge estimates. Different levels of instructional
support (Tobias, 1989) could be used to help students learn the
meanings of the words they had judged incorrectly.
Use of the text passage makes it possible to implement a training
strategy featuring maximal prompting in the form of very active
instructional interventions at the beginning and fading those out until
the passage alone is presented without any prompts. The interventions could include such procedures as: urging students to provide
definitions or synonyms for the words, asking them to rephrase the
clauses containing the target words, asking questions about the words,
and cueing students that the target words are especially important or
that they should pay special attention to them. Of course, research
would have to determine whether the suggested interventions actually constitute a hierarchy ranging from maximal to minimal support.
It should also be noted that a number of passages, with associated
word lists and vocabulary sets, may be needed to develop an effective
knowledge monitoring training procedure. Once research has determined the usefulness of the procedures outlined above, they could
become an important resource to help teachers at all levels improve
the knowledge monitoring of their students.
In addition to the possible usefulness of the instructional interventions described above for training, they could enhance the similarity of the KMA to dynamic types of assessment, and to students'
school learning. Research could then determine whether such interventions improve the knowledge monitoring procedure's relation-
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ship to school learning. It should be noted that, giving students an
opportunity for new learning before administering or re-administering, the knowledge estimating procedure is likely to be more complex
in mathematics or science than it is for vocabulary. Dynamic assessment in these fields would probably require very active instructional
interventions before students can improve their knowledge, because
few people can master new material in science or mathematics merely
by being asked to read a passage and by twice working on problems
in that field, or even by the type of interventions suggested above.
Optimal Indicators of the Latent Knowledge Monitoring Construct

Metacognitive knowledge monitoring is a latent construct inferred from the various scores generated by the procedure. Many of
the preceding studies combined the + + and - - scores to form a
measure of knowledge monitoring accuracy. The combined score
seemed to have face validity as the most direct and most theoretically
interesting index of knowledge monitoring accuracy. Furthermore,
by including the - - scores the combined total seemed independent of
students' actual knowledge, because the combined estimate included
items answered incorrectly. Scores based on the signal detection
paradigm were used in Study II, but seemed to add little to the
combination of + + and - - scores used in the other studies. However,
the findings of some of the investigations, especially Studies VII and
VIII, suggested that differences between groups were obscured when
the sub-scores for different categories (+ +, + -, -+, and - - for words
defined explicitly or implicitly) were combined.
Ideally, the optimal knowledge monitoring score should be determined empirically, rather than on the basis of its face validity. The
four subscores, or eight if the explicit-implicit distinction is used,
generated by the procedure should be submitted to procedures such as
the analysis of covariance matrices in order to determine which score(s)
are optimal indicators of the latent knowledge monitoring construct.
Further research is clearly needed with larger samples (perhaps 200-300
students) than previously employed in order to obtain some stability for
the results. The data should then be analyzed with LISREL or comparable procedures in order to identify empirically the optimal score of the
latent knowledge monitoring construct.
Knowledge and Estimates of Knowledge

Research has indicated that vocabulary scores are one of the most
powerful predictors of school learning (Breland, Jones, & Jenkins,
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1994; Just & Carpenter, 1987). The knowledge monitoring procedure
scores combine both students' estimates of what they know and their
actual knowledge. Thus, the + + score is a composite of both word
knowledge, determined by the raw score on the vocabulary test, and
the students' estimates of that knowledge. Each of the studies
described above examined whether the estimates contributed independent variance above that accounted for by students' knowledge.
Operationally, this question was analyzed by comparing the variance
accounted for by correct estimates (+ + and - - combined) and those
representing only the number correct on the vocabulary test (++
added to - +). Table 7 summarizes these results for each of the studies.
Table 7 indicates that in Studies V, VII, and VIII (four comparisons) knowledge alone, determined by raw score on the vocabulary
test, accounted for more variance (ranging from 1-17%) than the
estimates. Also, there seemed to be little difference between actual
knowledge and estimates in Study III. When knowledge estimates of
college students taking introductory psychology classes were related
to their Psychology AP scores, the effect size for knowledge alone was
13% (Study VII) and 17% greater (Study VIII) than for knowledge
estimates. When relationships between indices of introductory psychology students' in-class performance and KMA scores were analyzed (Study VIII) the effect size for knowledge alone was 6% greater.
It is not unusual for vocabulary knowledge, even in an unrelated
domain, to be an important predictor of students' grades in college
exams, such as the multiple-choice test and the AP examination used
in Studies VII and VIII. Vocabulary scores in domains not directly
related to the curriculum have been powerful predictors of all types
of school learning (Breland, Jones, & Jenkins, 1994; Just & Carpenter,
1987), and findings that they were highly related to how much
students learned in a psychology course (determined by either the AP
exam or in-class tests) were not surprising. Furthermore, because
students had little prior experience with the content of the AP examination they had no basis for estimating their performance on that test.
Therefore, in such instances it is reasonable that actual knowledge
may be more important in determining students' achievement than
estimates of that knowledge.
Knowledge estimates accounted for more variance in seven studies, nine comparisons (ranging in effect size or R2 from 1% to 58%,
with a median of 4% more variance), compared to knowledge alone.
The largest differences occurred in the study of need for feedback
where vocabulary raw score accounted for an insignificant 4% of the
variance, and accurate knowledge monitoring estimates accounted
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for a substantial 62% of the variance! Of course, that finding should
be replicated on larger samples. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable
that need for feedback should rely more heavily on students' estimates than on their knowledge.
Another large difference between the contributions of estimated
and actual scores occurred in Study IX, one of the math studies.
Estimates of the number of problems that could be solved accounted
for 31 % more variance than the problems actually solved. The findings of Study IX were replicated substantially in Study X; unfortunately a computer malfunction made it impossible to compare the
estimated and actual scores in that investigation. Although the math
studies clearly need replication, the findings suggest that knowledge
estimates may be more powerful predictors of success in that domain
than in vocabulary.
One possible reason for the substantial effects in mathematics
compared to vocabulary may deal with domain similarity. That is,
knowledge estimates in math were made from content that was
highly similar to the types of problems encountered during math
instruction. As indicated above in the discussion of the performance
expectation studies, the vocabulary words used in the research were
not similar to the domains in which instruction occurred, or to other
types of external criteria, perhaps leading to somewhat weaker effects. Tha t interpretation is supported by findings from several of the
investigations. In Study I, relating the declarative word knowledge
and estimates of that knowledge to reading comprehension, the
highest relationships were found for KMA scores after students had
read the text passage in which the vocabulary words were defined.
That procedure was obviously very similar to the task students face
in reading comprehension tests. Furthermore, in Study III social
science and science had the lowest relationships with KMA scores,
and the effects for social science and science were insignificant in
Study IV. Because the KMA materials were developed to be quite
general, they were probably dissimilar to what students learned in
these more technical areas. These results suggest that the KMA has
stronger effects within a domain, rather than across domains. Schraw,
Dunkle, Bendixen, and Roedel (1995) found that knowledge monitoring had both domain specific and domain general attributes. Further
research is needed to clarify the domain specific and/ or domain
general characteristics of the KMA.
Another possibility accounting for the more positive results in the
studies involving mathematics deals with the perceived difficulty of
the subject. Everson, Tobias, Hartman, and Gourgey (1993) found
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that students perceive mathematics to be the second most difficult
subject, right after science. Conceivably, as suggested below, students' estimates of their knowledge in more difficult domains are less
automatic and involve more reflection about their prior experiences
than in simpler areas. Students' confidence and/or their anxiety
about these fields may also affect their estimates. Further research is
clearly needed using materials drawn from mathematics, science, and
other fields to study both this question and the issue of domain
generality-specificity.
Difficu lty and Knowledge Monitoring Procedure

Little information about the difficulty of the various vocabulary
and mathematical materials was available prior to their use in any of
the studies. This may well have contributed to some of the variable
results. It seems reasonable that estimates of knowledge based on
students' thoughtful consideration of what they know and do not know
would be more substantially related to other variables than estimates
made more 01' less automatically. Rapid answers made with little
reflection are most likely when students respond to materials that are
very easy for them. Wrong estimates for such relatively automatic
responses probably indicate careless errors, rather than failures of
well-considered estimates. More difficult materials may also evoke
nonreflective responses, because students may feel that they neither
know nor care about what the correct answers to such questions are.
Items of moderate difficulty, about which students may have partial
knowledge that can be extended by exerting some effort, would appeal'
to be most likely to elicit well-considered responses reflective of students' metacognitive knowledge monitoring ability.
Item difficulty is also of importance in considering the different KMA scores. Of the foul' scores generated by the procedure,
the greatest number of responses fell into the + + category in the
studies described above. It may be assumed that more difficult
items would yield more - - and - + responses, increasing their
reliability and the likelihood that they could contribute more variance to the discrimination between accurate knowledge monitors
and their less accurate peers. Furthermore, having more items in
the - - category will reduce the similarity between es timates and
number correct for two reasons: First, such response represents
accura te estimates but no knowledge about the item, and second,
more - - items leaves a smaller percentage of + + items.
In future research these exp ectations about the effects of varying
item difficulty levels should be tested by using items with a previ-

214

TOB IAS/EVERSON

ously determined range of known difficulty. It could be hypothesized
that the most useful metacognitive knowledge estimates are likely to
be generated from materials of moderate difficulty, and that more
difficult items will increase the distinction between KMA accuracy
and number correct on any of these procedures.
Relationship to Metamemory Research

The procedure described in this chapter is similar to metamemory
research on the feeling of knowing (FOK) and judgment of learning
(JOL). FOK judgments "occur during or after acquisition and are
judgments about whether a given currently non-recallable item is
known and/or will be remembered on a subsequent retention
test... .Judgments of learning (JOL) occur during or after acquisition
and are predictors about future test performance on currently recallable items" (Nelson & Narens, 1990, p. 130). In terms of that definition, students' judgments on both the word list and math problems in
the preceding research were similar to JOLs.
FOK research was originated by Hart (1965) who asked general
information questions of students who, after failing to recall an item,
had to make a judgment regarding their FOK about that item. Finally,
they were asked to select an answer from a set of dis tractors. The
procedure has been extended to asking students to guess if they could
recall words learned in a paired associate task (Hart, 1967; Ryan,
Petty, & Wentzlaff, 1982). Nelson, Gerler, and Narens (1984) also
extended the FOK research to students' ability to relearn, and to
perceptual identification tasks. Reder and Ritter (1992) investigated
whether students opted either to retrieve or calculate mathematical
problems, and the latency and accuracy of these processes. A review
of FOK research indicated that "a large number of studies confirmed
that (students).... unable to retrieve a solicited item from memory can
es timate with above chance success whether they will be able to recall
it in the future, produce it in response to clues, or identify it among
distractors .. ..The standard finding is that the predictive validity of
FOK judgments is above chance, though far from perfect" (Koriat,
1993, p. 609-610).
The FOK and JOL paradigms differ from the present research in
a number of ways. First, the FOK judgments are typically required
after a recall failure, rather than after every stimulus presentation.
Second, in FOK or JOL research no attempts are usually made to
enable students to learn and/ or correct their knowledge of the stimuli,
as they were in some of the present research. Third, the purposes of
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the metamemory research are to clarify the mechanisms accounting
for FOK and JOL, rather than to use the scores as a measure of
metacognitive knowledge monitoring to be related to different variables of importance in students' school learning.
Suggestions for Further Research

A number of recommendations for further research have been
made earlier; additional suggestions that do not pertain directly to the
previous discussion are made here. The positive findings relating
kn.owledge monitoring to need for feedback suggest that studies of
similar variables relating the procedure to processes of importance in
school learning may be fruitful. For example, forgetting what has
been learned in school may be related to knowledge monitoring. It
could be inferred that students with good knowledge monitoring
abilities, by having a clear sense of what they know and do not know,
may be able to retrieve more prior learning than those who have a less
secure grasp of what they know and do not know and, hence, may
have greater difficulty retrieving prior learning. A pilot study of the
knowledge monitoring-forgetting relationship provided substantial
support for that reasoning, and will soon be followed up.
The relationship between knowledge monitoring and the effect of
distractibility is another fruitful area for investigation. Even though
there is a great deal of anecdotal evidence that students are readily
distracted from their studies, it has been surprisingly difficult to
divert students in investigations specifically designed for that purpose (Slater, 1968; Tobias, 1973). Although some of that variability
may be ath'ibutable to motivational phenomena (i.e., the interest level
of both the primary and distracting materials seems to be important
in determining whether students are successfully diverted from their
studying; Tobias, 1973), students' knowledge monitoring abilities
may also help to determine whether students are distracted. Students
with an accura te grasp of their knowledge should find distractions
less disruptive from their work than those with a hazier notion of
what they know and do not know.
Research should also be conducted relating knowledge monitoring to depth of processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). Students should
be able to distinguish between the known and unknown more accurately if the learning was processed at a deep, rather than shallow
level. Deeper processing should enhance shtdents' knowledge monitoring ability, and it could be predicted that students will make more
accurate distinctions between the known and unknown on material
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they are induced to process deeply, either by experimental manipulations or instructions, rather than at a shallow level.
Learning in complex domains, such as science, engineering, or
making diagnoses in medicine or other fields, often requires that
students bring substantial amounts of prior learning to bear in order
to understand and acquire new knowledge, and/ or solve problems.
Some prior learning may be recalled imperfectly, or may never have
been completely mastered during initial acquisition. Students who
can accurately distinguish between what they know and do not know
should be at an advantage while working in such domains, because
they are likely to review and try to relearn imperfectly mastered
materials needed for particular tasks more readily than students who
are less accurate in making such differentiations.
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Metacognition and
Computer-Based Testing
Gregory Schraw
Steven L. Wise
Linda L. Roos
The University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Metacognition refers to thinking about thinking, or more generally, to using higher-level knowledge and strategies to regulate lowerlevel performance. Previous research suggests that metacognition is
an important part of learning among adults (Baker, 1989; Garner &
Alexander, 1989; Pressley & Ghatala, 1990) and children (Alexander,
Carr, & Schwanenflugel, 1995; Borkowski & Muthukrishna, 1992).
Metacognition contributes to learning in several ways, but especially
by helping learners to use their attentional resources more efficiently,
to process information at a deeper level, and to monitor their performance more accurately.
Notwithstanding its importance, there is considerable debate
regarding how to measure meta cognition. At the heart of the problem
is the elusive nature of metacognitive knowledge itself. Most theorists assume meta cognitive knowledge is highly abstract and cuts
across domain-specific boundaries (Brown, 1987; Flavell, 1987; Paris
& Byrnes, 1989; Schraw, Dunkle, Bendixen, & Roedel, 1995; Schraw &
Moshman,1995). In contrast, most declarative and procedural knowledge in memory is welded to a specific domain, and can be stated as
a declarative fact or demonstrated through a procedure. As a result,
declarative and procedural knowledge are much easier to identify,
manipulate, and measure than metacognitive knowledge. Added to
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this is the fact that metacognitive knowledge is acquired gradually
over long periods of time, emerges relatively late in development, and
often is difficult to explicate even when an individual demonstrates a
high degree of metacognitive competence (Brown, 1987; Garner, 1994;
Weinert & Kluwe, 1987).
Another problem is that metacognitive processes such as planning and evaluation are difficult to measure directly.
For this reason, researchers have relied on a variety of indirect
measures such as verbal reports, think-alouds, self-report inventories,
and subjective measures of performance accuracy. One consequence
of the unobservable nature of metacognitive knowledge and regulation is that researchers have focused their attention on several specific
aspects of metacognition that are easier to measure than others,
especially various forms of monitoring. Most studies have focused on
memory monitoring (Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982; Johnson,
Hastroudi, & Lindsay, 1994; Lovelace, 1984; Koriat, 1993; Schneider &
Pressley, 1989), comprehension monitoring (Glenberg & Epstein, 1985;
Leonesio & Nelson, 1990; Weaver, 1990), or performance monitoring
(Glenberg, Sanocki, Epstein, & Morris, 1987; Pressley & Ghatala, 1990).
This chapter addresses problems related to the measurement of
metacognition in greater detail. We believe that some of the more
imposing obstacles can be addressed successfully via computer-based
testing procedures, but especially those pertaining to the assessment
of metacognitive control processes. We will argue that computerbased testing provides opportunities for researchers to measure control processes with much greater precision than with noncomputerized
methodologies. Computer-based testing enables us to do so in an
unobtrusive, reliable manner that is less apt to be confounded by
pre experimental knowledge and ability.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into six sections. The
first of these provides a brief overview of previous research and
presents a multilevel model of metacognition that distinguishes between two major components, including knowledge about and regulation of cognitive processes and knowledge. We further distinguish
between two subcomponents of meta cognitive regulation, including
meta cognitive control and monitoring. Control processes are used to
select performance goals and guide ongoing cognitive activities.
Monitoring processes are used to evaluate the present success of one's
performance and the degree to which one has met one's long-term
performance goals. We assume that control and monitoring are
reciprocally linked in a manner that facilitates self-regulation during
performance.
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The overview is followed by a section that outlines some of the
methodological shortcomings of previous research. These include
issues pertaining to the reliability and construct validity of dependent
variables used in these studies. Of greater importance, this section
considers how dependence on a limited repertoire of methodological
strategies has precluded inquiry along two important lines. The first
concerns the investigation of metacognitive control. We believe that
few studies have investigated control processes at all, and that none
have done so directly. The second line of inquiry concerns the
relationship between control and monitoring processes. Current
conceptualizations of metacognition make a number of assumptions
about this relationship that have not been tested empirically.
The next section provides a review of recent developments in
computer-based testing that offer great promise for the measurement
of metacognition. These include the contribution of item-response
theory to the rapidly growing field of computerized adaptive testing
(i.e., tests in which a computer-controlled algorithm selects test items
from a multilevel, calibrated item pool) and self-adapted testing (i.e.,
tests in which examinees select item of a designated difficulty level
from a multilevel, calibrated item pool).
We consider ways that self-adapted testing (SAT) can be applied
to the measurement of metacognition in the next section. This
includes some of the psychometric advantages of SAT as well as a
description of on-line measures of cognitive and metacognitive behavior that can be used to test the model of metacognition proposed
later in this chapter. Specifically, we address how SAT can be used to
assess metacognitive control in a variety of ways, including a measure
of how accurately individuals select test items, as well as selection
times, item response times, and across-test item selection strategies.
The final section outlines an agenda for future research using
SAT. One important goal of this research is to link the kinds of data
collected in previous studies with the kind of on-line measures
available in SAT. Among other things, this would enable researchers
to compare the reliability of subjective paper-and-pencil judgments
made before, during, or after testing to objective measures collected
during SAT. Ideally, one would hope for a strong correspondence
between the two; however, one possibility is that pre- and post-test
subjective judgments do not correspond closely to actual on-line item
selection strategies. Another goal is that researchers investigate in
detail the relationship between control and monitoring. One would
expect these processes to be linked reciprocally, even though there is
no direct empirical evidence to support this assumption. Establishing
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such a relationship would suggest that control and monitoring processes are part of a larger regulatory system. In contrast, finding that
the two processes are not related strongly would suggest that each is
governed by a separate reservoir of knowledge.
The final section of the paper summarizes our main points and
offers some general conclusions. Chief among these is the claim that
researchers may benefit by incorporating recent innovations from the
computer-based testing community, and by using SAT to bridge the
gap between existing metacognitive theory and empirical studies that
do not adequately address questions raised by this theory.
COG NITIVE AN D METACOG NITIVE PROCESSES

Individuals rely on both cognitive and metacognitive skills when
learning (Garner & Alexander, 1989; Pressley, Borkowski, & Schneider,
1987). Cognitive skills are those that help a person perform a task;
metacognitive skills are those that help a person regulate and monitor
task performance (Artzt & Armour-Thomas, 1992; Schraw, 1994; Slife
& Weaver, 1992). Metacognition is thought to include two main
components (Baker & Brown, 1984; Brown, 1987; Jacobs & Paris,
1987). The first, knowledge of cognition, refers to what individuals
know about their own cognition or about cognition in general. It
usually includes three different kinds of metacognitive awareness:
declarative, procedural, and conditional knowledge (Brown, 1987;
Jacobs & Paris, 1987; Schraw & Moshman, 1995). Declarative knowledge refers to knowing "about" things. Procedural knowledge refers
to knowing "how" to do things. Conditional knowledge refers to
knowing the "why" and "when" aspects of cognition. The second,
regulation of cognition, refers to metacognitive activities that help
control and monitor one's learning. Although a number of regulatory
skills have been described in the literature (Jacobs & Paris, 1987;
Kluwe, 1987), two that appear to be essential are control and monitoring processes.
A growing number of studies have been conducted over the past
decade investigating these components. Those focusing on the knowledge of cognition component typically employed either think-aloud
(Swanson, 1990) or self-report measures (Dixon, Hultsch, & Hertzog,
1988; Schraw & Delmison, 1994). Those focusing on the regulation of
cognition componen t, but especially the monitoring subcomponent,
typically employed some form of priming task, or asked individuals
to make subjec tive judgments of coniidence, ease of comprehension,
or overall learning prior to or subsequent to completing a test
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(Glenberg, Sanocki, Epstein, & Morris, 1987; Leonesio & Nelson, 1990;
Weaver, 1990).
Unfortunately, because many of these studies used widely
different materials, data collection procedures, and criterion measures, results are mixed and often difficult to compare. In lieu of
a comprehensive review of these diverse findings, we turn briefly
to a summary of recent research investigating the control and
monitoring subcomponents. We do so for two reasons. One is to
provide a more detailed definition of each construct. A second is
to delineate the strengths and weaknesses of recent empirical
research.
Research on Control

Metacognitive control refers to regulatory processes that occur
prior to or during a learning activity tha t direct the course of cognitive
activities. These processes include but are not restricted to planning,
allocating resources, selecting strategies, and setting specific performance goals. Control processes typically are assumed to guide
cognitive activities in a top-down manner (Nelson & Narens, 1990,
1994). Most theorists also assume that control processes are intentional, nonautomated, and partially statable (Bjorklund & Harnishfeger,
1990; Pressley, Harris, & Marks, 1992).
Many studies have investigated the effect of strategy instruction
on meta cognitive control (see Garner, 1987; Pressley et al., 1987;
Pressley, 1995, for reviews). These studies invariably indicate that
strategy instruction increases metacognitive control in two ways:
through better use of limited cognitive resources and more elaborative processing (Willoughby, Wood, & Khan, 1994; Wood, Pressley, &
Winne, 1990). However, few of these studies have shown attempts to
assess the accuracy of enhanced control processes, the degree to
which learners have metacognitive awareness about enhanced control, and the extent to which enhanced control is related to monitoring
accuracy.
Several studies have investigated the relationship between
control and monitoring more directly. Pressley and colleagues
(see Pressley & Ghatala, 1990, for a review) found that experimental manipulations that improved performance (presumably by
enhancing meta cognitive control) did not lead to more accurate
monitoring among college students . In contrast, Maki and colleagues (Maki & Serra, 1992; Maki, Foley, Kajer, Thompson, &
Willert, 1990) found that experimental manipulations that neces-
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sitated deeper information processing (e.g., asking readers to generate missing text information) led to more accurate monitoring.
Other studies have used estimates of future performance on a
specific task as a measure of metacognitive control. Schraw (1994)
asked college students to estimate their ability to monitor accurately
their reading comprehension. Control predictions were correlated
positively (i.e., p < .01) with test performance and post-test estimates
of monitoring accuracy. Levels of self-assessed monitoring ability
also were related to item-by-item and end-of-test monitoring accuracy. Those who rated themselves as normatively accurate monitors
tended to be more accurate and to improve more than poor monitors
as a function of self-generated feedback. These findings suggested
that older learners possess knowledge about metacognitive processes
and use this knowledge strategically to control their performance and
monitoring.
A follow-up study by Schraw (1995) examined performance control judgments (i.e., pretest estimates of one's ability to perform well
in a specific domain) across a variety of content domains and test
formats. Results indicated that control judgments were correlated
positively among domains even when test performance was controlled statistically. This suggested that metacognitive control may
be a domain-general rather than domain-specific phenomenon. However, control judgments across different types of tests (i.e., recognition of facts versus recall of inferential relationships) were unrelated.
This suggested that control judgments may be dependent on the
specific cognitive processes required of a particular test format (see
Pressley & Ghatala, 1990, and Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1994, for a
further discussion).
Research on Monitoring

Metacognitive monitoring refers to processes that occur during or
after a learning activity that provide information about the effectiveness of those activities. These processes are used to evaluate the
present success of one's performance and the degree to which one has
met one's long-term performance goals. Monitoring is important
because it provides self-generated feedback to the control system.
Without accurate monitoring, efficient control of one's performance
may be impossible. Most theorists assume that monitoring is a datadriven process; that is, monitoring accuracy may be a function of
domain familiarity, automaticity, and task difficulty (Koriat, 1993;
Nelson & Narens, 1990, 1994).
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Monitoring studies typically require individuals to make subjective judgments of learning or test performance during or after an
initial study phase. Judgments are made for each test item using a 5or 7-point Likert scale, although some researchers have used other
techniques such as a continuous, bipolar scale adapted from the
multidimensional literature (see Schraw, Potenza, & Nebelsick-Gullet, 1993, for a further description) . The main purpose of these studies
is to determine the degree to which individuals accurately assess their
learning and performance.
Four types of judgments have been used in the adult monitoring
literature, including ease of learning (i.e., judgments of encoding difficulty), judgments of learning (i.e., the degree to which information was
learned during the study phase), feeling of knowing (i.e., the degree to
which one has access to previously learned information in memory),
and pelformance judgments (i.e., assessments of performance accuracy).
These four types of judgments have been used by researchers to
operationalize metacognitive processes involved in the acquisition,
retention, and retrieval of information (Nelson & Narens, 1994).
Monitoring studies differ widely with respect to the type of
criterion measure used to assess monitoring ability. Many studies use
some form of correlation, although a number of studies report other
measures such as bias (Schraw & Roedel, 1994), accuracy (Tobias,
1996), discrimination (Lundeberg, Fox, & Puncochar, 1994), or a
multicomponent measure based on bias, correlation, and discrimination (Yates, 1990). Currently, there is widespread disagreement about
the relative effectiveness of these measures (Keren, 1991; Liberman &
Tversky, 1993; Nelson, 1984; Schraw, 1995). One point of agreement
is that different criterion measures affect both observed results and
how researchers interpret these results.
These studies generally suggest that adults monitor their learning
and performance with a moderate degree of success, although results
vary from study to study. Surprisingly, monitoring proficiency does
not appear to be related strongly to relevant domain knowledge
(Glenberg & Epstein, 1987; Morris, 1990; Schraw et al., 1995) or
academic achievement (Pressley & Ghatala, 1988, 1990). These conclusions have been supported in the children's monitoring literature
as well, although there is considerable debate regarding whether
children monitor as accurately as adults (Alexander, Carr, &
Schwanenflugel, 1995; Butterfield, Nelson, & Peck, 1988).
Situational constraints also affect estimates of monitoring proficiency. One constraint is the point in the learning-test sequence in
which monitoring judgments are made. A number of studies indicate
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that calibration of comprehension (i.e., the correlation between pretest
judgments and actual test performance) is often quite poor, with most
studies reporting correlations in the .00 to .25 range (Glenberg et al.,
1987; Pressley & Ghatala, 1990). In contrast, calibration of performance (i.e., the correlation between posttestjudgments and actual test
performance) appears to be much better in both children and adults,
often ranging from .30 to .50 (Glenberg et al., 1987; Maki & Serra, 1992;
Maki et al., 1990; Pressley & Ghatala, 1990).
A second constraint is that specific testing conditions affect monitoring proficiency. For example, calibration of comprehension can be
improved under the following circumstances: (a) when adjunct questions similar to post-test questions are provided during study (Pressley,
Snyder, Levin, Murray, & Ghatala, 1987), (b) when periodic feedback
is provided to test takers (Ghatala, Levin, Foorman, & Pressley, 1989),
(c) when expert knowledge about the to-be-Iearned material is minimized (Glenberg & Epstein, 1987), and (d) when test takers generated
missing text information (Maki et al., 1990). Surprisingly, calibration
of comprehension does not appear to improve when learners were
specifically requested to monitor their comprehension or when they
are given the opportunity to re-study the to-be-Iearned materials
(Ghatala et al., 1989), or when they were given practice questions
prior to study (Maki & Serra, 1992).
Like calibration of comprehension, calibration of performance
improved under a number of testing conditions, especially when
adjunct questions were provided during the study phase (Pressley et
al., 1988), when test takers received external incentives to improve
monitoring accuracy (Schraw et al., 1994), and when test takers
received recall rather than recognition tests (Pressley, Ghatala,
Woloshyn, & Pirie, 1990). Calibration of performance also was related
to level of test performance (Schraw & Roedel, 1994). Individuals
monitored with less bias when judging their performance on easy
rather than more difficult items.
A third general constraint is that monitoring proficiency improves with feedback, incentives, practice, and training. Stock,
Kulhavy, Pridemore, and Krug (1992) found that experimenter-provided feedback increased the accuracy of confidence judgments.
Schraw (1994) reported that pre-experimental estimates of monitoring
proficiency were related to both local (i.e., the accuracy of itemspecific performance judgments made during testing) and global (i.e.,
judgments of overall performance made after testing) monitoring
accuracy. The accuracy of local monitoring was correlated positively
to the accuracy of global monitoring. In addition, the change in
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monitoring accuracy between local and global monitoring improved
significantly among good monitors, but did not improve among poor
monitors.
Monitoring proficiency also improves when individuals are given
incentives to monitor their performance more accurately. Schrawet
al. (1993) found that additional course credit for normatively high
monitoring accuracy led to more accurate monitoring, whereas additional credit for normatively high test performance had no effect on
monitoring accuracy. In addition, incentives to monitor more accurately improved test performance even though incentives to perform
better did not.
Monitoring training also improves performance. Delclos and
Harrington (1991) examined fifth and sixth grader's ability to solve
computer problems after assignment to one of three conditions. The
first group received specific problem-solving training, the second
received problem-solving plus self-monitoring training and practice,
and the third received no training. The monitored problem-solving
group solved more of the difficult problems than either of the remaining groups and took less time to do so. The group receiving problemsolving and monitoring training also solved complex problems faster
than the control group.
Summary

The control and monitoring research summarized above leads to
a number of conclusions. Regarding control, most adults achieve
some degree of metacognitive control by using helpful learning
strategies. Second, many adults possess some explicit metacognitive
knowledge about their ability to control performance. Third,
metacognitive control in one domain tends to be related to control in
another domain, even when performance is taken into consideration.
Fourth, metacognitive control appears to be superior in adults
(Alexander et al., 1995).
Regarding monitoring, adults monitor their performance with a
moderate degree of accuracy. Monitoring improves as tests become
easier and more factual. Second, monitoring proficiency appears to
be independent of intellectual ability (Alexander et al., 1995; Swanson,
1990) and academic achievement (Pressley & Ghatala, 1988). Third,
monitoring proficiency may be independent or even negatively related to domain knowledge (Glenberg & Epstein, 1987), independent
of ease of comprehension judgments (Leonesio & Nelson, 1990), but
correlated with other types of metacognitive knowledge (Schraw,
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1994; Schraw & Dennison, 1994). Fourth, one's ability to monitor one's
performance may improve with practice (Delclos & Harrington, 1991).
PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT MEASUREMENT APPROACHES
It could be argued that the gap between metacognitive theory and
empirical research is as great as any other area of psychological
inquiry. These are several specific reasons for this state of affairs,
many of them being methodological in nature (Kruglanski, 1989).
This section divides these problems into three interrelated categories
that are ranked ordered from our vantage point in order of importance. The three categories include task, test, and person constraints on
the measurement of control and monitoring.
Task Constraints

Task constraints refer to characteristics of the experimental task
that impede measurement of either control or monitoring processes.
The most serious obstacle is that researchers cannot manipulate either
control or monitoring processes directly, but must be content to
manipulate the task environment in which control and monitoring are
performed. This means that researchers must make inferences about
complex metacognitive processes on the basis of indirect measures.
Although this is certainly not a new problem to psychologists, it is a
serious one.
Operationalizing metacognitive control has been an especially
virulent problem. Presumably, the best way to study control processes would be to allow the examinee to exercise a great deal of
strategic control over his or her performance. Previous studies have
attempted to do so by providing specific task information, learning
goals, opportunity to study, strategies for learning, or conditions
under which learning is facilitated. In essence, these studies examined whether a variety of experimental factors affected metacognitive
control. However, none of these studies allowed examinees to demonstrate overtly in a directly observable manner how they attempted
to control their test-taking behavior. One way to do so would be
through the use of on-line verbal protocols in which individuals
describe their cognitive processes (Ericsson & Simon, 1984; Pressley &
Afflerbach, 1995). However, although an important research tool,
verbal reports are intrusive, resource consuming, and assume that
individuals have explicit access to metacognitive processes.
An alternative would be to study the way examinees make
strategic choices throughout a test. In self-adapted testing, for ex-
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ample, individuals choose test items of a designated difficulty level
from a multilevel, calibrated item pool. This may enable researchers
to examine several aspects of metacognitive control in an explicit, yet
unobtrusive manner. One aspect is the goodness of fit (i.e., calibration
accuracy) between self-selected items and observed performance.
Another aspect is whether examinees show evidence of improved
accuracy over the course of the entire test.
A somewhat different task constraint is introduced when researchers ask examinees to make subjective judgments of learning
and performance while simultaneously performing complex tasks.
Researchers invariably assume that such ratings have little effect on
performance, although oddly, there are no empirical studies we know
of that have investigated this assumption. Of greater importance,
researchers also assume that the demands of taking a test have little
impact on the accuracy of subjective ratings. This assumption clearly
is untenable in that confidence judgments become increasingly more
biased as a function of test difficulty (Schraw & Roedel, 1994; Schwartz
& Metcalfe, 1994). Although researchers have attempted to compensate for such problems via the judicious use of statistical analyses (cf.
Nelson, 1984), no amount of statistical tinkering can eliminate these
problems entirely (cf. Funder, 1987; Keren, 1991; Liberman & Tversky,
1993; Schraw, 1995).
Test Constraints

Test constraints refer to characteristics of the test itself, rather than
the test environment, that impede measurement of either control or
monitoring processes. A recent review by Schwartz and Metcalfe
(1994) addressed four test-related problems that we summarize here.
One source of variation among examinees, and presumably an important source of measurement error, pertains to the type of test being
given. Recall tests often are assumed to be more cognitively demanding than recognition tests. Most empirical studies echo this difference
by revealing higher correlations between performance and confidence (or accuracy) judgments on recall tests. One reason for higher
correlations is less restriction of the range of scores on recall tests
when compared to recognition tests. Because recall tests are more
difficult, their scores will vary across a wider range of possible values.
In contrast, easier recognition tests restrict the observed range of a
correlation due to homogeneous performance or ceiling effects.
Another inadvertent problem of recognition tests is that examinees are influenced by the availability of information included in the
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test item. Because test answers are provided explicitly in a recognition test, but must be generated in a recall test, examinees are
significantly more confident when monitoring recognition tests, but
more accurate when monitoring recall tests (Ghatala, Levin, Foorman,
& Pressley, 1989).
A second major source of measurement error is the length of a
test, or if it is a recognition test, the number of alternatives from which
one may choose for each item. It is well established that a test's
reliability is directly related to its length, with longer tests, and
recognition tests with more alternatives, being more reliable (Crocker
& Algina, 1986). Unfortunately, many early studies of monitoring
used multiple tests with one or two items per test, rather than the
preferable one test with a large number of items. To illustrate,
Glenberg et al. (1987) reported no statistically significant relationship
between pretest judgments of learning and subsequent performance.
This group of experiments required individuals to answer one main
idea question per test for a large number of tests. Replicating this study,
having first increased the length of each test, Weaver (1990) fOlmd that
the observed value of r increased monotonically as a function of test
length, until it reached an asymptotic value of r = .60. Thus, Glenberg
et al. (1987) failed to identify a significant relationship between judgments of learrung and test performance due to unreliable test scores.
A third source of error is test difficulty. Monitoring accuracy
declines as a test becomes more difficult, even when test performance
is controlled statistically (Schraw & Roedel, 1994; Schraw, Dunkle,
Bendixen, & Roedel, 1995). In addition, overconfidence is more
common than underconfidence and more likely to occur when a test
is difficult (Cutler & Wolfe, 1989; Newman, 1984). These patterns
have been observed on a variety of tasks including probability judgments (Fischhoff, 1988), reading comprehension (Glenberg et al.,
1987), recalling emotions (Thomas & Diener, 1990), and social judgments (Dunning, Griffin, Milojkovic, & Ross, 1990).
There are at least two reasons a difficult test may interfere with
control and monitoring processes. One is that individuals lack
sufficient background knowledge to answer the test question. It is
well known that individuals resort to a number of helpful, but fallible,
heuristics under these circumstances that bias their judgments
(Fischhoff, 1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). A second reason is that
information in memory is inaccessible during testing (i.e., available in
memory, but presently unretrievable). Partial or total inaccessibility
may lead to severe judgment bias due not only to poor monitoring,
but fallible retrieval processes as well (Koriat, 1993, 1994).
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A fourth source of error is knowledge about the test. Testrelevant knowledge may affect control and monitoring in several
ways-namely, by enabling examinees to identify test-relevant information more efficiently, process information at a test-appropriate
level (McDaniel & Einstein, 1989), and utilize self-generated feedback
(Glenberg et al., 1987). In general, as knowledge of the test increases,
performance and the reliability of tests improve as well (Schwartz &
Metcalfe, 1994). Research by Metcalfe (1993) also found that administering a test that was not expected reduced the correlation between
performance judgments and actual performance dramatically.
Person Constraints

There are a number of ways that prior knowledge might affect
control and monitoring processes negatively, and thereby reduce the
reliability of measurements (Baker, 1989; Garner & Alexander, 1989).
Insufficient knowledge may preclude the use of helpful learning and
test strategies and lead to lower performance. Lower performance
may, in turn, lead to a resh·iction in the range of observed test scores.
Low domain knowledge also makes a test more difficult, which has
several deleterious effects on monitoring already described above.
It is possible that prior knowledge interacts with many of the
constraints described above in complex ways. For example, low prior
knowledge presumably affects the degree to which individuals learn
information during a pretest study session. Poorer learning leads to
a greater amount of inaccessible information and a more difficult test.
Low prior knowledge in a domain also may restrict deeper information processing that could affect performance on some test questions,
but not others.
It is important to note, however, that increasing prior knowledge
per se does not seem to improve monitoring (Nelson & Narens, 1990;
Pressley et al., 1990), unless the inclusion of prior knowledge provides
an opportunity for self-generated feedback or additional knowledge
about the test itself (Glenberg et al., 1987). For example, research by
Morris (1990) found that although knowledge was related positively
to performance, it was not related to monitoring accuracy. Schraw
(Schraw & Roedel, 1994; Schraw et al., 1995) extended these findings
across multiple domains, arguing that individuals possess a domaingeneral (i.e., knowledge-independent) monitoring skill that is independent of domain knowledge. Glenberg and Epstein (1987) also
reported that higher levels of expert knowledge actually interfered
with accurate monitoring.
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Summary

Empirical studies of control and monitoring lag behind
metacognitive theory. One important reason is that each of these
processes is difficult to operationalize experimentally and to manipulate directly. Researchers have relied on several limited measurement
paradigms, including error detection (see Baker & Cerro, this volume)
and subjective calibration judgments. Both of these methodologies
are fraught with measurement problems related to the nature of the
task itself, to factors including the type and difficulty of the test, and
to characteristics of the examinee.
In subsequent sections of this chapter we argue that self-adapted
testing allows researchers to eliminate many of these problems, and
thereby increase the construct validity of tests (Rocklin, O'Donnell, &
Holst, 1995), by (a) controlling for test and item difficulty using a
calibrated pool of independent test items, (b) reducing measurement
error attributable to characteristics of the examinees such as ability
and prior knowledge, (c) utilizing unobtrusive measures that do not
compete for the examinees' limited resources, and most importantly,
(d) allowing the test taker to exercise a much greater degree of control
during the testing process. We turn now to a brief overview of
computer-based testing and two recent developments: computerized
adaptive and self-adapted testing.
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN EDUCATIONAL AND
PSYCHOLOG ICAL MEASUREMENT
Item Response Theory

During the past few decades, Item Response Theory (IRT), has
emerged as the psychometric model used by an increasing number of
testing programs in education and psychology. For large-scale achievement and proficiency tests in particular, IRT has largely supplanted
classical test theory as the basis for test development, scoring, and
equating. The central concept of IRT is the item characteristic curve
(ICC), which specifies the relationship between the level of an
examinee's proficiency (i.e., estimated ability) and the probability that
he or she passes the item.
The most commonly used IRT models assume that there is a
monotonic relationship between examinee proficiency and the probability of passing an item. In addition, it is assumed that the set of test
items under consideration is unidimensional (i.e., measures a single,
unobservable construct). It has been typically found, however, that
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the IRT model will adequately fit the test data if there is one sufficiently dominant factor underlying the items. A detailed explanation
of IRT is beyond the scope of this chapter; the interested reader is
referred to Hambleton, Swaminathan, and Rogers (1991) for a good
overview of basic IRT concepts.
Two principles of IRT are particularly relevant to the present
discussion. The first is a key property of IRT, termed invariance,
which states that an examinee's proficiency is independent of the
characteristics of the items that are administered. Consider the case
in which there is an available pool of 400 test items, and that it is larger
than would be administered to a given examinee (e.g., 100 items)
during a testing session. Regardless of which 100 items were administered from the pool, the examinee's expected proficiency estimate
would be invariant. Invariance holds because IRT-based proficiency
estimates take into account both (a) characteristics (primarily difficulty) of the items that were administered and (b) the examinee's
performance on those items. An important implication of invariance
is that two examinees can receive completely different tests, drawn
from the same item pool, yet their proficiency estimates can be
compared. Any differences in difficulty of the two tests are taken into
account by the IRT estimation procedure.
It should be noted that invariance is not a feature of the classical
test theory measurement model, in which proficiency estimation is
based solely on test performance (i.e., number of items passed). If two
examinees take two tests that differ in difficulty, then the difference
between the examinees' proficiency levels is confounded with the
difference between the difficulty of the tests.
A second principle of IRT that is of particular relevance to the
study of examinee monitoring and control is that the difficulty parameters of the ICCs, which indicate the relative difficulties of the items,
are placed on the same scale as examinee proficiency. This joint
scaling is depicted in Figure 1, which indicates that Item 1 is the least
difficult item, followed by Item 2, and so on through Item 5. Moreover, examinee A is the least proficient of the three examinees, and
Examinee C the most proficient.
Measuring difficulty and proficiency on the same scale allows one
to assess the degree of match between the difficulty of an item and an
examinee's proficiency. Why is this joint scaling important? The
closer the match between an item's difficulty and an examinee's
proficiency, the more informative is the examinee's response to that
item in estimating his/her proficiency. Hence, more difficult items
are most informative for more proficient examinees, whereas less
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difficult items are most informative for less proficient examinees. In
Figure I, the most informative items for Examinees A, B, and Care
Items 2, 3, and 5, respectively.

Figure 1. The joint scaling of item difficulty and examinee proficiency in IRT.
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Computer-Based Testing

With the introduction and rapid proliferation of microcomputers
came an increased use of computers to administer tests. There are a
number of advantages realized with computer-based testing that may
make it attractive to examinees, including the capability for ondemand testing, as well as immediate test scoring and reporting of
results. From a researcher's standpoint, however, computer-based
testing provides two additional advantages. First, it allows a much
greater degree of control over the test administration. Such control
may include (a) the order in which items are considered and answered, (b) how long each item is presented, and (c) whether or not
examinees are allowed to review, and possibly change, their answers
to items. Second, it allows the researcher to unobtrusively collect a
great deal of information about the test session, such as how long an
examinee took to respond to each item or whether or not the examinee
changed his/her answers to any test items. Because of these advantages, a computer-based test provides a unique opportunity for re-
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searchers to study examinee test-takil1.g behavior. With paper-andpencil tests, such advantages are unavailable.
Computerized Adaptive Testing. Computerized adaptive testing
(CAT) combines the psychometric advantages of IRT with the computing power of current microcomputers. In a CAT, a computer
algorithm is used to match the difficulty of the items administered to
the estimated proficiency of each examinee. At each step in a CAT,
the next item to be administered is a function of the examinee's
responses to previously administered items. Using a CAT, examinee
ability is estimated more efficiently than with a conventional test
because typically fewer items are required to attain the same degree
of measurement precision. It has typically has been found that a CAT
requires about half as many items to estimate an examinee's proficiency with the same degree of precision as a paper-and-pencil test.
Note that both of the IRT principles discussed earlier are essential
to a CAT. Because item difficulty and examinee proficiency are on the
same scale, items having difficulties matching an examinee's current
proficiency estimate can readily be identified and administered. And,
because examinees receive unique tests, the invariance property allows their proficiency estimates to be compared.
Self-Adapted Testing. Although CAT is by far the most popular
application of IRT in computer-based testing, other applications have
been studied. One of these is self-adapted testing (Rocklin & O'Donnell,
1987). A SAT is similar to a CAT with one important exception. In
a self-adapted test, the examinee is allowed to choose the difficulty
level of each test item administered, whereas in a CAT a computer
algorithm chooses each item to be administered based on the
examinee's performance on items administered earlier in the testing
session.
In a SAT, an examinee chooses the difficulty level of each item
administered from an item pool has been divided into several (typically 5-8) ordered difficulty levels, or strata, based on the IRT difficulty parameters of the items. This relationship among difficulty
levels is illustrated in Figure 2. Testing begins with the examinee
choosing the difficulty level of the first item, at which point an item
from the chosen stratum is drawn (without replacement) in a random
fashion and administered. After this item is answered, the examinee
is then asked to choose the difficulty level of the next item. This
procedure continues until a predetermined number of items has been
administered or a desired precision of proficiency estimation has been
reached. After item administration is completed, the examinee's test
performance is calculated using an IRT-based proficiency estimation
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method. As with a CAT, because proficiency estimation is IRT based,
the invariance property insures that the test performances of different
examinees receiving a SAT can be directly compared even though
they may have chosen to be administered tests that varied substantially in difficulty. Successful implementation of a SAT is largely
dependent on the instructions presented at the beginning of the test.
It must be explained to examinees that their test performance will be
evaluated on the basis of the difficulty levels they choose as well as
the number of items that they pass. Because most examinees are used
to taking tests where performance is based solely on how many items
are passed, examinees taking a SAT may tend to choose low difficulty
levels unless adequate instructions are provided. Hence it is very
important to provide examinees with clear instructions when administering a SAT. An example of instructions used with a SAT are found
in Wise, Plake, Johnson, and Roos (1992) .
The research on SAT conducted thus far has focused on its effects
on test performance and its relationship to examinee affective variables. Several studies have compared SAT with CAT, finding that
examinees receiving a SAT obtained significantly higher mean proficiency estimates (Roos, Plake, & Wise, 1992; Wise et al., 1992; Vispoel
& Coffman, 1994). Moreover, the difference in mean estimated
proficiency between SAT and CAT has been found to interact with
other variables. Significant interactions have been found between test
type and examinee scores on the Test Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger,
1980), with the difference in mean estimated proficiency between SAT
and CAT increasing with examinee test anxiety (Rocklin & O'Donnell,
1991; Vispoel & Coffman, 1994; Vispoel, Rocklin, & Wang, 1994;
Vispoel, Wang, de la Torre, Bleiler, & Dings, 1992). In addition,
Figure 2. Item Difficulty level strata in self-adapted testing .
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Vispoel et al. (1994) found a significant interaction between examinee
verbal self-concept and test type, with the largest difference in mean
estimated proficiency between SAT and CAT being associated with
low examinee verbal self-concept.
There also is evidence that the use of a SAT moderates the
relationship between examinee anxiety and test performance. In two
studies comparing SAT and CAT it was found that examinees administered a SAT reported significantly lower post-test state anxiety than
examinees administered a CAT (Roos et al., 1992; Wise et al., 1992). It
has also been found that a SAT yields proficiency estimates that are
less related to test anxiety than those obtained when a CAT or a
conventional test is used (Rocklin & O'Donnell, 1991; Vispoel &
Coffman, 1994; Vispoel et al., 1994; Vispoel et al., 1992). The findings
from these studies suggest that use of a SAT reduces the influence of
anxiety on test performance.
CONTROL, MON ITORING, AND SELF-ADAPTED TESTI NG

Although previous research on SAT has focused on its effects on
anxiety and test performance, a SAT also affords an opportunity to
measure elements of metacognition. To tmderstand this, it is useful
to consider the activities of the examinee during his/her test. A
difficulty level is chosen by the examinee, an item is administered, the
examinee answers the item, and the examinee is provided a choice for
the difficulty level of the next item. This sequence is repeated wltil the
test is completed.
We have observed that most examinees vary their difficulty level
choices during the course of a SAT. Moreover, it has been found that
many examinees tend to adjust their difficulty level choices to receive
items that are well-matched to their proficiency levels (Wise et al.,
1992). That is, many examinees taking a SAT appear to be motivated
to attain the same difficulty-proficiency match that is explicitly sought
by the computer algorithm in a CAT.
What psychological processes might be involved in attaining this
match? We contend that two key processes are monitoring and
control. Monitoring is required to assess the difficulty of the previous
item, and to compare its difficulty to one's perceived proficiency.
Control is then required to make a strategic choice, regarding the next
item's difficulty, on the basis of the perceived degree of match
between item difficulty and proficiency. If the match is sufficiently
close, then the examinee will likely choose the same difficulty level as
the previous item. If the match is not judged to be close then the
examinee will change difficulty levels in order to attain a closer
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difficulty-proficiency match. For example, if the examinee's monitoring process yields a judgement that the previous item was too easy,
then the control process will choose a more difficult next item.
Thus, whereas most of the previous research on SAT has focused
on the outcomes of taking a SAT, there is important information to be
gained by studying the process of taking a SAT. Through an analysis
of the SAT experience, we see that, although both monitoring and
control playa major role in the examinee's strategic choices, the
observable examinee behavior (difficulty level choice) most directly
reflects the control process. Later in this chapter we outline several
ways of using the data from a SAT to construct measures of the
control process.
Some Methodological Advantages of SAT

Self-adapted testing provides a unique, unobtrusive method for
gathering information about metacognitive processes, and especially
of control. Indeed, examinees need not be given specific instructions
about control or monitoring, or even know that their test behaviors
provide relevant information about these processes. The fact that
control processes are studied unobtrusively has two important advantages. One is that examinees are able to focus all of their resources
on the test, rather than dividing their attention between performance
and control-assessment activities. A second advantage is that direct
measures of metacognitive control are available (i.e., item selection
time and accuracy), rather than an indirect, subjective assessment of
control (i.e., confidence or accuracy judgments).
SAT has a number of other advantages as well that pertain
specifically to the task, test, and person constraints described earlier
in this chapter. The most important of these is examinee control.
Whereas all previous studies have asked examinees to complete a test
designed by researchers, SAT enables an examinee to choose items that
he or she feels are best suited to his or her proficiency without compromising comparability among examinees. With respect to the study of
metacognition, individuals with a high degree of metacognitive control
should be able to select difficult, yet answerable items. Those with less
control may select test items that are less appropriate for them. Those
with poor control may regularly select items that are too easy or too
difficult. The self-controlled nature of SAT enables researchers to
study the relationship among selection time, accuracy, and overall
test proficiency, as well as a variety of self-report judgments made
prior to, during, or subsequent to the test. Experiments could be
expanded to examine motivational variables as well.
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SAT also may increase the construct validity of proficiency estimates, and presumably measures of metacognitive control, by reducing confounds due to anxiety (Rocklin et al., 1995; Wise, 1994) and test
difficulty. This helps to reduce or eliminate many of the test-based
constraints typical of previous studies. For example, given that
individuals select test items from a pool of calibrated items, the
difficulty of these items should have little effect on the accuracy of
metacognitive control. This is in stark contrast to traditional paperand-pencil tests in which examinees monitor their p erformance with
greater bias as test items increase in difficulty.
Another strength of SAT is the property of invariance, which
enables each examinee to select items that are optimally suited to his
or her proficiency. Differences in the absolute difficulty of items need
not compromise estimates of metacognitive control. This means that
measures of metacognitive control are comparable on the same scale
even though individuals may be administered different test items and
even though individuals differ with respect to underlying ability.
The fact that SAT yields comparable es timates of proficiency and
metacognitive control regardless of differences in ability eliminates a
crucial person constraint in the study of metacognitive processes. It
is likely that prior knowledge also has less impact on proficiency and
control estimates than it would using paper-and-pencil tests. Although
prior knowledge may greatly affect which items an examinee selects,
item selection in itself does not affect estimates of proficiency. On the
other hand, it is possible that individuals with no prior knowledge, or
a great deal of it, may be poorly suited to the test if tl1ere are an
insufficient munber of test items near theiJ: true proficiency level.
In summary, we believe tha t self-adapted tes ting provides a
unique opportunity to study on-line metacognitive control p rocesses
in an unobtrusive manner. The ability to do so permits researchers to
explore a number of theoretical relationships among control, monitoring, and other cognitive skills (e.g., working memory span) that
remain unanswered. We describe several intriguing questions in a
subsequent section on future research. First we describe two methodological constraints on the use of self-adapted testing, then we describe a number of direct or derived measures of metacognitive
control that are available from a typical SAT testing session.
Two Methodological Considerations

Two key issues must be addressed when using a SAT to measure
metacognitive control strategies. First, the distribution of the item
difficulties should span the range of the distribution of examinee
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proficiencies, with enough items throughout the range that an examinee could take an entire SAT consisting of items with the same
general level of difficulty. Having an item pool that is both "wide"
and "deep" prevents examinees from being administered items that
are not well matched to proficiency solely because well-matched
items are unavailable.
A second consideration concerns the instructions given to the
examinees. Without instructions for examinees to try to attain a close
difficulty-proficiency match, it is unclear whether examinees who did
not choose closely matched items did so because they were unable to
match well or because they chose their items to attain another goal
(e.g., reduction of test anxiety). Hence, examinees should be explicitly
told to try to attain a close match. This, however, raises a troublesome
new problem-how does one word such instructions such that examinees unequivocally understand their task?
The resources required to administer a SAT pose a third restriction on its use in metacognitive research. To administer a SAT, one
must have (a) an item pool that is of sufficient size and has a broad
range of item difficulty, (b) IRT parameter estimates for each item,
and (c) computer software for administering computer-based tests.
Regarding the item pool, it is important to have a distribution of item
difficulties that spans the range of examinee proficiencies, and is
"deep" enough that an examinee could choose a difficulty level that
reflects a close difficulty-proficiency match many times without exhausting the difficulty level and being forced to receive items that are
less well-matched. As an illustration, if a researcher plans to use eight
difficulty levels in administering a 20-item SAT, the item pool should
contain at least 160 items. Furthermore, IRT item parameter estimation requires a sizable calibration sample. Depending on the IRT
model used, the typical recommenda tions for minimum calibration
sample size range from 200 to over 1,000 examinees. Finally, special
microcomputer software is needed to administer the SAT, such as the
MicroCAT Testing System (Assessment Systems, 1994). Roos, Wise,
Yoes, and Rocklin (in press) describe the program code needed to
administer a SAT on the MicroCAT system.
QUANTIFYING METACOGNITIVE PROCESSES USING SELFADAPTED TESTING

Although both monitoring and control processes appear to be
at work in a self-adapted test, the control process is more easily
quantified using measures obtained during the testing process. A
self-adapted test that is administered using computer-based testing

5. METACOG NITION AN D COMPUTER-BASED TESTING

245

software such as MicroCAT (Assessment Systems, 1994) can provide
a variety of information that is relevant to the measurement of
metacognitive activities. When a MicroCAT test is administered, an
output file for each examinee is created containing a detailed record
of the examinee's testing session. The file can contain an item-by-item
record of the difficulty level chosen, whether the item was answered
correctly or incorrectly, the examinee's current proficiency estimate,
and its standard error, as well as the time taken both to choose the
item difficulty level and respond to the administered item. This
information is readily obtainable from the MicroCAT testing system
and does not require extensive programming skills on the part of the
researcher. A guide to developing self-adapted tests on MicroCAT is
provided by Roos, Wise, Yoes, and Rocklin (in press).
It is important to note that these measures are obtained in an
unobtrusive manner. This mode of data collection allows examinees
to focus their attention entirely on the test, alleviating concerns
regarding the effects on test performance of requesting examinees to
provide self-reports of metacognition.
There are several ways to quantify the relationship between the
metacognitive control process and test performance (i.e., proficiency).
To further illustrate these quantifications, we will refer to Tables 1 and
2. Table 1 is an example of a testing session for an examinee with a
good match between proficiency and item difficulty, whereas Table 2
provides an example of an examinee with a poor proficiency-item
difficulty match. Each examinee is administered 20 items from a pool
of calibrated items that are partitioned into six mutually exclusive
difficulty levels. For each item administered, the difficulty level
chosen is displayed in the second column where Levell contains the
easiest items and Level 6 contains the most difficult items. The
difficulty parameter of the administered item is displayed in the third
column. The difficulty parameters of the items are obtained using IRT
estimation methods; these parameter values are matched to the scale
of examinee proficiency, which typically has a mean of zero and a
standard deviation of one. The higher the item difficulty parameter
value, the more difficult the item. The fourth column indicates the
difference between the examinee's proficiency and the difficulty of
the item. For example, the examinee in Table 1 had a final (i.e., endof-test) proficiency estimate of -1.31, which is relatively low. The first
item administered had a difficulty of -1.39, which indicates a close
proficiency-difficulty match (.08). The fifth column lists the absolute
value of the proficiency minus difficulty difference. The final column
indicates the correctness of the examinee's answer to the item.

Table 1. Testing Session for an Examinee With a Good Match Between Proficiency and Item Difficulty (Proficiency = - 1.31,
Standard Error = .319)

Item

Difficulty
Level Chosen

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

2
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3

Item Difficulty
Parameter
-1.39
- 1.13
- 1.73
- 1.42
- 1.28
- 1.30
- 1.32
-1.50
-1.25
- 1.39
- 1.77
- 1.67
- 1.30
-1.57
- 1.27
- 1.64
-0.73
- 1.24
- 1.12
- 1.14

Proficiency - Difficulty
Difference
0.08
-0.18
0.42
0.11
-0.03
-0.01
0.01
0.19
-0.06
0.08
0.46
0.36
-0.01
0.26
-0.04
0.33
-0.58
-0.07
-0.19
-0.17

Absolute
Difference

Item
Outcome

0.08
0.18
0.42
0.11
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.19
0.06
0.08
0.46
0.36
0.01
0.26
0.04
0.33
0.58
0.07
0.19
0.17

Right
Wrong
Right
Wrong
Right
Wrong
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
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Table 2. Testing Session for an Examinee With a Good Match Between Proficiencyand Item Difficulty (Proficiency = 0.32,
Standard Error = .620)
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Item

Difficulty
Level Chosen

Item Difficulty
Parameter

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

3
2
2
3
2
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
2
2
2
2
2

-1.13
-1.39
-1.73
-0.73
-1.42
-1.24
-1.12
- 1.14
- 1.28
- 1.30
- 1.32
- 1.50
- 1.25
- 1.39
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-1.77
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- 1.27

Proficiency - Difficulty
Difference
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1.45
1.71
2.05
1.05
1.74
1.56
1.44
1.46
1.60
1.62
1.64
1.82
1.57
1.71
0.86
2.09
1.99
1.62
1.89
1.59

1.84

1.84

Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Wrong
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right

=i

6
Z
»
Z

0
()

0

s:

-U
C
--i

m

JJ
I

OJ

»

(f)

m

0

--i

m

(f)

:j
Z

(j)

tv

~

-...J

248

SCHRAWIWISE/ROOS

The first measure of the relationship between metacognitive
control and test performance is provided by the proficiency-difficulty
differences. If instructed to attain a close proficiency-difficulty match,
examinees should proceed through the test, monitoring the difficulty
of the items administered and attempting to control subsequent
difficulty level choices to attain a close proficiency-difficulty match.
The degree to which an examinee is successful in controlling item
difficulty will be reflected by the magnitude of his/her proficiencydifficulty difference at the end of the test, with smaller differences
indicating greater control. Because the items are typically arranged
randomly within each difficulty level, perhaps a more reliable index
of the proficiency-difficulty match is provided by the average difference taken over the last five items. This is a measure of bias-the
degree to which an examinee tends to select items that are too easy or
too difficult. For example, the examinee in Table 1 showed a very
good proficiency-difficulty match (-.14), whereas the examinee in
Table 2 exhibited a poorer match (1.84) indicating a bias towards
choosing item difficulties that were too low.
Another measure of control is provided by the absolute value of
the proficiency-difficulty difference. This is an index of accuracy-the
degree to which selected item difficulties are matched to an examinee's
proficiency. This index is also quite different for the examinees in
Tables 1 and 2, with the examinee in Table 1 exhibiting a substantially
more accurate match.
The standard error of the final proficiency estimate provides an
alternative measure of accuracy. The more consistent the examinee is
in choosing items well-matched to his/her proficiency level, the
smaller the resultant standard error. Hence, the magnitude of the
standard error indicates the accuracy of the examinee choices. The
standard error for the examinee in Table 1 (.319) is substantially
smaller than that for the examinee in Table 2 (.620).
Additional information is available from the testing session that
may also prove useful in the study of control and (possibly) monitoring processes. One general type of information available is response
latency; that is, the amount of time examinees take to (a) choose item
difficulty levels and (b) answer items. Measures of this sort are very
difficult to obtain in a traditional paper-and-pencil test but are easily
and unobtrusively obtained when a test is administered via computer.
Researchers also may gain a better understanding of the control
process through an investigation of the strategies used by examinees
in selecting item difficulties. A computerized adaptive test provides
an efficient model of control because the item selection algorithm
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strives for a close proficiency-difficulty match. It would be particularly interesting, for example, to identify examinees who behave
nearly as efficiently (or perhaps even more efficiently) as the computerized adaptive algorithm.
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTUR

t RESEARCH

Self-adapted testing allo~s researchers to investigate at least six
questions pertaining to meta\~gnitive control, and the relationship
between control and monitoring, that have not been addressed adequately in previous research. We present these questions beginning
with the most obvious and specific ones, gradually moving toward
broader, more theoretical concerns.
Question one pertains to the relationship between metacognitive
control and test performance. Researchers often assume that more
accurate control leads to better test performance. SAT enables one to
test this relationship directly while eliminating confounds due to item
difficulty and presumed t.mderlying ability. Existing theory also
predicts a strong relationship between the accuracy of control judgments and performance (Nelson & Narens, 1994; Schraw, 1994).
Researchers could study the impact of practice, domain familiarity,
instructions, and other test-specific constraints via direct manipulation of these variables. Similarly, person-related variables such as
prior knowledge and working memory span could be examined via
blocking procedures, or treated as covariates.
Question two addresses the relationship between metacognitive
control and response latency variables, including item selection and
item response times. It is important to note that measures of response
latency do not provide pure measures of a single cognitive activity per
se. For example, item selection times, especially in the middle and
later parts of a test, reflect some mix of control, monitoring, and
performance processes. Nevertheless, SAT provides the best available methodology for assessing the relationship between control
accuracy and response time. There is little theoretical precedent thus
far regarding the relationship between control mechanisms and latencies. In general, response time and performance are related inversely,
although the magnitude of the relationship, as well as its direction,
depends on the type of variables being compared (Meyer, Irwin,
Osman & Kounios, 1988). We expect a similar relationship between
control accuracy and item response times. It is unclear, however, how
control accuracy and item selection times are related. One plausible
scenario is that individuals with a high degree of metacognitive
control need little time to make strategic decisions, in part, because
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many of these decisions are automated. This should lead to an inverse
relationship between selection time and accuracy; that is, as control
increases, selection times decrease. On the other hand, if item selection times include monitoring processes carried over from the previous item, we would expect a negative relationship between selection
time and control accuracy. This assumes that monitoring is a relatively nonautomated, time-consuming process.
Data collected from SAT studies can be used to test competing
hypotheses about the relationship between selection and response
times, and control accuracy. One possibility is that this relationship
changes systematically as a function of examinee knowledge, proficiency, practice, or test efficacy (Rocklin et al., 1995; Wise, 1994).
These changes could be studied easily by blocking examinees on any
of these variables or by manipulating controllable variables (e.g.,
instructions) directly.
Question three pertains to the specific relationship between expertise and control processes. Opinion appears to be split on this
matter. Some researchers have suggested that monitoring accuracy is
largely a by-product of domain-specific expertise (d. Glaser & Chi,
1988). However, a number of recent studies (Glenberg & Epstein,
1987; Morris, 1990; Schraw & Roedel, 1994) failed to show a relationship between monitoring accuracy and domain expertise. It is important to note, however, that the relationship between monitoring and
expertise may be quite different than the relationship between control
processes and expertise. Currently, we know of no study that examines control accuracy across different levels of expertise.
SAT provides a format for investigating the relative impact of
expertise on control processes, including performance accuracy, control accuracy, and item selection and response times. Although we
would expect expertise to be positively rela ted to test performance
and estimated proficiency, we would not necessarily predict a corresponding increase in control accuracy. This reflects our view that
control processes are, in part, domain-general phenomena (d. Schraw,
Dunkle, Bendixen, & Roedel, 1995). Although expertise should enable examinees to perform better on a test, their expertise need not
improve their ability to control or monitor with a high degree of
accuracy.
A fourth question is the degree to which control accuracy is
related to other cognitive variables such as general aptitude and
working memory span. Very little research has been done in this area
in general. Of studies that have investigated these relationships
directly or indirectly, there is little evidence that aptitude is related
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strongly to metacognitive processes in children (Alexander, Carr, &
Schwanenflugel, 1995; Swanson, 1990) or adults (Pressley & Ghatala,
1990; Yan, 1994). We know of no study investigating the relationship
among control and monitoring accuracy and traditional indices of the
speed and accuracy of working memory.
Research in this area is important for two reasons. One is to
establish the degree to which metacognitive processes such as control
and monitoring are related to "hard-wired" cognitive differences
such as general intelligence and working memory capacity (d. Jensen,
1992). Evidence that metacognition is not related strongly to these
variables would highlight the flexible, developmental nature of
metacognitive knowledge. A second reason is to examine the compensatory relationship between measures of cognitive ability and
metacognitive knowledge. In a ground-breaking study by Swanson
(1990), for example, metacognitive knowledge contributed to complex
problem solving among young adolescents over and above the effect
of ability. This finding suggests that metacognition may follow a
separate developmental path, and may act independent of other
cognitive mechanisms (see Alexander et al., 1995, for a further discussion).
Question five pertains to the still elusive relationship between
control and monitoring processes. Several theorists have distinguished clearly between control and monitoring processes (Koriat,
1994; Nelson & Narens, 1990; Pressley & Ghatala, 1990).
Nevertheless, much of the empirical literature in the field has
focused on monitoring rather than control processes, due in large part
to the difficulty researchers face when measuring control.
Some believe tha t control and monitoring are practically, if not
statistically, linked (Nelson & Narens, 1990, 1994). Others believe that
monitoring is both ftmctionally and statistically independent of control, and in fact, represents a fW1damentally different type of cognitive
activity (Koriat, 1993, 1994).
The literature is in need of further contributions on this point. We
believe self-adapted testing methods can be used with tremendous
advantage to address this question. Previously, w e described how
control processes may be quantified in a SAT via direct and indirect
measures obtained w10btrusively. It also is possible to obtain mea sures of monitoring via subjective judgments made after answering a
test question within the otherwise computer-based format of SAT.
Control and monitoring indices could be compared over the course of
a test to determine their relationship. If the two are linked, one would
expect monitoring judgments made at item selection to be linked to
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item selection at item i + 1. Data of this type, as well as a variety of
derived indices of control and monitoring, could be used to test the
efficacy of a regulatory loop that connects monitoring and control
functions. In this view, monitoring processes provide data-driven
feedback to control processes that use this feedback to iteratively
guide future performance. This presumes that monitoring and control processes are flexible, reciprocal processes that communicate with
each other, even if they do not share a common set of cognitive
resources.
It is possible that control and monitoring processes are related in
different ways as a function of expertise. For example, control and
monitoring may be related more strongly as expertise increases,
provided these processes become mutually encapsulated within the
expert domain (Glaser & Chi, 1988). If control and monitoring skills
remain domain-general in nature, then expertise within a domain
should not matter. Another possibility is that control and monitoring
are unrelated (Koriat, 1993, 1994). In this view, monitoring processes
are "parasitic" in that they are based on domain know ledge and
efficacy beliefs within the domain, rather than a metacognitive mechanism that actually monitors the accuracy of performance independent
of domain knowledge.
A final question addresses the degree to which individuals are
better able to control their subsequent performance than, for instance,
a minimum-error computer algorithm. Part of our interest in this
question stems from the finding that some individuals perform better
on a SAT than on a comparable CAT (Rocklin, 1994; Wise et al. 1992;
Wise, Roos, Plake, & Nebelsick-Gullett, 1994). Wise (1994, p. 18), for
example, stated "when examinees are allowed to choose their test
item difficulty levels, they perceive a sense of control over the test,
which serves to reduce anxiety" and which presumably improves
performance. Echoing Wise's (1994) thoughts on perceived control,
Rocklin et al. (1995, p. 114) stated that "the effects of self-adapted
testing can be attributed specifically to the control that examinees
exert over the difficulty levels of items they attempt." One explanation of the difference between SAT and CAT versions of the same test
is that many examinees experience less anxiety when taking a SAT
(Wise et al., 1994). Another explanation, although not mutually
exclusive from the reduced anxiety hypothesis, is that some individuals are better able to control their performance than even the most
accurate computer-driven selection algorithms. One way to test this
difference is to offer good and poor controllers the opportunity to take
similar exams using both SAT and CAT formats. Coupled with on-

5. METACOGNITION AND COMPUTER-BASED TESTING

253

line or retrospective verbal reports, a comparison between the two
methods may illuminate some of the subtle control processes used
during testing.
_
These six questions present an impressive array of topics that
warrant further research. Understanding control processes with more
precision is important in and of itself. However, understanding the
crucial relationship between control and monitoring is even more
important, because it is inconceivable that researchers could claim to
understand metacognition without understanding the locus and functions of control and monitoring under a wide variety of circumstances, as well as the relationship between them. Similarly, it is
essential to understand what makes a highly metacognitive person so
able to self-regulate his or her behavior. Comparing good and poor
controllers (and monitors) to existing computer software may provide
some illustrative insights that increase our understanding, while
posing new research questions.
SUM MARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter explored some of the possibilities of using a computer-based testing format to investigate metacognitive processes.
We reviewed recent research on control (i.e., regulatory processes
used to guide cognitive activities) and monitoring (i.e., regulatory
processes used to evaluate the present success of one's performance)
functions of metacognition.
After highlighting some of the basic assumptions of computerbased testing, we described several specific strengths of self-adapted
testing (SAT). We argued that SAT alleviates a number of serious
methodological problems endemic to traditional tests. These included confounds due to differences in ability, prior knowledge, and
item difficulty. A more salient problem was that traditional tests do
not allow examinees to exert full control over their test-taking behavior. SAT eliminates this problem, and simultaneously offers researchers the opportunity to gather valuable information unobtrusively.
We next considered some of the direct (e.g., item selection time)
and indirect (e.g., control accuracy) measures available when using
SAT. These measures can be used to answer a host of questions about
metacognitive control, as well as the relationship between control and
monitoring processes. In addition, it is possible to compare good and
poor monitors, as well as to compare the same examinee under CAT
and SAT testing conditions. These comparisons offer a unique opportunity to study many aspects of metacognition in a much more direct,
yet unobtrusive manner.
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Our main conclusion was that computer-based testing formats
offer a number of new methodological avenues for the study of
metacognition. We proposed six questions that warrant considerable
research over the next decade. Chief among these is the relationship
between control and monitoring processes, whether these processes
share a common pool of resources, and whether they enjoy a reciprocal exchange of information indicative of a regulatory loop. Although
little was said concerning developmental issues, we see little difficulty
applying these procedures to younger examinees, provided individuals have some knowledge of the test domain, and researchers have
access to a calibrated pool of test items.
Finally, despite the tremendous potential of self-adapted testing
as a tool for measuring meta cognition, we wish to emphasize its
essential compatibility with other measurement techniques. SAT seems
amenable to on-line and retrospective verbal reports, as well as to online subjective performance judgments similar to those used in most
monitoring studies. SAT also provides an opportunity to investigate
the criteria examinees use to select test items. Concurrent verbal
reports may be highly valuable in this regard.
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Development of Grounded
Theories of Complex Cognitive
Processing: Exhaustive Withinand Between-Study Analyses
of Think-Aloud Data
Michael Pressley
University of Notre Dame

I am going to begin with claims that may seem heretical at the
Buros Institute, the host for this symposium: Much can be understood
about cognition and its metacognitive regulation through qualitative
analysis. Qualitative analyses of complex cognitive and metacognitive
processes makes a great deal of sense before even attempting quantitative analyses of those processes. In particular, I am going to explain
here the advances made by my associates and me in understanding
skilled reading using the method of constant comparison, a qualitative approach for developing what Strauss and Corbin (1990) refer to
as grounded theories. If that does not offend Buros regulars, perhaps
the types of data used as input to the theory construction process will.
I believe, as do others (see Ericsson & Simon, 1993), that the most
telling analyses of complex, conscious, self-regulated cognitive processes have been produced using verbal protocol procedures-that is,
when people have thought aloud as they performed complex tasks.
My associates and I have been using verbal protocols of reading to
develop grounded theories of consciously regulated reading.
Given that preconceptions do influence research, it is important
to layout one's assumptions and understandings about a to-beresearched problem at the outset of the study and to audiences who
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must evaluate the work. Thus, I begin this chapter by laying out
briefly my theoretical sensitivities before I conducted the research
reported here, an essential step in qualitative analyses. They included
a history of success with both verbal protocol analyses and grounded
theory approaches, a long-term interest in reading comprehension,
some successes in studying it using traditional quantitative, experimental approaches, but also some important frustrations doing so.
After laying out my preconceptions, I will cover a specific verbal
protocol study conducted by my colleagues and me in which constant
comparison was used to develop a grounded theory of how social
sciences professors read research articles in their areas of expertise.
This will be followed by a discussion of how Pressley and Afflerbach
(1995) used constant comparison to generate a more general grounded
theory of the conscious processes in reading. They used all of the data
generated in verbal protocol studies published to date, with the result
a grounded theory that is a qualitative meta-analysis of the verbal
protocols of reading reported to date. I will conclude the chapter with
a brief discussion of the implications of the work reviewed here for
future individual research projects on conscious processing during
reading, the development of standardized measures of reading comprehension skill, and the construction of more complete grounded
theories of complex cognition and behavior.
BACKGROUND: MY THEORETICAL SENSITIVITIES AS I
EMBARKED ON THIS RESEARCH

Beginning with my earliest research, I have been interested in the
strategies people use to accomplish academic tasks, and in my second
year of graduate school I discovered the power of verbal protocols to
reveal cognitive processes, many years before Ericsson and Simon's
(1984) book made the approach more respectable in the eyes of many
research psychologists. In particular, Pressley and Levin (1977) asked
students in grades 5 through 9 to talk aloud as they studied paired
associates in anticipation of a memory test. We demonstrated in that
work a clear developmental shift in the likelihood that students
would verbally elaborate paired associates as they studied- that is,
embed word pairs in a meaningful sentence. Especially striking was
that whether and how much students reported elaborating was a
much better predictor of objective memory performance than age, a
satisfying outcome for us at the time given our theoretical conviction
that Jenkins (1974) was correct, memory depends much more on what
one does to remember than on other factors. Pressley and Levin
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(1977) were widely cited and this was considered one of the best
contributions I made in the area of memory development. The
acceptance of that work did much over the years to convince me
personally of the value of the think-aloud approach.
Since my graduate school days, I also have been interested in how
cognitive strategies can and do mediate learning of text (Pressley,
1976, 1977). Although most of my research in the decade following
graduate school was not concerned with text processing, I returned to
the study of comprehension processing in the late 1980s. Using a
variety of qualitative methodologies, including ethnographies, interview studies, and case studies (e.g., Pressley et al., 1992) my group
made fairly rapid progress in our efforts to understand how elementary students can be taught comprehension strategies. That qualitative methods produced rapid understanding of high quality
comprehension instruction, work that has been applauded in many
ways, fueled my enthusiasm for qualitative research.
As my students and I tackled the problem of comprehension
strategies instruction in the elementary grades, we also began research on adults' naturalistic processing of text. On the positive side,
we had some success using quantitative methods to document that
college students often are not aware whether they have learned text
content they have studied (Pressley, Snyder, Levin, Murray, & Ghatala,
1987) or even when they have completely missed the point of something
they have read (Pressley, Ghatala, Woloshyn, & Pirie, 1990a, 1990b).
That is, we were able to doctunent somewhat surprising monitoring
failures in adult readers-surprising, at least, from the perspective of
those who believed that comprehension monitoring failures were more
a problem of childhood than adulthood (Markman, 1981).
With the successes came some frustrations, however. For example, Barbara Snyder's master's thesis with me at Western Ontario
involved a number of well-controlled, quantitative comparisons of
students' overt behaviors as they read from a textbook in use in one
of their courses. We preswned that this would be a window on the
nature of skilled reading. That proved not to be true. The only
conclusion that we could draw from the study was that college
students do a great deal of beginning-to-end rereading as they study
textbook chapters. Although this finding pointed out a disturbing
quality of college student reading, and it is a result that has proven
replicable and continues to disturb those who worry about the efficiency of college student study (Cordon & Day, 1995), it seemed to
Barbara Snyder, me, and reviewers of the paper resulting from the
study, that much more must be going on. I suspected that the
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impressive text representational abilities of college students that had
been documented by Kintsch (e.g., 1982, 1983, 1988, 1989), Graesser (e.g.,
1981; Graesser & Bower, 1990), van den Broek (1990a, 1990b), and others
were in part the products of conscious processes, processes that were
essential for me to understand, given my career-long interest in how
purposeful processing affects learning, memory, and comprehension.
I went with the instincts that had served me well in understanding
paired-associate learning. I started inviting people to my office, asking
them to think-aloud for me as they read. What I heard was a bit
overwhelming. Reader after reader provided extremely rich thinkalouds, ones filled with strategies, attempts to make inferences, and
great intellectual activity in general, including reflection on and evaluation of what was read. As I reviewed the quantitative, experimental
studies of text processing conducted in the 1980s, what was surprising
to me was that none of these studies seemed to be capturing the richness
of the processing that I heard readers describing. Moreover, as I read the
think-aloud studies of reading conducted in the 1970s and 1980s, I had
the same feeling, only more intense, for I knew the think-alouds I had
witnessed in my office were filled with information about reader strategies, attempts to consh'uct inferences, and reflections on text.
What was going on in the verbal protocol studies of reading?
Most of the think-aloud studies were designed to test particular
hypotheses-to determine if particular types of processing were
occurring. That is, many of the investigators believed some particular type of processing was occurring in reading and conducted their
think-aloud analysis to confirm such a possibility or elucidate the
processing further. I realized what was needed was think-aloud
studies in which the researchers were as open-minded as possible
about the processes that might be reported. I was optimistic that
such an approach might work in light of my recent success in
studying elementary-level comprehension strategies instruction. By
approaching that work with the goal of constructing as complete a
grounded theory of teaching as possible, my colleagues and I had
constructed a theory that included much that others had missed
when they had studied elementary-level comprehension strategies
instruction. I knew what I had to do: It was to apply such an openminded, grounded theoretical approach to the analysis of verbal
protocols of reading. Before describing the efforts of my colleagues
and me to do this, I review briefly some essential prerequisite
materials: how grounded theories are constructed and why there is
reason to believe that verbal protocols of reading are valid indicators
of reading processes.
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Development of Grounded Theories Using the Method of Constant
Comparison

Before a scientist will use a methodology, she or he must be
convinced that it is rigorous and effective in doing what is claimed it
does. Strauss and Corbin's (1990), Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded
Theory Procedures and Techniques particularly convinced me that construction of grounded theories made sense. I describe here some
highlights of their perspectives on data and its analysis.
Construction of a grounded theory begins with collection of data.
That is, this is an approach for developing a theory that is grounded
in data. As a dyed-in-the-wool empiricist, this aspect of Strauss and
Corbin's thinking was exceptionally appealing to me. The researcher
who is attempting to develop a grounded theory may spend a great
deal of time observing behaviors in a setting of interest, interviewing
informants, or, particularly relevant here, have people think aloud as
they do a particular task. Many types of data can inform the
development of a grounded theory. In some cases the researcher will
rely on only one type of data, in other cases on variations of one type
of data (e.g., different types of verbal protocols of reading), and in still
other cases, several types of data.
The task then is to induce regularities from the data collected,
through a method known as constant comparison. Thus, the researcher goes through the data systematically looking for meaningful
clusters and patterns-behaviors that seem to go together logically. It
is then necessary to name the clusters, to come up with ca tegory
names for the behaviors included in the clusters. Such an analysis
often results in a number of categories.
The next objective is to attempt to identify evidentiary support for
the categories. The investigator, however, is always open to- and
actually looking for-data inconsistent with the emerging categories.
This can be done by reviewing previous data, but typically also
includes the collection of new data.
We note that qualitative researchers typically begin their analyses
early in the data collection. As tentative categories emerge, there is
opportunity with every new data collection to look for support or
nonsupport of categories-to compare tentative conclusions with
conclusions suggested by new data. The researcher may change
categories or their names, delete categories, or add them in light of
new data. In short, there is fluid interaction between data collection,
data analyses, and construction of conclusions. Analyses and data
collection are interwoven enterprises.
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Eventually, there is a stable set of categories. The task then is to
define the categories precisely, in terms of defining properties, and to
begin to organize these categories in relation to one another. For
example, categories can be placed in hierarchical arrangements with
each category defined in terms of its defining properties. Once the
categories have been identified, fully defined, and placed in hierarchical arrangement (with these categorizations, definitions, and arrangements challenged by checking against the data a number of times),
the researcher can begin to feel that the data on hand are understood
about as well as they are going to be understood. Data collection
continues lmtil no new categories, defining features of categories, or
relationships between categories are being identified. This may take a
while or it may happen fairly quickly. Strauss and Corbin (1990) are
emphatic that researchers must continue to analyze the data-must
continue to compare emerging conclusions against new data-until the
point is reached when no new information is being generated, for to do
otherwise results in an incomplete groWlded theory.
Just as it is possible to evaluate the quality of quantitative studies,
it is also possible to evaluate qualitative studies-on about the same
dimensions. The language is different, however (Cuba & Lincoln,
1982; Lincoln & Cuba, 1985). Dependability is the qualitative analysts'
term for reliability. That is, the qualitative analyst must convince that
most people would come to the conclusions that are drawn based on
the sample of data analyzed. Rather than worrying about internal
validity, qualitative researchers are concerned with credibility. To the
extent that the case is strong that the grounded theory captures the
reality of the situation studied, the greater the credibility of the study.
Rather than external validity, the qualitative analyst values transferability-that the analysis was conducted in a setting representative of
the lmiverse to which the researcher wants to generalize. Confirmability
is the term used instead of objectivity, with confirmability generally
high when something like triangulation occurs in the study-when
multiple indicators are used to buttress conclusions. The best qualitative studies are high on all of these characteristics.
Validity of Verbal Protocols of Reading

If verbal protocols of reading are to be used as indicators of
skilled reading, it is essential that there be clear relationships between
verbal reports of cognitive processes during reading and actual reading. As it turns out, the track record on this count is strong for adults
readers, including the following outcomes:
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Hare (1981) reported that good compared to weaker college
student readers were more likely to monitor their comprehension as they read and set into motion fix-up strategies
when comprehension was less than complete.
Olson, Mack, and Duffy (1981) observed correlations between
self-reported strategies at particular points in text and the speed
of processing at those points. That is, reading was slower early
in a story when readers reported storing background information presented in the story and formulating hypotheses about
the stories read. At points where substantial inferential activities were reported, processing was slower. Subjects reported
simply confirming their suspicions as they finished text with
relatively rapid reading times near the end of text.
In Trabasso and Suh (1993), self-reported inferential activities
predicted a variety of performance measures related to the
inferences, including reading times and long-term retention
of stories.
Wade, Trathen, and Schraw (1990) examined the overall
patterns of strategy use reported by college students as they
read The Sea Around Us. They detected six types of profiles of
text processing, varying from ones that reflected extensive
responding to text to minimal responding. By far, one of
Wade et al.'s groups was more sophisticated in their strategies use than any of the other five. This group, which Wade
et al. (1990) referred to as "good strategy users," following a
categorization suggested by Pressley, Borkowski, and
Schneider (1987), was more diverse in their strategic responses to text than were other participants in the study.
They made notes, paraphrased, outlined, and/ or constructed
diagrams as they read. They varied their reading speed from
skimming to slowing, and they reread when it was necessary.
They made use of their notes and mental notings to review
the text read after reading. With respect to recall of important
information in the text, there was more than a half standard
deviation recall difference favoring the good strategy users
relative to the next best group.
Guthrie, Britten, and Barker (1991) reported that the strategies
self-reported by college students as they searched documents
for information correlated with how efficiently they searched
text.
Haas and Flower (1988) observed that graduate students
were more likely than undergraduate students to do "rhetori-
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cal reading" of a section of an undergraduate textbook. That
is, they reported attempting to understand the author's intentions in writing the text as it was written.
• Deegan (1993) observed that first-year law students who
were doing well in law school read differently than first-year
law students experiencing difficulties in school. Specifically,
the better students were more likely to respond to text with
questions about the meaning and structure of a law-related
text they read.
• Lundeberg (1987) reported that legal experts were more
likely than legal novices to attend to important information
in a legal case they read, and to overview the case, attempt
to summarize it, evaluate it, and reread the case analytically.
• When Earthman (1989) had graduate students in English and
freshmen read short stories and poems, she found that the
graduate students were more likely than freshmen to work at
filling in gaps in meaning in the texts and were more likely to
relate texts to knowledge of the world. The graduate students
were also more likely to take alternative perspectives while
reading the literary works.
• Graves and Frederiksen (1991) observed considerable differences between the think-alouds of English professors reading
an excerpt from The Color Purple and college sophomores
doing so: The professors were more aware of the functions of
the narrative in the text as well as the relationship of the
author to the reader of the text. The experts viewed the text
as the result of deliberate choices made by the author, with
their perceptions of these choices affecting their understanding of the text
• In Wineberg (1991), when historians read American history
textbook material, they were much more likely than high
school students to search for the authorial intentions and
hidden meanings. High schools students treated the texts
more as factual documents containing information that was
not open to question. The historians questioned.
In short, a variety of investigators, collecting diverse think-aloud
data as people read, have observed correlations between reported
reading behaviors and reading performance or between reported
reading behaviors and level of reading ability. Although my view at
the outset of this study was that much more validating data would
be desirable, I was struck that the studies validating verbal protocols
were not countered in the literature by failures to obtain verbal
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report-reading relationships. There is good reason to have confidence
in the validity of verbal protocols of reading.
Summary

Since the earliest days of my career I have been aware of the
verbal protocol approach. It worked well for me in the past, as it has
for other investigators interested in complex cognition. I have also
been interested in comprehension processes throughout my career.
Although I enjoyed some research success in analyzing comprehension,
I felt that much important about comprehension was not coming
through either in existing experimental analyses or verbal protocol
studies, an awareness developed as I listened to verbal protocols of text
processing much richer than the descriptions of processing in the
existing literature. My success with the grounded theory approach as a
tool for the analyses of comprehension insh"uction impressed upon me
the power of this approach to elucidate complex phenomena. Thus, it
made sense to me to apply that approach to analyses of verbal protocols
of reading, believing that if I did so, I would produce much richer
descriptions of reading than had been generated in the past. What
follows is a description of how my colleagues and I did so in a single
study, followed by a brief review of how Afflerbach and I applied the
method of constant comparison to 40 verbal protocols of reading to
produce a general grounded theory of conscious processes during
reading.
HOW SOCIAL SCIENCES PROFESSORS READ JOURNAL
ARTICLES

What Wyatt, Pressley, EI-Dinary, Stein, Evans, and Brown (1993)
wanted to do was document reading at its best-what it might look
like when exceptionally skilled readers are reading content that is
interesting to them for a purpose that is important to them. As
members of a Washington DC university community, a convenience
sample of skilled readers was faculty members. Given what we
knew about expertise (Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 1988), it seemed likely that
the most sophisticated reading might be observed when readers read
in domains in which they had high prior knowledge. Thus, we
decided that we would ask professors to read in their areas of
expertise. So that their interest would be high, and the material was
being read for an authentic, meaningful purpose for the professor,
we felt that it would make most sense to allow the readers themselves to select the articles they would read.
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In identifying a pool of potential "expert" participants, the following criteria were applied: (a) The participant possessed a doctorate in a social or behavioral science. (As social scientists ourselves, my
students and I felt that we would be in a better position to understand
the think-aloud comments of social scientists compared to natural
scientists, humanities scholars, or professors in some other field foreign
to us.) (b) The participant had published at least five articles in selective
outlets over the last 5 years. We felt that this criterion would assure a fairly
select sampling within the select category of university professors. None of
the participants, however, had written on reading sh'ategies, nor was
there any reason to believe that any had particular scholarly expertise
about the nature of skilled reading,
Procedures

At an initial meeting, the participating reader was told that the
purpose of the study was "to investigate how experts stay current in
their fields of expertise." Participants were asked to select three
research articles that they had not yet read but would be interested
in reading as part of "staying current in their field." The researcher
requested that the participant not begin reading the articles-that
they make their selections on the basis of author and title only.
The entire second session was recorded on audio tape. At the start,
the investigator explained that the session would be devoted to working
with one of the articles. The subject then chose an article from the three
she or he had identified. In all cases but one, the article was the report
of original empirical research; in the outlying case, the article was a
position piece on a particular research direction.
Participants were directed to "read the article as they normally
would." They were encouraged to think aloud as they went through the
article, offering any comments or explanations they wished. Using a
duplicate copy of the article, the investigator noted tl1e participant
actions, attentive to any aspect of the participant's behavior that pertained to processing of the article. For example, the researcher noted
indications of the reading path taken through the article-when different sections were begun, pages turned, text underlined, verbatim statements made, and so on. Observations of participant's nonverbal behaviors
also were noted on tl1e researcher's copy. If more than 2 minutes passed
without any verbal comment from the reader, the investigator prompted
the reader with the question "What are you doing now?" At the end of
the session, the researcher collected the participant's copy of the article
so that any markings the participant made could be analyzed further.

6. DEVELOPMENT OF GROUNDED THEORIES

271

Records of this second meeting were expanded into a comprehensive chronological description of the participant's activities while
reading the article. In this process, the researcher's notes, audio
recording, and any annotations on the participant's copy of the article
were combined to generate a thick description of the participant's
reading behavior.
In the third and final participant-investigator meeting, the investigator gave the participant a copy of a process description of their
reading. This provided an opportunity for participants to identify
problems in the description and analysis of their reading strategies.
When the participant disagreed with the description or analysis
(which was extremely rare and never with respect to a major conclusion in the protocol), the disagreement was noted and an adjustment
in the protocol considered later by the researcher, following additional review of the raw data.
Analyses

For the first five readers in the study, five members of the research
team each worked with a participant's protocol and began an analysis
of the observed reading behaviors, following a variation of the method
of constant comparison (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) described earlier. In
particular, they examined and reexamined a protocol, attempting to
identify categories that exhaustively accOlmted for the behaviors in it.
Then, these five researchers and a sixth member of the research team
met and compared categories they had observed. Each researcher then
reexamined the protocol they had analyzed in light of categories identified by the other researchers. Over the course of several meetings,
analysis and discussion of strategies used by these first five participants
resulted in a long list of individual strategic behaviors. Additional
meetings then occurred, each one followed by reanalysis of the reading
protocols of the first five participants and reflection on the categories of
reading behaviors that typified what was observed in the reading of the
first five participants. After about 8 weeks of reanalyses and reflection,
the six co-investigators were satisfied that the most critical reading
behaviors were captured adequately by the categories summarized in
Table 1. The scoring categories were grouped into theory-based sets and
subsets as reflected in the organization of Table l.
The 10 protocols of reading subsequently collected also were
scored in terms of the Table 1 critieria. Two researchers scored each
protocol: the researcher who had had face-to-face contact with the
participant and one other member of the research team. The team
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Table 1

Linearity and Nonlinearity of Reading
•
•
•
•

•

•

Reader either surveys text before reading it or does not.
Reader either generally reads article from front to back or
does not.
Reader either reads large section of article in a linear fashion
or does not.
Frequency of jumping forward (jumps ahead to another section, staying at least 30 seconds) or looking forward in text for
particular pieces of information (e.g., footnotes, results, references) and returns.
Frequency of jumping back (Jumps back to another section,
staying at least 30 seconds) or looks back in text for particular
pieces of information and returns.
Frequency of reading selectively in linear fashion (skips some
information, then reads closely) during reading of the abstract ... introduction ... methods ... results ... discussion/
conclusion ... references.

Goal Awareness
•
•

Whether highly aware (before reading) of specific information being sought from the article and looking for it.
Whether looking for information relevant to personal and/ or
professional goals (own research, writing, teaching, bibliography) .

Awareness
•
•

•
•
•

•

Frequency of reading aloud (and self-reports that he or she
would read aloud if reading alone).
Frequency of exploiting personal strengths (e.g., says can
understand tables better than text, so more attention to tables,
or vice versa).
Frequency of closely attending to tables/figures.
Frequency of talking about things, "1 typically do when I
read."
Frequency of varying reading style according to relevance of
text to reading goals. (Style includes slowing for careful
reading, skimming, and very fast skimming.)
Frequency of expressing own biases/expectations toward
text.
Continued .... .
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Table 1 (continued)

Planful
•
•
•
•
•

Frequency of reported watching for particular information
throughout reading.
Frequency of reported decisions to continue reading (based
on the abstract or something other than abstract).
Frequency of claiming intent to read section in specific order.
Frequency of adjusting attention to material depending on
relevance to reading goals.
Frequency of noting parts of text (e.g., references) to read later
or to remember for future reference.

Monitoring
•
•

•
•
•

Frequency of backtracking. (Rereads a sentence for clarification or backtracks for stated purpose of clarification.)
Frequency of noting explicitly how difficult the text is to read
(reading is easy, difficult, she/he does not understand the
text, something in text is puzzling).
Frequency of noting explicitly when something in text is
worth or not worth noting.
Frequency of noting explicitly when something in text is
already known or not known to him/her.
Frequency of noting explicitly when something is taken from
another source (e.g., from a named researcher's work).

Relating Information to Prior Knowledge Base
•
•
•

•

•

Frequency of reading reference list to activate prior knowledge.
Frequency of anticipating/predicting information that will be
presented; testing predictions.
Frequency of reacting to information based on own knowledge (including reactions to the author being read, others
authors cited in the text, methods, analyses, content, discussion, or text structure of the paper).
Frequency of reacting to text based on very personal prior
knowledge (e.g., own theories, own writing, knows author
personally).
Frequency of noting that text contradicts a belief held by the
reader.
Continued .....
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Table 1 (continued)

Evaluative Reactions
•
•
•

•

Frequency of evaluating relevance to goals.
Frequency of evaluating whether what is being read is the
specific information being sought from the article.
Frequency of evaluating whether information is relevant to
personal and/or professional goals (own research, writing,
teaching, bibliography).
Frequency of evaluating the text (including reactions to literature review, particular citations, theoretical perspectives,
methods, analyses, and results-including the novelty of
findings, conclusions, discussions, implications, writing/ editing style, and biases of the author).

Going Beyond the Information Given (Elaborations)
•

•

Frequency of constructing conclusions or summary interpretations beyond information provided in article. (Comes up
with summary interpretation of results, tables, or discussion/
conclusion.)
Frequency of constructing paraphrases/ explanations of what
is in the text and/ or gives examples.

Integration
•

•
•
•
•

Frequency of going back and forth in text (to go to table or
figures or to guide further reading in this article). Goes back
and forth between figures/ tables and text or compares figures/tables with one another to integrate.
Frequency of getting ihformation explicitly from text on figure or information from figure on side of text or side of figure.
Frequency of verbally relating material from different parts of
text.
Frequency of summarizing the whole paper after reading it.
Frequency of indicating she or he will be looking at other
materials later with eye to relating to what is in this text.

Elucidation of Discourse Structure
•

Frequency of mentioning division or relations among different parts of a section or marks major divisions of an argument
(e.g., by writing brief title for division, numbering steps).
Continued .....
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Table 1 (continued)

Written Responses
•

•

•

Frequency of highlighting (frequent marking of text to highlight, including underlinings, check marks, arrows, brackets,
boxes) and marking references/terms to find later.
Frequency of elaborating (making brief summaries of text,
including marginal notes); sketching the design of the study
in writing; relabeling figures/tables; adding more information to figures/tables; rewriting some information in clearer,
more memorable form.
Frequency of writing notes on separate piece of paper or
computer.

Affective Reactions
•
•
•
•
•
•

Frequency of expressing positive affective reactions.
Frequency of expressing negative affective reactions (including anger, tiredness, or boredom).
Frequency of expressing interest.
Frequency of expressing lack of interest.
Frequency of expressing surprise.
Frequency of using expletives or slang.

Nonverbal Responses
•

Frequency of laughing, looking puzzled, gesturing, giving
raspberry, scratching chin, putting hands on forehead.

continued to meet frequently to assess whether the existing set of
reading sh·ategies needed to be modified. There were very few behaviors (and no potentially important ones in our view) produced by tl1e 15
participants that were not consistent with the Table 1 categories. When
participants' behaviors were categorized as never occurring, occurring
once, occurring 2 to 4 times during the session, or occurring 5 or more
times, there was little disagreement at all between raters (i. e., although
the two raters might disagree whether 7 or 8 instances of a behavior
occurred, this made no difference when the response classification was
that the behavior occurred "5 or more times").
Resu lts

AllIS readers in the study were very active, using well-regarded
comprehension strategies, such as predicting and verifying predic-
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tions, summarizing, elaborating on text, seeking clarification, and reading selectively. The readers in this study monitored comprehension and
important characteristics of the text, such as its difficulty level and
relevance to reading goals. They evaluated the adequacy of text form
and content. Indeed, each of the behaviors in Table 1 was evidenced by
the majority of readers in this study. Moreover, there was nothing rigid
about their articulation of strategies and prior knowledge, but rather, the
readers were highly responsive to text, shaping their reactions on the
basis of text content, its relationship to their prior knowledge, and their
purposes in reading the text.
Summary

What Wyatt et al. (1993) reported was the most elaborate set of
comprehension processes ever identified in a verbal protocol study.
This was undoubtedly due partly to the sophistication of their readers
and to the match between readers' prior knowledge, interests, and what
they were reading. I believe, however, that the detailed model of text
processing emerging from Wyatt et al. (1993) also was due to the
analytical approach taken. We reflected long and hard on what the
readers were doing, reflecting and rereflecting on the possibilities of
missed categories of responses. In the end, what we had was a high
quality qualitative study. The results were dependable, in the sense that
we believe most observers armed with the Table 1 criteria would have
scored the individual readers as we did, given that the members of the
research team were able to score the protocols with great reliability.
With respect to credibility, there was simply notlcing left over to score
after the Table 1 criteria were applied: An internally valid model
accOlmts for everything in the data, and this analysis did so. There was
h·ansferability. The scoring scheme developed with the first 5 readers
generalized to the next 10 readers.
Even so, this study did not capture all tlle conscious processes that
are skilled reading. No individual verbal protocol study could do so, for
each is limited with respect to type of reader and the type of material
being read. To capture all of the conscious processes that are skilled
reading, what is required are diverse readers reading a variety of
materials. More positively, when all of the verbal protocol studies of
reading are considered, there is an enormous range of readers reading
a great variety of materials. I realized fuat it might be possible to consh·uct
a general model of conscious processing by collapsing the outcomes obtained across fuese studies. I also recognized tllat fue method of constant
comparison could be adapted to do that, with the promise of a general
grounded fueory of conscious reading.
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A GENERAL THEORY OF CONSCIOUS READING: USING
CONSTANT COMPARISON TO GENERATE A META-ANALYSIS
OF THE VERBAL PROTOCOLS OF READING

Wyatt et al. (1993) was simply one in a long line of verbal protocol
studies of reading, beginning with Squire's (1964) analysis of how
teenagers process short stories. Across these studies, many different
readers have been studied from grade-4 students to middle-school
and high-school students to college students and their professors as
well as other highly skilled professionals. Many different types of
materials have been read from poems and paragraphs to short stories
and expository pieces. Readers' goals have varied from study to
study. The specific instructions provided to readers varied as well.
Thinking aloud was operationalized in a number of ways in these
studies, from completely self-regulated thinking aloud during reading to reporting thoughts at designated points in text to reporting
thoughts shortly after reading is completed. Sometimes the scoring of
data was grounded completely in the data, as in Wyatt et al. (1993).
More often, it was not, with investigators interested in particular
processes and hence, scoring the protocols selectively. One reaction
to all of this variability might be to throw up one's hands and exclaim
that general conclusions about reading could not possibly emerge
from it. If the goal is to understand every conscious process that
might occur during reading, however, the variability across studies is
something of a godsend. The more variability in research operations,
presumably the more variability in processes reported. To the ex tent
that the operations in the various studies have sampled well the entire
range of operations possible in such studies, the more likely the
processes observed will be representative of the entire range of
conscious processes during reading.
Thus, Peter Afflerbach and I located every verbal protocol study
of reading that we could (Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995). Our intent
was to categorize and organize every conscious reading process
reported by the readers in these studies. That there were 40 studies
made this task formidable. These studies were produced in diverse
disciplines, from cognitive psychology to rhetoric to reading education and thus, ranged from extremely quantitative efforts to entirely
qualitative investigations. That there were very different reporting
standards and practices across studies greatly increased the challenge
in summarizing data across investigations.
Even so, Pressley proceeded to do so, using a constant comparison approach, checked and challenged by Afflerbach. Pressley and
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Afflerbach (1995) read every study completely, initially listing every
process reported in the studies. These lists were then reduced by
collapsing over redundant reports, categorized, and then organized.
The categorizing and organizing continued until neither Pressley nor
Afflerbach could discern any new categories or relationships between
categories.
The final result required 27 single-spaced pages typed in a small
font (see Chapter 3, Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995). Since producing that
catalog of conscious reading processes, another half dozen verbal protocol studies have come to my attention. None of those included data
that would have altered the 27-page summary. Thus, our confidence is
increasing that we exhaustively categorized conscious reading processes. Table 2 is a much reduced version of the full Pressley and
Afflerbach (1995) catalog.
Table 2
I.

Identifying and Learning Text Content
A. Before Reading
1. Constructing a goal for reading of this text
2. Overviewing (skimming) the text
3. Deciding to read only particular sections and which particular sections
4. Deciding to quit the reading because content irrelevant to
reading goals
5. Activating prior knowledge and related knowledge
6. Summarizing what was gained from previewing
7. Based on overviewing, generating an hypothesis about
text meaning

B. During Initial Front-to-Back Reading
1. Generally front-to-back (i.e., linear) reading of text
2. Reading only some sections, ones believed to contain
critical information
3. Skimming (i.e., less complete than front-to-back skimming cited earlier)
4. If text is easy, reading using automatic processes, until
something goes wrong
5. Reading aloud; voicing what is otherwise subvocal speech
6. Repeating/restating text just read to hold in working memOlY
7. Repeating/restating a thought that occurred during reading
continued ....
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Table 2 (continued)

8.
9.
10.
11.

Making notes
Pausing to reflect on text (and perhaps notes, if made)
Paraphrasing part of text
Explicitly looking for related words, concepts, or ideas in
text and using them to construct a main idea, gist, or
summary
12. Looking for patterns in the text
13. Predicting-substantiating (i.e., draft-and-revision strategy
for main ideas of text as well as how the author has
structured the text)
14. Resetting reading/learning goals at a different level of
understanding because the text suggested that there might
be a more appropriate goal
C. Processes in Identifying Important Information in Text
1. Looking for information relevant to personal or professional goals or specific reading goals for this text (i.e.,
reading selectively)
2. Deciding which pieces of information in text are important (in relation to the goal involved in reading this text),
based on prior knowledge
3. Looking specifically for what is "news" in the reading
4. Dismissing information presented in text because it is not
consistent with prior knowledge (i.e., accepted thinking in
domain covered by the reading)
5. Looking for/acquiring key words (i.e., concepts repeated
in text; important vocabulary, phrases; qualifying words,
such as if, when, only)
6. Looking for topic sentences
7. Looking for topic paragraphs
8. Noting parts of text to remember for future reference
9. Noting references in the text that should be looked at or
considered later
10. Somehow marking important points in text, including
important examples
11. Skipping examples because general points not provided
in examples
12. Copying key sentences
13. Adjusting importance ratings as additional text is encountered
continued ... .
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Table 2 (continued)

D. Conscious Inference-Making
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Inferring the referent of a pronoun
Filling in deleted information
Inferring the meanings of words based on clues
Inferring the connotations of words and sentences in the
text
Relating information encountered in text to prior knowledge
Making inferences about the author
Making inferences about the state of actors, world in a text
Confirming/ disconfirming an inference with information
in subsequent text
Stating/drawing of/deducing implied conclusion

E. Integrating Different Parts of Text
1. Explicitly attempting to get the "big picture" before worrying about details
2. Generating the big idea as well as the development of
ideas about component parts, with these related to one
another during the reading of the text
3. Noting different parts of text and their inter"elationships
4. Holding representations of the ideas developed in text in
working memory
5. Combining text structure and contextual clues to determine text meaning
6. Searching text for information relate<;i to point currently
encountered
7. Searching text after a first reading, hoping to find/stimulate a macrostructure, because a satisfactory one was not
detected during first reading
8. Rereading text to search for intersentential connections
9. Relating the currently read text to a previous portion of text
10. Making notes to assist/stimulate integration

F. Interpreting
1. Paraphrasing parts of text into more familiar terms
2. Visualizing concepts, relations, emotions specified in/
inferred from text
3. Identifying "symbols" or "symbolic language" and translating them
continued .. ..
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Table 2 (continued)

4. Instantiating prior knowledge schemata that are activated
by information in the text (e.g., thinking about a particular
restaurant while reading an article about the social hierarchies in restaurants)
5. Empathizing with messages in text
6. Making claim about "what the author really wanted to say"
7. Constructing interpretive conclusions
8. Constructing interpretive categorizations (e.g., of the entire text type; of general concepts developed in text)
9. Physically or mentally doing (enacting) what the text
instructs the reader to do (or suggests people should do)
and then confirming the expected outcome or noting the
. discrepancy from the expected
10. Constructing (and/ or holding in memory) alternative interpretations of text
11. Constructing (and/or holding in memory) alternative
perspectives on a story from the perspectives of different
characters in the tale
12. Pretending to deliberate with others while reading the
text, perhaps by talking to themselves, with alternative
interpretations entering the dialogue
G. After Reading
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.
9.
10.
11.

Rereading after the first reading
Reciting of text to increase memory of it
Listing pieces of information in text
Constructing cohesive summary of the text
Self-questioning, self-testing over text content
Imagining how hypothetical situations might be viewed
Reflecting on information in article, with it possible for
consequent shifts in interpretation unfolding over an extended period of time
Rereading parts of text following reflection
Continually evaluating and possibly reconstructing W1derstanding
Ch anging one's response to a text as the understanding is
reconstructed
Reflecting on/mentally recoding text in anticipation of
using it later
continued ....
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Table 2 (continued)

II. Monitoring
A. Text Characteristics: Perception of...
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Whether text content is relevant to the reading goal
Difficulty of the text
Author's style/style of text; structure of the text
Linguistic characteristics of text (e.g., lexical-morphological, syntactic)
Specific biases reflected in text content, specific expectations of the text author about the readership
Relation of this part of text to larger themes in the text
Relation of this text to other sources
When text is ambiguous or potentially so
Relationship between own background knowledge and
text content
Tone of the text

B. Meaningful Processing of Text: Perception of...
1. One's purpose in reading the text
2. Own behaviors/strategies in processing text
3. Reading behaviors/ strategies as in the service of the reading goal
4. One's typical reactions to this type of text
5. The difference in reaction to this text compared to typical
reactions to text
6. Effectiveness of processes and strategies used to make
meaning
7. When comprehension processes are challenging capacity limit
8. When there has been progress in meaning-making, although more to go
9. Whether overall meaning is comprehended or reading
goal is accomplished
10. Text gets easier to read as meaning becomes more certain
11. When the end of a unit of meaning has occurred
12. When the reading goal has been achieved
C. Problems: Recognizing ...
1. Loss of concentration
2. Reading too quickly (e.g., decoding is occurring, but comprehension is low)
continu ed ... .
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Table 2 (continued)

3. Text is poorly written
4. Unfamiliar terms in text
5. Failure to understand what has been read or achieve one's
reading goal
6. Lack of background knowledge is affecting comprehension negatively
7. Inconsistency between personal beliefs and information
in text; inconsistency between text meaning and opinions
of authoratative sources
8. Inconsistency of one's expectations about meaning and
information in text; conflict between interpretation made
previously and new information in text
D. Monitoring and the Stimulation of Cognitive Processing:
Activation of Processes to Accommodate Text Characteristics/Task Demands
1. Subjects make decision about how much to interpret text
strictly or liberally, depending on their goal in reading or
task demand that is on them
2. Decision to rank order reading tasks or goals based on
judgment that not all are attainable or doable given contextual constraints
3. Decision to skip material
4. Decision to skim material
5. Decision to read material carefully
6. Decision to construct the meaning of text carefully because aware that the text is difficult (e.g., abstract, torturous syntax)
7. Decision to reset reading goal at a lower level because it
is apparent that the reader will not be able to fulfill
original reading goal by reading this text
8. Decision to look up background material in other sources
because aware that other knowledge is required to make
sense of what is in a current text
9. Decision to dispense with processing of some part of text
because of awareness of potential capacity overload
10. Decision to focus on some content and not other material
. because of beliefs about processing strengths and weaknesses
continued ....

PRESSLEY

284

Table 2 (continued)

11. Decision to reread material in one section because it is not
yet understood
12. Decision to reread material in one section because it is
interesting
13. Decision to just keep reading in hope that later content
will become clearer
14. Attempt to pinpoint confusions
E. Activation of Processing Due to Awareness of Difficulties at

Word or Phrase Level
1. Evaluating importance of unknown word or phrase to
overall meaning of text before deciding whether to expend effort to determine its meaning
2. Greater attention paid to unknown word or phrase
3. Use of context clues to interpret a word or phrase
4. A candidate meaning for unknown word/phrase is generated, with subsequent evaluation of the reasonableness
of the sentence using that meaning
5. Generating hypotheses about confusing word, concept,
or phrase followed by attempts to determine the adequacy of the hypothesis
6. Just keep reading, forgetting about the word
7. Use a dictionary
F. Activation of Processing Due to Awareness of Difficulties in
Understanding Meaning Beyond the Word or Phrase Level
1. Although aware of the comprehension difficulty, doing
nothing
2. Once aware of a comprehension difficulty, taking a corrective approach (e.g., analyzing carefully information
read thus far; rereading last section read)
3. Once several potential interpretations of text are recognized, ones not obviously consistent with one another,
reader responds (e.g., constructing inferences to account
for the perceived discrepancies)
4. If a part of text cannot be understood completely, shifting
focus to other parts of the text or questions not considered
but also need to be resolved
5. If a text cannot be tmderstood, attempting to think of an
analogy
continued ....
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Table 2 (continued)

6. If a reading-related goal is determined unattainable, adjusting the goal
7. Looking up some of the references cited in the write-up or
seeking other information from other sources
8. Reading on without figuring out interpretation when one
cannot be discerned
9. Distorting some information to interpret consistent with
tentative hypothesis
10. Distraction (thinking about things other than reading;
falling asleep)
11. Simply giving up on understanding the text and quitting
G. Post-Reading Monitoring and Decisions to Process Additionally

1. If reader is aware that the macrostructure active at the end
of reading is consistent with text, and important questions
that came up during the reading have been answered, not
likely to search text additionally
2. If reader senses inconsistency between macrostructure
active at end of a reading and text, or important questions
that came up during reading have not been answered,
reader continues search for meaning

III. Evaluating
A. Consistent Evaluative Mindsets
1. Anticipatory evaluation/ affect, based on feelings about/
knowledge of topic
2. Acceptance
3. Skepticism, with wariness heightened to the extent that
the material is likely to impact conclusions considered
important by the reader
4. Reader acutely aware document was written by a particular person with particular biases, purposes, background
knowledge and hence, believes document must be evaluated by implied meanings
B. Focussed Evaluations
1. Style of the text
2. Content of the text
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The Nature of Conscious Reading Emerging from the Verbal
Protocol Data

What is most striking from reading the verbal protocol studies is
that readers are so driven to construct meaning. Every action in Tables
1 and 2 are directed at meaning making or is the result of meaning
making. Readers can interact flexibly with text, using their prior
knowledge to construct interpretations of what they are reading, relating what they ah'eady know to the new ideas in text. Readers often
respond passionately to ideas conveyed thmugh text. As Pressley and
Afflerbach (1995) noted: They are consh'uctively responsive in their
reading, especially when they are working with texts that are important
to them, interesting to them, and related to matters in which they have
decidedly well-informed opinions and clear expertise.
There are four clear indications of constructive responsivity
in the verbal protocols:
1. Readers can actively search, reflect on, and respond to text in
pursuit of main ideas and important details. The skilled reader comes
to a text knowing that it has main ideas and supporting information.
An overview of the text can provide a great deal of information about
the general type of information covered in it and where various topics
in the reading are located. There is definitely differential attention to
information in text that seems centrally relevant to the reader's goals.
The reader sometimes jumps back and forth to consider important
points in the text carefully, points that seem critical to comprehend in
order to get what seems like critical information from text. There is
focus on important details as part of constructing the whole meaning
of text.
Inferential activities also reflect the pursuit of larger themes, from
inferences about the author's overall intent in writing the piece to the
drawing of conclusions strongly implied by the text. Readers' awareness that the parts of text add up to a much greater whole is reflected by
their many attempts to integrate across disparate parts of readings.
Those attempts also reflect determination to get at the larger meaning of
text, for protocol study participants reported great efforts expended in
comparing parts of text, holding disparate ideas in working memory
while searching for related ideas throughout text, and rereading to
clarify how previously encountered information related to parts of text
just covered.
After a text has been read, additional reflection and rereading are
common, again in the service of finding the larger meanings in the
text. Readers monitor whether they have comprehended a reading. If
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they feel they have not comprehended the text's overall meaning, this
can be motivation to process the text additionally and/ or differently
in order to construct a more complete understanding of it. Evaluations of the whole text are common in reader remarks, including
evaluations of the validity, interestingness, structural integrity, and
sophistication of the overall text. In short, there is construction and
response throughout the process of reading for understanding, with
pursuit of an understanding of the whole stimulating much processing and analysis of the parts of text.
2. Readers respond to text with predictions and hypotheses that
reflect their prior knowledge. This can start with an overview of text,
with hypotheses advanced about the potential meaning of the text.
Hypothesis generation continues as front-to-back reading begins. At
some point, information will be encountered making clear that at least
some of the hypothesized points are in error. Is there anything
dysfunctional about prediction errors? No, they reflect active engagement, attempts to understand text by relating it to prior knowledge.
That such errors were common in the think-alouds makes clear the
constructive nature of the reading captured in the protocol analyses.
That the initial hypotheses of the readers did not prevail but yielded
to information in the text makes clear the responsive nature of
consciously controlled reading.
3. Readers often are passionate in their responses to text. It
particularly comes through when readers have great expertise related
to and interest in the topic of the text. There was surprise, laughter,
puzzlement, frustration, and anxiety in the think-aloud reports. These
responses were possible because of extensive prior knowledge and
the related values and beliefs of the readers in these studies. The
passions are responsive in that they were elicited by particular points
made in text.
4. Readers' prior knowledge predicts their comprehension processing and responses to text. Thus, the initial hypotheses about the
meaning of text that result from overviewing are a product of associative responses to information encountered during the preview. As
reading proceeds, additional associative responding based on prior
knowledge is common. Also, prior knowledge affects decisions about
what is potentially important (e.g., novel) in a text and worthy of
differential attention and what is not so worthy. Such inferences are
largely based on prior knowledge. For example, conjectures about
Michener's purpose in writing his current book are informed by
knowledge of Michener's purposes in writing previous books. Interpretive categorizations of a work (e.g., a "political satire" or an
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"historical fiction") require knowledge of such genres. In fact, interpretations of all sorts require prior knowledge that permits the reader
to imagine the state of affairs depicted in the text as well as how the
state depicted in the text contrasts with other states of affairs. Thus,
it is impossible to come to an interpretation of the importance of the
Kennedy presidency without knowledge of other presidencies.
Comprehension monitoring is largely enabled by prior knowledge. Much of deciding whether text is comprehended is based on
whether the message abstracted from the text makes sense relative to
what the reader already knows about the topic of the text. Monitoring
also involves awareness of how the new information relates to old
knowledge and whether one's personal prior knowledge permits full
appreciation of the text.
Evaluative responses to a text are not possible without massive
prior knowledge. Judgments about the qualities of a text depend on
knowing a great deal about how texts can be (and typically are)
written and about previously existing ideas relevant to the text.
Readers embrace pieces that are consistent with what they believe
already and often reject writing that is filled with information inconsistent with their own views of the world.
Concluding Comments

Pressley and Afflerbach (1995) offered the most comprehensive
analyses of the conscious processes of reading ever compiled. In
doing so, they subsumed a number of other theories about comprehension, making clear that support for each could be found in the
verbal protocol data but that none of them were sufficient to explain
the complicated articulation of processes documented in the thinkaloud studies: These included reader response theory, metacognitive
theory, schema theory, propositionally based theories of discourse
and inferential comprehension, and sociocultural models of comprehension (see Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995, chapter 4).
How good is the theory of constructively responsive reading
proposed by Pressley and Afflerbach? It is very credible. That verbal
protocols generated since the Pressley and Afflerbach (1995) model
was completed seem to be consistent with reading as depicted in
Table 2 increases confidence in the model. Because the data informing
the model came from studies that varied so much in their particulars
suggests that the model summarized in Table 2 is transferable. All of
the main categories in Pressley and Afflerbach (1995)- such as the
main categories summarized in Table 2- were supported by indica-
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tions from multiple studies, indications that varied because of the
operational variability across studies and thus, we believe the model
has confirmability. That is, its various claims have been triangulated.
This is a powerful model, with its power largely because it is a theory
that was completely derived from data, with the grounded theorists
(Pressley and Afflerbach) reflecting on, categorizing and recategorizing,
and organizing and reorganizing lmtil there was a framework that
convincingly included all the data. It is a theory worthy of additional
testing-which is the product grounded theory analyses are intended
to produce.
IMPLICATIONS

What is different because of the analyses reported here? Quite a
bit, with this work having implications for the conduct and analyses
of future verbal protocol studies of reading, development of standardized measures of reading comprehension, and meta-analytic studies
of complex cognitions and behaviors.
Verbal Protocol Studies of Reading

One of the most disappointing aspects of the many verbal protocol studies of reading is that the research was not very analytical.
Typically, there was only one condition in a study, that is, no experimental manipulations that would permit assessment of the determinants of comprehension processing. There are very good theoretical
and pragamatic reasons to believe that reading will vary as a function
of reader characteristics, for example, readers' purpose, prior knowledge, state (e.g., alert vs. tired), and motivation. Comprehension
processing probably also varies as a function of external demands,
such as the amount of time available for reading.
Other environmental variables may make a difference, too, such
as whether text is presented linearly, as it is on a computer screen, or
in a traditional book. In short, there is much to be understood about
how reading varies as a function of a variety of variables.
One reason researchers have not conducted more analytical studies in the past has been that scoring verbal protocol data has been a
major hassle. Particularly relevant here, every new investigation
involved a great deal of effort to design an effective scoring scheme.
I believe that the existence of the Pressley and Afflerbach (1995)
catalog of conscious reading processes will make it much easier to
conduct verbal protocol studies because it makes so clear just what
processes are possible.
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Although I am not optimistic that it will prove easy to design
reliable scoring schemes based on the most fine-grained categorizations in Pressley and Afflerbach, I do think that reliable classifications
will be possible at more coarse levels of analysis-for example,
perhaps about as coarse as the categorizations offered in Table 2.
Why do I think that? Examine the level of analysis in Wyatt et al.
(1993) summarized in Table 1. The categorizations in that study were
very reliable. The difference made by Pressley and Afflerbach (1995)
is that the painstaking efforts in Wyatt et al. (1993) to develop a
scoring scheme should be less painstaking in the future, so that
research resources can be redirected, for example, to expand the
number of conditions in these studies.
If I were doing a verbal protocol study today, and I expect I may
be back doing them in the near future, I would take the Pressley and
Afflerbach (1995) catalog and begin to score my protocols. Then, I
would collapse over subcategories until my scoring scheme was
reliable. This process should be much easier than starting from
scratch and building a scoring scheme. Frankly, I cannot wait to have
an opportunity to do this.
Standardized Measures of Comprehension

Standardized measures of comprehension typically require readers to read text and then answer comprehension questions. The
quality of comprehension processing is then inferred from performance on the comprehension questions. In contrast, the measurement commlmity increasingly embraces more authentic approaches
to assessment, including performance assessments aimed at elucidating more directly cognitive processes. A major challenge to the
development of such assessments is the scoring of them.
Just as the Pressley and Afflerbach (1995) catalog should serve
researchers collecting verbal protocols, it should also make it easier to
score verbal protocols that are collected as part of efforts to develop
more authentic comprehension assessments. To be certain, there are
enormous challenges that remain for such assessments to become a
reality, but I am confident that the effort will lead to important
insights about reading. For example, when Cordon and Day (1995)
asked college students to think aloud as they read passages from
standardized comprehension measures, processing proved to be much
less sophisticated than the type of reading Wyatt et al. (1993) observed: The college students relied heavily on rereading rather than
more active, selective processing.
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One of the main reasons I believe that the Pressley and Afflerbach
(1995) catalog will have an impact on standardized testing is that it is
the test construction community who have talked most with Peter
and me about Verbal Protocols of Reading. I am heartened by this
development, and by the invitation of the Buros Institute to present
here, because I am convinced that cognitive psychology has much
more to offer the assessment community than it has offered in the
past. In particular, my reading of the interest in Verbal Protocols by
measurement professionals is that the Pressley and Afflerbach (1995)
analysis makes obvious the possibility of reasonably easy and reliable
scoring of verbal protocols of reading: One obvious possibility would
be simply to collapse across the many categories of response summarized in the book until scoring was reliable.
Consider the following examples based on the level of detail in
Table 2. Even if scorers had difficulty determining whether an inference
involved inferring the meaning of a word based on context clues versus
inferring the connotation of a word, they very likely would have no
trouble agreeing that the inference was a conscious inference. Even if
scorers could not agree that a particular response reflected the reader
making a claim about "what the author really wanted to say" versus the
reader empathizing with messages in a text, the scorers would likely
agree that the reader was interpreting the text.
In summary, the verbal protocol approach offers a much more
direct window on processing than other forms of comprehension measurement. At a minimum, because cognitive psychologists have collected verbal protocols of excellent reading, composing, and problem
solving, those devising tests to evaluate the sophistication of cognition
at least have a better understanding of the nature of sophisticated
cognition than they did before the verbal protocol approach was employed extensively by cognitive psychologists. Moreover, when verbal
protocols are used to assess processing, the assessment is much more
driven by what is in the head of the reader, writer, or problem solver
than by what in the head of the individual constructing the assessment
instrument. For example, a multiple-choice item to assess whether
inferencing is occurring during reading includes one logical inference,
based on the item writer's perspective. The inferences an item writer
makes, however, are not always the ones any given reader makes. Some
readers may fail an item tapping inferencing not because they are not
reading actively and making inferences but because they are not making
the inferences the test constructor made. In short, I believe that verbal
protocols may permit assessments of processing that are much more
realistic than the assessments of the past.
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Meta-Analytic Summaries of Cognitive Processes and Behaviors

There has been an explosion of interest in the past 15-20 years to
find ways to summarize findings from a large number of studies.
Much progress has been made in the development of meta-analytic
procedures for quantitative data. In contrast, there has been little
progress in finding ways to summarize qualitative outcomes.
I believe that many of the analytic procedures (Miles & Huberman,
1994) that can be used to organize qualitative data in individual studies
can also be applied across studies. Pressley and Afflerbach (1995) used
one approach, grounded theory analyses based on the method of
constant comparison (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), to organize the data in
verbal protocols of reading. I am looking forward to much more
complete grounded theories of problem solving and composition processes in the near future, for the fairly large think-aloud literatures on
problem solving and composition are now being analyzed by others
using procedures similar to those Afflerbach and I employed. I hope
this is the start of a h·end.
I also think that the methods used by Pressley and Afflerbach (1995)
will prove more broadly applicable, perhaps useful whenever complex
behaviors are reported categorically across a number of investigations.
With the expansion of qualitative methods in general, many complex
processes and behaviors will be studied qualitatively, with a number of
problems studied in a large number of studies. It is essential to find
ways to summarize the data collected in these efforts and thus, Pressley
and Afflerbach (1995) is probably the first in a long line of qualitative
meta-analytical investigations.
Concluding Comment

My colleagues and I have never been afraid to break with traditional
methodologies if there was promise of conceptual advance. In general,
although others have embraced our findings, they typically have not
followed our methodological leads. One reason is that my associates
and I have never shied away from labor-intensive methods, ones
requiring more data collection and more intense data collection than
often occurs in social sciences and educational research-for example, my work on monitoring of strategy efficacy (e.g., Pressley &
Ghatala, 1990; Pressley, Levin, & Ghatala, 1984) and the research on
transactional strategies instruction (e.g., Pressley et al., 1992). Another is that I never really saw myself as a methodologist and thus,
did not attempt to impress my methods on others. This time, the
analyses are as labor intensive as ever, but I am more determined to
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persuade others of the power of the methods my associates and I are
using. I believe that there will be real advances in understanding of
complex cognitive and behavioral processes if others do follow the leads
of Wyatt et al. (1993) and Pressley and Afflerbach (1995). A great deal
was leamed about conscious text processing in the work summarized in
this chapter. Moreover, the efforts to do meta-analyses now will payoff
in less diagnostic effort in future research as well as more valid standardized assessments. The promise is great for empirical and theoretical
advances as well as for practice.
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ASSESSING METACOGNITION:
IMPLICATIONS OF THE
BUROS SYMPOSIUM
Gregory Schraw
The University of Nebraska-Lincoln

This chapter attempts to consolidate the diverse opinions and
conclusions included in the previous six chapters of this volume. I
have found it easiest to do so in three sections. Section 1 provides a
summary the book's main themes. These themes pertain to the need
for a more comprehensive theory of metacognition, the disparity
between metacognitive theory and measurement, methodological
questions about the measurement of metacognitive processes, concerns about poor instrumentation, the generality of the metacognition
construct, and issues pertaining to educational practice. Section 2
raises concerns central to the measurement community in general.
These concerns include questions about the reliability and validity of
assessment techniques and paper-and-pencil measures. Another
concern is the need for dependable performance assessment of
metacognitive skills among younger and older students. Section 3
makes a number of suggestions for future research and measurement
practice based on current theory. A number of educational implications are discussed as well.
Six Emergent Themes

Most researchers studying metacognition agree that it is important to study, but difficult to measure. The chapters included in this
volume provide a variety of strategies to bridge the gap between
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metacognitive theory and measurement practice. I believe there are
six discernable themes that emerge from these chapters that, collectively, point the field in a sensible direction for further research and
discussion.
Theme 1: The need for a comprehensive, unified theory of metacognition.
Throughout this volume, there are repeated references to two compatible, yet theoretically distinct, theories of metacognition associated
with the work of John Flavell (1987) and Ann Brown (1987). Most
experts, including those represented in this volume, view this as a
serious problem because it prevents researchers from agreeing upon
basic metacognitive processes and terminology for those processes. The
terminology problem is especially important because many researchers
describe the same basic processes using somewhat different terms.
However, all the contributors to this volume, as well as other
theorists not included (Chi, 1987; Garner, 1987, 1994; Nelson & Narens,
1994; Metcalfe, 1994a), agree on the primacy of three overarching
processes I refer to as regulatory control, performance monitoring, and
task monitoring. The former refers to a variety of self-regulatory
processes used to actively, and often intentionally, control cognitive
activity. Many of these activities have been described in detail in
related volumes on self-regulated performance (Schunk &
Zimmerman, 1994; Zimmerman & Schunk, 1989) and reading
(Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995; Pressley, Harris, & Guthrie, 1992).
Performance monitoring refers to monitoring ongoing comprehension via either self-report or various subjective measures (see
Schraw, Wise, & Roos, this volume). Task monitoring refers to
assessing the demands of the task at hand, especially its difficulty
relative to one's own skills and knowledge (see Borkowski, Chan,
& Muthukrishna, this volume).
A great deal of discussion centers around these processes either
directly or indirectly. Most chapter authors believe the three processes
are related in a reciprocal, interactive fashion, forming a triarchic set of
basic metacognitive processes (Pintrich, Wolters, & Baxter, this volume).
There are several explicit mentions of the relationship between control
and performance monitoring, a relationship Schraw et al. (this volume) refer to as a regulatory loop. Borkowski et al. (this volume) also
address the crucial relationship between task monitoring and conh'ol,
especially among younger students and older students who find academic work quite difficult (Borkowski & Thorpe, 1994).
A closely related problem is the fuzzy boundary that separates
overlapping constructs such as metacognition, executive processes,
and self-regulation (Pintrich et al., this volume; Zimmerman, 1994).
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Although little is said about this issue directly, there is some discussion regarding the relationship between metacognition and motivational variables. These authors generally agree that motivation is an
important contributor to metacognition, although it is less clear whether
it is part of metacognition per se (see Garcia & Pintrich, 1994 and
Pressley, Borkowski, & Schneider, 1987 for related discussions).
Theme 2: There is a large discrepancy between metacognitive theory
and measurement practice. Chapter authors unanimously agreed that
metacognition is an important theoretical construct that warrants
serious attention. They also agreed that measurement aspects of
metacognition typically are included as an afterthought. Most researchers are interested in measuring metacognition only as far as
those measurements can be used to evaluate metacognitive theory or
improve instructional practice. This perspective limits focus on the
integrity of the measurement process apart from how it impacts
metacognitive theory.
Reducing the gap between metacognitive theory and measurement practice depends in part on the success of establishing a comprehensive theory of metacognition that researchers can use as a common
referent point (see Theme 1). It also depends on researchers' willingness to become conversant with contemporary measurement theory
and to value the integrity of one's measurement instruments as much
as one's metacognitive theory. This is a tall order at the present, given
that many researchers interested in metacognition have limited training in psychometric theory, little interest per se in measurement, and
tend to view measurement as an unglamorous means to a more
impressive theoretical end.
Theme 3: There is considerable debate regarding the relative pros and
cons of different assessment methodologies. As in any contemporary
debate on research, this volume present differing views regarding the
utility of qualitative and quantitative methods. Pressley (this volume)
presents a careful argument for the increased use of qualitative
methods such as grounded theory approaches Strauss & Corbin, 1990).
According to Pressley (this volume), researchers have privileged
access to the thoughts and strategies used by individuals as they
perform a task or reflect on their performance.
Others were less positive about qualitative approaches, however
voicing traditional concerns summarized in Ericsson and Simon (1993)
and Pressley and Afflerbach (1995). These include the potentially
intrusive nature of interviews, the possibility that individuals do not
have privileged access to their own cognitive processes, and the
possibility that individuals will provide biased reports of their activi-
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ties. Nevertheless, all of the contributors to this volume agreed that
both traditions have strengths and weaknesses, and do not guarantee
informative or accurate assessment. More importantly, there was
strong agreement that any method is superior to no method at all!
The most reasonable strategy at this point is to recognize the problem,
then turn our attention to the daunting task of unifying metacognitive
theory and constructing reliable and valid methods for evaluating
that theory.
Another methodological subtheme concerned what several authors referred to as grain size; that is, the specificity of the task that is
being assessed (Howard-Rose & Winne, 1993; Pintrich et al., this
volume). Pressley (this volume), for example, described ongoing
research of an extremely broad grain size-no less than an exhaustive
taxonomy of strategies used during highly constructive reading.
Pressley and Afflerbach (1995) reported over 150 separate strategies.
Tobias and Everson (this volume) reported studies of much smaller
grain size; that is, the accuracy of specific monitoring judgments. The
process model described by Borkowski et al. (this volume) necessitated a number of assessments, each of differing grain sizes.
The issue of grain size is important for two reasons. One is that
bigger grains become increasingly dependent on longitudinal, qualitative methods, although it is possible to use sophisticated quantitative methods such as structural equation modelling as well. In
contrast, very small grains seem easier to study with traditional
quantitative methods such as reaction and choice selection times,
recognition and recall measures, or calibrated accuracy judgments.
One potential drawback, however, is that small-grain processes may
be so automatic, individuals may no longer have privileged access to
performance, precluding the use of introspective measures.
Grain size also affects the degree to which measurements provide
a useful test of meta cognitive theory or educational interventions. For
example, although studying the acquisition of a specific strategy is
crucial (see Borkowski et al., this volume), such information would
not be sufficient to assess the validity of the process models described
by Pressley and Afflerbach (1995) or Borkowski et al. (this volume).
A third methodological subtheme concerned what kind of
metacognitive processes individuals choose to study. The general
consensus was that small-grain processes (e.g., monitoring strategies)
vary among different groups and ages, and that one model of
metacognition may not apply to all individuals. On the other hand,
studying monitoring processes in experts and novices may lead to
different results (Glaser & Chi, 1988; Glenberg & Epstein, 1987). The
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current volume does not offer a resolution to this paradox. I believe
that researchers will have to make a greater effort to construct a
comprehensive developmental model of metacognition as opposed to
a purely descriptive account of what the average college sophomore
does. Clearly, models are needed in which expert and novice performance can be reconciled.
At this point, there continue to be important differences of opinion regarding how to measure metacognition. This issue must be
resolved before substantial progress can be made in the field. Specifically, researchers must at least agree on what constitutes necessary
and sufficient evidence for assessing the validity of metacognitive
constructs, even if researchers continue to disagree about the methods
they use to collect evidence. Pintrich, Wolters, and Baxter (this
volume) make a number of important suggestions in this regard
based on the work of Messick (1989).
Theme 4: Most available instruments that measure metacognition have
unknown psychometric properties. Both Pintrich et al. (this volume) and
Baker and Cerro (this volume) suggested that most measures of
metacognition can be characterized by two salient features: (a) they were
constructed for use within a specific study and (b) there is little or no
normative information about them even within the population for
which they were designed. There are two measurement-related consequences. One is tllat the dimensionality of the insh'uments (i.e., what
psychomeh'icians would refer to as an instrument's factor structure) is
unknown. This prevents researchers from identifying the number and
type of psychological constructs the instrument presumably measures.
Second, there often is no information regarding how the hypothesized
construct is related to other relevant performance outcomes.
There are several instruments that prove exceptions to this rule.
One is the Learning and Study Strategies Inventory (LASSI) developed by Weinstein, Zimmerman, and Palmer (1988), which reports 10
separate subscales, including attitude, motivation, anxiety, test strategies, and self-testing. Although the LASSI has acceptable internal
consistency measures for each scale (i.e., _ = .70 to .80), and correlates
with measures of cognitive performance, it is unclear whether it
measures meta cognition per se, or cognitive skills such as study
strategies that are regulated with the help of metacognitive knowledge. Another instrument is the Motivated Strategies for Learning
Questionnaire (MSLQ) (Pintrich & DeGroot, 1990; Pintrich, Smith,
Garcia, & McKeachie, 1993), which measures both motivational and
strategy subscales. A third scale is the Metacognitive Assessment
Inventory (MAl) (Schraw & Dennison, 1994), which includes know l-
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edge of cognition and regulation of cognition subscales. Although the
MAl has extremely high reliability, its relationship to other cognitive
measures remains to be investigated.
As this list indicates, all of these instruments have been developed
within the last decade, and most are fewer than five years old. Initial
results seem promising, and there is complete agreement that all of
these instruments represent positive steps in the assessment of basic
metacognitive knowledge. However, as Pressley and Afflerbach
(1995) point out, paper-and-pencil inventories are no substitute for
more in-depth analyses of metacognitive knowledge. Second, inventories alone seem incapable of capturing the complex dynamics of
metacognitive regulation. Third, all of these instruments are intended
for use with adolescents and adults; thus, instrumentation is needed
for younger learners.
Theme 5: There is uncertainty (and discomfort) regarding the domaingenerality of metacognition. The degree to which metacognition constitutes a domain-general phenomenon remains an important question.
The basic issue is this: If metacognition is really a function of expertise, and therefore is domain-specific, can it be measured at all using
a domain-general instrument such as the LASSI, MSLQ, or MAl? An
equally pressing problem is how to test whether metacognition is a
domain-general phenomenon? Several studies have addressed this
question either directly or indirectly. Glenberg and Epstein (1987), for
instance, found a negative relationship between expertise and monitoring. Music experts monitored more poorly than physics experts on
a test of music principles whereas the reverse was true on a physics
test! Morris (1 990) found that domain knowledge was unrelated to
monitoring proficiency even though it was related to one's ability to
answer questions effectively in that domain. However, Maki and
Serra (1992) found that monitoring improved as individuals acquired
more information from the to-be-Iearned materials. These studies
provided indirect, as well as conflicting, evidence about the domainspecific nature of metacognitive knowledge and regulation.
A more direct study was conducted by Schraw, Dunkle, Bendixen,
and Roedel (1 995). In the first of two experiments, individuals
completed eight multiple-choice tests that varied with respect to
content domain, overall difficulty, number of items, inferential difficulty, and number of distractors. Despite the heterogeneity of these
tests, confidence judgments were correlated in the neighborhood of r
= .50 among all tests even when performance was controlled statistically. Monitoring accuracy and discrimination scores (i.e., the ability
to discriminate between correct and incorrect answers) were also
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correlated. However, in Experiment 2, where all five tests were
matched on length, difficulty, and test-item format, monitoring accuracy and discrimination scores were correlated even when performance was controlled. Schraw et al. (1995) concluded that monitoring
accuracy and discrimination were attributable to two processes that
included domain-specific expertise and knowledge that supports
performance, and domain-general regulatory strategies such as selfchecking that supports self-regulation.
Of course, all of the studies described in this section investigated
metacognitive processes of limited grain size (i.e., comprehension
monitoring). Thus, even though there is evidence that comprehension monitoring relies in part on domain-general metacognitive knowledge, it does not follow that other metacognitive processes (e.g.,
planning, and allocation of cognitive resources) are domain-general.
The theoretical and educational implications of future research in
this area are crucial in my opinion. One implication of data consistent
with the domain-general view is that educators may feel more confident teaching domain-general metacognitive skills, rather than skills
that are encapsulated within specific domains such as mathematics
and reading (see Fodor, 1983; Gardner, 1983; and Hirschfeld & Gelman,
1994, for opposing views). A second implication is that researchers
must inquire about the development of domain-general skills. One
intriguing explanation has been proposed by Karmiloff-Srnith (1992)
who hypothesized that domain-specific skills and knowledge are
merged over time across domains to create domain-general knowledge. Understanding the underlying cognitive mechanisms that
enable this development is a worthy topic in and of itself.
Theme 6: Difficulty relating metacognitive theory to educational practice. One often heard complaint is that there are too few proven
methods for improving metacognition among children and adolescents. Baker and Cerro (this volume) point to a number of successes,
including Palincsar and Brown (1984), Paris and colleagues (Cross &
Paris, 1988; Jacobs & Paris, 1987), and Pressley and colleagues (Brown
& Pressley, 1994; Pressley, Harris, & Marks, 1992). Nevertheless,
Baker and Cerro also are outspoken about theorists' willingness to
make snap educational recommendations without any evidence to
support their claims. In fact, most training studies have reported
modest, yet lasting, gains only after intensive instruction lasting from 6
weeks to 6 months (Delclos & Harrington, 1991; King, 1991, 1992).
Another major problem is the almost complete lack of standardized assessment guidelines for use in the classroom or in research
settings, especially when evaluating younger learners. One notable
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study in tills regard was Swanson (1990), who found that metacognitive
knowledge among fifth and sixth graders facilitated problem solving.
Swanson also suggested that metacognitive regulation may develop
independent of skills traditionally measured on aptitude tests, although tills controversial claim requires additional research. To
assess metacognition, Swanson administered a 20-question verbal
interview, tapping student's knowledge about self-regulation.
Swanson also provided extensive documentation for scoring the
interview, although with the exception of Corkill and Koshida (1993),
others have not capitalized on these guidelines.
SUMMARY

The six themes related to the theory and practice of metacognition
provide an ambitious agenda for future theory development, research, and educational practice. It seems clear that a new agenda is
in order. Indeed, it is conceivable that the construct of metacognition
may lose its appeal to practitioners, and its theoretical relevance, if
researchers do not provide a much greater degree of psychometric
rigor during the next decade. There are several salient issues facing
researchers. One is to construct a comprehensive theory that includes well-specified subcomponents. A second is to agree on what
kinds of evidence are necessary to validate this theory. A third is to
construct standardized procedures using qualitative and quantitative methods to assess metacognitive competencies. A fourth is to
design and test interventions to improve or remediate important
meta cognitive competencies. A fifth is to propose standards by
willch these interventions can be evaluated.
Thoughts from the Measurement Community

Not everyone is excited by terms like metacognition and selfregulation. As recently as the mid-1980s, many people felt that
metacognition was too broad and elusive to be studied effectively.
One common complaint, and the driving force behind the symposium, is that some theorists interested in metacognition have neither
the training or inclination to establish sound psychometric underpinnings to measures of the construct.
In tills spirit, there are several cautions that one might expect to
hear from testing and measurement experts. Although these cautions
parallel the six themes described above, they provide a view of the
problem from a somewhat different perspective.
Caution 1: The field needs a plan for comprehensive assessment of the
construct. Test authors would quickly point to the testing industry to
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make their case. Aptitude tests, for example, come in virtually every
size and shape imaginable. Th ese tests typically provide reliability and
validity norms, and endeavor to meet all the standard evaluative criteria
proposed by measurement theorists such as the Standards for Educational
and Psychological Testing (AREA, APA, & NCME, 1985). Notwithstanding the continuing debate about the validity of aptitude tests, and
the role that aptitude plays in learning (see Jensen, 1992, and Sternberg,
1986, for different views), modern testing as we know it would not be
possible without an overarching plan for translating aptitude theory
into instruments that can be evaluated with exacting care.
Caution 2: Generate and test models. Researchers have failed for the
most part to translate metacognitive theory into testable models. In
this view, a theory provides a method for systematically organizing a
body of knowledge that explains a particular set of phenomena
(Byrnes, 1992; Kuhn, 1989; Schraw & Moshman, 1995). Every theory
has at least two distinguishable parts; a formal aspect (i.e., postulates
about how a phenomenon occurs) and an empirical aspect (Le., a test of
those postulates, usually in the form of data or mathematical proofs).
A model provides a formal description of a theory by specifying the
relationships among its most important postulates. These descriptions often take the form of a diagram, flow chart, or summary table.
Models are convenient ways to operationalize a theory and enable
researchers to test one part of the theory at a time. Models are useful
in that a theory can be tested and modified without discarding the
entire model.
Both Flavell (1987) and Brown (1987) proposed descriptive theories of metacognition that, although overlapping, remain somewhat
independent of one another. Surprisingly, very few researchers have
attempted to translate these theories into operational models that
enable researchers to investigate systematically the relationships among
model components. Two important exceptions are the models proposed by Nelson and Narens (1990, 1994) and Borkowski and colleagues (Borkowski & Muthukrishna, 1992; Borkowski & Thorpe,
1994; Borkowski et al., this volume). These models enable researchers
to make explicit predictions about the relationships among control
and monitoring processes, one's extant knowledge base, and motivational factors that affect self-regulation.
Process models clearly play an important role in theory testing.
Models specify particular relationships that can be tested explicitly.
Of equal importance, models focus our attention on the role that
instrumentation and measurement play in theory testing. The advent
and continued growth of structural equation modeling, for example,
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has ushered in a new era in the measurement of salient constructs in
cognitive psychology. Such models require researchers to test not
only the structural aspects of the model (i.e., relationships among
model components predicted by theory), but measurement aspects as
well (Bollen, 1989).
Caution 3: Construct and evaluate instruments that assess specific
components of the model. Three questions seem especially germane to
this caution. These include: (a) What is the construct of interest? (b)
Do appropriate measures exist to measure it? and (c) Does the
measurement process change the construct? Each of these questions
is considered briefly.
What is the construct? Broad constructs are difficult to measure,
making it unlikely that there will ever be a single measure of
metacognition (see Pintrich et al., this volume; Schraw, 1995). An
alternative approach would be to partition the metacognition construct into smaller components, then hypothesize about the relationships among subcomponents, although others may disagree with this
strategy (Linn, 1991). Constructing a detailed structural model that
specifies individual components and their interrelationships is an
essential precursor to the validation process.
Do appropriate measures exist? Once potentially measurable subcomponents have been defined, researchers must select behavioral
and self-report indices that measure these components. Indices of
metacognitive activity should be evaluated in an ongoing manner
using a variety of approaches (see Crocker & Algina, 1986, chapter 4,
for a summary of this process). Potential measures need to be
evaluated with respect to reliability, validity, and utility, or their
qualitative counterparts such as credibility and authenticity (Creswell,
1994; Merriam, 1988; Miles & Huberman, 1984).
Two aspects of reliability are essential. One concerns the internal
consistency of an instrument. Measures such as coefficient alpha
provide easy-to-compute indices of internal consistency and are available for a variety of measures of meta cognitive knowledge and
performance (Pintrich et al., 1993; Schraw & Dennison,1994; Weinstein
et al., 1988). However, when used in isolation, coefficient alpha is
insufficient. A second aspect of reliability is consistency over time.
Currently, there is little available information regarding test-retest
reliability on commonly used measures of self-regulation and
metacognition.
Multiple aspects of validity are crucial to the effective use and
interpretation of scores from an instrument or experimental results.
In their chapter, Pintrich et al. (this volume) addressed the question of
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validity using Messick's (1989) five-component framework. In this
view, all questions of validity are essentially questions related to
construct validity (Le., the degree to which inferences about a score
accurately represent an observable or unobservable phenomenon of
interest). Given that Messick views each of these five components as
interrelated, threats to any component necessarily affect all others.
A similar argument can be made for the credibility of qualitative
methods. Whether researchers use terms such as utility or confirmability
is beside the point; rather, they must demonstrate that they have
explained a hypothetical construct (or phenomenon) in an accurate,
replicable way. Researchers with a predilection for either qualitative
or quantitative methods should conduct carefully planned validation
studies to assure their methods accurately describe the phenomenon
of interest. In particular, there is a tremendous need for studies
evaluating the convergent and divergent validity of scores from
multiple measures, preferably using multiple methodologies, to explain metacognitive phenomena. Point 3 made by Pintrich et al. (this
volume), in which they recommended the use of a multitrait,
multimethod approach to construct validation, emphasized this concern directly.
Does the measurement process change the construct? Researchers
must ask themselves to what extent their measures of metacognition
affect the deployment of metacognitive knowledge and regulatory
skills. Although there are a variety of potential measurement confounds, several that I consider to be especially serious are discussed
below (see Baker & Cerro, this volume). The first is that self-report
inventories (e.g., Schraw & Dennison, 1994) may elicit socially desirable responses. One way to safeguard against instrument bias is to
conduct convergent and divergent validity studies. Unfortunately,
few studies of this kind have been reported.
A second potential problem is that think-aloud studies may
affect the measurement of metacognitive processes by competing for
limited resources that are necessary for task performance. One option
is to use retrospective self-reports; however, verbal report theorists
generally view retrospective reports as less reliable than concurrent selfreports. Competition for limited resources also affects many quantitative studies, but especially those using on-line confidence judgments of
performance. One alternative is to use unobh'usive measures such as
computerized testing procedures (Schraw et al., this volume).
A third problem is that structured interviews may provide information to individuals that they would not report on their own,
thereby masking their true metacognitive knowledge. One option is
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to ask iniormants to respond in writing, although this leads to other
problems such as competition for limited resources.
A fourth problem, and the most serious in my opinion, is that
individuals may differ in terms of their ability to explain or estimate
their metacognitive knowledge either verbally or in writing. For
example, experts may have a richer vocabulary for describing their
mental processes, even though novices engage in similar processes.
In essence, this problem is due to aptitude by treatment interactions,
and must be considered carefully when researchers evaluate potential
threats to the validity of their findings.
Caution 4: Use diverse assessment methods. Pintrich et al. (this
volume) captured the main theme of the Buros Symposium when
they concluded there is no one-size-fits-all measure of metacognition.
Indeed, if we accept the premise that there are two or more distinct
metacognitive processes (e.g., control and monitoring), it seems reasonable to conclude that there must be different measures of these
processes. Equally reasonable is the assumption that each identifiable
metacognitive process can be measured using different instruments
and methodologies (see Borkowski et al., this volume).
Perhaps the best advice one could give researchers interested in
metacognition is to adopt a multitrait, multimethod (MTMM) model
of assessment along the lines first proposed by Campbell and Fiske
(1959), and elaborated upon by Cook and Campbell (1979). The
MTMM approach emphasizes the collection of multiple measures of
a phenomenon using multiple, preferably diverse, methodologies. In
the context of validating metacognitive theory, this means using
objective self-reports (Pintrich et al., this volume), subjective selfreports such as concurrent verbal reports (Pressley, this volume),
subjective assessments of one's thinking or performance such as
calibration judgments (Tobias & Everson, this volume), and unobtrusive measures such as item selection times using computer-based
testing (Schraw et al., this volume) . Other measurement approaches
are needed as well, such as neurophysiological correlates of
meta cognition (Metcalfe, 1994b).
Summary

The four cautions outlined above summarize basic measurement
concerns for any research agenda. They have special importance for
the domain of metacognitive research given the paucity of systematic
validation studies. Foremost, the field needs a systematic and comprehensive assessment agenda, lest it lose its credibility among psy-
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chologists and educators in general, and measurement experts in
particular. A major part of this agenda should include the development of a testable model of metacognition. Work in this direction was
described by Borkowski et al. (this volume). Second, working models
must be tested and refined in an ongoing basis. Earlier stages of this
research will undoubtedly focus on specific components of
metacognition, whereas the later stages may test multicomponent
models using procedures such as structural equation modeling; that
is, the grain size of these studies would be expected to change over
time. Third, a variety of measures should be used to assess each
separate component, as well as the entire model. Last, adopting a
multitrait, multimethod approach to model testing may enhance the
effectiveness of this research.
An Agenda for Future Research

There are many ways that the assessment of metacognition can be
improved in the future, but it is not an easy task, and it cam10t be done
without the help of colleagues in different fields of study. This section
makes seven suggestions for future research and practice based on the
cautions described above. I have rank ordered these suggestions in a
way that might surprise some readers. Regardless of their ordering,
all are essential to the advancement of the field, and should be taken
seriously.
Suggestion 1: Researchers interested in metacognition must collaborate
with measurement and instructional design experts. Most of the authors
included in this volume would acknowledge their lack of technical
measurement expertise. Most of them, and most researchers working
in the area of metacognition, are not keenly interested in measurement issues per se. Many, including myself, do not have a strong
interest in the design of instructional interventions. Yet it is clear to
me that failing to involve measurement and instructional design
experts may be disastrous to the field. I believe we are at an impasse
that cannot be overcome without the skills and knowledge of experts
who do not share our vested interest in the construct of metacognition.
On a brighter note, let me focus on some of the potential advantages of cross-disciplinary collaborations. One is that experts at
solving measurement problems may add a tremendous amount of
richness to existing theory. A second is that measurement and
instructional design experts may provide innovative ways to assess
metacognition, both with respect to objective paper-and-pencil measures, as well as performance-based assessments. A third is that
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instructional design experts have much to offer by way of translating
metacognitive theory into instructional practice. The same may be
said regarding how to evaluate formative and summative instructional outcomes.
Suggestion 2: Agree on a unified theoretical framework. It bears
repeating that the field is perceived by some outsiders as too theoretically disparate. It is unlikely that substantially more progress will be
made until researchers agree on what it is they are looking for. My
personal preferences are for a three-component model of metacognition
that emphasizes the role of regulatory control, performance monitoring, and task-monitoring processes. Such a model is already consistent with much of the theorizing being done in meta cognition and
self-regulation (Baker, 1989; Borkowski et al., this volume; Garner,
1987; Garner & Alexander, 1989; Jacobs & Paris, 1987; Nelson &
Narens, 1994; Pintrich & DeGroot, 1990; Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995;
Schraw & Moshman, 1995). Even earlier theories such as those
proposed by Brown (1987) and Flavell (1987) that postulate two main
components, are highly consistent with the three-component view.
It is my view that the most important issue separating existing
accounts of metacognition is terminological differences, not assumptions about basic metacognitive processes. In a way, it is as if the field
has agreed on what kind of pizza it wants to eat, but still can't decide
how to slice the pieces! I believe we are much closer to a comprehensive theory of metacognition than most casual observers would give
us credit for. Perhaps our greatest challenge is to recognize the
perception of disarray from outside the field and to resolve it!
Another theory-related suggestion is to focus on measuring the
practical and statistical relationships among the three main components described above. Recent work by Nelson and Narens (1990,
1994) and Koriat (1993, 1994) have raised extremely important questions about the relationship between monitoring and control. The
importance of this relationship, as well as ways to test it, were echoed
by Schraw et al. (this volume). Borkowski et al. (this volume) also
emphasized the relationship between performance and task monitoring.
Suggestion 3: Identify suitable outcome measures that can be used as
criteria to evaluate metacognitive behaviors. Most of the work done in the
field of metacognition has been devoted to generating theory. A
sizable amount of work also has been done on testing a narrow band
of metacognitive processes, but especially comprehension monitoring
(See Baker, 1989; Pressley & Ghatala, 1990; and Schraw & Moshman,
1995, for reviews). Some work, but not a great deal, has been done on
instructional improvement (Brown & Pressley, 1994; Jacobs & Paris,

7. ASSESSING METACOGNITION

311

1987; King, 1991; Brown & Palincsar, 1989). Yet virtually no attention
has been paid to identifying suitable outcome measures of
metacognition, other than as they apply to testing components of
metacognitive theories, or evaluating the efficacy of instructional
interventions.
Of particular concern are measures with a high degree of ecological validity, including performance-based measures that capture midrange (e.g., 3 months) and long-term (e.g., 6 months or more)
development of metacognition. There are not any suitable methods in
this regard at the present time, and unfortunately, few researchers
seem to have considered this problem (see Baker & Cerro, this
volume, and Garner, 1987, for further discussion).
Outcome measures should be identified that meet a variety of
needs. One especially important need is to parallel measures of
metacognition that are suitable for children and adults. Without such
measures, comparisons among age groups at a single time are compromised, as are across-time comparisons within the same group. A
second need is to identify measures that are suitable for field settings.
Many studies rely on either checklists or overt behavioral measures.
Lacking is a method for identifying multiple levels of metacognitive
activity via self-report. A third need is to construct specific versus
broad measures of metacognition. Most shldies focus on monitoring
judgments made prior to or after completing a test item. Although
monitoring reflects an important component of metacognition, it fails
to provide information about strategies for planning, debugging, or
evaluating.
Another important question to ask about these measures is the
degree to which they intrude on metacognitive processes. Asking
individuals to think-aloud as they perform a task, for example, may
interfere with that task by consuming limited resources, or it may
facilitate metacognitive behaviors by calling explicit attention to task
demands.
Suggestion 4: Empirically investigate the relationship among different
outcome measures. One consequence of the small amount of work that
has gone into identifying alternative outcome measures is that very
little is known about the relationship among these measures. For
example, there has not been a systematic comparison of the relationship between ratings of monitoring accuracy and self-reported strategies, even though these measures are used frequently in the literature.
As measurement experts would remind us, the more measures we use
to assess an outcome, and the more we know about the relationship
among these measures, the better able we are to make reliable and
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valid inferences about the construct under study. Put simply, it is crucial
to converge on a consh·uct using multiple, triangulated methods.
Suggestion 5: Establish methodological and data-analytic guidelines for
measuring metacognition. Any research tradition quickly establishes its
own informal or formal guidelines for administering and interpreting
a task. One example is the use of monitoring accuracy judgments that
pervade the metacognition literature. Nevertheless, with the exception of monitoring accuracy judgments (see Tobias & Everson, this
volume), error-detection (see Baker & Cerro, this volume), and selfreported strategy use (see Pressley, this volume), there are few guidelines available for either researchers or practitioners. This is a serious
obstacle for educators who want to improve metacognition in the
classroom. One difficulty is understanding what metacognition is, a
problem that is due in part to too much theoretical and terminological
slippage. Another problem is selecting a benchmark for measuring
the growth of metacognition (see Suggestion 3 above). A third
problem is deciding on a method for assessing metacognitive progress.
My observations have led me to conclude that teachers and parents
typically assess meta cognitive growth using intuitive hunches rather
than tangible outcome measures. This is due to at least three factors:
(a) uncertainty about what to look for; (b) the lack of meaningful, costefficient measurement strategies; and (c) the lack of meaningful
interpretative guidelines.
The lack of procedural and interpretative guidelines is a serious
problem within and beyond the field of metacognition. Within the
field, there are few established procedures for measuring metacognitive
knowledge. Of the three most widely used paper-and-pencil instruments (i.e., the LASSl, MSLQ, and MAl), only the LASSl has been
used enough to provide relatively stable norms for different types of
students. Most studies continue to use instruments designed specifically for the study at hand. Many studies that used the LASSl, MSLQ,
or MAl also have fairly small sample sizes (i.e., less than 100), that
preclude a meaningful replication of previous studies. To complicate
matters, very few studies ever report reliability coefficients for criterion measures, and few researchers have enough measurement and
statistical savvy to understand the subtle, yet important, differences
among alternative data-analytic strategies once data have been collected (Keren, 1991; Schraw, 1995).
Another issue concerns the purpose of metacognitive assessment
(Baker & Cerro, this volume). Information gathered during an assessment can be used for different purposes (Tindal & Marston, 1990).
One purpose is to make placement decisions, such as whether a
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student is admitted to a restricted program. A second purpose is to
make diagnostic judgments regarding a specific skill or learning
disability. A third purpose is to use the information to provide
ongoing feedback to students, parents, and teachers. A fourth purpose is to provide summative evaluation at the end of an instructional
unit or training session. Whereas most researchers used measures of
metacognition as summative indices of unobservable metacognitive
competencies, most educators are interested in metacognition from a
diagnostic and formative evaluation perspective. There has been very
little thought given to bridging the gap between researchers and
theorists on the one hand, and practitioners on the other. I believe
researchers have a responsibility to bridge this gap and to address
how educators can collect information about a student's skills in a
manner that enables the educator to provide useful formative feedback. Similarly, many teachers hunger for guidelines for diagnosing
potential learning difficulties related to lack of cognitive and
metacognitive regulation.
Suggestion 6: Establish guidelines for implementing and evaluating
instruction. Metacognitive theory has not been translated adequately
into educational practice. This sentiment was captured well by Baker
(1989), Garner (1987), and Baker and Cerro (this volume). Few
teachers have a clear sense of how to improve metacognition and
meta memory, or even ways to enhance the growth of specific subcomponents of metacognition such as conditional knowledge, although some educators are quite skilled in this regard. Educators
desire guidelines for helping their students become more
metacognitively aware. These guidelines should explicate separate
subcomponents of metacognition (e.g., conditional knowledge, monitoring) as specifically as possible, and propose specific instructional
interventions that improve these skills. Researchers also must propose guidelines for assessing the growth of metacognitive skills.
A number of researchers have investigated the kind of instructional interventions I am describing (Brown & Pressley, 1994; Delclos
& Harrington, 1991; King, 1991; Paris & Jacobs, 1987; Palincsar &
Brown, 1989; Zimmerman & Martinez-Pons, 1990). Many of these
interventions have focused on teaching specific strategies (e.g., identifying main ideas) and monitoring their use. Others have proposed
a broader research agenda (Garner, 1990; Pressley, Harris, & Marks,
1992; Van Meter, Yokoi, & Pressley, 1994). My own view is that
instructional research in metacognition should proceed in several
ways. One is the traditional theory-driven approach reflected in the
work of Palincsar and Brown (1984). Another avenue is to utilize in-
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class observations to construct grounded theories of metacognition
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Pressley, this volume). Grounded theories
seem especially important at this juncture given the lack of a unified
theory of metacognition. A third approach is to utilize phenomenological methods (Creswell, 1994; Moustakas, 1994) that provide an indepth descriptive accolmt of what effective teachers do to improve
metacognition.
Educators need to assess the effectiveness of their interventions as
well. As I have suggested at several points in this chapter, guidelines
and proven instruments for doing so are lacking. There is much that
teacher-preparation programs could do to enhance future educators'
knowledge of measurement and assessment. However, at present,
many preservice teachers appear to be ill-prepared to meet assessment challenges. At a minimum, classes in reading, science, and
mathematics instruction should include methods for providing a
knowledge base, as well as metacognitive knowledge about regulating that knowledge base. Suggestions for assessing the effectiveness
of both kinds of instruction (i.e., cognitive and metacognitive skills)
should be embedded within this context.
Suggestion 7: Consider the relationship among metacognitive and
affective variables. This suggestion follows from the work of Borkowski
and colleagues (Borkowski . & Muthukrishna, 1992; Borkowski,
Millstead, & Hale, 1988; Borkowski et al., this volume) that describes
the relationship among metacognitive and affective variables. Far less
has been made of these important connections than they deserve (see
Weinert,1987). However, several studies suggest that metacognition
may playa role in increasing personal interest and reducing anxiety
that interferes with task performance (Tobias, 1995; Tobias & Everson,
this volume). Similarly, metacognition may facilitate the understanding and regulation of emotions and possible selves in academic
settings (Borkowski & Thorpe, 1994). Last, Pintrich and colleagues
(Garcia & Pintrich, 1994; Pintrich & DeGroot, 1990; Pintrich et al., this
volume) have elaborated on a number of important connections
between metacognition and motivation.
Summary

This section ha s proposed a broad agenda for translating
metacognitive theory into educa tional practice on a broad scale. This
goa l is ambitious. It will take the better part of a decade under the
bes t of circumstances. The success of this research depends in large
part on the ability of theorists, insh'uctional design experts, and
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specialists in educational measurement to carve out a common agenda.
This agenda should accomplish the following: (a) provide operational
definitions of specific metacognitive skills and their relationship to the
student's knowledge base, (b) construct and evaluate a variety of
outcome measures that can be used to assess these skills, (c) crossvalidate these outcome measures so that they can be used collectively to
conduct multidimensional assessment of metacognitive skills, and (d)
train practicing teachers to teach and evaluate metacognitive skills.
Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to provide an overview of salient
measurement issues that are relevant to the study of metacognition.
Although I believe the construct of metacognition is essential to
understanding human cognition, the past two decades of research
and practice have not achieved the lofty goal of presenting a comprehensive theory of metacognition that can be rendered into educational
practice. It is time to take this goal seriously. The Buros Symposium
on Issues in the Measurement of Metacognition was convened for this
specific purpose. The chapters included in this volume have turned
over many rocks, showing us the good, the bad, and the ugly.
Yet although a call to arms is warranted, it would be misleading
to suggest that the field has reached an impasse. As evidenced by the
chapters in this book, researchers agree on many essential points
regarding metacognitive theory and practice. There is substantial
agreement that the related constructs of metacognition and selfregulation have made an enormous contribution to cognitive psychology, literally changing the way that psychologists and educators
view cognition and development. There also is widespread agreement that it is time to shore-up our knowledge of metacognition with
sound measurement practice.
The separate and combined contributions of this volume point us
in the right direction for substantial progress over the next decade.
Metacognition has much to offer teachers and researchers. I believe
the field of metacognition can deliver on its promise of helping
students at all levels understand their thinking and learning.
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Q
questionnaires: 60, 66, 78,84- 86,110,
150

R
r~ading:46,48-52,56,59,61 -64,68-

69, 72-79, 104-106, 108, 110111,116-120,125- 127,132,134,
261-271,276- 278,286-292
reading behaviors : 268, 271, 275
reading comprehension: 49, 59,6162,64- 65,69- 70,72,76,84,88,
152,154,157,159,166,176,191,
196,206- 207,212,228,234,262,
289,298,300,303,314
reading protocols: 271
reading strategies: 270- 271, 275
reciprocal teaching: 32-33
regulation of cognition: 45, 50- 51,
62, 78, 83, 100- 101, 113, 224,
226,302
regulatory control: 298, 310
reinforcement: 201-202, 203
reliability: 104, 109, 111-112, 114,
117,131,134,167,225,234- 235,
266,276,297,302,305- 306,312

s
schoollearning: 151, 153, 159- 160,
166- 167, 175, 183, 185, 209,
215
self-adapted testing: 225- 226, 232,
236,239-245,249-254
self-assessment: 128
self-regulated learning: 43- 90
self-regulation: 7, 13, 44, 47, 50-53,
56- 57,60-61,66,78- 79,81-82,
85-88, 90, 101, 112, 224, 298,
303-306,310,315
self-report: 51, 60, 62, 66- 68, 71, 78,
81, 83- 86, 149- 150, 224, 226,
242,245,267,298,306-308,311312

signal detection theory: 157
situational interest: 160-161, 197199
strategy effectiveness: 121
strategy instruction: 227, 313
strategy knowledge: 2- 8, 10-11,56,
160
strategy revision: 13, 16
strategy selection: 4-5,9,13,16,1819, 29-30, 51, 53, 57, 115, 127,
148
strategy variables: 46

T
task analyses: 7, 16
task monitoring: 298, 310
task specificity: 59, 64, 78, 109
task variables: 46
task vs. ego orientations: 28- 29
test anxiety: 84, 240
think-aloud: 60, 66- 67, 69, 71, 7374, 76-78, 81, 83, 86, 103-104,
116- 118,122,125,134,149,224,
226,262-264,268,270,277,287288, 292, 307, 311
topic interest: 197- 198
training: 76, 148, 208, 230- 231, 299,
303- 304,313

u
utility: 60-61, 66, 76, 85-86, 299, 306307

v
validity: 43- 44, 50, 53- 55, 57- 58,
60-67,69- 70,73-74,76-78,81,
83- 84, 86, 88, 104, 109- 114,
117, 131, 134, 157-158, 225,
236, 243, 266, 269, 287, 297,
300- 301,305-308,311
verbal protocols of reading: 261262,264-266,269,276- 278,286,
289- 292

Subject Index
verbal reports: 74,76,103- 106,109,
111,119,134,149,223-224,232,
253-254,266,268,308
vocabulary: 64, 69, 158-159, 164,
166-169,179,182,184-186,193,
196,204,207,209- 210,212,308
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vocational high school: 172- 173,
183-184,194-195,206
volitional control: 52

